Hoover tells the White House about Gouzenko (September 1945)

13. Hoover to Matthew Connelly, 12 September 1945. ALT SP Py S48 JOHN EDGAR HOOVER DIRECTOR Federal Bureau of Irmestigation United States Bepartment of Justice Bashington, B. C. ROP -pnenee September 12, 1945 Honorable Matthew Connelly Secretary to the President ILD SOY The White House Washington, D. C. NET 2I-5 Dear Mr. Connelly: (Far Wane 9-26-80) The Royal Canadian Mounted Police have advised that they have obtained positive information through a former employee of the Soviet Military Atteche at Ottawa, Canada, that the Soviets have an extensive espionage network in Canada. The Soviets have made the obtaining of complete information regarding the atomic bomb the Number One project of Soviet espionage and these data must be obtained before the end of this year. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police re- port that there is considerable loose talk in the Office of the Soviet Military Attache in Ottawa regarding the “next war” which the Soviet Union will have with the Anglo-American nations. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police received from the sane source information that an assistant to an Assistant Secretary of State under Mr. Stettinius, was a paid Soviet spy. This man's name, or nickname, is unknown at the present time but further inquiry is vdeing made by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police in an effort to obtain further identifying data. No information regarding this situation is being furnished to the State Department in the absence of further identifying data. With regard to the atomic bomb project, Dr. Allen May, a British scientist assigned to the McGill University Laboratory in Canada, has deen identified as a paid Soviet spy of long standing. May spent some time during September, 1944, at the Metallurgical Laboratory of the University of Chicago, working on the separation process for uranium and is well informed as to the methods of setting up uranium piles or lattices. Nee

13. (Continued) “av is reported to have furnished the Soviets in Ottawa with a small quantity of U233 which is one of the isotopes of uranius and this specimen was flown directly to iloscox. Lume au.urmation regarding liay has been furnished by the Federal Bureau of Investigation to Major General Leslie Groves, head of the Lianhattan Engineering District project. It has also been Aefinitely determined by the Royal Canadian Younted Police that Dr. Kay, in the first part. cf July, 1945, advised the u!fice of the Uilitary Attache in Vitawa, that the United States Navy wag using radar-controlled projectiles against Japanese suicide planes and thst the tubes and batteries within the projectile were finished with a special clastic protective device against the shock of firing, which the Americen authorities have not furnished to the British. This latter information has been called to the attention of the Office of Naval tntelligence. The Canadian situation is being followed closely and amy additional information will be brought to the attention of the President and you. \iith assurances of my highest esteem and best regards, Sincerely yours,

14. Hoover to Frederick B. Lyon, 24 September 1945. og ENGAK es HOOVER "DIRECTOR ¥ederal Bureau of Juuesiigation Linited States Department of Justice Washington, B. C. "My NPOP “SECRET BY Sprorau September 24, 1945 Chief Civision of Foreig Activity Correlation State Department Washington, D.C. John Edgar Hoover Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Subdgect: SOVIET ESPICUAGE ACTIVITY Reference is made to my memorandum of September 18, 1945. addi- ticnal information has been obtained by a Sureai representative from Igor Gazenko as follows: iS aeTEpNAPTONAE ORGANIZATION OM Ae Gunenko stated that all intelligence ectivities cutside the Soviet WN ra Union and inside the Soviet. Unicn are coordinated by G. Malensov, a meter, of the Politicel Bureau of the Ail Union Commmist Party oz Bolsheviks, a monber of the Central Committee of the same orgenization end the man mo is mentioned by many ‘Soviet officials as Steiin's successor. Malenkov,. according .to Guzen anxo, is actually the head of all intelligence. activity, anc “ilitary “Intelligence, Naval Intelligence, the NAVD arid the political apparatus are ali ul ~tinately. Fesponsidle bin. om “Malenioy.4 z5. the actual head. of the ‘political 28 paratu s in foreim on countries and: 411 commnications, reports, et cetera, from ‘he: rolitical “Secretary in sny Babassy are sent directly to ialenkov and not to kolotoy or LUN anyipersen in the Peoples Commissariat of foreign 4iiairs. aN Ae ikewise, no commmication from the Military or Naval Attaches in o> any! Emoassy woule go to Molotov. Such communications go to the Chief of <7-7-Esplonage for the area covering the particular Embassy. yY In the same way, ‘the Embassy Secretary who represents the NKVD does QW not sand any correspondence to the Peoples. Commissariat of Foreign Affairs... %y according to Gizenko, the only person in the Emboessy who ould be corresponding with the Peoples Commissariat of Foreig Affaira would be. NA the Ambassador’ hizself, who in every instance is only a front, and possibly one or two men close +o the Ambassador who are called Sinnocents.tt \s ‘DecuasguPiab BE SPALCL IS

(Continued) Guzenke strassed shat and economic vatters ative auc the itdlitary or idly oe of interest to the salted or advised with regard val attaches. sassad or. ccorcing to Guzenko, he has neard discussions in the Saviet Eebassy 2 indicating ahnat the presert systen of super asing tae activi ti es of assy is mach more e efficient ans mach mor e effectiy ve “than the ole rsome Comintern setzp.. Inder the present organization, the directive, ed sy Halenkov throuch the Embassies to the Parties throughout the sorta are math more direct end tnere is less nossibilitr of nisinterpretation. The man in tne Sxbassy in Canada whe handles political matters is Gous2rov, the Third Secretary, vno has his am cryptograrher, one Petony, who also acts 2s a door guard the Embassy. The aforementioned system is knowm to Cuzenko to be in operation in the United St aves, Canada and iexico and possioly in the otner Viestern Panisphere countries. It is also in effect in Great Britain, to ais cersonal knowledge. He celieves. that this system is likewise in effect in all other countries in the world where the Soviets have diplomatic establishments, althcuzh there are variations far these countries occured che ned Army. +h, states agents, size such rapoarts e2cy In we These esnionage agents are to oe sent from Buropean countries. These would number between 50% to tne rank of Ambassador and would actually te Soviet ance, NKVYD or Comintern men. Guzenko pointed out that Iieutenant Kulakov had told hin that one of his, Kulekov's, best friends is en officer in the MKD... This EXYD officer is

4, (Continued) é Lubdl in-Polish Embassy in Wosecy. Xulakov's friend to work’ and it is apvarently standirs joke in Moscow the Polish code rooz. Guzenko, another UYVD man who is 9 close friend of Marshal Tito's personal cipher clerk in Yuvoslavia. nis cipher clerk is almost worked tc death because Tito Senas 5 Ressages to escow asking for instructions and advice on the most minor Guzerkxo stated that Soviet Intelligente had good coveraze av the present time in the Czech Osbassies and he knows from reading dispatches that litary Attache wio is being assigned to tre Czech Legation in Ottawa is riet espionage agent. This individual had expected to be anrcinted Adiutefht to the Chief of the Czech General Staff, but the Soviets decided that he snould go to Canada in the immediate future as Military Atteche, considering this to be an egnally important post. Guzenko stated that in Washington, D. C. the Czech Military Attache is viet spy named Hess. It seexs that Colonel Zatotin, the Soviet ili tery che “in Ottawa, made a trip to Washington shortly after his arrival in teva and sent a cable to ‘ioscom telling them taat he nad met Hess, who seemad 2 sympavhetic and that Zabotin felt that he cozid be developed. Moscow isdiately cabled back that Zabdotin should stey away fron Hess because he already being operated as a spy by Ceneral Sarazev, Soviet “ilitary sttache i Shington,. asked vaat the attitude in the sco Conference and-the otner™ torards (5286S 5 “and Bu asia: played: “leading roles. Bolsheviks, waic is*newa in the ‘such matters. They ware likewise. (Young Communist League), which is at and there was also considerable loose talk in the Bmbassy itself... Fron ncicents, mzenko understood that the Soviets cons! tered all such con- as merely “talk fests” which served only to conceal from the Anglo- powers and from the rest of the world tre actual plans of the Soviets. nz of a material nature waich could be gained by tne Soviets thrmgh nferences was, of course, all to the good and would not have to be gained e of arms.

14. (Continued) that he nad been told that the Soviet Union's budget for war, ish vould include intelligence activities, apzropriations for the Red amy sa Navy and for war production, would be greater during the coming year, ostensibiy 2 reer of pease, taan it had been last yeer during a year fohdl actual warfare. He furtr Stated trat he nad been informed that tt Soviet Union 2s not converting its facteries to consumer goods production, such as tne United States and Canada had ann rounces those countries were doing, but, on the other nerd, tne Soviets were increasing their wer notential by setting up additional. piants devoted solely to war production in Siberia, He stated that he was in- formed that the Soviets would continue to increase their industrial production for war and would ootain consumer socds from factories in the satellite States ef Eastern Europe and threugh purchases in the Western Hemisphere Gazenko stated that the Soviets before the use of the atomic bomb were aiident that within ten years their military potential would enable then to conquer the world, Since the atomic bomb has been used by the United States, ‘ther have set their calendar ahead and nave instructed all espionage agents to make the obtaining of tae complete constraction plans of the bond itself the No. 1 espionage project. They have issued instructions that this information snould be obtained by the. end of tris yer, 1245. Guzenko stated that ‘the last message received 4t the Exbass; from Hoscow tefore he left on September 5, 1945, was stressing the necessity for obtaining the atomic boro before the end of tais tear. their calender that he was merely tel rv. vt nion ‘is ais “wisi SWIST 77 [Pe sel F SOVIRT AGENT fully regarding ts possible Guzenko was questioned care idgentity of tae ridual in the Department of State under Stettinius wro is 2 Soviet spy. cugen tated he did not know the man's name but that ke had been told that ana rant to _Stettinius was @ Soviet spy. This information came to him in. After the arrival of Kulakey in Ottawa in the Summer of 1945, Keletov aml Ccuzenko got into a discussion on the agencies of the Canadian organization 2S co. ed to the United States organization. Guzenko was bearing in mind the

14. (Continued) MIO TH 2e Soviet inspectors crith regard to the Averica axov informed Guzenko that altnoush the Canadian. ion was closely knit and well operated and most productive, that ere, of course, more azents in the United States ard that he had learned an Assistant of Stettinins, then the United States Secretary of Soviet spy. Guzenko pointed ous that this information so-ig i to Kulskov's attention prior to Hay 17, 1945, because ov left Uoscon for tne United States and Canada on that date. He Stated that .ne did not ask for the naze of this individuel because Hulabor would have suspected his motives, since it involved an individel tho was not beins min uy Qolonel Tat mi sdotin, Guzenko pointed out that tne Soviets were frantic to ottain the Secrets of the atomic bomb and that an incident had been reported in the Eress recently anich apreared to him to have been inspired by a Soviat azent. Soviet agent might not necessarily be the same one to whom Xula\or referred tit on the other hand, it had all the earmarks of the tecaniaue used ‘by Sovrist Political espionage azents. Ha referred specifically to the anncuncenent nade in London by Stettinius that the atomic bomb should be turned over to the ecurity Council of the Inited Nations. Guzmko Suggested the Burean ould determine who Suggested to Stettinius that this Staten the res gnt be able to idgentify a ‘Soviet agent, if not the besiamius referred to by Fulakov,