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DOCUMENT FILE · 9 January 1964

The CIA's Tibet program reviewed for the Special Group (January 1964)

A three-page CIA paper that put a price on the Tibet program for fiscal 1964: $1,735,000 for guerrillas in Nepal, a subsidy to the Dalai Lama, a Colorado training camp and Tibet Houses abroad.

Declassified 1964

From the document

The purpose of the program at this stage is to keep the political concept of an autonomous Tibet alive within Tibet and among foreign nations, principally India, and to build a capability for resistance against possible political developments inside Communist China.

Paragraph 1, Summary · ✓ verified against FRUS

This included bringing 133 Tibetans to the United States for training in political, propaganda and paramilitary techniques

Paragraph 3, Background and Objectives · ✓ verified against FRUS

The Tibet Houses are intended to serve as unofficial representation for the Dalai Lama to maintain the concept of a separate Tibetan political identity.

Paragraph 3, Background and Objectives · ✓ verified against FRUS

Nonetheless, this program will continue to require fairly large expenditures over a long period of time to keep the possibility of a non-Communist government alive to the Tibetan people.

Paragraph 5, Recommendations · ✓ verified against FRUS

Excerpts are passages from a US government work (public domain), quoted exactly and checked against the text on history.state.gov on every rebuild.

By the end of 1963 the CIA's Tibet program, begun in the late 1950s, had changed character. The great revolt of 1959 was over, the Dalai Lama was in exile in India, and what remained was a guerrilla force on the Nepal–Tibet border and a growing political effort among the exiles. On 13 December 1963 the Special Group, the White House committee that reviewed covert operations, approved its continuation. This paper, dated 9 January 1964, answered the next question: what was the money for1. The operation is described on this site as ST CIRCUS.

What it says

The summary defines the program as political action, propaganda and paramilitary activity, with a modest purpose: to keep the idea of an autonomous Tibet alive and to build a capacity for resistance "against possible political developments" in China1. The background section recalls the force of about 2,000 men on the Nepal border, 800 of them armed by an airdrop in January 1961, and lists what had been added in 1963: training in the United States for 133 Tibetans, continued subsidy to the Dalai Lama's household at Dharmsala, continued support to the guerrillas in Nepal, and the move of some unarmed guerrillas to India for further training1.

Plans for 1964 included some 20 single resident agents inside Tibet, two road-watch teams to report Chinese build-ups, and six border-watch radio teams. To meet the exiles' shortage of trained administrators the CIA would educate 20 young Tibetan officials, with Cornell University tentatively agreeing to host them under a committee of prominent Americans. Tibet Houses in New York, Geneva and a third city withheld in the printed text would act as unofficial missions for the Dalai Lama1.

The paper's heart is a budget for fiscal 1964 totaling $1,735,000. The largest items are $500,000 for 2,100 guerrillas based in Nepal, $400,000 for the "covert training site in Colorado," $185,000 for "black" flights carrying trainees from Colorado to India, and $180,000 as a subsidy to the Dalai Lama1. The training site is not named; other accounts identify it as Camp Hale, near Leadville4. The CIA expected costs not to rise and recommended that the program continue1.

What happened next

The source note in Foreign Relations records that the Special Group discussed the paper on 13 February and approved it on 20 February 19641. A 1968 status report to the 303 Committee, the Special Group's successor, was gloomier: no radio teams were left inside Tibet, the singleton agent network had not developed, and Chinese control was "as pervasive as ever"2. In January 1971 the CIA told the 40 Committee that the non-guerrilla budget had been cut from over $500,000 a year to $363,0003.

How to read it

The memorandum is an agency's case to its overseers for money, and it describes plans more than results. It was printed in 1998 from the State Department's Special Group files, with more than a dozen deletions, several of them a line or more long; the withheld passages appear to concern the program's foreign partners and bases1.

Sources

  1. FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China, Document 337 (Memorandum for the Special Group, 9 January 1964), US Department of State, Office of the Historian (1998).
  2. FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China, Document 342 (Memorandum for the 303 Committee, 26 January 1968), US Department of State, Office of the Historian (1998).
  3. FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 278 (Memorandum for the 40 Committee, 11 January 1971), US Department of State, Office of the Historian.
  4. Wikipedia CIA Tibetan program, Wikipedia.