What the Germans could read: the TICOM report, Volume 1, Synopsis (1946)

DOCID: 3560861 “SECRET By Authority of. the Commanding General ARMY SECURITY AGENCY ‘Washington Jeclassified and approved for oursuant to E.0. 12958, 2 3017 EUROPEAN AXIS SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE IN WORLD WAR AS REVEALED BY "TICOM" INVESTIGATIONS AND BY OTHER PRISONER OF WAR INTERROGATIONS AND CAPTURED MATERIAL, PRINCIPALLY GERMAN In Nine Volumes Do NTT, estroy Retunto ha SG NSA-Techn cat Lib *ry when no“longer nooded o-3t 24 Waa vou. -Prepared under the direction of .the be CHIEF, ARMY SECURITY AGENCY pe 1 May 19 oo, a WDGAS~-14 ex — EGE Heh} —

DOCID: 3560861 VOLUME VOLUME VOLUME VOLUME vou V VOLUME VOLUME VOLUME VOLUME oOo OnNnw SYNOPSIS NOTES ON GERMAN HIGH LEVEL CRYPTOGRAPHY AND CRYPTANALYSIS SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY OF THE SUPREME COM- MAND, ARMED FORCES SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF THE ARMY HIGH COMMAND THE GERMAN AIR FORCE SIGNAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE THE FOREIGN OFFICE CRYPTANALYTIC SECTION GOERING'S "RESEARCH" BUREAU MISCELLANEOUS GERMAN TRAFFIC ANALYSIS OF RUSSIAN COMMUNICATIONS

DOCID: 3560861 “VOLUME 1--SYNOPSIS

DOCID: 3560861 VOLUME 1 SYNOPSIS Paragraph Origin of "TICOM"........ ee om ce ever ev seereecsaveseses dL The European fxis eryptanalytic effort against United States communications... .cr.cesccccrceneccsseve 2 Organization of German Signal Intelligence Agencies.... 3 The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command. esevesese*eew eo eos oe eee eevespve ee eateeca oe tae eee tee eeeeve The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Air Force Fig COMMER sx bx 05% 66 Ow 6H OS Ow OREN ORO abe Oe we es The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High COMBAT o6 ia iA OTT RNKIMI TAMURA Te MISS He ROS we ee ws OR The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme COMMENG APNE FOPCEB.. on 0:6 0:20 Wa He 264 we G0 woe Be G8 HE KE HED The German Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section........ Goering's "Research" BDureaeiis sic xe we eu Ke Ke Wy 8K8 £58 OK Oe Ow BO CON HD WwW Collaboration between German Signal Intelligence Agencies in Cryptographic Matters.....ccesccccccseccedl Uvllaboration between German Signal Intelligence Agencies in Cryptanalytic Matters... .csccascenscscvasedd a. Relationships between Forelgn Office Crypt~ analytic Section, Goering's "Research" Bureau, and the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces. Military Agency Relationships~-exchanges of cryptanalytic information. Military Agency Relationships--exchanges of personnel. Military Agency Relationships--cooperation vith regard to IBM and Rapid Anaiytic Machinery. Military Agency Relations).ips-~cooperation with regard to interception. Cooperation between Military and Civilian Agencies on solution of Agents' systems.

DOCID: 3560861 Paragraphs Other Axis (European) Cryptanalytic Agencies.......... 12 a. Italian Cryptanalytic Agencies. b. The Hungarian Cryptanélytic Agency. c. The Austrian Cryptarialytic Agency. ag. The Finnish Oryptans lytic Agency- e. The Bulgarian CGryptanalytic Agency. Liaison betveen German Signal| Intelligence Agencies and other Axis Cryptanalytic Agencies............006 13 &. Liaison with Japan. b. Liaison with Italy. ec. Liaison with Hungary dad. Liaison with Pinland. e. Liaison vith Spain and Bulgaria. Chart summsrizing results of Huropean Axis Crypt- SRALyale. sas ees mineceegen amalWeme@eReRemekimeesmesin l. Origin of "fICOM".-- |The word "TICOM" served as a cover name for & special project and for an organization, the "farget Intelligence Committee." The project, which wag originally eonceived by Colonel George A. Bicher, Director of the Signal Intelligence Division, ETOUSA, in the summer of 1944, aimed at the investigation and possible exploitation of German. cryptologic organizations, operations, installations, and personnel, a8 soon as possible after the impending collapse of the othe support forces. Colonel Bicher elicited and secured the|support of the U. S. Navy and of the British, and eccordingly a joint and combined "Target Intelligence Committee" |vas established in England in October 1944, by the authority of the Chief of Staff, United States Army; the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet; and the Chairman, London Sigint Board.

DOCID: O) 3560861 The Target Intelligence Conmittee oviginally planned airborne operations, even before the German collapse, to seize imrortant German signal intelligence targets, known from Ultra meterlal and prisoner of war interrogations. there were four objectives: &. To learn the extent of the German cryptanalytic 7 effort against England and America; b, Yo prevent the results of such German cryptanalysis agsinst Engiand and America from falling into unauthorized hands as the German Armies retreated; ec. To exploit Gasman eryptologic techniques and in- lentions before they could be destroyed hy the Germans; and d. To uncover items of signal intelligence value in prosecuting the war against Japan. The TICOM mission was of highest importance. American cryptographers did not then know| vith certainty the extent ins«urt’ to which United States coummications vere sécure or seecowe; nor did they know the extent of the enemy's cryptanalytic abilities, strength, and materiel, except by conjecture, by inference Prom Anglo-American cryptanalysis of German syatens and frou prisoner of war| interrogations. German cryptenalytic successes were obviously unpublicized. They were reflected instead in higher| casualty lists and lessened auccess on the part of Allied tactics and strategy. In the Spring of 1945, however, conditions for the proposed operations became rapidly unsatisfactory. The know German signsl intelligence agencles vere dispersing or retreat~ ing to @ther localities in greatest disorder. Pinpoint locations could not be established. The possibility was remote that Anglo-Americsu parachuta units could seize worth- while personnel] and waterial and) hold them through the con- fusion of wajor battles. Therefore, in March, 1945, TICOM decided instead to alert six United States- British target exploitetion teams in England, these teams to be sent into enemy territory as either United) States or British troops overran it, where they were to take over and exploit known or newly discovered targets of signal intelligence interest and to search for other signal intelligence targets and per- sonnel.

—_ ase ae DOCID: 3560861 The first exploitation team was dispatched in April 1945 to the Neumvenster-Flensburg area, and other teas were quickly dispatched to gher sreas as soon as overrun. The Odyssies of the TICOM teams striving to locate and exploit signal intelligence targets during the confused d&ys before and after the German capitulation, make¢ entertaining as vell as instructive reading. They are fully recorded in the TICOM publications) A short summary of these ppenabs. ous is given an Volume 8, Chapter X, of btLhis repo> The results obtained tron these TICOM efforts vere im- pressive. Approximately 4000 separate German documents were esptured.2 This material! yeighed 5 tons. Many crypto-~ graphic devices a&nd machines vere captured. One hundred and ninety six reports, based on interrogation of German signal intelligence personnel, together vith other mis- cellaneous reports and translations were issued by TICOM. The true value of the TICOM effort is not measurable in such statistics. Its importance lies rather in what the TICOM effort revealed to American cryptologists concerning German gignal intelligence, with particular reference to American systems. The TICOM prisoner of war interrogations and captured documents, with the interrogetions conducted by other Anglo-American agencies (notably the Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre,jor "CSDIC"} have given Anglo- American investigators a reasonably complete picture of Gernan signal intelligence. The United States Army Security Agency has obtained from these interrogations and documents information useful in assessing its own cryptanalytic and cryptographic achievements, especially its own development of rapid analytic machinery, the state of its research in cryptography, and the cryptographic security of American systems. 1-Ssee IF 15, IF 40, IF 51, IF 101, IF 165, IF| 166, IF 167, and I-l. 2. “By "document" is meant either one or 4 collection of papers, books, files of correspondence, messages, films, worksheets or other items of intelligence value, to which & TICOM document number vas assigned for convenience in classification and handling.

DOCID: 3560861 2. The Kuropean Axis lcryptanalytic effort against United States communications .~--From TICOM sources it is learned that ®uropean cryptanalysts were unable to read any U. S. Army or pt high-level cryptographic systems. The Army Converter M134C (SIGABA), the Army Teletypewriter Cipher Attachment known as the Converter M-228 (SIGCUM), the Army Teletypevriter Pri- vacy Set (SIGIBS), the Army High Security Teletypewriter Cipher System (SIGTOT), the Army Speech Equipment RC-220-T1 (SIGSALY), the Combined Cipher Machine (CCM), the Navy Electric Cipher Machine Mark III (ECM, identical with SIGABA), and the Navy Teletypevriter Cryptographic. Attachment (C. S. P. 1515, identi- cal with the Army Converter M-228) were completely secure. One Army Strip system (System No. 47 or 67) and one Navy strip system (probably Cc. 3. P. 1404) were read for short intervals until the principle of strip elimination was introduced. The low-grade ciphony device (Speech Equipment AN/GSQ-1, or SIGJTP) vas not read, although theoretical solutions vere worked out. Both of the unenciphered War Derszrtment Telegraph Codes (SIGRIM and SIGARM) vere read by the Germans. Hungary received photostatic copies of War Department Confidential Code Number 2, probably from the Bulgarians, together with at least one set of cipher tables, and the Italians reconstructed subsequent editions of the enciphering tables. The compromise appears to have been shared with other Axis powers, notably Germany, Fin- land and Japan. Military Intelligence Code No. 11 (physically compromised), used by the Military Attache in Cairo, vas read throughout the summer of 1942. The Germans read messages in several versions of the Division Field-Codes._ German cryptanalysts solved from 10 per cent to 30 per cent of intercepted JU. S. Army M-209 messages. Save where keys vere captured, it vas jusually read.too late to be of tacti- cal value. Messages sent by the Army in Slidex, Codex, Bomber Code, Assault Code, |Aircraft Movement Code, Map Coor- Ginate Codes, and Cipher Device M-94 where employed, were read regularly and almost 100 per cent.

DocID: 3560861 Combined Naval Cypher No. 3, used by the U. S. Navy and the Royal Navy for Atlantic Convoy operations, was read almost 100 per cent by the Germans from the end of 1941 through the middle of 1943, The solution of this system was perhaps for the allies the most disastrous signal intelligence success achieved by the Germans. Allied convoy shipping losses suffered during this period were six times as great as during any other comparable period. The Germans engaged in intensive and successful traffic analysis activities against United States Army and Army Air Force radio communications. This included direction-finding, analysis of call sijn and frequency allocation systems, analysis of plain text and operator's chat, as well as more complex operations, such as aireborne radar route tracking, and moni- toring of transmitter zero beat tuning. The U. S. Army Converter M-134A (sicmyc), and the U. 8. Navy Cipher Machine (HCM), furnished by the Navy to the State Lepartment, were not read by the Germans. The State Depart- ment Strip systems O-l and 0-2 were solved, the former probably through @ Compromise, and the latter through cryptanalysis. Several State Department codes, including the Brown Code (un- enciphered) and Code A-1 (enciphered), were compromised and read, probably from 1938 and 1939, respectively. From an intelligence standpoint the results obteined by the German cryptanalytic successes were important, but not decisive. american Army and Navy strategy’ vas secure as long as high level systems were employed. Tactical operations, hovever, Gid suffer. The Anglo-American convoy shipping losses during 1942 and early 1943 were huge, largsiy because of German successes with Combined Naval Cypher No. 3. German traffic analysis and cryptanalysis provided a comprehensive order of battle for the U. S. Army and Army Air Forces in the United Kingdom, in the Mediterranean, and on the continent. According to a German air force officer, "no attack of the Kighth Air Force came as a surprise." The value of the intelli- gence which the Germans got from State Department codes and strip ciphers is not accurately known. The strip systems were probably read too late to be of any great value. The compromise

DOCID: 3560861, f Military Intelligence Code No. 11 did provide intelligence P unguestioned tactical value, particularly in the summer f 1942 during Rommel's advance to Egypt. The German cryptanalytic effort against Russian military communications was even greater than tnat wade against the nited States. The German successes in solution of medium nd low sr&éde English military and naval communications ystems were considerable. The cryptenalysis of the diplo- rel ip) atic comumunications of Italy, Japan, France, Turkey, Bulgaria, reece, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, and other smaller nations Also achiaved important results. A tabulation of the rosults of German and other European is cryotanalysis, country by country, 13 given in Chart 1-2, the end of this Yolume. These results will be discussed aiso n the subsequent volumes on the separate German agencies. 3. Organization of German Signal Intellizence Agencies. ermany possessed six main cryptologic organizations during orld War II, with a total strength, including field untis overhead, of approximately 39,000 persons. taly possess- d tvo main signal intelligence organizations; Finland, Austria, nd Hungary each had one. The grand total of European Axis ersonmnel engaged in signal intelligence in World Var II is stimated as 36,0006. This nuaber is small vhen compared with the numbers ngaged in the Anglo-Awerican effort. Tha grand total of Angio- merican Ssignel intelligence perscinel at the end of the War, neluding &11 aervices and fnecluding field and overhead per- onnel, wes in excess of 60,000 persons. Out of this total, he United States Army employed approximately 28,000 persons. Of the six main German cryptologic organizations, four Vere military, and two vere civilian. The four military organizations were: a. The Signal Intelligence Agancy of the Army High ommand {OEH/GG4NA), which dealt with enemy Army traffic. b. The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High ommsnd {OKW/4SKL TII}, which dealt vith enewy naval traffic. c. The Signol Intelligence Agency of the Air Force High ommand OXL/LN Abt 350), which dealt with enemy Air Force traffic. ad. The Signel Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command ried Forces {OKW/Chi}, which dealt with enemy, nsutral or riendly diplomatic traffic, commercial traffic and news broadcast: MOM me ©

DOCID: 3560861 The two civilian organizations vere: a. The Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section (Pers Z 8) which also dealt wlth diplomatic traffic, eneiy, neutral, ar friendly. >. Goering's "Research" Bureau (FA), a Nazi party agency which also dealt with diplomatic traffic, nevs releases, broadcast monitoring, telephone monitoring, snd other types of comnunicetiona intelligence, enemy, neutral, or friendly. Chert number 1-1 at the end of this volume shows how the Above six B&gencies vere related. Brief descriptions of these agencies and their vork follow. 4, The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command.--~ ‘the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command {Qherkommendo des Heeres, General der Nechrichten Aufklaeriung, ebbreviated OKH/GiNA) was located at Jueterbog, about 60 miles southvest of Berlin. Its mission included cryptanalysis and evaluation of Allied army traffic, any level, whether strategic or operational. It also did a small amount of radio broadcast monitoring. This Agency vas the main unit of the German Army signal ntelligence service in 1945. Other units were: a. Two intercept stations operating directly under the ignal Intelligence Agency, and supplying it wlth intercepts f Allied high-level traffic. bh. Nine field Signal Intelligence Regiments assigned o various Army Groups for the purpose of interception, traffic nalyeis, cryptenalysis, @énd evaluation of Allied Army low- tevel tactical traffic in the Army Group areas. These egiments were independent of the Gentrel Signal Intelligence gency, Dut supplied the latter with intercepts and reports. c. A swall Signal Intelligence Secticn, assigned to he 4rmy Commander in Chief, West, which acted as a coordi- Ating eection for the tyo Signal Intelligence Regiments on the Western front. An estimated total of 12,000 persons vas employed in the Army signal intelligence-effort described above.

DOCID: 3560861 The main successes of the German Army signal intelli- gence organization frow its formation to the end of the var Ltneluded the folloving: a. Eefore 1939 it vas able to establish French, Dutch, ‘and British order of battle. This vas domby cryptanalysis ‘of French codes and Dutch Army double-transposition ciphers, ond through direction-finding and traffic-analysis directed apainst British Army communications systens.2 b. During the 1940 French campaign it established French mobile order of baftle. This waa done oy cryptanalysis of Prench codes('s.neamed)." ce. It established Russian army order of battle and jocation of strategic roserves, from early in the var through 1945. This ves accomplished |through treffic analysis and cryptanalysis of Russian 2, 4, 4, and 5-figure codes {both Army and Teoples Commissariat (NiVD)). 5 d. It gave Rommel intelligence of great operational value during the fighting around Tobrulr. This was done by solving the super-engipherne t of & comprowieed British code (unidentified). e. Information on operettions undertaxen by the Amandosn Army in North Africa, and thereafter through the var, was obtained through solution of Converter M-209 traffic.7 During the fighting in Sicily the Germans captured two wegks after it went into effect, a key list valid for one month and vere enabled thereby to read the system completely for the remaining two veeks.9 On other nets vhen sufficient depth 78; I 26; I 21; 119 Sip 107 3 1135. Germans called this “the British War Office Code. ?x 15%; IF 107; I 60; 1213. Sip 307

DOCID: 3560861 tactical velue.t Information concerning dand, England, Central America, g. Tactical artillory targets, points in France were obtain & Eritish device for protecting This device was used by both Br various yersions of it were sol hours, t h, Solution of traffic pa works in 194. gave evidence tha over Hungerian railroads could 1. Successful cryptanalys traffic of Yugoslav partisans, Russian agents, and the Polish The Signel Intelligence Ag issued three deily reports, Th Command, Navy High Commend, Air Suprems Command, Armed Forces; Elite guard; end probabiy to th 14s 415 127 140 13tp 120 end IF 107 l4tr 107 p38 157 74 8p 126 pO 197 135, 1 75, D 60, I i170, 15 17r 74, 76, I 80, I 109, IF 107 was available, from 10¢20 to 30m24 of M-209 traffic vas read~ able, though moet of the traffic was read tco late to be of U. S. Army activities in Ice- and North Africa, vas obtained by reading the U. S. Army Division Pieid Codea (ufc 15, 16, 17, 21, 25, and 28, anc possioly otners).+~/ iyformation concerning Allied bombing and weether reports, size and location gf Allied units passing Military Police control ed from sclutions of "Slidex," and reports on the operational Low-level traffic. — itish and American forces and ved, usually in from one ta three ssed on Hungarian internal net- & transportatioa of Gepman troops be safely undertaken. Ls was carried out against the Greek partisans, Czech agents, resistance movement.19 ney of the Army High Command se were gent to the Army High Force High Command, and to the to Himmior as shief of the 2 Reich Sccurity Office (RSHA). 8, and others.

DOCID: 3560861 Each of the nine Signal Intelligence Regiments in the field suppiled intelligence directly 'to commanders et Army Group, Army, and Corps levels, looking to them for me uery directives on mis- ations end priorities. They cooperated closely with tne local Alr Force Signals Regiments. The Signal Security Agency of the Army High Command (In- spektion 7/IV, ebbreviated In 7/IV) issued Army Codes and Ciphers until 1944, when this function was taken over by the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Suprome Commend, Armed Forces (OKW/thi). Volume 4+ is a detailed accpunt of the German Army Signal Intelligence Agency, its fisia units, their sctivities, 5. Tho Signo) i:ntelligence Agency of tho Air Force High Command-- fhe Stenst Intelligence Agenc.. of” tie Air Force High Command (Oberkommand. der Luftwaffe, Lu tuechrichton Abteilung 350, abbreviated OKL/LN Abt 550; previously Chi Stelle, O Bah), was the principeal unit of the German Air Force Signal Intelli- gence Service in 1945. Field units vere: es a. Thres autonomous Signal ‘Intelligence Regiments with a total of eight battalions. ®. Five autonomous Signal Intelligence tattalions. Thirteen thousand people, including overhead, were employed in all the above units. The German Air Force Signal Intelligence Service successes egainst the Royal Air Force and the United States Army Air Forces ere outstanding. ‘a. The Service furnished a ‘comprehensive and continuous picture of the battle order and deployment of United States. Army Alr Force end Royal Air Force units in the United Kingdon, n the Mediterranean Theater, and, after D-day, on the continent. This information came mainly from traffic anelysis, radio-telephone monitoring, and monitoring of air-borne radar devices. The Bolution of Royal Air Force 4-figure codes (from March 1940 until 1 November 1942) gave basic gata which was enlarged upon and used until the end of the war. 70, IF 182, IF 175 pig 11,

DOCIL 3560861 b. It gave prompt and accurate werning of United Statea Army Air Force and Royal Air Force heavy bomber missions. This resulted from advanced methods of traffic analysis from radio- telephone monitoring, and from radar monitoring c. It gave Immediate varning to Gorman ground forces and fighter squadrons of tactical operations by Allied ground sup- port aircreft. ad. In comection vith its western front activities, the solution of the Bowber code, Slidex, Syko, and Rekoh (used by the Royal Air Force and,for a'‘short time, by the United {tates Army Air Force), both by capture and cryptanaiysis, was impor- tant throughout the war. The German Air Force Signal Intelilgence Service successes against the Kusslan Air Force were also groat. Its cryptanalysis of Russian Air Forse ground-to-ground 2-figure, 3-figure, and 4~Pigure administrative and opcrational codes, and some 5~Cigure codes, provided a complete order of battle for the Russian Air Forces from 1937 until the end of the war, <A large emount of intelligence on Russien fray battle order was also obtained from a study of alr networks b. Froin partial decipherment of air-ground traffic, from plane-to-ground radi%-telephone monitoring, and from radis- direction finding of bombers when airborne, it was able to give. acieuPehe varnings @ all Russian long-range strategic bombing raids. ec. From cryptanalysis of each Russian Air Army's 2-figure, 3-figure, and 4-figure traffic, from traffic enalysis, from plane- to-plane radio-telephone monitoring, end from radio direction- finding of planes in flight, it was able to warn German ground forces and fighter squadrons of impending operations by Kussian fighters and fighter bombers 21y 70 22 le 182 °21F 175 24, 120 °31p 187 2607 187

DOCID: 3560861 Intelligence from both Western and Russian fronts, in the form of daily, weekly, or monthly reports, was furnished by the Signal Intelligence Agency {OKL/LN Abt 350) to the Air Force High Command and to the local Air Forces (Luftflotten). Daily and monthly reports were also sent to the local Army Signal Intelligence Reginents. Monthly reports were sent to the Army Commander in Chief West, to the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Conmand {OKH/GdNA), to the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command (OKM/4 SKL/III), to the Signal Intelli- gence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi), oo and also to the Air Force Signal Intelligence units in the field.2' Field units, charged with the responsibility for warnings on allied air raids, telephoned their varnings and reports directly to fighter squadrons, anti-aircreft batteries, and the local Gauleiters in charge of civilian air raid yvarnings.2 Group IV of Division II in the Office of the Chief Air Force Signal Officer (Oberkommando der Luftwaffe/Generalnachrichten- fuehrer II, Gruppe IV, abbreviated OKL/Gen Nafue II/IV) issued codes and ciphers for the Air Force. Group IV of Division III (OKL/Gen Nafue III/IV) checked them for cryptographic security. A detailed description of the Signal Intelligence Service of the Air Force is given in Volume 5 of this report. 6. ‘The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command-- The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High senna {Ober- kommendo der Kriegsmarine, 4 Seekriegsleitung III, abbreviated OKM/4 SKL/III) vas responsible ‘for traffic analysis, cryptanalysis, and evaluation of British, American, Russian, French, and Svedish navel traffic. It had a strength of approximately 1,000 persons. It also had operational control over a field organization of approximately 2,500 persons. The field units were as follows: a. Four detachments in Flanders, Brittany, Wilhemshaven and Pomerania engaged in cryptanelysis on low-level systems, interception and direction-finding. Each detachment had a total complement of 200 men, including 100 intercept operators and 10 eryptanalysts. IF 180 p 51 a IF 181

DOCID: cose: b. Eighteen "primary direction-finding stations", whose main duties were interception rather then direction finding. Rach station had a strength of 100, including 60 intercept operators, and 5 cryptanalysts,. Twenty five "secondery direction-~finding stations", whose duties vere direction finding and traffic analysis. Each station had strength of 26 persons. ad. Small detachments vere occasionally set up for special missions, The main successes of the Signal Intelligonce Agency of the Navy High Command (0KM/4 SKL/III) included the folloving; a. In 1939 it was able to establish the war-time organi- zation end disposition of the British Flest, through solution of British Navel Code No. 2, b. In tne spring of 1940 it obtained complete information concerning the progosed British and French Norway expedition ("Operation Stratfoga”) This was done by solution of British Naval Cypher Ho. 4, The German invasion of Norway follaved lumediately. During the subsequent Norvegian campaign, solution of traffic sent in British Naval Cypher No. 4. gave detailed information on Allied counter-measures, such as proposed British lending fields, transport arrival SONG RALOS and the disposition of British and French surface forces. c, Throughout 1942 and pert of 19435 it provided important intelligence on Atlantic convoys by a current (and nearly 100%) solution of Gombined Cypher No. 3 used by British and U. 8. North Atlantic Convoys.41 fhe average wonthly allied sh: pping losses in the Atlantic during this period were approximately six times .he average monthly losses in later periods. Minor successes of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command (OKM/4 SKL/III) included the solution of the Britis! Interdeparimental Cypher?* solution in 1943 of a Royal Alr Force torpedo-bomber BEERS POSE A05 cipher used for practice exercises in the English Channel;?/’ and solution of various minor Navy and Merchant Navy codes and ciphers. 29m 517 P0n_517 enformed jointly with Goering's "Research" Bureau (FA), the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supremo Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi), and with the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Commander in Chief German Air ‘Force (Chi Stelle, OBdL) I 147. 33n 6 DIS DAL Did

DOCID: 3560861 The Neval Slynal Intelligence field units described above carried out direction-finding activities against Allied naval and merchant ships, plotted their positions and movements, and passed the information to local commanders. Detachment Flanders, at Bruges, assisted in the 1942 “escape” of tne pocket battle- ships Scherahorst and Gneisenau when they made their dash from Brest through the English Channel to Kiel. This same detach- mont read Britisn neval traffic to advantage during the Dieppe raid. The Signal Security Agency of the Havy High Command (0KN/4 SKL/II), as opposed to the Signal Intelligence Agency(OKM/4 SKL/ III), issued German naval codes and ciphers, and made cryptogra- phic security studies of these systems, Its exact strength is unknown, The detailed organization and history of the two signal agencies of the Naval High Command (0KM/4 SKL/III and oxm/% SKL/II) are not discussed further in this report. Their use of punch-card book-keeping machinery ("I. B. M."), their security studies, and their chief cryptanalytic methods, hovever, are discussed in Volume 2, 7. ‘The Stpnet Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces<;- The 51 ntelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht, Chiffrierab- teilung, abbreviated OKW/Chi) had three main functions: a. It intercepted, studied, and evaluated diplomatic, military attache, and "egent" traffic. b. It monitored, and evaluated commercial radio traffic and nevs broadcasts. c. It made security studies of the codes and ciphers used by the Suprewe Command, Armed Forces, the Army, “he Air Force and the Navy, and many government departments, vetoing (after 1944) the use of those it deemed insecure. The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) operated at least thirteen radio intercept sta- tions of its own, and received radio traffic from other agencies as well (notably Gooering's "Research" Bureau (FA)). qt also received land-line traffic from sources not stated.? pp 9, PS

DOCID:| 3560861 With the exeepticn of military attache systems, it did not york on snemy Army, Navy or Air Force traffic. Documentary evi- dence as to its cryptanalytic successes is limited. The fol- lowing summary covers its most important known oryptanalytic achievements: a. The most extensive 1939-1944 successes ssem to have been achieved with French systems, The electrical Hegelin Cipher Machine B-211 (adopted by the French now obsolete) vas solved, and limited succéss vas also genteves. in the solution of the Frenen Hagelin Machine BC-38. An important military attache code (ASA trigraph FVD) was solved at the beginning of the war. 36 After 1940 311 Vichy-French systems vere automatically compromised. when filed vith the German Armistice Commission in Wiesbaden. b. At least four Japanese diplomatic codes (including those designated by ASA trigraphs JAE, JAH and JBA) were \solved. In 1955 and 1959 the Agency collaborated with the Cryptenalytic Section of the Foreign Office (Pers ZS) in «4 3gurrent solution @ of daily keys for the Japanese "Red" Machine. c. Precise details on solution of U.S, systems are ‘not available. The agency had compromised copies at least two U.S. State Depsrtment codes, namely "Brown" and "Al". Work vas also done on the U.S. State Department Strip Ciphers O-1 and 0-2, the lead in 0-2 soluyyon being taken by the Foreign Office Gryptenelytic Section. d. Crcatisn Enieme traffic vas solved through mea cee machine wirings .o9 395 45 op 7; 1160 pb 361 51 p 8B 517 3. pid 38, 89 I538 p3; I 92 p2

DOCID: steose: e. Little information is available on successes in solution of English systems. Polish, Turkish, Greek and Latin Amsrican systems were solved extensively. Prior to 1943, appreciable success was achieved in the solution of Rtalian diplomatic codes. During the first half of the year 1944 important de- odes designated as “VN's" (Verlaessliche Nachrichten) otaled 3,000 per month.40 Selected decodes were sent to feld Marshal Keitel, Chief of Armed Forces; to Hitler; and by Keitel to General Jodl, Chief of the Armed Forces Operations Staff. They verse also sent to the Army, Navy and Air Force High Commands,1 and probably to the Signal Intelligence Aganoien of these commands.42 In addition, approximately 45 special reports vere sent each day to special recipients, such as the Field Economic Office, the, Department of Armed Forces prope ganiaas the Western Armies Branch and Joint Intelligence.*5 After 1944 the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces issued cryptographic systems for the Army and interservice communications. One of its most imvortant responsibilities by the end of the war vas the evaluating of the cryptographic systems of other services. A file belonging to Dr. Erich Huettenhain, its chief cryptanalyst, indicated thet cryptographic studies vere made on cipher teleprinters, Enigma machines, specially designed Hagelin machines, small cipher devices and hand systems. 4Opp 9 41s aus, pg 427 13, p 3 op 9pe2

DOCID: 3560861 In connection vith its security commitments, the Si Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces oKw/ Chi) was responsible for the tvo most serious German crypto- graphic mistakes of the var: the continued use in high level German military communications of the plugboard Enigma machine and the teleprinter cipher attachment 8Z 42 in their insecure forms. OKH/Chi rejected the 1943 proposals of the Army Signal Security Agency (IN 7/IV) that the (insecure) SZ 42 be replaced by the cipher teleprinter T52d, a secure device.45 It also frowned on suggestions that the insecure plugboard Enigma be used with pluggable Feriector-uhsels, a change vhich vould have made it secure. mo Approximately S00 persons vere employed in all duties except intercept. Volume 3 of this Report gives a more detailed account if this agency. 8. The German:Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section.~-- The German Foreign Office had tyo cryptologic sections, the. Cryptanalytic Section (Personal Z Sonderdienst des Ausvaertigen Amtes, abbreviated Pers ZS) and the Cryptographic Section {Personal Z Chiffrierdienst des Ausvaertigen Amtes, abbreviated Pers Z Chi). The Cryptanalytic SeOtion of the Foreign Office (Pers Z S) wag the senior German cryptanalytic agency. It was organized in 1919 or before. At its greatest strength it employed approximately 200 persons. Its mission vas the solution of foreign diplomatic codes and ciphers. The Section had one small intercept station at Dahlen. 7 -For the rest of its inter- cept it was dependent upon the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi), Goering’s "Research" Bureau (FA) and the German Postoffice. 45D59, p 17 D 59, p 10; see also I 31 “Tr 90, para 103 48, 22, para 103

DOCID: 4560861 The Cryptenalytic Section achieved its greatest succeases with diplomatic codes, both one-part and two-part, enciphered and unenciphered. &. From 1935 until 1942 it achieved practically 100 ger cent success in the solution of Italian diplomatic codes. b. It read the United States State Department Grey, Brown and A-1 Codes.°-" It also succeeded in solving the American. Diplomatic Strip Ciphers O-1 and 0-2, the former in partial fashion based upon & compromise.51 c. The Section solved tvo British Foreign Office Codes and the British Government Telegraph Codes.52 d. In 1940 success in solution of French diplomatic. codes vas estimated at seventy five per cent.55 e. A number of major Japanese diplomatic codes vere read, and there is sone pyldence that at least one major Chinese system was solved. Y. The Section also solved tyvo machine ciphers. The Japanese Red Machine vas solved in 1938 and read currently until February, 1939.55 The Section collaborated with the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKY/Chi) in this solution, and it is not known whioh agency deserves credit for the original solution.56° In 1941, after @ partial solution by Goering’s "Reseerch” Bureau (FA), the Sviss diplomatic Enigma traffic vas solved.57 Little information is available on the Section's achieve- ments in terms of intelligence. The distribution it gave its decodes is unknown. The Section’s personnel seem to have. thought primarily in terms of cryptanalysis 48 a science, rather than in terms of what their intelligence contribution meant to & successful German diplomacy. 58 The Section seens to have been badly neglected by higher Foreign Office Authorities, both with respect to needed personnel, and with Yegard to interest in its vork. 49y 22, para 25 30, 2e 527 22, para 54; DP 15, p 4, 53 I 89 52p 16,Reports 2, 3, 4 5Ap 54, p 13 S47 22, para. 176 553 22, para 19 567 22, para. 19 5Tp 54, p18 58506 Vol. Vie Ch. 5 19.

DOCID: 3560861 Some of the Section's senior personnel acted in an advisory capacity to the Foreign Office Cryptographic Section (Pers Z Chi).59 The latter section was responsible for the preparation, compilation,distribution and security of Foreign Office codes and ciphers. Few details are available concerning its security studies or its personnel. It was presumably responsible for the use in German diplomatic correspondence of the code systems known as the "Deutsches Satzbuch", the Deutsches &.":zbuch enciphered by"Floradora" (Army Security Agency trigraph GEC), and the "one-time pad"(Army Security Agency trigraph GEE),all of which were read by Anglo-American cryptanalysts.Volume 6 of this paper gives an account of the cryptologic Sections of the German Foreign Office. 9. Goering's "Research" Bureau. Goering’s "Research” Bureau (Reichsluttfahrtministerium Forschungsamt, abbreviated as FA) was formed in 1933. According to Goering,it supplied the new Nazi government with a signal intelligence organization of its own which had "no political axe to grind nor ideology to follow’ 60 In addition to non-military cryptanalysis,the "Research" Bureau had the following functions: a. As a Nazi censorship organization in peace-time it monitored telephone conversations in all large German cities at first only in the Reich but later extending into Austria, Denmark,and"German" Poland.61. It had access to messages sent over all German commercial teletype and telegraph facilities,62 and maintained investigators in all main postal censorship offices .63 b. In war-time it liaised closely in the censorship of all communications as directed first by the Abwehr and later by Himmler's Reich Main Security Office. It is known to have served the latter agency as a cryptanalytic agency for Russian Agent messages.(As no cryptanalytic organization within the Reich Main Security Office is known to TICOM it is probable that the"Research" Bureau filled this function). 64 I 172; I 22 I 143 TF 29; T 240 I 143; IF 15 IF 132 "TF 29; T 240

DOcID 3560861 c. It monitored vorld-yvide radio nevs broadcasts, in particujar the British Broadcasting Company (London) broad- casts. d. It operated six wireless intercept stations of its own, for intercepting foreign diplomatic and commercial traffic. In addition, it exchanged copies of wireless intercepts with the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Arréd Forces (OKW/Chi), the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Navy High Command (OKM/4 SKL/III), and probably vith the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Commander in Chief German Air Force (Chi Stelle OBdL). As can be seen from the functions outlined above, the "Research" Bureau vas not primarily concerned with cryptanalysis. No documentary evidence bearing on its cryptanalytic successes was found by TICOM. Based upon secondary evidence and scattered TICOM interrogations, the bureau's chief cryptanalytic achievements seem to have been as follows: a. In 1941 the agency collaborated with the Cryptanalytic Section of th ae Foreign Office (Pers ZS) in solving the Svias Enigmsa. Personnel from the Bureau claimed to have broken nigun {or Swedish) Hagelin traffic.67 b. According to nevspaper reports, 1938 decodes of French traffic revealed that, lacking English support, the French Government did not intend to oppose the Austrian Anschluss with force. e. In 1938, during the Munich Conference, the "Research" Bureau is said to have solved the British system which carried Chamberlain's messages to London. Hitler once delayed a con- ference yith Chamberlain for several hours in order to get such decodes .69 d. Solution of Russian internal wireless messages revealed bottleneclrs in the Russian military supply system. The dates of this solution ere unknown.70 6517p 132. 667 25; I 54; D 54 Report 8 Srp 138 6917p 130 T0r 25

DOCID: 3560361 The “Research” Bureau circulated its intelligence tn the following forms: a. Decode bulletins were sent regularly to Hitleri, Goering, Field Marshal Keitel and General Jodi of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (0KW), Foreign Minister Ribbentrop, and Admiral Doenitz of the Navy High Command. b. Individual items of current interest, collected items on single subjec:, and consolidated special reports were sent to interested ministries. ec. Special tiaison officers were assigned to the Foreign Office, the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces, the Relch Security Office, the Economic Ministry and Ministry for'War Production, and the Propaganda Ministry. Goeringts "Research" Bureau had over 2,000 personnel Less than one per cent of these were apprehended by TICOM for interrogation. Volume 7 of this report is a detailed account of this agency. 10. Collaboration between German Signal tntelligence Agencies in Cryptographic Matters-- It seems probable. that, prior to 1943, there was some sort of collaboration between the various branches of the German Armed Forces in crypto- graphic matters. The widespread usage of the Enigma machine, the universality of the teleprinter systems used, the alloca- tion of similiar hand cipher systems to army, air force:and police units, all point either to an excellent cooperation in the cryptographic field, or to the existence of some: shadowy interservice agency or higher authority whose re- sponsibliity it was to study, test and recommend the intro- 3G duction of such devices and systems. There is no reference in the TICOM material to such an agency, other than a passing 194% reference to "the biz executive committee," a group which ap- parently had some responsibility for cnyplogranes changes and improvements in a cipher type teleprinter,/ From the headings Tip 135 12) 59, p 6

DOCID: 3560861 on various memos belonging to Dr. Huettenhain (chief crypt- analyst for the Sign®l Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi!), it could be assumed that! the Chief Armed Forces Signal Communications Group (OKW/Chef Ag WNV) acted as a senior military cryptographic authority, approving or disapproving the introduction of various systems, and using the facilities of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) and the army agencies (Inspectorate 7/VI (In 7/VI) and the Army Ordnance Development and Testing Group Signal Branch (Wa Pruef 7)) as its staff or advisory agencies. 73 An order from Field Marshal Keitel, Chief of Staff of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW), dated October 1943, made. the introduction of new ciphers for branches of the Armed Forces contingent upon the agreement of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW), and probably upon the agreement of the Signal ete eae Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces {OKW/Chi).7 In 1944 General Preun, who was both Chief Signal Officer of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/WFSt/Chef WNV) and the Chief Signal Officer of the Army (OKH/Chef HNW), made; the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) a central clearing house for all German cipher development and security scrutiny work. This was easily done vith reference to the Army. On September 5, 1944, General Praun signed an order directing that the cryptographic develop- ment and testing functions of the Army be turned over to the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi}. Personnel from the Army Security Agency (In 7/IV), 73, 59 various letters and memos. From the headings of crypto- graphic manusis, it could be assumed that Ag WNV/Fu I, as issuing authority, was responsible until 1944, when OKW/Chi apparently replaced it. See OKW/Ag WiV/Fu I "Schluesselan- leit zum RS 44" dated March 27, 1944 and OKW/Chef WFSt/ Ag WNV/Chi "Rasterersatzverfahren” of Dec. 7, 1944, TF 31 and TF 52 respectively. Tp 68, p 11; D 57 p 14

pocrp} 3560861 including Technician Dr. Fricke, and the personnel of In- spectorate 7/VI (In 7/VI) who were engaged in cryptographic vork, vere transferred into the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi)./5 Thereafter, while the actual production of keys vas left as an Army re- aponsibility, the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) devised the oipher systems and provided the material for Army key production.7 With the Navy and the Air Force the picture vas somevhat different. They vere permitted to continue their cryptographic development work, and retained the right to say which of their systems was to be used in what place--so long as the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (0KW/ Chi) concurred from a security standpoint in the original introduction of the systems. As Admiral Kraus® of the rt} Intelligence Agency of the Naval High Command (0KM/4 SKL/III) pointed out, "OKW/Chi recommendations could only lay down the (security) limits within which it vas possible to use a systen." The responsibility for whether and where a Navy. system was to be used lay with the Navy.77 With regard to ciphers used by the Waffen 88, the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (0KW/ Chi) had consultative povers only. While General Gimmler, successor to General Praun as Chief Signal Officer, publicly gparkcbersgen the cooperation betveen the two services as "perfect}75 Col Mettig, chief of the cryptographic division in OKW/Chi, indicated that an effective supervision vas never introduced. 79 139 68p3_ T8y 55, (43) TTD 68, p 14 78 68, p13 794 96, p 19

DOCID: 3560861 The preeminence of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) in cryptographic matters and security was apparently of feet Ey with the military services. In his speech of Beeests 1944, General Gimmler pointed out that primacy in the civilian field was dependent upon voluntary concurrence from the agencies affected. He could only plead that "OKW was pre- pared to t&ke the lead in this matter, providing that the: Party and State concurred" and requested that "the Party and Reichs authorities" cooperate. 80 Goering} "Research" Bureau {FA) developed its own codes and ciphers,® although the Bureau oe use cipher teleprinters adopted by the military services.S2 Evidence is available that in 1945 administrative hand ciphers {Behoerdenhandschluessel) vere 1asued to Senior Specialist Wenzel of the "Research" Bureau (FA).[2 A similiar situation prevailed with the German Foreign Office. The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Ch1) was never si ioue to know the details of the ciphers used’by the Foreign Office.S4 ‘The Foreign Office, hovever, did use cipher teleprinters and Enigma machines.35 ll. Collaboration betveen German Signal Intelligence Agencies in “Cryptanalytic Matters.-- The collaboration betveen Agencies in cryptanalytic matters varied. In general relation- ship betveen Goering's "Research" Bureau (FA) and the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) vere not overly cordial. The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Naval High Command (OKM/4 SKL/III) maintained a traditiona2d 80, 68 p 14 Blip 342 I 25, page 9 83e ayo "I 31, page 15 851 22, para 115

DOCID: 3560861 navy reserve in dealing with other agencies. There was no high- level signal intelligence coordination, and there was frequent overlapping and duplication of effort betveen the agencies dealing with diplomatic cryptanalysis. But, with the exceptions noted above, there seems to have been 4s much liaison and as much cooperation @s vere necessary. This was especially true in the case of the military field organizations, the Army Signal Intelligence Regiments ("KONAs") and their Air Force equivalents, the Air Signal Regiments (LN Rets). a. Relationships betveen Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section, Goering's “Research” Bureau, and the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces. the Cryptanalytic Section of the Foreign Office (Pers Z 8) enjoyed reasonably good vorking relationships with both Goering's "Research" Bureau (FA) and the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi). As stated, hovever, the re- lationships betyveen the latter tyvo agencies do not appear to have been cordial. The Foreign Office (Pers Z S) received the bulk of its intercept from Goering's "Research" Bureau {FA) and the Signal Intel} sgence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (0KW/ Chi).©2 It received numerous compromised codebooks and keys from both agencies.87 Cooperative attacks on difficult problems were not uncommon. In the case of an unspecified U. &. Strip System, the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) vorked on the point-to- point traffic, while the Foreign Office (Pers Z 8) worked on the circular traffic, 35 with a complete exchange of results. In the case of the Japanese Red machine, the Foreign Office (Pers Z 8) attempted to solve messages sent on even days, while the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces {OKW/Chi) attempted to solve messages sent on odd days, a "practical arrangement" reached also between the U. 8. Arny and the U. 8. Navy prior to the Pearl Harbor disaster. Results 86, 22, para 103 T2038; D16, pages 3, 5; DF 15, pages 4, 5 I 32, page 10

DOCID: 3560861 vere exchanged.39 Goering's "Research" Bureau (FA) and the Foreign Office Cryptanalytic Section {Pers Z 8) cooperated on the solution of the Suiss Enigma.90 Exchange of code group identifications, additives and enclphering keys between these two agencies vere egauents especially on English, Italian and Vaticen systems.91 Personnel vere exchanged betveen the Forelga Office Cryptanalytic Section {Pers Z 8) and the Signal Intel }igence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/ Chi}. Goering's "Research" Bureau (FA) vas formed by a small group of cryptanalysts who left the Cipher Department of -tha Reich Defense Ministry (Reichswehruinisterium), the pre- decessor agency of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (oxw/chi). This defegtion may account for the bad feeling between the tvo agencites.9? There are no known examples of diract cryptanalytic exchanges between the tuo agencies, nor vere there subsequent exchanges of personnel. -Goering's "Research" Bureau (FA) vas not given access to the special cryptanalytic machinery developed by the Si 1 Intelli- gence Agency of the Supreme Armed Forces (OKW/Chi), although this machinery was made available to other Agencies. Relation- ships could probably have been improved had not Goering's "Research" Bureau (FA) sought to take over the Signal Intelli- gence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi).95 897 31, para 53 90, 54, page 18 91536, pages 1, 2; 1172, paras. 11, 13, 14; Teese, various report: 927 22, paras. 20, 84 937 21, p 1; 1131, p3 Soe 9 p35 aay 131; p3; 78 p 4

DOCID: 3560861 With reference to the exchange of traffic, however, collaboration was apparently complete. It is known that in early 1944 approximately one third of the intercept received by the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed forces (OKW/Chi) came frow Goering's "Research" Bureau (PA).96 The latter always received copies of all the traffic intercepted by Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) stations.97 b. Military Agency Relationships-- exch f tana lytic information. GoViaboration between the eas Sipaet intelligence Sgencies (OKH/GdNA and its predecessors, In 7/NVI and HLS Osi} and the Signsl Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) was excellent. ‘The Chief Signal Officer of the Suprese Commend Armed Forces {OKW/Chef WNV) was also the Chief Signs] Officer of the Army (OKH/Chef HNW)9 However, since the Supreme Command agency's commitment was diplomatic and willitary atteche treffic, no broad basis for eryptanalytic liaison existed. The Army and Air Force Signsi Intelligence Agencies maintained permanent liaison on English Naval and Air systems (SYKO, M209).99 In 1943 the Army Agency {OKH/In 7/VI) had discovered how to recover true M-20¢ settings from relative settings, and they had passed the technique on to the Navy and Air Force agencies.190 According to Senior Specialist Tranow of the Naval Agency, hovever, the Army-Navy cooperation was given up in early 1944 siuse "no results of value were ob-- tained."101 In 1943 the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed FYorces Come (cht the Cryptanalytic Section of the German Foreign Office (Pers Z 8), and the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Commander in Chief German Air Forces (Chi-Stelle OBdL) collaborated on solution of an unidentified US strip system. 102 96pF 9, p 3 Sry 108 991 93, p 3, 4 100 14h, p 2 101; 93, p 3 102n69 5

DOCID: pie. a260S51 The Apag-Navy- Air Force field collaboration was usually excellent. 10 It embraced on occasion exchange of personnel and equipment, a complete exchange of reports, and a close oryptanalytic liaison on operative systems, 104 Eastern front reports show a detailed operational collaboration between Air Force Signal Regiment 357 (LN Regt 353), the Army Signal Intelligence Regiment 1, (KONA 1), and the Naval units dealing with Russian Black Sea Fleet traffic.+05 Army Signal Intelli- gence Regiment 5 (KONA 5) worked closely with the Air Force inkeliigence organizations in the West (at Paris and Noisy). ‘During the period 1940-1942 the Signal Intelligence Agencies of the Navy (OKM/4 SKL III) and the Air Forces {Chi- Stelle OBdL), and the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Sup- reme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi), and also Goering's “Research” Bureau (FA), a11 collaborated on solution of the English Interdepartmental Cipher.107 There was "Research" Bureau (FA)-Neval (OKM/4 SKL/III) cooperation on the solution of the British Goyernment Telegraph Code (South Africa) and Bentley's Code.l105 The Army Agency, Inspectorate 7/VI (In 7/ VI) actually worked on Turkish diplomatic traffic, by agree- ment with Goering's "Research" BureaulJ9 and had Army Signal Intelligence Regiment 4 (KONA 4) intercept this traffic for them. This work probably duplicated efforts of the Signal Intelligence Agency of ihe Supreme Comrand Armed Forces (OKW/ Chi) however. 103 I 26, p 2 10453 M-o4, M-209, Slidex, Russian codes, etc. 1057 130, p 15 1067 113, p 8 O7r 93, p 4; I 147, p 12, 12 108; 95, p53 10977 196, p 8

DOCID: 3560861 Military Agency Relationships--exchange of personnel.-- In 1942 Prof. Nowopeschenny of the Signal Tate’ ti pense Agency wf the Supreme Commend Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) and a group of his eryptanalysts were transferred to Intercept Control Station Rast (HLS), one of the predecessors of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command (OKH/GdNA) for work on the main Russian army five-figure code.110 At one time the Naval commander in the Aegean area placed his radar intercept personnel and equipment under the command of Air Signal Regiment (LN Rgt) 352.111 on one occasion personnel from Air Signal Regiment (LN Ret) 3545 went aboard the cruiser "Prinz Eugen” to wonitor traffic froa the Air Arm of the Russian Baltic Fleet.112 In the spring of 1942 the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Naval High Command (OKM/4 SKL III) exchanged personnel with the Apty and Air Force in order to get trained Hollerith operators.215 ny 1939 Dr. Huettenhain of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces {OKw/Chi) wes detailed tg jhe Army agency to work on solution of French military systems, +1 a. MLlit ney Relationships--Cooperation with regard to IBM a api {io Machinery.-- ‘The Army Signal Security Agency (inspektion V Spbreyizted Ia 7/IV) pioneered in the use of IBM tHollerith) equipment. Its installations were set up in the winter of 1939 end 1940, and later transferred to Army Inspectorate 7/VI (In 7/VI),one of the predecessors of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command (OKH/GdNA) 12 110,, 123 p 3 aa, 126 p i4 112, 163 p 3 75 146 p i7 114 D60 p 4, 5 115

DOCID: 3560861 In March, 1942, representatives of Goering's "Research" Bureau (FA), and of the Signal Intelligence Agencies of the Commander in Chief Air Forces {Chi Stelle OBGL) and the Navy High Command (0KM/4 SKL/III) visited the Army installations and obtained valuable information as to the possibilities of IBM in cryptanalysis.116 The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) never owned its own Hollerith machinery and used the Army installations.117 In 1944 the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Suprewe Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi) developed a number of “decoding devices, some of which were handed over to the Army, Navy and Foreign Office agencies.118 ‘ne Digraph Weight Recorder {Bigrammsuchgeraet) was made available to the German Weather Service (WENUEB).119 e. Military Agency Relationships--300 ration with regard to interception.~- Goering's Kobeanen” Bureau (FA) occasionally furnished the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Coumander in Chief of the Air Force (Chi Stelle, OBdL) with ao traffic.420 The amount of this traffic is not known. Goering's “Research” Bureau (FA) also passed some intercepted commercial traffic of naval interest to the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Naval High Command (OXM/4 SKL/III).221 ‘The German Navy passed its weather intercept to the Air Force, who had sone intepgervice responsibility for the solution of weather traffic. On operational fronts, when army search receivers found air forse frequen ies, information concerning these frequencies was qygpited to the appropriate air force field intercept units. The Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Ch4 controlled a naval direction finding station in Spain.12 116) 146, p 17 1177 67, p 2, 3 1185p 9, p 3 119; 32, p 4 120; 29, p 3 121; 95, p 12, 18 1227 93, p 4 1237 130, p 15 1241 96, p7 SRE

DOCID: 3560861 f. Cooperation between Military and Civilian Agencies on solution of Agents' systems.-- The extensive German effort against agent-vartisan systems warrants separate discussion. This effort was shared by at least three organizations, and perhaps a fourth. The organizations were: the Signal Intelli- gence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces {OKW/Chi), Army Inspectorate 7/VI (OKH/In 7/V1), perhaps Goering's "Research" Bureau (FA), and a small organization which did little or no cryptanalysis, the Radio Defense Corps of the Supreme Command Armed Forces {OKW/WNV/FU III). The relation-~ ship between these agencies illustrates collaboration in both intercept and cryptanalysis, and an allocation of primary responsibility which varied from problem to problem. At the beginning of the war, responsibility for monitoring clandestine transmissions in Germany and the occupied terri- tories was borne by the Radio Defense Corps {OKW /FU III}.125 In the spring of 1942 the Radio Defense Corps pressed for the establishment of its own cryptanalytic section. Neither the Army nor the Supreme Command signal intelligence agencies were anxious to see the establishment of a new cryptanalytic agency for agent traffic. Accordingly, a section for cryptanalysis on agent transmissions was established in the Army Inspectorate TAVI (In 7AVI).126 This section was known (from its chief) as "Referat Vauck". Originally located in Berlin, Referat Vauck moved in the fall of 1943 with the Redio Defense Corps (FU III) to Dorf Zinna, near Jueterbog. It was transferred in the fall of 1944 from Inspectorate Tit {In 7/VI} to the newly formed Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command (OKH/GdNA) and was transferred again in early 1945 to the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command Armed Forces (OKW/Chi/Gr. IV). Both these latter changes were administrative only, since the section remained with the Radio Defense Corps at Jueterbog.127 1257 115, p 2 1267 415, para 15 1277 115, paras 12, 31

DOCID: 3560861 Refsrat Vauck dic not enjoy a monopoly on agent crypt- analysis. Most of its and the Redio Defense Corps! (FU III) effort was concentrated on western agent networks (France, Belgium). In the eastern and Balkan theaters, other agencies ee tne bulk of agent intercept and cryptanalysis, as ollovws: (1) Russian Partisan Traffic-- The work done by Referat Vauck on this problem covered only the period mid-1942 to mid-1943. Its work was then taken over by a section under Lt. Schubert of Army Signal Intelligence Regiment (KONa) 6,228 Schubert was ultimately transZerred to the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Army High Command (OKE/GdNA), where he took: over "eastern" cryptanalysis on the NkVD-partisan networks ,229 (2) Yugoslav systems~- Most of the interception and cryptanalysis on Yugoslav systems ws done, not by the Radio Defense Corps (FU III), but by a special detachment of Army Signal Intelligence Regiment (KONA) 4, stationed in Belgrade.}” Cryptanalytic work on the more difficult Balkan systems was done in Berlin by Balkan Section (Referat Bailovic) of Army Inspectorate 7/VI (In 7/VI), ype thus complemented the activities of Referat Vauck.+ (3) Polish Resistance Movement Systems-- In 1943 Referat Vauck solved the principal system used by the Polish Government in Exile aah for communication with the Polish Resistance Movement (Warsaw). So important was this traffic that, in the fall of 1945, eight members of Vauck's Section were transferred to the Polish Section in the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Gonmmand Armed Forces (OKWw/Chi, Gr. es The intercept work done by the Rizdio Defense Corps (FU III) was augmented -by the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme (gymand Armed Forses: (OKW/Ghi} and assist-nce was given by Army Inspectorate 7/VI (In TANI). intercept station at Lauf, 1287 115, pT 1297 26, pl 4507 115, p8 1327 115, pg