The CIA Inspector General's report on plots to kill Castro (1967)

oa tonts10101 MATERLAL REVIEWED AT CLA HEADQUAITPERS BY HOUSE SELECT CONALTLIRE ON ASSASSINATIONS STAFF MEMBERS FILE TITLE/NUMBER/VOLUME: 1977 IG Report Spel PNG (unsanitized) AH, INCLUSIVE DATES: REFS CUSTODIAL UNIT/LOCATION: PCS /LOC ist See Se itah Rvs ROOM: 2D il DELETIONS, IF ANY: DATE [DATE RECEIVED RETURNED REVIEWED BY (PRINT NAME) SIGNATURE OF REVIEWE 16 Sen 78 ‘{acDONALD Burst LIB. PE FER Be itaZp.. is REE” 37 geF-78T: xc ED _LoOfr2— Tent ee et 6 Deere BETSY (AlLMOR Der EA CHUCK KK. eee ale Re past Genanen 0h ones ctl, canes in ob NNER aaa APS ee ani mah. An

00c00 CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM > RELEASE AS SANITIZED 23 May 2907 MEMCRAZOUM FOR THE RECORD SUBJECT: Report on Plots to AssasSingte Fidel Castro fais report was prepared at the request of the Director of oR aig Central Intelligence. Ee assigned tre tasx to the Inspector so General cn 23 March 1967. The report sas delivered to the Director, personally, in installments, beginning cn 24 April 1967. The Director returned this copy to the Insvector General on 22 May 1967 ne with instructions that the Inspector General: a Retain it in personal, EYES CHLY safekeeping Destroy the ore burn copy retained tesporerily by the to Inspector Cereral Destroy all xctes and other source materials originated by those participating in the writing of the report Tze one stayback burn copy, all motes, and all other derived ¢ 3 source materials were Gestroyed on 23 May 1957. This riboon copy is the only text of the report now in existence, i either in whole or in part. Its text kas teen reaé only by: a an Richard Eelus, Director of Central Intelligence ! 4 J. S. Earvan, Inspector General K. BE. Greer, Inspectsr (ste sf the authers S. D. Breckinridge, Inspector (one of the authors) Bt All typing of drafts and of final text was doze by the authors. i Filed with the report are: O?iice of Security Pile used as source material Memorandims concerning Willien Sarvey Certain MONGOCSS paters Fa Drew Pearson colums Taspector Ceneral j j Rega reat Ma ae wR Re TNL YFP Haas oe

0000 GILGS Introductory Section Miscellaneous Schemes. Prior to August 1950 Aerosol Attack on Radio Station Contaminated Cigars Depilatory The Gambling Syndicate Operation Phase 1 (August 1960 May 1961) Phase 2 (Late 1941 June 1963) ¢ a The Wiretapping Incident C The Phyllis McGuire/Attorney General Pease (late 1961 May 1962) The Long Committee Phase (May July 1966) Schemes in Early 1963 woo? Skin Diving Sutt cakes Bds ot Prem fae €:223 Project AMTASE Rojando Cubela (March 1962 March 1966) Gt sto wre wwe Fomee eas Discussion of Assassination at High-Level Goverment Meetings Special Group (Augsented) Meeting of 10 August 1962 Special Group Meeting of 30 July 19S The Ranifications of the Gambling Syndicate Operaticn Gaiagits Roy £5, anemamERe” tA WES Bt PRT} hw} asa ot pleat ge font Gis ba Tee MOOI IE TIEN fete See CHR te Weer me teen aye Bee “WL eetet es Te tae epee TS ete RE Nera Sets. RE Sa wee nS age

10000 ECMRewy Trteq ns: F an oe cae th FABLE OF CONTENTS _Searcity of documentary evidence 2 2 se we te ee ew ew Pelatioasnis of assassization plenring to goverment policy Risk of essassinstion whea a goverment is overtarowm Resort to svmecdocne wes Published intelligence on the possibility of Castro's denise Accuracy of tae story Drew Pearsca has Miscellazcous Schemes Prior to August 1960... 4-2-6226 ferosol Attack on Radio Station 2. 2 2 ee we ew we we ew Contaminated Cigars Funds are epproved for pessing to Varozma © © 0 Menzy and lethal pills are passed to Yarona Varona‘s restaurant coatact im Cuda 2 2 2 ee ee ee ew Eevards calls off the operation Disposition of the pills ....2.2-ececesecececes ec eve oe + List of those witting of the operation Depilatory cece ecec sce eee tere see eo eo eo we Gambling Syndicate Phase 1 2. 2 2 ew we ee we te ee tw Genesis of the plot... ce ececcccer cer crs eee ‘First contact with Maheu O'Connell named as case officer 2 6 2 ee ee oe we wo ew as First oeetizg with Roselii Briefing of Dulles and Cavell we ee ee te tw First neeting between Maheu and Gisncara font Prue identities of Giancensa and TrufMiceate become known... C: Rolie of Arafficante ae Early plannirg on the means of assassination 2 eee Guna's involvement with lethal cigars we preparation of lethal cigars 2. 2 2 2 oe wo very of the cisars to Gunn Roosevelt learns of the plot ese ee ee 2 © © oo Te Possible vays of pacreging the poison “SNF Decisicn to package the poison im pill form 6 6 wo tn & Juan Orta is identified as the syndicate's man in Cuba Gumn tests the pills on gutrea pigs 2 ee © oo Sequence preceding passing the pills to O'Connell O'Connell receives the pills and passes them to Roselli... vt Tee Farvey is briefed on the operation Teafficente receives the pills and gives thes to Orta oc 2e Fd IéentiMecatica of Crta nn The Orta channel collapses sss eee eee eee eee st Varona is brought into the operation EB Edware X. Moss 2 2 eee ee wee ce we ee ee eo ew is Roselli associates O'Cozceil with CIA Page ES. anuenKe © BRS BRAN YU CREE R SSR alte 4 Pete oe codetthes: pac SAF Seogee ret. aes evedge cxpnsee 14

Ae hehehaall some speach cf Pege Gasbifing Syndicate Puasce 2.2. 2 2 ee eo ee wo ew eo Why Zarvey was brieved on Phase 1. ce ee ww oo 37 Esrvey put in charg? cf tse Evecutive Actisa Capanility 37 Harvey briefs Helms on the Executive Action Capability. 33 GFdLi- planced assassicatioa of Linunts 36 wn Approval of Froject DRUIE ss ees eee ew es ee 38 Biscell pits Earvey in charge of the Castro operation 39 Earvey is told ne will head the Cuba task force 2 ee ee ee 39 Farvey's first meeting with Edvards on the Castro operation ko Ternization of GIiTie se ee ee ee ee ee ee ee eee ee oe BL Harvey briefs Eelas on the Cascro cperuticon ki Divferirg views on the tummover to Harvey 0 2 oe ee ew ew we BL Earvey's first meetixg vith Eoselll in Yew York City 43 Resellé end O'Connell go to Mies. 2 ee ee ee ee ew ww AG Earvey leaves for Miart with lethal picis 6 Yarvey takes over "a going operation" 7 Changes in gangster personnel participating 2 0 ee ee oe wo BG Maceo enters the operation 48 9 Earvey supplies weepons and equiprent to Verona oo 9 Roselli reports that the pills are in Cure 50 tf 3 Varorna sends a three-man teum to Cuba 2 2 2 ce oo ee e SL C Saeed Yerona plans tc send skree militia men to Cura 51 Harvey and Roselli agree to termmicste the operation ooo §2 > Roselii comes to Washingtoa to meet Karvey 53 % Harvey's meeting with Roselli observed by the FBI es oo 54 List of persons witting of this paase cr the operatica 55 The Wiretapping Incident 2.cesececeecec eee oo o Giancana suspects Enyllis McGuire ani Pan Rowan o eo o 5 Giencane asks Makeu to bug Rovan's roca 57 Likely date of the bugging incident © eo oo os 0 58 4 Maheu asks Edvard Du Bois to do the job 58 eS Du Bois assigns Balletti and Earrison to the Job. 22 8 4 3 Wiretap made instead of microphone plant 59 Palletti is caught ard paones Maheu for kelp. © ooo 9 Maheu refers the F3I to CIA 59 bs Shef Edvards meets with an FSI representative 2 Eavards intervenes with Sas Papich on Maheu's behalf 61 oO Houston intervenes with the Justice Derartzent. ae 61 Houstoa briefs Generel Carter 62 i Edwards and Houstoa brief the Attorney General. 2. 0 ee 628 Edvards sends a memorend= record of the meeting to Kemedy 63 Gambling Syndicate Passe 2 is already imder wey 2 2 ee “ae Eelms is briefed on the meeting vita the Attorney Gereral 65 ee ‘Sdwards warns Narvey to clear vita tee ICT. 2 ee ee ew ee 65 Kennedy's request oa $ March 67 for ea copy of the briefing meso 65 ie ae ae TI rene canter gs Me ete SE ty te Bre are se eae “Sejeatpeemaroamcs meg. ee alee ee eno ome ee htt

APPT WK Sy ey ar aly oe The wiretapping Incident (continued) Cafcego Sun-Tizes story of 15 aug 53 re Glancara & CIA. 67 Chisago Daily ews story of 99 Aug 63 re Glancaca & CIA 8&9 Eains sends MeCare a copy of tne Hencedy briefing menorandii=. 69 aw Pamoers now connect CIA & gangsters in plot to kill Castro rie The Long Camaittee. 2. 2 ce ee te we te ee we ee ee we TL Former Make ecployee called ta testity 7 fhe Onasstis-Hiarcaos fight cover cil szivping rights Jl Mateu is hired ty iifarshss acd is supsorted by CIA {2 CIA faterveces cn Klarchos’ tenul?. 2 2 2 owe ew ee ee ew ww FA The Long Committees plans to resurstect the Onassis wiretap 72 CIA interveres with the Leng Comittee on Maheu's behalf. 73 Mareu applies pressure on Cla to avold piolicity 73 Maheu indicates he may brief his attorney 2. 2 ee eo ww TH 4 Schemes in Early 1953. eee we cee eee eee ee ee oe TH te, Skin Diving Sult. 2. 6 22 ce ee we ew ew oe eo ee eee oe oe FH Gift from Donovan to Castro 15 ae The suit is bought and sade reads. 2 2 eo ee ot ee wo ow TD Tse plan is overtazea by events 19 6 I4st of perscas witticg. eo @ oe oe @ es s es e @ e e oe e co Cr Booby-trepped Sea Stell AAAAA The plan proves to be ispracticable Ramses of those witting 2. 2 0 eo ee ee we wo Project AMIASH Rolando Cubela. 2 2 0 0 eo eo we ote ew oe TE meeting with Cubela in Mexico City (Mar 61) iT) role in the Cubes revolution Cubela reported disaffected 2. ese 2 e ee eee eee wee Mexico City meeting inconclusive iG tj *Cubela and Juan Grta want to exfiltrate (Mar 61). “oq Cubela asks for meeting in Paris (acs 41 Cubela plans to attend Zelsink! Youths Festival. «22 tings in felsins! (Aug 52)... Meetings in Steckkois se e oe e s oe e e sd e e es e e eo eve eo Cubela objects to the vord "assassic2te" Faris reetings (Aug 62); & dexolition training. Meetings in Porto Alesre (Sea: 53) Paris reetirgs (Oct 63); Cubela wants assurance frou U.S.Govs FitcGerala meets with Cutela in Feris (Sez 35) Ditfericg versions of what FitzGerald tcl2a Cubela 2 2 0 SBRRGLKSSSESSSaa Te AL DAO bg 2218'4 EALARS bee, OS ERR ROR tates 3 ai. os cade 8 pee OE he re Atel Sane eee 2 oS weet we trey ae, ere ge Th LOT RUS SL ee eee Tose ele ete at Ela eas eG Re ty, ooo Ss eemee me ee owe ae SPF ge se eepetee weno

14-00000 eseg ee e372 do settee? av tc ctes Wohi’ Project AMLASG Roles@o Cubela (sontinved) Cuba cache approved for Cubala. 2. 2. 2 2 © ee oe Tne Black Lear 50 schene {5 discussed Guna coaverzs a ballpoins yen into a bypodersic syringe Sanchez gives to Cubels in Paris waile Keanedy is shot Cubela asks for high-povered rifle with telescople sight. Those witting of the Black Leaf 40 episode Cutela cache put down (without rifles) (Her Cubela requests a silencer for a FAL rifle SAS requests SSD to preduce FAL silencer o2 crash tasis Second Cubela cache put dow (with FAL ritles)(Jumé 6%) Artize meets Cubela interandiary. eoecene eee eo ee eo ew Artise agrees to reet with Cubels persomily Sanches neets Cukela in Parts (Dec 64). 22 2 2 ee eee Explaration of kow Artime and Ccbela vere put together Artine and Cubela meet in Madrid (Dec 6+) 2. 2 2 2 ee “Artine agrees to fourmish stlencer Artine gives Cubdela silencer and ocher special gear Second sene-line between Cutela and gacbli=z syndicate operation 104 foe Beadquarters tersiczcates all cunlucts with Cutels group. 2 ay Cubela and others arrested; plead guilty (‘ar 66) ae The ChargeB 2 © © ee we oo ew ew eo oe we ww ow Castro asks -for lenfency Testimony about the silencer. 2. 2 «0 © © © 0 oo oe ow Cubela expects to be executed Cubela sentenced to 25 years’ imprisoment. © © 0 2 No mention rede of Cubdcla's pre-Nov 64 dealings with CIA Memo to Secretary of State (Rusk), Subject: CIA Involve SoBe Fo ment in Cuban Counter-revolutionary Activities oe cf Arrest of Rolands CUSELA Secades and Esrnon Toras “72 4, GUIN Diaz,dated 7 March 1966 (added after completion Bl Sie wn cones of report) ae eee eeee eee ee eae eer re 2 me Ce gon SBME Bl Mh dr emcl F an po. Ce iad irs tet renee ais OTE aes om wet ge etter Page Bese BEBBSeeeeRes 103 wate wane te > -—oneaMNR Tet ae ape repent ss 8 as me GIGS Neate ate epee Oy aes “see nets SOE ee nde tg wae Stes sega dy at tm mae Bey ces re eiecines mre os anette meee

0000 co, rppey_rurd aut ooo Tics ile i dk 25 April 1907 This reconstruction af Agency involvereat in plans to assassinate Fidel Castros is at best an imperfect Ristory. Because of the extreze sensitivity of the operations being discussed or attenpted, as a cetter of principle no official records vere kent of planning, of approvals, or of inplénentation. The few written records that do exist are either largely tangential to tae main events or vere put on paper fron memory years afterward. Willies es Sarvey has retaized skeletal notes of his activities durizg the 4} years in question, and they are our best cource of dates. Dr. Edward Gunn, of the O2fice of. Medical Services, has @ record of whes he set and when and cryptic references to the subjects discussed. epee etemenen 2s of TSR, kes a record of tvo or three dates that ere Pertinent. Gunendl [were involved in only the technica? § 3 aspects of operatiozal plenning, and their participations vere short- ast 2 lived. Although fregzentary, their records are a help in establishing 4 Sgt. Sh. erktical tine frenes. Operational files are useful in some instances, wg because they give detes of meetizgs, the substances of which may be 3 inferred from colleter21 infomation. For the most part, though, we have had to rely on information 1 @lven to us orally by pecpla whose mensories are fogged by tise. -Tneir recollections of dates are particularly hazy, and scme of thes he mre ete j-~ icue testes wees stovigbesta et oe ety et ee tae eet arte Reta oer econ ey abeaetia nar era arena ee ssl 19)

G00 CGE betemetnhe-aires debi tA sete sates citertme oh tanBS PREP. persozally varied vith the intensity of the U.S. Covermment's efforts eelett toa Rewer © BYE. ie, 6 ates wid wore @re no longer eble to ksep the cetails of cre plan separate frou those of esothe.. We interviewed everyore viem ve could identify as Uttely to be movleczeable, with the exceptions of Hr. Dulles end Geseral Cavell. A camplete list is attached at Tab A. We did not go an fishing expeditions among the sere possibles. To have done so vould have risked saking witting a mmber of employees vhno vere previcusly unvitting and, ia our esticate, would have added little to the detatis avalladle fram those directly involved. There are incorsistencles emong the various accousts, but most of then can be resolved by collating the {information fimnicked by all of the identifiable participants in ea particular plen and by then checking it against specific dates’that cen be fired with fair certainty. We believe that this reconstruction of what happened and of the thinking associated with 1t is reasonably sound. If there are significant inaccuracies in the report, they are wost likely to occur in faulty ordering of the sequence of events. People still remember much of What happened, but they can na longer recall precisely vben. “It became clee= ‘yery early in cur investigaticn that the vigor with which schenes vere pursued within the Agency to eliminate Castro to overthrow the Castro regime. We can identify five separate phases in Agency assassination plammirg, although the transitions fro: one 3 ee ie ee se at seh ss naa aya aK Te GE. ES Srpone ge seefgare oa: > ate Gen pane Safe. OS ee ee ee ee gg ENE LR Dees te gS EP amine Osan ica sel He —orogn, reget or ace roe we ee Bt ce eet he aan Pete. Oe Hee > wey ean macs ws ose ees Se ad Airgas Bee + 00s @ remem ae ae, oo enema

G00 see wee es eaarz pura wtui 2 to another are not always sterpvly defined. Sach phase is a reflection of the then prevatlirg Government atiituds tovard the Cuban regime. a a. Prior to August 1950: All of the identifiable schenes: prior to about August 1950, with one possible exception, vere ained only at afscred! ting Castro cersorally by influencing his behaviour or by altering ais =ppearance. oe b. August 1960 to Avril 1951: The plots that vere hatched in late 1960 ard early 195) were aggressively pursued and vere viewed by at least sxe of the participants as being merely one wR aspect of the over-all active effort to overthrow we regime é 74 that culsinated in the Bay of Pigs. fn C-. ce. April 1961 to lete 1061: A major schene that vas 7 begun in August 1960 was called off after the Bay of Pigs and remained dormant for several montas, as ata most other Agency So operational activity related to Cuba. ee Inte 1961 to late 1952: That particular scheme was cE z 7 reactivated in early 1962 and was again pushed vigorously in the 3 Mes era of Project MONGOOSS and in the clicate of intense admini- stration pressure on CIA to do scmething about Castro and his fi Late 1962 until vell into 1963: After the Cuben misafle a crisis of October 1962 and the collapse of Project MONGOOSE, the Poe. esa’ Taegan? sea: RS ont. oe oe.

4-00000 oe 6 baler srom qe WARE Lek FT) Pat dim exvalgn sentee 2a, acre aggressive scheme that was begun in August 1960 and revived ta Apzil 1962 was ficslly ternteated in early 1963. ‘wo other plots vere originated ia 1963, but both vere {opracticable ané nothing ever cane of then. We cenrot overemphasize the extent to vhich respons{vle Agency officers felt themselves Subject to the Gininintcation's severe pressures to do scmething about Castro and his regime. ‘he fruitlees and, in retrospect, often unrealistic plotting should be viewed in that Light. Many of those we interviewed stressed two points that are so obvious that recording them here may be superfluous. We believe, 7 though, that they are pertinent to the story. Elictnation of tue dominant figure in a goverment, even vheno loyalties are held to his personally rether than to the goverment as a body, will not necessarily cause the downfall of the government. This foint was Soran bay cane vee IE SMLCOV nO. ST: stressed with respect to Castro and Cuba in en internal CIA draft be aad oF Paper of October 1961, which was initiated in response to General Maxwell Payloc's desire for a contingency plan. The paper took the position that the demise of Fidel Castro, fros whatever cause, would offer little opportunity; Zor the Liberation of Cuba fron Coummist and Soviet Bloc control. The second point, which is more specifically ee eres relevant to our investigation, is that bringing about the domfall of @& government necessarily requires the removal of its leaders frou r) be ITER RMO RS 880 se Ee SN De ee anne ater inl “saa Pe errr Sr hI Menten BL ete ee pB ee nt atte md bee ty eer ees

eH, alas 3, UTR PMN Bh SERBS or EY WAS Ta wre a Sad ote Seed Loew ait LUN bh ake at positions of sover, and there is always “he riss that tne particl- pants will resort to assassication. Sush-rensvats eo ie CAUSA Cueto overcok.the-nik Sw Siem oe Of ‘ea Frusitioby forses_encoumsged but-aot- controlied-oy~—tae-U:3 Goverment. Shere is a third point, whiea was aot directly made by aay of those we interviewed, but vhich emerges clearly tran the interviews and from review of files. “me point is that of frequent resort to Fynecdoche--the mention of a part when the whole is to be understood, or vice versa. ‘Thus, we encounter repeated references to phrases such as “disposing of Castro,” which way be read in the nerrov, literal sense of assassirating hiz, vhen it is intended taat it be read in the broader, figurative sense of dislodging <he Castro regime. Reversing the coin, ve find people speaking veguely of “doing scme- thing about Castro" vhen it fs clear that what they have specifically in mind is killing hin. Ina situation wherein those speaking may not bkave actually meant what they seemed to say or may not have said what they actually heant, they should aot be surprised 1f their oral shorthand is interpreted differently than was intended. X The suggestion was made to us that Operations aimed at the assassination of Castro may have teen generated in én atnosshere of stress in intelligence publications on the possibility of Castros ee) qecke Pte me oman Mahe eee sh adie mamas sempelhiines so as creme we mgs sere 6 dames Ae a8 ners ape oop oe

74-90000 Ate Aarts aR rita MOBY ie Reg hp ain ee. Peer Fase eee Gexise ‘eed on the reordering of the political structure chat wculd follow. We reviewed intelligence publications fraz 1950 threugh 1966, including National Intelligesnce Estizates, Special Natiozal Intelligence Estizates, Intelligence Menmorandims, and Memorardims for the Director. The KIZ's on “Ibe Sitvation asf Prospects in Cuba” for 1950, 1953, and 1664 Lave brief paragraphs un itzely successor govermments if Castro were to depart the seems. te also find similar skort references in a SIZ of March 1960 and in an Intelligence Menorandim of May 1965. In each case the treatment is ro rore nor less than cne vould expect to tind in comprehensive round-ups such @s these. We conclude that there is no reason to believe that the operators were unduly influenced by the content of i=telligeace publications. Drev Pearson's columm of 7 March 1967 refers to a reported CIA plan in 1963 to assessinate Cuba's Mdel Castro. Pearson elso has information, as yet umpublished, to the effect that there was 4 meeting at the State Department at which essassiration of Castro _was discussed and that a teaz actually landed in Cuba With pills to be used in an assassination attempt. There is basis im fact for each of those three reports. a. A CIA officer passed an assassination seepon to an Ageacy Cuban asset et a reeting in Paris on 22 Sovenber 1963. he veapon wes a Sallpoint pea rigged as a nypodermic syringe. VON La ea aes TOE. sashaase saan dy ae Tae ee tee ee te eee ne ne we ue tae Prmecte” cd scented aia a4 eae ae TA be Bdge” nae, Ltd aT eat ae es faleeag Wie yreaty am ane nthe teemaseo eet Hin cts mermamonmin 84 Os os, sae Ore sens oa. i

we wee ee aoe ay werk Tne CIA officer suggested taut the Cutaa asset lead the syringe with Black Leaf 40. ‘he eviczence iadicaces that the neeting was unter way at the very moment President Keanédy was shot. b. There vas & necting of the Srecieal Group (Augeatea) in Secretary Rusz's conference rocz on 10 August 19<2 at which Secretary McNazara broached the subject of liquidatisn of Cuban leaders. The discussion resulted in a Profect MONGOOSE action sezorandim prepared by Ecvard Lensdsle. At asothes Special Group meeting on 31 July 1964 there was discussion of oa @ recently-dissewinated Clandestine Services inforsation report ae) on a Cuban extle plot to assassinate Castro. CIA bad refused C: ‘the exile‘s requess for funds and kad 29 involvezeat in the plot. ce. CIA tvice (first in early 1962 asd again in early 1952) supplied lethal pills to U.S. gambling syndicate renters working so in. behalf of CIA on a plot to assassinate Fidel Castro. The 1361 wos plot aborted and the pills vere recovered. Those furnished in ps ae April i952 vere passed by the gazbling syndicate representative we “to a Cuban exile Jeader in Florida, vho in tum kad them sent to Cuba about May 1962. In Jume 1962 the exile leader reported that a teem of three nen had been dispatched to Cuba to recruft for the operation. If the opportunity presented itself, the team would make an attempt on Castro's life--perkaps using tre pills. ban ORR PARI RW) os eranry sur. Oi yo wah att Le sare etta GRE Pipe ene meer etee Lovet Bo bate err tet Peete Te ME ee cee ot Fete 20 Baten ayn at ‘Sananp cans ed an ar woe pie wee eso e 8 8 Le mere ENON BREITT om Aeceg Peaet: ti wan perenne ores

th Those i es ter aoe PNET SOOO! congeene et natimesmnsarnenies RD SR Lhe Nees. BOE, wie cere Mee oh LT FFP EOL, erent Lr YO ow. r nTy 6rtira at This report describes these and otter episodes ia details puts thes into verspective; saad reveals, that walle the events Cescrited a7 Drew Pearson did oceur and are subject to being patched together as though one complete story, the irplisation of a direct, causative relaticaship aznong then is unfounded. ee eee wha fhe eee eee Tet et tet woe Feet st oat ee BEY ak as. Pee nano den) peewame CD RHA Ae ae

10000 “eer stew mR eee ewe ory hat PE hao Fiscellaceous Ssheses Prior to Auzist 1950 March to Auzust 1960 We find evidence of at least three, und perbaps four, echeres that were under consideration vell before the Zay of Pigs, but we Oo can fix the time frame only speculatively. .Those who have sose knovledzge of the episodes guessed at dates ranzing from 1959 through 1961. ‘The March-to-August span. ve have fixed may be too narrow, but Lt dest fits the limited evidence ve have. @.. None of those ve intervieved who was first assigned to ‘the Cuba task force after the Bay of Piss moves of any of these extntaty force in pre-Bay of Pigs days, is probably tke most reliable i mo b. J.D. (Jake) Esterline, who was head of the Cuba task o3 witness on general timicg. He may not have been privy to the “Precise, details of any of the plans, but ke seems at least to etge tp C8! PO os yrret ‘SR STARE. Oe Oitiemcerrery Qt ee mse have Imown of £ all of then.” He 1s no louger able to keep the Getails.a? ore plan separate from those of another, but each of the facets he recalls fits sowevhere into one of the scheses. Hence, we conclude that all of these schemes vere under consideration i vhile Esterline bad direct responsibility for Cuba operaticas. Esterline hisself fiumishes the best clue as to the wwe ie Sot e Ree Me wt ee Tee pe ote ee on BP erred Ee mee ee an wae Pee eee est ates Se AP ee Sr Bere TES ae lo.

24-90C09 Whe possible time spas. He things it unltizely that esy planatag of this sort would have progressed to th2 poiat of consideracisaa th of neans until after U.S. policy concerning Cuba vas decided upon about Harch 1960. By about the ead of the third quarter of 1950, the total energies of the task force vere concentrated on the main-thrust effort, and there would have been no interest in nor time for pursuing such wills-o'-the-wisp as these. We are unsdle to establish even a tentative sequence among the screxes; they may, in fact, have been urder consideration simulteneously. We a find no evidence that any of these schezes was approved at any level higher than division, if that. We think it most Likely that no higher-level approvals were sought, because none of tne scheses ecenenee ar progressed to the point where epproval to lauzch would have been i Aerosol Attack on Radio Station of (SD, remembers discussion of a schene to ms conteminate the air of the redfo studio where castro broadcast his i Speeches with au aerosol spray of a chemical that produces reactions Siniler to those of lysergic acid (ISD). ‘Nothing came of the idea. 5 said he had discouraged the schece, because the csem{cel could not be relied upon to te effective. also of ISD, Pires Lo] BS) SESE ee meee, j oe alee. ne where gtr eR mete GE epee epee te EM ele el

14-00000 recalls expertzentation wiih psychic ezergicers Sut cacaot relate it ts Castro as a target. we Scud x0 one else wi > resembered enything of this plot, with the possible exception of Jaze Esterline who _may have it confused with other schezes. Contarinated Cizars Jake Esterline claizs to have bad in his possession in pre-Bay of Pigs days a box of cigars that had been treated with scoe sort of chemical. In our first interviev with him, his recollection was 3 that the chemi~eal was interded to produce texporary personality Gs mis disorientation. The thought was to scoehow contrive to have Castro emoke one before making a speech ané then to meke a public spectacle of himself. Esterline distinctly recalls having hed the cigars in hfs personal onfc extil bo lets ya: ana thet they defMicttely vere i ve intended for Castro. He does not remesber how they came into his possession, but he thinks they must have been prepared by) Ima second interview with Esterline, ve mentioned that we bad learned COMB ws, since first speaking with kis of a scheue to cause Castro's beard to fall out. He then said that his cigars might have been associated with that plan. Esterline fim@lly said that, althozgn it vas evident that he no longer resembered the intended effect of the cigars, he was positive they vere rot lethal. ‘Tae cigars were never SE tar SUNOS SaRquERERAy BEML EEN SSE, cK ee cae Se ek St OR SO te et ee oe ve Eee eee ae eS gee

24-90C09 DRS HOME IE OM SORTS, TEL ee BL REO nae. fret sy oe, Sete ye used, according to Esterline, tecause WAH/s could rot figure out how to celiver thea without danger of blovsecz on the Ayency. Ee says be destroyed thes before leaving Way in June 1951. 4 Sidney Gottlieb, of TSD, claigs to remember distinctly a plot involving cigars. To emphasize the clerity o? his nesory, be named the officer, then assigned to Wi/CA, who approached him with the 6cheme. Although there may well have teen such a plot, the officer Gottlieb named was then assigned in India and has never worked in VE Divisies nor had anything to do witha Cuta cperattons. Gottlieb TD. ophats. Term, renenbers the scheme as being one that wus talized about frequently but not widely and as being concerced with killing, not merely with influencing behaviour. As fer as Gottlieb knows, this idea never got beyond the talking stage. TSD may have gone ahead and Prepared the cigars just in case, but Gottlieb is certain that he did not get the DD/P's (Richard Bissell) personal approval to release them, as would “Ss have been done if the operation bad gone that far. We are unable to discover vhether Esterline and Gottlieb are speaking of a single cigar episode or of tvo unrelated. schemes. We found no one else with 7 5 firm recollections of lethal cigars being considered prior to August Cat 1960. os 7 er ee vost 4 we ty 1. a3 Br

14-00000 8 eet ae we 2g eet a Pid 7a Oo wee, ee ene en o & ro oNag eer tere? ad ary Devils cry recalls a scheme involving thelliimm valts, a 8he chesical used by women as a denilatory--the thought teirg to destroy Castro's image as “The Beard" by ceusing the deard to fall out. The chemical may be administered either oraiiy or py absorption through the skin. ‘The right dosage causes deplistion; too muck produces paralysis. __]retieves that the idea originated in connection with a trip Castro vas to have made outside of Cuba. The iéea wae to dust thallium power into Castro’s ahces shen they were ft PE «RS, “> put out at night to be shined. ‘he scheme progressed as far as procuring the chemical and testing it on anizals. i Lom recollection is that Castro did not make the intended trip, and the scheme fell through. renesbers consideration being given to use of thallium salts (perhaps against Castro) and i Something having te do vith boots or shoes. _aces not remember with whom he dealt on this plot. We found no cone else Sta, AER shy 98 BARU. 0! Nore Raper with firm knowledge of it. re BER Gara RRS bee Qa, wee! gd! ee pips fel, Quan “elteees fe eat Sw ursa! cymes ts ee, Pe ve Me we! are ie tee tee: Pie pe? Si Ree RAY WO Clee eg tee Be gree yrs PRET aie 4s wen ateony Tene weal te oe see HE oe we Teese wre AS rey Me eS

14-00000 BES rad ea AE I ea FRE RL TEE BTR wpe tee TEL eat eee IGE te Gandling Syndicate The first cericusly-pursued CIA plea to essassizate Castro had its inception in August 1960. It involved the use of menvers of the crinizal ucdervorld with contacts inside Cuba. he ‘operation had two phases: the first ran from August 1750 until late April or early May 1961, when it vas called off following the Bay of Pigs; the second ran from April 1952 until February 1963 and was cerely revival cf the first phase which had teen inactive since about Hay 1961. Gesblizg Syndicate Paase 1’ August 1960 Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans, asked Sheffield Edvards, Directar of Security, if Edvards could establish contact with the U.S. gambling syndicate that wes active in Cuba. The objective clearly vas the assassination of Castro elthough Edvards Clains that there was a studied avoidance of the tera in his conversation with Bissell. Bissell recalls that the idea originated vith J. C. King, then Chief of Wi Division, although King now recalls huving nad only linited knowledge of such @ plen and ata -much later date—about mid-1962. de. the Cee st eet tt et we “ee tt Toy ep FaL Or ne eee aot GEAR PTs ay an

4-00000 Seed ame women tee Ew Me ee wee eel ase “AraAReT Freee cee Sete eye foe i & Eee ame Edverds consulted 2~cert A. Hate:, a privece investigates vho hed done sensitive work for che Agescy, to see if Meheu had any underworld ceatacts. Haheu vas once a srecial egent of the Fat. Ee opened a private office in dashirzton in 1956. The late Robert Cumninghem, of the Office of Security (and also a forser Special Agent with the FSI), ‘mew Maheu an4 imew that his business was kaving @ shaky start financially. Cunninghen erranged to subsidize Maheu to the extent of $500 per monts. Within six months Maheu was doing 60 well financielly that he suggested that the retainer be discontinued. Over the years he has been intizately involved in providing support ae for some of the Agency's more sensitive operations. He has since G moved his personal headquarters to Les Argeles but retains a Washington office. A more detailed account of Mateu's backgrowid eppears in a separate section of this report. (Comment: Although we see nothing sinister in it, ve are struck by the fact that so meny of the persons vhose mazes appear mo in this accout once worked for the FBI. We have already nazed “ly Cunningkem end Maheu. Later to appear are William Harvey, James O'Connell, and Edwerd Morgen.) SABRES Maheu acknowledged that he Led ea contact who uight furnish access to the criminal wméervorld, but Maheu was most reluctant to ellow himself to be involved. in such ean assignment. He agreed to oo PUTA Aye ota ee ome we ih enti bs Ree oh. 7 ye ee SE et eee SW peerecnere: owe “hegstes hiietine ieee ene to fe corre cain nahn armen ods ean on

0009 aed be! cl odes care daar tame, bits participate caly after ceizg pressed oy E2.ards 79 do co. Maheu identizied his contact as cre Jonany Roselli, who cived in Lus Angeles and had the concession for the {ce-makirg machines on “the strip” in Las Vegas and vhos Mabeu understood to be a mesber of the Syniicate. Maheu vas kmowa to Roselli 2s ea can veo kad 3 number of large ousisess organizations asc <3. Edzards and Maheu agreed that Maneu vould approach Bosellf as the representative of business- men with interests in Cuca who saw the elimination of Castro as the essentis] first step to the recovery cf their invesusents. Mabeu was authorized to tell Rosell{f that his “clients” vere willing to ny, pay $150,000 for Castro's resoval. é Septerter_ 1960 Snef Edwards raced as bis case officer for the operation 5 Jemes P. O*Comell (a former Special Agent, of the FBI), thea Chief, ‘Operational Support Divisioz, Office of Security. O'Connell and Si. Meheu met Roselli. New York City on Ik September 1960 where Maheu eo made the pitch. Roselli initially was also reluctant to become involved, but finally agreed to iatrod:ce Maheu to “Sam Gala” who either ked or could errerze contacts with syndicate elenents in Cuba who might handle the job. Boselli said he had no interest in befag TF paid for his participation and believed: that “Gola” would feel the APO aa eb siedh= wes es fee Ag werestacin ite ar ee, TT ED Sg: TER AS PSS er RS tg FH ah Shan Anare ong Saplings

0000 ee ee ey eed eo oe ereorr ryce ewe ise 2 Bebe eee oe nobel we i. sase way. A menoracd:: for the reecr? prepared by Sheffieli Edvacits on ls May 1962 states: “Mo menfes were ever paid to Rosell! and Gianacana. Maheu was vafd part of his exvense macnecy during the periods that he vas in Miasf.“ (Giancana is “Gola.") O'Connell was introduced (in tre rane) to Roselli as an eaployee of Maheu, the explanation being that O'Conrell would handle the case for Maheu, because Meheu was too busy to work on it full tice himself. No one else in the O?Pice of Security was made witticg of the oreration at this tire. Edwards hizself did not meet Roselli until the susmer of 1352. § ex ») At this point, about the second half of September, Shef Zdvards told Bicsell that he tad e friend, a private investigator, who had 7 a@ contact who in turn kad other contacts through whom syndicete elements in Cuta could be reached. ‘hese syndicate elements in ere. ot fea Cuba would be willing to take on such an operation. As of the latter part of September 1960, Edwards, O'Conzell, and Bissell were the only my Ones in the Agency who knew of a plan against Castro involving U.S. gangster elements. Zdverds states teat Richard Helms was not inforned of the plan, because Cuta was being herdied by Bissell at that tine. With Bissell present, Edverds briefed the Director (Allen Dulles) end the DDCI (General Cabell) on tne existence of a plan involving foc} members of the syndicate. The discussion wes cirevmspect; Edvards ‘A Baoe OS ee rt wie RPS cn CEE ARAN) are ta

0000 wl yey Ber. snag Te ede we meee ett 7 ake deliberately avoided the use of easy "tad vords."” Tee descriptive «era used was “an intelligence operatioa.” Edwards is quite sure that the + “fe. DCI acd the DDCI clearly understocd sae nature of the operation ke was discussing. He recalls describing the chancel es being “fro A to BtoC.” As he then envisioned it, was veheu, "3" wes Rosell!, ana was the principal in Cuba. Edwards recalls that Mr. Dulles merely nodded, presumably in understancing and approval. Certataly, there was no opposition. Edwards stetes thet, while there was no forzal approval as suca, ke felt that he clearly kad tacit approval fe. >) to use his om judgaent. Bissell comitted $150,000 for the support of the operation. (Cament: In the light of this description of the brieftcs, ae eae eter it is appropriate toe conjecture es to just what the Director did approve. “It is safe to conclute, given the men particiraticg gE. and. the general. subject of the seeting, that there was little Like Lthooa of misunderstanding--even though the details were deliberately blurred ani the specific intended result was never stated in ummistekable languase. It is also reasonable to 2 conclude that the pointed avoidance of “bad words" expaoasized ‘to the participants the extrene sensitivity of the operatica.}., During the veek of 25 Septemver 1960, O'Coxcell and Maheu went to ete ee om Miami where Roselli introduced only Maheu to "Sam Gola” at a meeting SURE be Firs Ay “14 -q eT ore tet et Seen bHty CRT ance er me Boe lennaanerermres memento pone BF Se Fan ee te eG SE rr ert Ce tna Ets go ae eo On

14-00000 atta, fia tre Fontafstleau Eotel. "Sola" said he ned 2 =29a, vaca ke lér-ntified only as “Joe,” who would serve as courler to Cuta end rst v make arrangements there. HMaheu pointed ort “Gola” to O'Connell 4 froz a distance, but O'Conzell never cet either “Gold™ or “Joe.” Ee did, however, learn their true identities. Aa Office of Security penorandim to the DOCI of 25 June 1955 places the tine as “several weexs later.” O'Connell is now uicertsin.as to whether it vas on this first visit to Miami or o1 a subsequent ope that he and Makeu learned. the true identities of the two men. Maheu and O'Connell were staying at separate hotels. Makeu phoned O'Connell one Sunday moraing and J) called his attention to-the Parade supplement in one of that morning's Mianl newspapers. It carried en article on the Cosa Hostra, wita pictures of prominent members. ‘The can Maheu asd O*Connell knew as "Sam Gold” appeared as Mos Salvatore (Sam) Giancana, a Chicago-based gangster. “Joe, the courier" (who was never identified to either Mabeu or O'Connell in any other way) turned out to be ‘Santos Trafficaate ? an the Cosa Nostra chieftain in Cuba. iar oo At that tise the gambling casinos were still operating in Cuta, ETD POEL PREP. PROMIME RAE Da Ts ee aat and fratficante was maxing regular trips betweea Miami and Eavaza on syndicete business. (The casinos vere closed and gambling vas banned effective 7 January 1959. Ca 13 January 1959, Castro annoumced that tke casinos would be permitted to reopea for tourists and foreigzers ee ee ag Re et, 3 22 AEE SES gt tee ee Ne eee, Cote Cae Sommer eee eo wees ee Pere FE Blas ee el te cee nee oe gt rye 40. Taree ee Ps cottrte ere Siete oe Se, ete re of ae fei oe cer eiteteesy

74-90000 ite samme © wry. ae ee okt eee ee ate oe? eye 04m APyrrom GARR THe a2 bens mm ta oe out that Cubes3 vould Se carred. Sree eabicet on LY fepruary 1959 authorized reopeniag the casinos for the “curist trade. Tice segazine for 2 March 1959 amo:mced that the casincs tad teen reopened the. previous week. The New York Times issue of 30 September 1961 exrounced that the last of the cesiros szill mnrfog hed been closed.) Trafficente vas to make the ervrangenments vits cre of kis cemtmects inside Cuba on ore of his trips to Havans. Pall and Early binter 1950 Very early in the oreraticn, well before the first contact with Roselli, the rachinery for readying the meens of assassination vas set fo motion. The sequence of eveats is not clear, but it Is aprerent that a mccber of methods vere coasi¢ered. Preparatica of seme matertals went ehead vithout express approval. (Comment: It should be noted that TSD maintains a stack of equipsent and materials for operatiozal use. When queries are wade of TSD technicians about cateriels or devices that are not stock items, it is not wuusval for the technicians to go ghead with the preperation of the materials or devicés es3inst the event that there is e formal reqzest for them. Because of this, undue significance should not be attached to advance preparations for this operatica. It snould also be note? that te. eee ro eee oy ¥ ee wal fe lim cme Se TT rE ee Dba! ge TF eats Joe. ars Fe ake AE AS of Rn

mar ed Perera at, ARP 41, 98 AP cae Bae PPK. AIT: Aatarramenng Ore Steve A ek EE GY Rt HE RSPB. vty awe Swamy tN ee at it was not unusual at the tice in question for the Chief of TSD to be by-passed in operations involving his» people. While Cornelius Roosevelt, then Chief of TSD, has the clear impression that all requests were levied through ats, iastances were cited in the course of this inquiry where such was not the case. ‘The practices and procedures in existe sence at the time may account, at least in part, for the d{ffering recollections of what did and what did not happen acd for the differicg degrees of significance @lveu davelogzents in the sfnds of the particimnts.) Dr. Edvard Gunn, Chief, Operations Division, Office of Medical Services, has @ notation tkat on 16 August 1960 he received a box of Cuban cigars to be treated vith a lettal xaterial. He understood then to be Fidel's favorite brand, and te thinks they were given to him by Shef Edvards. Edwards does not recall the incident. Gunn bas notation that he contacte of TSD, on 6 September 1960. Lemans experimenting with sose cigars and then treating “a full box. He cannot now recall whether he vas initielly given two boxes, experimenting with one and then treating the other; or whether he bought a box for experimentation, after «hich he treated the box supplied his by Gunn. He does not, in fact, resember Gunn as the supplier of uny cigars. We is positive, thouch, that he did contaminate a full box of fifty cigars with botulinw toxin, a virulent poison that -21L- 3b hie minced “ita Le rh and ted ee Be, Wee, penmewm mess ome awree Balt nisi Ba PO GR eto Lee aah ‘fs toot if Shae? “ye eget PR teh ane fete Bene ae~ fe we tle teye: Pais SO tae AS eR Steels, Veer. ean ot ren Mee BhSAmbeice “ae: ae

4-90000 "An ar est) Lin s6d produces a fatal ilines3 come hours after Lt is ingested. Tretchler distinctsy recenbers the flaps-and-seals joo he hsd to do on the box aod oo each of the wrapped cigars, both to Get at the cigars and to erase evidence of tampering. He kept cne of the experizental cigars and still has it. Ee retested it during our inguiry and found that the toxin still retained 944 of its original effectiveness. The cigars were so heavily contaninated that nerely putting one in the mouth vould do the job; the! intended victim would not actuslly have "Gunn's notes show that he reported the cigars as beirg ready fi for delivery oy 7 October. 1960. [notes do not show actual on delivery until 13 February 1961. ‘They do not indicate to vhor delivery was nade. Gunn states that he took the cigars, at some SR peepee rete unspecified tise, and kept them im his personal safe. He remenbers oy” destroying then within a month of Shef Edvards retirement in June 1963. (Comment: "Others recall the cigar schese, but only as an idea that was ‘cousidered evi then discarded. Roosevelt, Chief of TSD at the time, and O'Commell, the case officer, recall the ¢igar scheme, but feel that it vas never considered seriously. Zo Gunn ent[ vko gave it a good deal of tine but did not participate in the broader operational discussions, the cigars i. loom as important.) ae) tree) a oa io ARREARS Ee esr fuse woe “eos se BT we we ee tte eo om creme eT Lt Sa LE tot tcp pe 7°. oa” oo soe ee et oe & “wo ee ro ne er se tT. 2 “es 64 ose ete eT ee o Tig we. rq win int ra eae ofa

biel: 2a wee os avards recalls apprcaceicg Roosevelt after Bissell hed already es é spokes ta Roovevelt on the subject; Roosevelt recalle speaking to Bo Sot # Edwards after Sissell dfscussed it with Eé-ards. Bissell does not recall specific conversacvions with either o7 them on the techaical aspects of the prodlen, but he believes that he must have "closed the loop” by teiks with both Edwards and Roosevelt. Roosevelt recalls his first meeting with Edvards as being in Edwards' office. Edvards nae renenbers asking to be introduced to a chemist. He sure that he é did not name the target to Rousevelt, but Roosevelt says he knew it was Castro. Roacsevelt belfeves that he would have put Edwards in Co touch va[ then chief of TSD's Chenical Division, tut Bortuer bas no recollection of such work at that tire. [Ld recalls other cperations at otter tizes, but not this one. Roosevelt ie sey that, if hs turned it over of could have EFA sin assigned it to| a; ot Se ce Roosevelt remembers that four possible approaches were considered: on aD sone thing highly toxic, such as shellfish poison to be adzinistered With a pin (which Roosevelt seid was what vas supplied to Cary Powers); (2). bacterial material in Miguie ‘fom; (3) ‘dactertal treatment of a weer cigarette or cigar; aad (4) a hacdkerchief treated with bacteria. at The decision, hed the best of his recollection, was that bacteria in ec Liquid fom was the best means. Bissell recalls the sane decision, abo cet oe aw Peat aut ¢ we Est be ae Teg eA we piers Fae Tike nat ee aeSiseiBe ‘ake Saale OE tr saree Ne Sesenierswae Pee 23 Lerey SER: pets were gael Chad econ toe oa De 4 sa ators: Bowe? Pi Lal PE re foe

14-00000 tying 1+ to 8 recollection that Castro frequently crack tea, coffee, ! i or toufllon, for which a liquid poisca would be particularly well 3 sulted. F Janvary February 1961 Despite the decision that,a potson in liquid for: vould be most i desirable, what was actually prepared end delivered was a solid in a the form of small pills about the size of saccharine tablets. i remembers meeting vith Edwards and O'Conmell in Edwards‘ office to discuss the requirement. The specificaticus were that the poison te stable, soluble, safe to handle, ucdetectable, not immediately acting, and vith a firuly predictable end result. Botulin comes nearest to meeting all of those requirements, and it may be put up in either liquid or solid form. __—states that the pill fora vas chosen because of ease and safety of handling. OIG eens @yemmiceaves aewener amewerse crip eatene gr sa. tess. urd in ae we wenefed (Comment: ‘The gangsters may have had soze influence on the a choice of a means of assassination. O'Connell says that in his came. + very early discussions with the gangsters (or, more precisely, Vaheu's discussions with them) consideration was given to possible ways of accomplishing the mission. Apoarently the Agency-had first Stee mee ee thougt.t in terns of e typical, gangland~style killing in vhich nn Castro would be gunned down. Giancana was flatly opposed to the ial Poke aor he es eet eee en ieee. Sine Zar ard wo ow, tne! ee On at ee en sk ee Se EE ey Baath: oteeree eben wee. Sey set ow se 57

10000 ary ey Pee RNAs RE ATA ord Patass epee Spee; $ oth rs we mo pamela Certantg gree 7 Oe we pty oe epee. re “eg ete rye aarp, uce of firearms. He said that no one could de recruited to do the Job, tecause th: chance of survival and escape would be Z A, negligible. Giancana stated a preference fora lethal pill. oA RS F that could be put into Castro's food or drink. Trafficante (“Joe, the courier") was in touch with a disaftected Cuban official with access to Castro and presumably of a sort that Li would enable him to surreptitiously poison Castro. The gangsters naned their man inside as Juan Orta wao was then Office Calef and Direccor Geseral of the Office of tae Prine Minister (Castro). é an The gangsters said that Orta had once been in a position to ( receive kickbacks from the ganbling interests, had since lost yj that cource of incone, and needed the money.) When Edvarde received the pills he dropred one into a glass of water to test it for solubility and found that it did not even ak, ee Seo LT RT disintegrate, let alone dissolve. [oe them back and made up @ new batch that set the requirement for solubility. Edwards oes at that point wanted assurance that the pills were truly lethal. be EE called on Dr. Guna to make an independent test of them. Edwards gave Gunn money to buy guinea pigs as test animals. Gunn has a record of a i conversation vich[ fon 6 February 1951. It may have related-to| the ‘tests, but we cannot be sure. What appears to have happened is that Giuma tested the pills on the guinea pigs and found thea ineffective. © ee eg kt Bes tctbernat Sete oe ee ge SE oo Pero Ae sears ee Soot ot we TET forte eth ye aa ae Tope be an fe ERE late RS Sani Pay ea

eLul. ol Was states that z23ts of dow:lin oa guinee pigs ere not valid, because guinea pigs have a high resistance to this particular toxin. + + [_____}htnsere tested vee pills on monkeys end found they did the ert jod expected of then. We cannot reconstruct with certminty the sequence of events betseen readying the pills and putting them inte tue heads of Roselli. wards has the ispressicna that he had a favorable report froa Dr. Guna on the guinea pig test. Gunn probably reported only that the pills vere effective, and Eévards assumed the report was based on tire results of tests on guirea pigs. Dr. Cunn bras a clear recollection, ! _) without a date, of beirg present at a meeting in which Rosevelt demonstrated a’ pencil designed as a contealcent device for delivering i the pills. Roosevelt also recalis such a meeting, also without a date. Gunns’ notes record that his last action on the operation came i on 10 February 1961 when he put Gottlieb in touch with Edvards. Gottlieb has no recollection of being involved, ean impression that is Loe, supported by Bisseil wno states that Gottlieb's assignments were of a H different nature. O'Comell, vho eventvally received the pills, recalls that he dealt with| hes no record of > delivering pills at this tice, but he dces not ortinarily keep detailed Seats at ACFE BES OR ae records of such things. aod far ene te am ce ime gt oo te Ba eaten oe eek tess SES oe Seraph wees OO eee fel ESS rn weaee: wet NR ae Sa natiaey tere tt. ceune vimana Porpetien ileptatmeapen, epee. «Me deme carers Setar oe Sve he Ja et "ne ee OF ren mete eos, or

pet me? ao Sted me ce ee ee tim erewers Crener cuss In asy evens, C'Conmell dia receive the pilis, and he believes ee dh! petit a6" there were six of then. He recalls giving tusee to Roselli. Presuzably q the other taree vere used fn testing for solubility and effectiveness. Tse dates on vhich O'Cenzell resefved the pills and subsequently passed then to Roselli cannot be established. It would have been sonetine after Cuza's notation of 10 February 1961. Guaa also has a record of being approacned about the undertaking vy William K. Harvey (former special ageat of the FBI) in Pebruary Bo in connection with a sensitive project Tarvey was vorking on for oo Bissell. According to Gunn's notes, he briefed Harvey on the operatica, 1 and Harvey instructed afm to discuss techniques, but not targets, @ with Gottlieb. Guna’s notation on this point is not in accord with i the recollectiosof any of the others involved. We are unable to 3 clarify it; the note may have been in another context. O'Connell ty states that J. C. King was also briefed at this tine, althcugh King denfes learning of the operation until much later. fit Late February Mareh 1651 i Roselli passed the pills to Trafficante. Roselli reported to me f O'Connell that the pills had been delivered to Orta in Cuba. Orta is woilerstood to heve kept the pills for a couple of weeks before fe bd eae weturning them. According to the gargsters, Orta got ‘cold feet. g owe oes fei Fatt eh dae Seeeew ere comer rer) Soe ne we GRP hap ed SG t th casttorstvys. ee ee ie ‘anes aA eto HEL, Rett ood pt ee, ee ieee nat, en ED Sow at aor ade, Ti tise eB RN espe 1

sted meets gg AR GEES 10% (Comment: Crte lost nis position fa the Price Minisver's Office o1 26 January 1961, whit: plenctzg for the operation was oo? derma i. still going on in Hiemf and in Washington. He took refuge La aia a the Venezuelan Eutassy on 11 April 1962 and became the respensi- bility of the Mexican Extassy when Veremela broke relations with Cuba in Novseter 1951. Castro refused to give his a safe conduct pass until October 1904 vben he was allowed to leave for 2 Mexico City. Fe arrived in Miami in early February 1965. (Tt appears that Edvards and O'Connell did not know at the time of Orta’s fall fron favor. They have made no reference Aebos- ak ashes stead “ede dtd teadion, 10 oo GPS Ay to it--ascribing Orta‘'s failure to cold feet. It would seen, eeen mata net on though, “that the gangsters did know that Orta had already lest his eccess to Castro. They described hin as a man who had once kad @ position that alloved hia a rake-off on ganbling profits, a position that he kad since lost. The only job with which ve cea Bie iT AL ANAL er Tf oan associate Orta that might have alloved hin a rake-off was the one be held fn the Prine Hinister's Office, which he loston UE Toye 26 Jenuary 1961. It seems Mitely that, while the Agency thougat the gangsters bad a man in Cuba with easy access to Castro, what they actwally bad was a man cisgruntled et having lost access.) vole The previously-wentioned 2& Sime 1966 su=cary of the operation prepared by the Office of Security states that when Orta asked out AOR OTR: Tht eR cial weg SERS TS: ON RE MT SE de ethos ve eek oe woe ie leas Fe tatoo ORE ae rear foes pe geee eee tt ae Th ee te etaetweie ary net ‘unite, beeps oo Saw nosh, ag tee S50" id en eed PEA ag Ae OLE EA AG FO Te Rt AIST é.: Moe wee pene lene et ean sete ae ae mere seep tente tine seen RS NAT yas eg NTE RR TES SEs ee ae ote fee oe ad “> ae gt Se re et 7S rt ns ee ee a arn Ve eA Te eee FE

0000 IEE? GO oF Hesse am eee mewmed oe os permed ynainee Sree «seems Bere eRe of the assigasent he cuzgested anotasr caniidate vino meade several atte-ats witheut success. Neither iivards sor O'Coasell mov the identity of Orta’s replecsenent nor any adifticzal cetails of ‘he reported further attenpts. Mare; April 1961 Following the collapse of the Orta channel, Roselli tela O'Connell that Trefficante mew of a =an high up in the. Cuban exile movenent who night do the joo. He identified hin as Tony Verona (De. Manvel Antonio de YARCIA y Loredo). Varona vas the head of the Democratic Revolutionary Front, a group supported by the Agency as part of the larger Cuban operation. O'Connell widerstood that Varora was Gissatisfled with tre nature ane the extent of this support and that IMAAVZ suspected that Varona was not keeping his bargain vith the Agency. (Comment: Reports from the FRI suggest how Trafficante ney have known of YVarona. On 21 December 1960 the Bureau forzariea to the Agency a memorendim reporting thet efforts were being nade by U.S. racketeers to finexce enti-Castre activities in hopes of securing the gamoling, prostitution, and dope monopolies in Cuba in the evert Castro sas overthrown. A later reports of 18 Jamery 1961 associates Varoza with those schemes. Varora aot 7 78 BERL ENE Lider MORI REE TH ase menceREN@e COASPS FULD Fhe One ra wee ae) neds ae wg gl te Ce le Pte Oe ppg High ery ent ce eregah

4-00000. ull pent. “Teavttomilt Pas $lpemn cue gf ere Hee eo 4 +0.9F pate ED Rl Foe adel te approval tecane invalid if Moss vere sos used within six moaths of the cate of the approval.) Trefficante apprcacked Varona and told rin that he hed elieats who wanted to do away with Cestro and that they would pay big corey for the job. Varcaa resorted to have ceen very receptive, since it would mean that he would be able to buy his own ships, eras, aad as waa ccumunicatioas equipoent. (Coment: By this tice Roselli had beceme certain that O'Connell was an Agency exployee, not a suoordinate of Mazeu. Pre. we + He told O'Connell that he waa sure that O'Connell was “a iC, governneat man CIA” but that O'Connell should not coafirs i- this to him. Roselli said that as a loyal Azerican ke would do vhatever he could end vould never divulge the operation.) i j i Roselli vas to deliver money to Varona for expenses. O'Connell i nov recalls the amount as $50,000. Edwards, who was avay at the tine, vt recalls it as $25,060. Since Edwards was absent, O'Connell had to rrr get apvroval from Edvards' deputy, Rotert Bannerman, who uatil then i bad been unwitting of the operstion. O'Connell told Bannersan thet the operation vas known to and approved by Edvards. Bennersan authorized i passing the money acd now recalis the amount as being on the order of 4 eet $20,0Cc to $25,000. An Cffice cf Security menorandim to the DUCI, Boo, es a te ceed te bate Say Sy Se EY nL GSE EB

Lo eee rT TENT pepe ont we MGMT tet ne cme ee Gated 24 June 1965, sets the amount as $210,U05 in cesh and $1,000 worth of commmicatizas equipment. Jace Ioverlice, who signed the j vouchers for tae funds, recalls the amounts as being those stated in the Office of Security nenoracdim. (Comment: Asa sidelight, Esterline seys that, when he learned of the inteaced use of Varcna, steps vere taken to mo, cancel the plan. Varong was one of the five key figuses in the Revolutionary Frout end was heavily involved in support of the approaching Bay of Pigs operation. If steps vere in fact taken i to end Vsrona's participstion in the syndicate plan, they weve ineffective. It is clear that he contizued as an integral part i of the syndicate schene.) When the money vas ready, O'Connell took the pills from his safe and delivered thew and the noney to Roselli. Roselli gave the pills end the money ‘to Varona, whom Roselli dealt with under psevdonyn. foo: Ldttle 4s inovn of the delivery chamels beyond Varana- Varoua vas fee Pelfeved to Inve ot asset inside Cuba in a position to slip a pill eee a to Castro. Edvards recalls sarething ubout a coatact who worked in 4 a restaurant frequented by Castro and who was to receive the pills end yt put thes into Castro's food or drink. Edverds believes that the fe ee schene failed because Castro ceased to visit t2at particular restaurant. oon wt eee i aes + ads on, Oa ott ie aan wget Re mat se en, SES Sat eee Se oye es ek soph?

90000 29% boa Slt see ee ee ne eee eee wei et eee Anril May 195.” Soon after the Bsy cf Pigs, Zavarts sent word fo Rosell a through O'Connell % the operaticn wes off--even {f something happesed there would te no payorf. Uivards is sure there was & complete standdown after that; the operation was dead and remained so i until April 1952. He clearly relates tz* orfgins of the operation to the upcoming Bay of Pigs invasion, acd ics terization to the Bay of Pigs failure. O'Connell agrees that the operation was called off i oo after the Bay of Pigs but that the terniration was not firm an“ final. 4 ™ He believes that there was scnething goicg on betveen April 1961 and_ 1C.- April 1952, but he cannot now recall vbat. He agrees with BLL Harvey that when the operation was revived fm April 1962, Harvey toox Over @ "going operation.” “os (Cement: As distinguished frou Zdvards and O'Connell, both Bissell and Esterline place the termination date of the assassination operation as being about six months before the 4 mot ke. Bay of Pigs. Esterlize gives as bis reason for so believing the fact that the decision had been rade to go ahead with a massive, major operation instead of an iné!vidvelly-tergeted one such as this. Whatever the intention in this respect, if the decision to # terminate was actually cade, the ceczisica was not cocuunivated

0000 her gm RB eae, effectively. It is clear that th‘s plen to assassinate Castro continued in train until soretine after the Bay of Pigs.) O'Connell believes thst he cust have recovered the pills, but 7 he has n0 specific recollection of having done so. He thinks that instead of returning them to T5D ke probably would have destroyed them, most lively by flushing them down a toliet. Treichler has no record of the pills kaving teen refurned to him, but he says he is + quite sure that they vere. In a memorandum of 14 May 1962 Sheffield Edvards stated that ice} BPP knowledge of this particular operation was limited to six persoas. i C In the course of this invesvigaticn, ve huve identified the following persons vho kiew in late 1960 or early 1951 of this specific plan bing ee: frame to assassinate Castro: 1. Allen Dulles, Director of Central Intelligence sO 2. General C. P. Cabell, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence i fe 3. Richard Bissell, Deputy Director for Plans i ae Sheffield Edvards, Director of Security ie James Q*Comel, Office of Security, the case officer 6. J.D. Esterline, Cater, wa/t stan ene 7 Cornelius Roosevelt, Chief, TSD 8. Ckemfcal Divisioa, [5D 9. Edward Gunn, Chief, Overations Division, Medical Services a furs a as 3 san BOEEV IS Be te aE ae To Site he ee: oat Ft Peer em 4 -s08 hire. HL pe eT et wea ne scent wnt ner rene So 220 toe ER me EP ESR EN henna oe Te Ee Ie. ee See es fewest tee

ete AMES grees seme aie ree ghee oe ve hwatem. tere cele telete Om TL 10. Willies Harvey, Chief, FI/D i ll. Sidney Gottlied, Special Assistant to the DD/P (Gottlied's fo iors + fase was encountered repeatedly in this inquiry, but he on denies moving of the operation in 1960-61.) +! 12. Eobtert Bannerman, Deputy Director of Security 13. J.C. King, Chief, WH Division (He too denfes knovinrg of i ‘the operation at the tine.) ty @ne followirg persons outside the goverrment are known to be pi witting of the operation and either know or strongly suspect the Ageacy's connection with it: 1. Robert Maheu, a private investigator (. 2. John Roselli, the Agency's principal contact with the gesblirg syndicate 3. Sam Giancana, an importent figure in the syndicate 4k, Santos Trafficante, the courier and man inside Cuba These additional people vere avare of the operation, but their kmovleége of CIA's connection with it can only be speculated: eas 1. dJuen Orta, the man originally selected to poison Castro 2. Antonio Varona, a Cucan exile leeder 3. ‘re son-in-law of Verona, who is known to have been involved with his closely during this time. (The Varora 201*file makes no reference to Varona having a-son-in-lew, but he identified i this close associate as such.) Sree wai nsec is tn are

£4-00000 TE nee we nee Se tee ene meng ee eee os oe on 77 eee em woes “sts a Tae Ageacy’s General Counsel, Lavrence Houston, end Attorne Gersral Rotert Kenzedy learned the full dswils of the operatioa in May 2962. We do not mov the particulers of the report Drev Pearsen now has, but 1t may include many of the deteils of this operation. If 1t does, thea the circle of those now kncviedgeable vould be 4 sew ape ata widened to include: N i. Edvard P. Morgan, Maheu's Wasairzton attorney i 2. Columtist DInew Pearson and protably his partmer, gs Jack Anderson 3. Chief Justice Earl Warren ao oe, James Rowley, chief of the Secret Service -5- Pat Coyne, Executive Secretmry of the PYIAB 6. Attorney Ceneral Ramsey Clark Various menbers of the FAL ag2 rae 3 wo ete 2h- >. ae ere ety oo soy CAC EMU! ORME? RAYA SEP WENA aE SOME RC SSA: Ba en err cy ade ae Le Re YE mer st ee eo oe tp ne Crores ware Sek emma rk 4 aeoge ose meek fees” Kye. fas aA egh ee ‘ee, ida 22 2S ai bani re as See LTA eared Sasees fee2: POEL SISE et nS oe levee

4-00000. Tan Gesbling Sysiicate Puzse 2 Willie Zarvey, Chief of FI/D, was triefed in February 1961 (by authority of Richard Bissell) on pease ore of the gnabling oats aie. syndicate operation. That briefing wes in conection with a sensitive operation that Bissell rad assigned to Esrvey. Earvey ceseribes it thus: Early in the Keozedy adwinistration, Bissell called him in to i discuss what Harvey refers to as an Frecutive Action Capability; L.e., general stand-by capability to carry out assassinations when required. Harvey! notes quote Bissell as saying, “ce White House bas twice urged me to create such a capability." Bissell recalis d'scussixg C. the question of developing a general capability with Harvey. He mentioned the Edvards/gambling syndicate operation against castro in that context, but he nov thinks that the operation was over by then and thet reference to it vas in terms of a past operation asa case in point. It was on this basis that Harvey arranged to be briefed by Edverds. Harvey’s fixing of the Gate as February was ‘only ‘ie after review of events both preceding the briefing and folloving it. is He says now that it might have been/early es late Jam=ary or as late as March 1961. After some discussion of the probleas involved in developing an Executive Action Capability, Bissell placed Harvey in charge of the SB te oie 4 effort. Harvey seys that Bissell had already discussed certain aspects Coe NR) Rebvacte) amen cae yA AS) Codes. la eet ee, ee ee Ee ota Ree ce eh 2am SPF wert ARF Trial ialltint DAR ed fg eretge ie SScey ees: oer nt pein phe wpe nbes re nen tater la lethaeaay ae ie

£4-00000 OLY MED oe PN of the problen vita Arnold Sliver urd wita Sidney Gotvelied. Since Silver vac already cut in, Earvey used in developing the NMA ome Executive Action Capebility, although rever vith respect to Castro. cote ts Bae We did not question Gottlieb on his knowledse of the prezram for ooo ewe cresting an Executive Action Capability, but Zarvey's mention of bin in this connection may explein a notation by Dr. Guna that Harvey getewe instructed Gunn to discuss techniques with Cottlies without associating 4 the discussion with the Castro operation. 7 Harvey states that after the decision vas made to go ahead vith the creating of an Executive Action Capabilicy, and while he vas C 5 still discussing its development with Bissell, he briefed Mr. Helns cmmamreppmeane siete ae os fully on the general concept but without seation of the then ongoing Plan to assassinate Castro. The Executive Action program came to be known as ZRRIFIZ. Its i Principal asset ves en agent, GI4IN, who bed teen recrufted earlter an co EEE NRL by for use in a special operation in the Congo «(tise (O'Donnell made a survey of the scene, decided he wanted no part in Yee wee j an assassination attempt, and asked to be released--which BisseLL een cate Granted.) The project name, ZANIFIE, firss arpears in the Ailes in May 1951, although the first recorded approval is dated 19 February tt gee ! 1962. Tae new DD/P (Helus) on that date authorized Harvey, by es ae toe tee toe eo eee eT ES oe Shere na a es Lo coer Syrpaecet at. wy, ea Freee ya Sie fy Tye as tears wear eet oe. Fee Ayre Foe ep ania lap bi cadre Ran aber emmenarmaert onek Selatan oh. Se RE: oars Oe «bss ee Fe Pe ae ee lalate aad aaah Rinne aioe omen Ho rene meme: 2: SRE eRe

90000 ees re ee ere, tah + hots BTS ABA! BE ORME PQ om Hove ae Spore Tir if "as os tae we ©. > “pee oa & se te te ee te ee ee a maid MALTA Sec co ema me ~eimsiomemns Be lee Reg Newer Tt ER Pb sees ee SN kee erin ete SESTERT Sear ALS expenditures was to be by Tate 1961 Early 1962 tds “was nencraddin, to handle the progect on a specia: basis. Accounting for geseral category end ou sarvey’s certifi- cation. The initial approval was for $14,700, consisting of $7,200. for QU4IN's eannval selary and $7,500 for operaticcal expenses. Project ZRRIZLZ was covered as an Fi/D cperaticn (ostensibly to develop a capability for eatering saves ecd for kidnapping couriers). It continued on a course separate from the Edvanis/gembling syndicate Esrvey has a note that on that dave he discussed with Bissell the application of the operation. against Castro until 15 Kovember 1961. ZFRIFLE progran to Cuba. Earvey says that Bissell instructed him to take over Edvards’ contact vith the criminal syadicate and thereafter t run the operation against Castro. Hervey adds that, as a completely unrelated development, shortly after this discussion with Bissell he vas told by Hels that he was to be placed in charge of the Agency's Cuba task force. era, em > + tae fhe te coe cars Harvey secalls that he was very busy vith a mmber of things in the period that folloved the discussion with Bissell that led to his taking over Edvards’ Castro operation. He vas curning over his responsibilities in FI/D. Ee ves working with NSA on the Martin/ oo Mitchell defection case. He was reading in on Cuba operations and

re sees Ors ste ae ck te ee tote wee Cf wag Tt oo ett te ee Bie ce ee taee ee tas berm 477+ oes ve St SRE ELI OLLIE wee coe te eee ee ee eS [eet ee et eee et Phim gi Sse oy 08 AP ees GE POET we Tae. pa e YF Pathe sme een ne coma EEN oT cal ws we en nd a vas engaged in daily seetisgs concerning uen. He attencéed a sta chie?s' conference in Panaca {a late Jaavary ani early redruary. BOHR Febreary March 1952 Harvey recalls a first meeting vith Edwards in Febreary 1gé2 i oa the subject of the Castro operation. He also recalls vorking out the details of the takeover during March. (Cement: After Earvey took over the Castro operation 3 van it as one aspect of ZRRIFIZ; however, he personally handled the Castro operation and did mot use any of the assets being developed in ZRRIFIE. He says that he scon came to think of tke Castro operation and TARIFLE es being synonymous. The over-ail Executive Action progres came to be treated in his mind as being synonymous vith QW, the azeat vorking on the over-all progras. He says that when he wrote of ZARIFLE/QIWIN the reference vas to mmomegams enn Executive Action Capability; when he used the cryptonym ZARIFLE alone, he was referring to Castro. He said that his correspondence @pseite Bibi Hh RARE RaP TAY TIER: ce never reeettere Be ony would disclose this distinction. We reviewed the. correspondence and found it for the most part unreve (After Earvey left Task Force W and vas winding up ‘his headquarters responsibilities {n preparation for assignment to Ste Poe 7 Rose, he wrote a mezorandus to the Chief, FI Staff, dated 27 June. ph reall Eee: as “hog 83D loaar 75 yey eae 5 et ae ar Ce reer mae Pa pars ae Toe eo ee ene ee TRE ie ane na

24-90C09 1953, stating that the original justifieatioa for exploying ot QisTI no longer existed end raising the q:estion of QU4IN's i tersination, The records (CLIA-197%, 2% April. 195%) show that mad QIN vas tersizated by the Luzenbourg Station on 21 April af 196:. There is no indications in the mule that the Executive Action Capability of ZaaIz/Gidill wus ever used.) April 1962 Edwards recalls Harvey coatacting him ia April and asking to be § put in touch with Besellf. Edwards cays that he verified Felus‘ C: approval and then made the arzargenents. Farvey states that he triefed Hels before hfs first neeting vith Roselli, explaining its purpose, and that he also reported to Helms the results of his meeting with be Roselli. Harvey states that thereafter he regularly briefed Helms on the status of the Castro operation. ree (Coment: Edvards statement that he “verified Helms* xi approval” is the earliest iniication ve have that Mr. Helms had Pre wre been nade vitting of the gaz=bling syndicate operation against Castro. Harvey added tat, vhen he briefed Helzs on Roselli, ( i he obtained Helns' approval not to trief the Director.) Eévards, Harvey, and O'Camell have differing recollections-of the specifics of the turnover frea Edvarts/O'Comell to Harvey. Mot CO. DIT oT. yy er. 6 fea ipo 7 + ame TR ae Te re ee, oe oe an ee

Ae hehehaall free. all of tee éifferences can be resolysd--no0% evea dy follow-up interviews in suich *re information furmiszed by each was chected with each of the other tvo. There is no disagreenent on tre fact of the turnover nor on when it tock place. The recollections vary deciéedly, though, on the status of the operation at the tine of its transfer to Earvey and on just hoy clean the break «as betveen phase one under Edwards and phase tvo under Harvey, foc Edwards believes that the operation was called off i completely after the gay of Pigs and that there was no further i operatiosal activity in coasection with 1% until Harvey met stp C Rosell and reactivated the operation in April 1952. O'Connell {introduced Harvey to Roselli, and Edvards had nothing further tr do with the operation--with the exception of a meeting with Attorney General Robert Kennedy in connection vith the Phyllis McGuire wiretapping incident. (‘he wiretapping incideat is 4 described in a separate section of this report.) Edvards’ Tle records show that on 1 May 1962 Harvey called Réverds “and 21 QT aman ett» wD St indtcated that he was dropping any plans for the use of Roselli for the future.” i Earvey‘’s recollection of the turnover tends to suppers Edvards® summary, but he claims tzat he took over "a going operaticn.” Scene support for this claim is found in kis description BT hed tt ae ett Ip ae oe te aad Ps ooo TE RR EPC OR, ne ir wet SPT, ote ind

0O8.FRy em: fot. MER PERE RETAY SRE aeer culo eemeRe hRatEm me tae wo iy GRE wee Meee wee rcs Yoo “sy yy. ‘Ge 8 hae os oo of juct nos it was planced to get the poleoa into Castro’s food by employirg someone with access to a restaurant frequented by Castro’ The mechanics vere identical with those described by Edvards and as reported in our earlier account of phase one of the operation. e. O'Connell's account of his own role in the operation in the early weeks folloving Harvey's supposed takeover mikes it evident that there vas not a clean break between the Office of Security's sesponsibility and that of Harvey. Further, O'Connell mov believes that there must have been “scmething going on” between April 196L (after the Bay of Pigs) and April 1962, but he claims to be unable to remember any of the particulars. There are other disagreements among the three on facts. They are reviewed here, not because they alter the essential fact of the turnover or of Harvey's sole responsibility for the operation after @ certain point in tine, but because they suggest that persons who vere supposedly unwitting of events efter the turnover were in fact “witting, because they were not effectively cut off At the instant of turnover. Harvey's notes show that he and OComnell went to Hew York City to meet Roselli on the &th and 9th of April 1952. O'Connell recalls it as being early in April end that the introduction was cede on a ‘eo tssSid wees cogs commer ese mens schoe cre mene

-O0000 estes wow PES SEEN OT oy meena: ee errpaten Htete Gegmst ee atte, Sunday, weica worla maze it ite 8th. Harvey says that only he end O'Conrell met vith Roselli; O'Connell says that Haheu was also pe Percnc present at the meeting. Zozc are positive er the eccuracy of thetr at vos recollections, and each gives reasons for bis coatidence in his Clarity of recall. The significance, for purposes of ‘thts. inquiry, is whether Msheu Cid or did sot know that the opereticn continued Won, under Earvey. a. Harvey is certain that he would have remembered it if Maheu were present. He and Maheu were in the same FBI training ov Py RES class at Quantico in 1940. %e does not remember having seen C Maheu since he, Harvey, cene with the Agensy in 1947, although ke acknowledges that he may have seen him once or tvice socially. He is sure he has not seen Maheu since 1952 when Harvey vas assigned te Berlin. OfConnel, who set up the meeting, is just as positive BRA HR PE PED SURE LARS dBaS WnRENEA TA YP ae that Maheu vas there. Ee describes a series of events that a reassure his of the accuracy of his memory. ‘fhe four of then OT peavete seperately to New York. They met at the Savoy Plaza ‘Hotel (Savoy Hilton?) where all four stayed. After discussions, Maheu suggested dinner aS the Elx Room, a fashionable restanzant in a nearby hotel. O’Comell says thet Makeu picked up the tab. oo They finished dinner ebout 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. Roselli wanted to i soe age a ree ells, mere Sei sigss Sgett, pe SD eT, th Ee GR 2g Ste Sage ot ee Lyi 207 Lge “pinecone rect aoe eae embry: ic coil ee eas:

0000 Roselli left New York for Miami the next day (presumably 10 April) buy tae group a nigazcap, out since it was Simeay afgh« avarly all of the cers vere closed. They walzed aroucd the neignbor- hocd locxing for an open bar aod firally sound. up at the Copecabana. ‘hey vere refused admittance to the bar because of @ rule restricting admissioca to couples, co they cat at @ table where they could watch the floor shev. Roselli fourd tisself facing a table at “ringside” at which Poyllis McGufire was sitting with Dorothy EKilgallen and Liberace for the opening night of singer Rosemary Clooney. To avoid Payllis McGuire's seeing hin, Roselli got his ccupanions to change their seating arrangenent so that his back vas turned to Miss McGuire. Mabeu vas an integral part of allthis. (Roselli's reason for not waating Phyllis McGuire to see him with his compantons vill. becose evident frou Ler role in the wiretapping incident, vhich is described im a separate section of this report.) The two aitrering recollections camot be reconciled. As a point of interest, Havards stated that when he briefed Harvey on the operation "he deliberately anitted reference to Mahen in order to screen Maheu ‘off fros Earvey's takeover of the operation. The next significant point of difference has to do with vkat happened after the New York meeting. O'Connell teld us that te and Tee 2 (3) cals O94 oe POE os

14-00000 on. tee % and remained there uatil Harvey arrived. Earvey, on the other kacd, recalls a reeting with ('Comell aad Roselli in Washington on lk April. O'Connell, at first, did not recall the Washingtca meeting, but, when given Hervey's. chronology, he said ke did recall returning to i Washington to reet Eervey for seme perpose but trat the details are t vague in his nind. Harvey at Yirst thought that the 1s April meeting in Washington vas O'Connell's last contact with Roselli during this sector’ phase of the gambling syndicate operation. O'Connell told us “0tms compton. AERin CR ET Otel PER SR Teel a eee ig in wens PES PAA. ese “uae 10. eee TT ie Gperation had definitely ended by Jume 1942 when he was assigned FCS ey wma oe that Roselli was apprehensive over the new arrangement (ana of Earvey personally) and asked 9’Connell to re=ain on for a time, which O'Connell agreed to do. When told that O'Coarellvas sure that he had continued on in the operation for sone two or three weeks after Harvey's take- over, Harvey agreed that this was correct. O'Connell's carryover was for purposes of continufty., We caanct be sure of the date O'Conzell vas finally eliminated fros the operation. He was in Miami with ‘Roselli and Harvey perhaps as late as 27 April. His role in the to Ocinava. Harvey recalls leaving Washington for Miemi by automobile on 1G April. He thought that he took delivery of the pills from Dr. Gunn before leaving. Gunn has no record of any such deliveryat that tine; his last record concerning pills is dated February 1961. tS bat FVVwIs wae I ee ES prarkteag ana ila, olLaweeg Sago ctiai. ee tet gee spears OA Tote. Be FT yet te eet gira thet. “Elegy oP Pa, Raty ae wee toe arene dechoned cates ce oe owt oo at. ese iia Tame ge BR PF RRS EEE REISS Sieh TERRE Oey SOREL Se ce wae Ray inate aoe he ge ar tem afer mene +

24-90C09 ia ii hell el Tee ed a. does have a cotetion of delivering four pills (one capsule acd tiree teblets) to "J.0." on 18 April 1962. reeas his as being Jism O'Connell. When told of this, Harvey agreed that it was protably correct. O'Connell elisa feels that he must have been in Washington for the pill delivery. Harvey says that he arrived in Miemi on 2) April 1942 and found 4 Roselli, already in touch with Tony Verona, the Cuban exile leader vho 7 bad participated in phase one. It is at this point that the final of aifference in recollections occurs. Earvey described the manner in Which the lethai material waa to be introtuced into Castro's food, ye IC > involving an asset of Varora's vho had access to someone in @ restaurant frequented by Castro. We told Harvey that Edvards had described precisely the same plan. When ve asked Harvey hov Edvards could have Imown of the mechanics if there had been no activity in the operation fora year, and if Harvey was starting again from scratch, Harvey replied that he took over a going operation--cne that vas patie an already “in. trein.”. Edvards denies that this is so. O'Connell, says 4 that Harvey is the one who is right. ‘The operation was going on when Harvey took it over, although O'Connell does not remember when Varora was yeactivated or what had been done with hin in the meantine.. Along with the change in Agency leadership of the operation, which sav Harvey replacing E@vards/O'Connell, there also vere changes & abr euro og}

etal rirs es omet? fia the orisimal cast of hocdiws piayers. Earvey specified that GLencaca was rot to be orought in on «se re: ctivatioan of the oretica, ete a, ead ke believes thet Boselli honored the request. Roselli ance oe var rapovted to Earvey that Giancaca nad esved if enything vas goirg oa, and’ when Roselli said chat notzing «as ceppering, Clancara said, "Goo bad." ASditicnally, Zantos TrezMtcente ("Jce, the courfer"™ trea the earlier phase) was no longer involved. With the closing of the oes ete ree last casino in Havarca in Saptemter 1901, Trafficante presimably so longer had access. Roselli now had a can know to Earvey as Maceo, who also used the rames Garcla-Gomez ace Godoy. St ame tee ce (Consent: Harvey is unable further to identify Maceo; he descrites ‘him as “a Cuban who spoxe Italian.” One of Varoza's associates in the Cuban exile comrmity vas named Antonio MACZO Meckle, but it seems unlikely that he was the Maceo of this operation. He vas promizent erozgh in the exile ceummity to 4 have been known to Harvey. Further, it seems clear that Maceo ot was “Roselli's man." This secord phase appears to lack the overshe: high-level gangster flavor that characterized che first phase. Roselli rercained es a prominent figure in the operation, but working directly with the Cutan exile comnmity ee and directly on behalf. of CIA. Roselli vas essential to the secord Pease as a contact wlth Verone, who preswzabdly still TS sete ee AR eu. fe mete en, er, oo ‘a nec Set wea eee PE geet es we tl te ene went Be Ie wee tt vay te twee SAT Le ere te SS aa? Fate TS OR, Bee heesiger ete gies petty Desens yet erties eae eS Co ee INES ind sat ee Be ee pe st

14-00000 be old wh Se “a4 wn, i i, believed ke was teing Supported by U.S. orsicesscea vith ficse is: sakes Cusa. Roselli needed Glancena end Trafficante in the first phese as a means of estabiisafcg contacts inside Cuba. ieciies tc Be did not reed them in the second phase, because he had Yarona. Eowever, it would be ratve to sssiume that Foselli did not take the precaution of intormaing highrer-ups in <ne syndicate treat he was working in we territory cexnsidered to be the private demain of stmeone else in the syndicate.) 7 "Wen the pills vere given to Varoza throwgh Nosellf, Varona. requested ams and equipment needed for tue support of his end of the Operation. Roselli passed the request to Earvey. Harvey, with the ep mene help of Ted Shackley, the chief of the JMAAVE Statica, procured explosives, detonators, tventy .30 caliber rifles, twenty .4§ caliber mee hand guns, tvo radios, ani one boat radar. Easvey says that the. ohare or “shopping list™ inclnjed same items that could be obtained only from the 0.S. Goverment. Harvey axitted those itens, because Roselli, posing as a revresentetive of private besiness interests, would not e To eS 00110 ANIA ag aie + have hed access to such equipeent. ‘The cost of the arms and equiment, about $5,000, was T/A'd to headquarters. Earvey and Shackley rented ea U-Haul track under en assumed rene, ctitmeee loaded it with the ams and equimzeat, ant parsed {+ in the parking lot DAD Ob BORE aE of a drive-in restaurant. ‘The keys vere then given to Roselli for Lo Cobo yo wee ee Bae. aa ote emetbe tee ? pie ea. a agrees er ne Teron Sevnieiin eh Ae, iT iim pe anette 2 san en OTe Mien Bree oe “He vt is este 5 ory acoull ont. Tes ras SS Pee mere, wnt “st Selec ETE 3% ta Soe aera an Raa oy

14-00000 RE DBRT: BIT ES ETAT, RT ig Sra oa aera Nees oa Pet mee ip ge Oe et ne re ere ee ee ee ete ae ee a oe Ft ete om, ree oe, elivery elizer to Maceo, to Yarona, or vo Varoza's son~in-leyw. Dvidestly Eearrey and Roseil{f rad not ;et caoce to “rust each otrer. Pertaps fearicg a dcuble-cross, each cet abcut independently to assure himself that the equiment reached the proper hands. After pardicg the truck, Harvey and Snackley kept the parking lot, under surveillance until the pass vas completed. Poselit, acconpanied cy O'Coanell, did the ‘same. Neither pair knew that the other vas i watching. Eventually the truck was picked up sad driven away. It was returned later, empty, and with the keys uncer the seat as i prearracged. Harvey returned it to the rental agency. Harvey says IC. that Saackley never knew to whom delivery was sade ror for wnat) purpose. Shacvley was merely called upon to furnish support for a headquarters operation fros which he was othervise excluded. i May 1962 4 2 Harvey end Roselli arranged a system of telephone communication wee: eg by vhich Harvey vas kept posted on any develoments. Harvey, using a ae "pay phone, could call Roselli at the Friars Club in Los Angeles at 1500 hours, Los Angeles time. Roselli could phone Eavvey at Harvey's home in the evening. Rosell reported thet the pills vere in Cuba and at the restaurant reportedly used regularly by Castro. weet eee de le Te Vee er Saee) ab) Ange see eee! lage es. Seine arte os tae ime tee mewn’ Maen pet ti teres 1560 tS ce laa’

14-00000 seein Cees vt pies a GPeNs oman wee ewes eee on ume 1952 Reselil reported to Zarvey on 21 June that Varcoa had dispatched. @ team of three nen to Cuba. Just what they were supposed to do is pretty vague. Earvey” said that they appeared to rave no specific plan for killing Castro. They were to recrult otters who mignt be tA used {nr such a scheme. If an opportumity to kill Castro presented a itself, they or the persons they recruited vere to make the atteapt-~. pernaps using the pills. Barvey never learzed their names or anything else about them. From the sequence of the reports, it would sees that the pills were sent in ahead of the three-man teen, but this is not row ascertainable. Cony ‘September 1962 Harvey sav Roselli in Miami on 7 and on 11 September. Varoza was reported as then ready to send in another team of three men. They ee BS GID nap were supposedly militia men whose assignzent was to penetrate Castro's pe an body guard. During “this period the “medicine” vas reported as still i fim place and the three men of the first team safe. Septenber 1962 Jenrary 1963 Although Harvey received several reports that the nilitia zen tere 7 poised to taxe off, presmaoly frou scuevhere in the Floride keys, ghee 8 ae bis ek ARI OMB SREP ee ere meen ne sire 2h ew heat ome panei 2ane Bree fae ot Tak La TY ASS SB of eet we Me aE 3 7 UT ae oe gt te el ate ot rec oe Se mF ga tee, weetetc re Oo ES Ten ST eg ce DF Fede ee ee ee en ie eg TNR sae lee adr ate BP lee ey Ls tae we Bo ertaide tee me cee cacreondaciend Hemet £60 ainaeie meat teed eth, tn ee Be eestti3 Race ebieihs Sigel ae SPR SPT coe be Eee PPE Tastee lig. gh 82 REALE oy BA EEF ER OR AEE ESE PBI F ELE AM Fiore Saree (ear paren S4- ra oF le, OE ae seer teeth mS Sees eB we ee pe bet ee ee es ee BR ye ae eo ee te OR, Ct ee ee ee and we av 2

they did nos actually leave. First, “soniitions inside” were givea as the reason for delay; then the Cotscer nicsile crisis threw plans ewcy. Earvey was in Mienl vevseen 22 Decencer and 6 January. fe saw en i both Roselli and Maceo several <ises duricg that period. He made a ot paynent of $2,700 to Peselli for passing Varoza for the expenses of” i the three militis men. Harvey and Rosell! had telepnore discussicns of the operation between 11 and 15 Jenuary. Harvey says that Roselli wasn't kidding himself. Ee agreed with Earvey that nothing vas happening and that there vas not much chance thet anything vould happen in the future. As far as Esrvey kcovs, the three militia men never did leave for Cuta. Ee knows nothizg of viat may have happened to the’ three reported to have been sent to Cubs. February 1963 Harvey was in Niamé ll-ls February.” He had no contacts with any so, of the principals, but he left word for Maceo that there was nothing ‘pew and that it now looked as if it were all over. (Just how Harvey en “left this vord for Maceo is not clear.) Harvey left Mieni on 15 rebruery to meet with Roselli in Los Angeles. They agreed at the Los Angeles meeting that the operation i would be closed off, but that it would te unwise to attempt a precizitate i break betveen Roselli and Verona. Roselli agreed that he would continue i ree ar se eet ye et, nt ae ee of OR Le serene in tte wey gem. ep ae” se ae pee a — BO etree BL eee ae tee stteewae os emtee Cee a

14-00000 Te OE amen omen CPR des we NR? “Weame. ARR CES ERRER Ee MLER OU SOT aD wT CEES PCR! TENE 5 ENG abe“ then closed his om home in preperetion for leaving the country and ee ns sane + we we me to ese Verona, gredvally reducing *he frequency of contact uatil Gere W2S mone. April Bay 1953 Earvey cays that he received tvs teleptoze calls from Roselli during this period. Harvey decided tiat it would be best to have ose last reeting vith Roselli before he left for his assigument in Roxe. cee The me He states that he reported this decision to Mr. Eelms who gave his approval... 2. June li Roselli came to Washington to reet with Harvey sometime about the middle of Jume. Harvey met him at Dvlles airport. Harvey remembers having suggested to Roselli tkat he bring caly carry-on luggage so there vould be no celay at the airport avaiting beggage. Harvey had by i as living in the house of a neighbor who was out of town. Roselli ae aE “Btoyed vith Harvey as a houseguest tke neighbor's home. That evening Roselli, Harvey, and Hrs. Earvey went out for dinner. While dining, Harvey received a phone cell fron Sam Papich who wanted to mew 4f Harvey knew the identity of his dincer guest. Harvey said that he did. Red bey eh 5 te TR tee Rem ee De Poop tet oe ve aSeenet eek hone Es 43 nee: en Rae as eR ater ae Feeaeons CASTES SOIT BESS, ORT it aN a at Pe oe ese aes, Hs AS: Naat hie ERR sobre Roe erat ee aA Relic an PST BNET ee ee res eete ml tee we

24-90C09 Daten nn rien sane satine wee + iY Oe Le sondage OH OES 28 fo. although be has heard from bim since then. ate em, It subseguentiy developed that the TEL nad Hozelli uncer intensive Gurvelllance at che tine, an@ Farvey specula whee ke was piczed vz as he left the airport parking lot and vas ideatiMed through his auto wens Bae license muber. Earvey met Pepich for breakfast the next morning aod explained that he wes ternicating an oneratfonal essociation with Roselli. Papich reninded Earvey of the FAI rule requiring FRE personnel to repors any known contacts between former FBI employees and criaizal elements. Papich said that te would have to report to J. Edgar Hoover that Harvey bad been seen with Roselli. Earvey said he understood Papich's situation and did sot object to such a report being made. Harvey said that he asked Papich to infom hin in advance if it appeared thet Eoover might call Mr. HeCone--Harvey's point being that he felt that McCone should be briered before receiving call from Hoover. Papich agreed to do so. Earvey said that he then told Mr. Eelus of the inciéent and that Helms agreed that there vas no need to brief HeCone wnless a call froa Eoover was to be expected. Seis vas Harvey's lest face-to-face meeting with Roselli, dae Tre later links between Harvey and Roselli are described in a separate section of this report. The list of persons witting of the second phase of the operation divfers from those who mew of the first pnase. Tose we have ideniifled Soe At wg eae ss ee ree deere Bate earth weet ene: asi Mogens oe si Seeger mares

90000 Mow seiget tee 1. Richerd Zeles, Deputy Director far Plans 2. Willies Harvey, Cotef, ‘isk Force @ 3. .Jenmes O'Connell, Office of Security (He knove that Harvey nt neti took over the operation and delivered pilis, arss, and 4 equiprent in April 1962. He does not mow of developments after May 1962.) 4. Shef?tela Edwards, Director of Security (Ze kmovs of the fact of the turnover to Earvey, wut states be knovs nothing of develoments therea*ter.) 5. J.C. King, Chief, WH Division (Ee stated in our interview with him that he krew that Harvey was having reeticgs with: A members of the gambling syndicate in 1962.) 6. Bruce Cheever, Barvey's deputy in 1962 (Cheever txows that Harvey was meeting with gangsters in Beno (sic) in the winter of 1562.) ben my 7. Ted Shackley, Chief, JMWAVE (He assisted Harvey in the delivery of arns and equiprent to Varceza in April 1962, but presumably did not kmow the identities of the recipients nor the purpose for which the material was to be used.)- 8. _|ssp participation vas limited to furnishing the pills to O'Camell on 13 April 1962.) ones 20 SE Beat Gir fly 9. Antonio Varona, the Cuban exile leader (He presumably vas not avare of goverment sponsorship.) oe ne 20. Varona's son-in-law (He too was presumably vas not evere of Syne the govermment’s role.) a Li. Maceo, Roselli.'s “man” (Maceo probably kmew there vas a government comection, but may not have idertified CIA as on evant the egency.) 4 We can only conjecture es to who else may Lave known at least that the operation was coatinuing and perhaps soue of the details. San r Ture Cys Pee ert se hte wt “4b dame aah. x re, Cae pa noe sascha’. STEABRON tetas EAs pm ee oe tel ele neers etn ae OF gree, Re eee oe Oe ee re oe ee ee in ell As ee ee pr iets Seder Peart dee SE ee Se ee Be ee Sa te Tree Tot

0000 th ag3y PEE ee ghee me PRE Migs Rear eeees ee ce of the channels through which the story may have raessed. Gilancasca was supposedly cut ous of che second parse, but se cannot be sure that Roselli did not keep hin informed. of Santos Trafficante. Farvey's introduction to + Maheu participated. The story that Drew Pearson ‘told the President, acd suspiciously like this second phase of the operation. then it is Lively that the operation has leaked-~-perhaps through these channels: Roselli to Maheu Makeu to Edvard P. Morgan, Haheu's Washington lawyer Morgan to Drew Pearson Pearson to Chief Justice Warren and to the President Warren to Rowley, chier of the Secret Service Rowley to Pat Coyne and to the FBT The FAI to Attorsey General Clark fos te We have a more detailed treatment in a separate section of this x a yer) 7437 wWaicn {s mown in other Goverment circles, sounds Tae sase cay be said Farvey is sure that Maheu vas not involved in to Roselli, but O'Connell is equally positive Iz ‘that 158 50, report ae cmme ext oo snes gp nee

24-90C09 wer ete oe tara oo tattrs ae, AAS RRR Renae ee met th eee + eee en Gem: 14 te hey eo Die ee ke te “Maheu was indebted to his. Giancena said that if ‘Naheu wouldn't me eke Tae dtretaveing Insideat late 1901 Esrly 1062 Weil after the Pre-Say of Pigs phase of the gambling syndicate operation to aasassinate Castro, and caly indirectly related to it, a development in the private life of Sem Glancara led to an incident that rade the FBI avare of th: Agency's relationship with the syndicate aod required the briefing of the Attorney General on the details of the assassination plas. Fhyllis McGuire, of the singing McGuire sisters, was and is Openly known to be Giancena'’s mistress. Giancana suspected her of having an affeir with Dan Rovan, of the Rowan end Martin canedy tean. Both Rovan and Miss McGuire were then entertaining in Las Vegas, and Glancana asked Maheu to put a bug in Rowan's room. Maheu did not vant to do the job and declined on tke grounds that he wesn't equipped for that sort of work. Gianceana made a claim for a return favor: he had worked on the Castro assassination operation for Maheu, and. Can take om the job, he, Glancara, would go to Las Vegas and do it hinself. Makeu agreed to arrange to have the room bugged. (Comment: The exact date of this is uncertain. An August 1953 ites on Glancaza im the Chicago Sun-Tines refers to the incident, without westion of wiretapping, and sets the year as SM gn sy nae ne al TRF ate Am wee Oe Sete oat eh ae ee tee eee mam ete HE mee fame, + he, ateagtd wena eae

0000 a °F hens oe ee ns on wri Rae oe ie es votes 19éL. Tnere is nothing in Ageacy flles what piapoints the date, and the memories of these ve {nverviewcd who mow of the incident os are hazy. YEdévards and O’Cosrell did not lear of the incident 4d until after it had happened. Zavards can place it only as being after the Bay of Pigs. O'Conzell et “trst thought that it vas ion early 1962. When shown the sevspaper accoumt, O'Concell said that if the news story vas correct, it would have had to nave been very late in 1961. An Office of Security semorandum to the DCI, of 24 June 1966, states that it ve2 "et the height of the project i negotietions.” This is confusing, rather then clarifying, because C the operation vas supposedly at dead standstill in late 1961 and very early 1962. Clearly the incident occurred before 7 February 1962, because it was on that date that the Director of Security told the Far that CIA would object to prosecution. Presumably the Fal's case was already complete by then.) Maheu arranged to have Giancana‘s request handled hy Edward Le Di Bots, a private investigator in Miext. Du Bots assigned tvo nen ae to the job: Arthur J. Balletti and J. W. Harrison. (Comment: The September 1966 classified telephone directory, for the Greater Miemi Area lists Edward L. Du Bois under “Detective Agencies." There is an advertisezent on the raze for "Arthur J. Balletti Tavestigations® waich lists as one of 220 ETM NETL Qe Rath em et see, ta te tnetnt weave wes yo PE GREE ROTEL 0A sO Oe YES 08 ae pears tS tarts ome et moe gt Sar wee te et. MEP “see eee gee Te Hie", boon sata ie gem ee ete on poe vara os Meat eee sabato rdyiaee nme cei toae SE Naat os OE pene wont oe

qeate ree Cae cae SR EMOTE OM Ae) eed BAG o.vm wy Od wee (PewaT! Ebadi Re PAE PEGs we ww on ery erry Macece his spectalties the obtaining of photographic and electronic evidence.) O'Connell rmcalls that, insteed of planting a picrophone in Rovan's roor, the investigator tapped the telephone, which would not have revealed the sort of intimacies that Giancana expected to discover. When Rowan left the rocm to do a show, Balletti also le?t his roca to see the act, leaving his equipcent out in full sight and rimaing. It was found by a maid, and the local sheriff's office was called. Balletti was arrested. Harrison was not piczed up. Agency personne) have no further inforration adout Harrison. The FBI identified hin only as being “supplied by Mahev.” *Balletta first tried to telephone Du Bois for help but could not reach him. He then called Maheu, in the presence of the sheriff's officers. O'Connell says that Maheu was able to fix the matter with local las Vegas authorities, perhaps with kelp from Roselli. Hovever, ‘Balletti's call to Maheu caused the case to reach the FBI. The Bureau decided to press for prosecution under the wiretapping statute. “When Maheu vas approached by the FBI, he referred them to the cra Director of Security, Sheffield Eavaris. (Cament: Edwards states that he hed told Meheu, who hed to work closely with the thugs, that if ke got into a bind vith: the FBI, he could tell the 3Sureau that he was vorking on an wat, wel3$ S38 abo pee cece’ bayew ce ata ae Sane Re moh ae ae lee en One ee wane. Liat? ES Bye Sa RISES € we Rowta eee oere ae ome segs EE os wed Wee tube 44 vom we eet

G00 bord Aa Pe tye inteLiigeuze operation being handled by Eawards. Hakeu, accorling to Edvwaris, told the Bureau taac ce kad not personally done the wiretapgizg, but that it grew out of an operation he was working on with Eduards. Meseu presuzably did not mentian the ultimate objective of the "intelligence operation” involving the gacbling syniicate. ‘The Bureeu, ina nencrandim from J. Zdgar Boover to the DCI, dated 23 March 1962, stated that: “Mehkeu claimed that he ordered coverzge of Rowan in tebalf of CIA's efforts to et ae ete mee sete severe obtain intelligence inforsation in Cuba through the hoodliuss element, inclading Sam Giancara, which Eed interests thers. Maheu C said he was put in contact with Glancana in connec-:lon with these H intelligence activities through John Reselli, a Los Angeles hoodlum. Makeu authorized viring of Rowan’s room and discussed this matter vith John Boselli.“) March 1 The 23 March merorandin tras the Bureau takes the form of a4 oo, oa + letter of confirwation of a 7 February meeting between an unnemed piee doo representative of the FBI and Shef Edvaris. The penorandus quotes Edwards as having made the following points: Makeu was involved in a sensitive operetion with the Agency; the Agency would object to any prosecution that would necessitate use of CIA personnel or information; poy RORY ere BENTO LIER RS ot) oars PreT Re akin ENN Ce. wok a x4 cad eee On ght ot ae Fr eR Bw ray tee TS fad 2. mee tees ewe ete nee el eameptieine age, Sa FS ae oh eas ion va as SIE ond RR ee om wer ots ot pew r

0000 Ghee EIS Sent de EER asd introduction of evicence scacernisg CZA cperaticns would eabarrass i the Goverasent. This is elso essentially as stated to uz by Etvards % in revieving the incident during the course of this investigation. The 23 March memorandus stated that the Crininal Division of the tg ih & hye eo ee i> Demrtment of Justice requested that CIA advise specifically if it ty objecved to initiation of crisinal prosecution egainst Balleti, Maheu, end Harrison. On 28 or 29 March, Sdverds met with the Bureau liaison officer, Sam Papich, and told hin that any prosecution would endanger sensitive sources and methcds used in a duly authorized project ard vould not be fin the national interest. Papich accepted j C Edvards’ oral statement as the reply requested and said that ke would Rhew we i report to proper authorities in the Bureau. Edwards made a record i. of the meeting in a mezorandim of & April 1942. Edwards informed us during our inquiry that at the time of the j bugging incident and the flap that ensued those (Dulles and Bissell) i who kad given the initial epprovel of the plan to assassinate Cestro through the gambling syndicate were gone. As no one else in authority (including Mr. Helms) had been cut in on the operation, Edwards dealt with Papich without reference to amyone else in the Agency. a st Avril 1962 In early April Papich informed Eivaris that Herbert J. Miller, Fa OD, -61l- ! tea 61 e sy ereeey TET SM ce? er? ee TY Pe) ee FS we eel EEO, PE el PROT AO” —ewoe 4 ee ee Ot oat 3S oe os eae re 2M ee ae ee Be hs cree “Pte GBR et. ert Ee on oe ore Ra EAS TOMER SEF. Sree

0000 Assistant Attorney Generel ia charge of the Crimisai Division of tae 4 Departsert of Justice, wanted to discuss the case. Edwards tas ry Drought in Lawrense Houston, Gereral Counsel, and asked Houstoa to naan F call on Miller and tell hin that the bugging ‘ncizent in Las Vegas f was related to an intelligence Operation and that the Agency did not think it wise at that time to surface its conzection with Roselli. Houston met with Miller on 16 April and told hin of the Agency's involvecent, without revealing any details of the assassination operation. Houston’s memorasdim of the meeting, dated 26 April, quotes 7 Milier as saying that he foresaw uo sajor difficuity in stopping ao prosecution, but that he might mention the probles t> the Attorney Yor General. Houston's remorandus notes that Miller reised a question about the possibility of our involverent in this particular case, the Las Vegas viretap, standing in the way of prosecution of other actions, particularly against Giancana. Ms Houston's 26 April merorandus states that on 20 April there vas eile second meeting vith Justice—vith Miller's first assistant, Mr. Foley. ie "At that meeting Horston told Foley that the Agency's request not to: Sade se RF prosecute vas linited to this specific bugging incident, was based on i security grounds, end that security considerations would not be a bar to prosecution on other matters. As it was possible that the Attorney General might be told ebout this and might then cell the DCI, Houston of. ee pik etieee tt FRET aCe oro oe arn atta’ — ee mes ener ted tat we seme oe Bote aie em cts ole a ones FD in a Poymer he Debt eae SELENE RS Her: Pes een rea ar — we eet FTI se nae 7 aaa te tenes ere ge ved Ae ha Ret etiwee ote ee Fm ee Se we ee Sn ee, So ne. oe hic VID eee

0000 bPegt er ot FER TP “7 TERS. PN ARES PRA ng PH Mews O80: Sho Sore “ig op FF May 1962 briefed the DDCI, General Carver, weo sald be underscood the sitcation end in due tine ofgnt cote? the Director, Mr. NeCone. whether General Cerzer 2id or cid not brie? Mr. MeCone. Is is not soswn There {s no indication that General Carter vas further briefed on the full detatis of the assassiration gist against Castro. The Attorney General obviously was told of CIA's operational involvement vith gangster elestents, because he req:ested a briefing on the details. On 7 May 1962 Sheffield Edwards and Lawrence Houston me with Attorney Generel Potert Kennedy and, as Edvards puts it, "briefed hin all the May." Houston says that after the briefing Kennedy “thought about tte problem quite sericusly." The Attorney General said that he could see tne problem end that he could not proceed ee, against those involved fn the wiretapping case. Ee spoke quite firaly, saying in effect, "I trust that if you ever try to do business with orgenized crine again--vith gangsters-~you will let the Attorney General know before you do it.” ( Houston quotes Edvards as replying that this was a reasonable request. Ravards says that anong the points covered was that of Reseili‘s motivation. The Attorney General had thought that Roselli was doing the job (the actenpt at assassination of Castro) for money. E-wards corrected thst iopression; he was not. oF eR, peepee ee te ete eg eee eb er oe ay omg ch GOO LIES RACERS SE, EEIEP ze mo eee is wrbi ie Cet: via dem oP ots, pop ys see Se TR eet MEN PE ap EE PY ene ae Na TO ga Cnet tt 9s oat eat. PE Be BP rs WER OS AE oe jai So tal Nae aie eee yee ee eye Meee ee ve oe cao MTT eeTe te NF aoe oo eee coed wae weve ame eee ne Omen wee! tte anetee snap veme ee

200 ie oe we ee me eee rege nom es roe ao, 63 a cara yer we tare ee et eters Leyte et ON eee rete ha mad 2 x i eae’ a: + ao Sentinel er ee Ses elk tg eee we cs tae nF ae > eee! Se re er als Seed aea aes DEEL notey tat Sas ects aie ESTs AE Een few etgs 0S Ea PELE Ora nes BET maT Homer: TS < Nrks 7 “7 ere Sas inl Ge > fie acsts Sete een “plop, ee em em EN te we ¥ or tele ote MN. ere eter es Ft ee east teme oo be Coa he es. el ech ep Ne me. yet ema. afae C..42R weet RY SBE Oe WET eran ose asta) oe Uiis Mouston recalls that during the meeting with the Attormey Geseral the letter ested for a memorandua record of the meeting. Pdvards belfeves that the request was made later and by telephone. A wenorandus was prepared and was signed by Edwards. Both Cavards end Houston recall heving bed a hand in writing it. A transof{<cal buck- ens slip from Houston to Kennedy notes that the request was mace on 1. May, which suggests that Fduards is correct in his belfef that the request vas made by telephore after the 7 May briefing of the Attorney grees General. ‘he memorandum is dated 24% May 1042. Tt. wag tyred fn tvo amet copies only, with the original beirg sent to Attorney General Kennedy and the other copy being retained by the Director of Security. It was typed by Edvards’ secretary, Sarch Hall. It does not state the “purpose of the operation on vhich Kennedy vas briefed, but it does wake it clear that the operation was against Castro aud its true purpose may be inferred fras the menorandim. Edvards states taat the briefing of the Attorney General and the forvarding of a memorandum of record was carried out without “briefing the Director (Join McCone), the IDCI (General Carter), or the DD/P (Richard Helms}. Ee felt that, since they had not been privy to the operation when it was wider way, they should be protected fros involvement in it after the fact. As noted previously, Houston had briefed the DDCI on the fect that there was a matter involving the

4-90000 ar ha or an cee ees tm enw wf es £ Peeks et loaf wasted ase ow Weems Department of Justice, out Esuston Lad 19+ gives the DOCI the specizics. Ee feels it would nave teen normal Jor nis to ksva briefed tie DCI- in view of the Attorney Geseral's interest, but ke also feels quite Sure hat/raula have remembered doing 1t and he cces not. He suggested that Edvards' Celiverate avoidance of such briefings may have led his ‘also to avoid mexing any briefings. de recalls no disagreements with Edvards oa this point and concludes tnat be must have accepted Edwards’ decision not to brief. so Houston anil Edwards briefed Robert Kennedy on a CIA operation ere enbracing gangster elements, which presumably was terminated following al tet C the Bay ox Pigs fiasco. Kennedy stated his view, reportedly quite Call strongly, that.the Attorney General should be told in advance of any future CIA fatentions to vorx vith or through U.S. gangster elezents. Fron reports of the briefing, it is reasorable to assume that Kennedy believed he had such a commitwent from Agency representatives. In fact, hovever, at the time of the 7 May 1962 briefing of the Attorney General on “Cambling Syndicate Phase Qze,".Phase Two under... 75 ie we Williem Earvey vas already well under way. Earvey had been introduced to Roselli on 8 April and Veroza or his men had received the lethal memes ae pilis, the arms, and related support equircent in Iate April.* The Attormey General was not told that the gambling syndicate operation ORES SAEED te FR MER eGR? te AIP SARL sat ERE had elready been reactivated, nor, as nr as we mov, was ke ever told i, oo g an oe oe or ae Seri ree cee rae teeth Tee epee ar — Le eteenee ent SP: naraisinss, mee cee ae Ce Bea, rk Reet BETO cs set bts oars oo soto. et. wr oe tee aes Jee tte ge cL ate 18 age ng weet ptieeias int m7 rae paw aes os etonh CE LE ees ae crite tabs care Oe ot Femmes nena ee te ee Bn ee er ram ere etnrem CE ate Ee em te neme

90000 eee as soe ween ween merges SEED TF ceed ta hss'e@ esd Vetwd om. that CIA hed a sconticufng involvecent with gangster eletents. When the Atcorzey General vas briefed o2 7 May, Edvaris knew ate that Hervey had been introduced to Roselli. ie rust also have mown that his subordizcate, James O'Connell, was in Mianf and roughly for what purpose (althougs Edvards does not nov recall this). ‘the gambling syndicate cperation rad bean taken from him, and, in xetruspect, he probably acted properly in briefing the Attorney General on only that aspect of the operation for which ke hed been resporsible aed and of which he tad direct, personal xnowledze. Earvey states tkat on 14 May he oriefed Mr. Helms on the meeting C with the Attorney General, as told to him by Edvards. Earvey, too, Pare HB ORTH gee advised egainst briefing Mr. McCone and General Carter and states that Helms concurred in this. Qn that same date, 14 May, Edvards prepered a memorandum for the record stating that on that day Harvey hed told his that any plans for future use of Boselli vere dropped. ee Beye Se tao", A wry, Gig Mares) tare HH ORRy ys Edédvanis’ memorandum ‘states that he “cautioned hina (Harvey) that woesuntat legs. Lene RFE AS ts west wa et ad aoe coe Tee Ey rae eg, (Eavards) felt that. “any future projects of this nature should have the bia si... “taett approval of the Director of Central Intelligence." Edvards” Toe informed us that he has no specific recollection of having told Harvey of Kennedy's warning that the Attorney Gereral should be told fn advance of any future CIA use of gangsters. cee WW Sea vere ge Be eet sine ae rr tome ye mm te Reel. eee ee ge Le ewe ete wm re ao toes near epee ae ia. eT Te ree he Se EY eee bk eee ST EEN NI SEE ey eee weet weriie > ye tae 27. oage ons SS re woes epee Tye het Sad tonal al nn es Set Joe conf Arete NE IT oe ere aye oo age eta ee eg ae feat pestweea ote tee So Powers SaaS, wee epee satel ate tecleae qertatte 5 ae Pred BOT fhataptegnednn roa cada peice ra wate nege see tome cre Neti ee wee

re gfe wr RN De enna ee Ate ee At sete i airating Freee Pes ope een Ba tages oa meee oben Se eh 7 rare we eee eh es we Beme ee TET ee re cee tee Cae cette oe Font aa Paes Although the Attorney General on 7 fresk account of the Azeacy's re vicas “Heowd “ey 1952 vas givea @ full and with Maheu, Roselli, and Edvards' memorandim on the 7 May 1962 meeting with Kennedy vhen Giancana in the Castro operation, including the wiretapping flap, {t appears that the FSI was not given anything like the same detail. Tae Sureau quite properly was not wold ebout the assassication Operation, and it seems that it also was not told how the private lite of Ciancana came to involve ‘the Agency in the Las Vegas vwire- tapping incident. Edvards states that to have briefed the Bureau on the assassinatioa operation vould have put it in an impossible bind, since both Roselli and Cisncana were high on the Bureau's “list.* The briefing of Attorney General Kenzedy was absolutely restricted to hin, aad ve can only speculate that the confidence was observed. (Comment: Senator Rotert Kannedy’s secretary, vho wes alsq his secretary when he vas Attoraey General, phoned the ne Director's office on 4 March 1967 and asked for a copy of the ‘eee, he was Attorney General, at which time he was briefed on the fo th Castro assassination operation. Kennedy mev of the Drew Pearson article of 7 March 1957 and wented to check his recollection of vhat he had been told by Edvards and douston on 7 May 1952. ‘The Attorney General's copy of the remorandus for the record of that briefing is in the archives of the Attorney Ceneral's office. Mr. Heims subsequently had lunch with Senator Kennedy. He took a aos re! + ae yoo tee ce id wet See. tle tee os tot woe slo ee “ste raed pt TTT ORS gee ef ope OB, eet RR ee OAS oe EE Nagin. MTS aie ee SOB aR OUTPUTS ae AE ee tte les ee alate Poh eo GA

0000 Boies mre bee eee Tels is the earliest date cn which we have evidence of Mr. MoCoae's being avare of any aspect of the scheze to assassinate Castro using Beir erate tag .wenbers of the gambling syndicate. Drew Peerson has access to these newsparer stories, ani they are available to any nuster of sources who migst visa to collect sucn infornation. The rumors of Cia's alliance vith guczsters are not new; what is new is that the moors now cosnect CIA aad the gangsters in a plot to assassinate Castro. I* say be assimed that the Attorney General (Ciark) xnows teat the mmors of the relation- ship, as such, are true because of the records of the FRI on the Les Vegas wiretapping incident. As of tals writing, he dees not necessarily snow more--subject to vhat he may have learned as a result of the FBI interview of Edvard P. Morgan, Maheu’s Washington attorney. A clue as to how much the Attorney General may “mow is i found in his statement that Maheu {s the closest thing to a link between CIA and Giancana. oot Be aie “a at pet ta % ee, Aopen ap re PCE mee ei Se eee SrieghS iH 57P? Lor fees ae rele breil nT Set fore aden ete, ete ay ee TP LgsOatS SIA ie Le pees aye ge ett ee wee ee oe

00c00 POR ty Meee ee ae! Bemtigpempemom agai WO. ef0 fee ee Mahe mage 180: rat bee soy ery ar oars by Senator Lorg of Missouri was investigating invasions of privacy and planned to call Makeu to testify. -Bagnate, Hiarchos, to help in a financtal tusele Eiarchos wes having Planar fe tenes oa tow May July 1955 The Agency's previous interventiozs ca Maheu's betalf are revieved here, tecause of the iccreasicgiy loportans role of Mareu in the scenario. ‘The last of these interventions occurred during i the period May June 1906. At that tine a Senete Comittee headed We learned indirectly of the Committee 6 intention to call his. A sen wao vas employed by Maheu in 1954-55 was inforsed that he would be called to testify about his activities during that period. He was an employee of AID in 1966. The Internal Security Division of the Department of Justice learned that he was to be called as a vitmess and informed. CIA's Geseral Counsel. In the 1991-55 tine perfod Maheu was hired by the Greek catyping with another Greek skippirg fignre, Coessis, who had nanaged te negotiate a pact with King Saud uncer which Onassis would control i 90% of ell Saud! Arabian of) shipeents. British, Averican, and German shipping interests cpposed Orassis’ near monopoly, and the US and UK governments supported Kiarchos in his fignt to kave the agreezent taal BRED te Oy ona mln EN Ce nim ett ete bees erento ee et See te ae Teme fr SE ae tate, Berne eh te ge nee ee tee ante od waka niet woe ere Ri ow Sere te

90000 Ger. oc eced wires elt al cancelled. Maheu is believed to Lave worked at tov ievels in dsth the British and Azerican goversments, reportedly seeting at least once ok é with Vice President Kixoa. Meheu's operations were fMnarced by teeta Yilarcnos, but CIA becaze involved {n supporting tren by request of the Department of State. Agency ccemunications and pouch facilities were made available to Maheu, acd he was given help in cevelopiag black propagas?s campaign ageinst Ceassis. Nfarcnos, with Mareu's help, won his scrap vith Onassis. A variety of litigation arose fran the contest. In one lev suit for libel before the New Yors Supreme Court in early 1956 (Onassts vs. C Catapodis), Niarchos was examined by attorneys Zor Catapodis. Wnen questicns vere‘asked about certain affidavits in issue (which ked been Hs passed through the CIA pouch systen), Niarchos, as a wituess, vas advised by his attorneys not to testify on the grounds of Goverment privilege. CIA inevitably becase irvolved. The General Counsel prepared a statement for the U.S. District Attorney in Kew York (to te retained by the 00/C office there) stating the Agency's interest. hees ans As @ consequence, CIA was identified as being 2 narty to the Riiarchos/ Onassis squabble. Although that vas in 1956, the Agency's inter- ventica is presimably still a'zatter of record. Tre Long Committee planned to resurrect the old Cnassis/Niarchos Nght, because {¢t had involved ea invasion of privacy. Apparencly te Soyer tOe ART BUBIO ENTE. EOTE ERTON RERUN ROM SARE URINE «Sar CTE +) Se wan ecm i Al RPSL ir er eB tn neues te og ot ae es ees et he gee ote ate com. ome Bae Fe be pg tmnisameg eT ee aA GTS Ie ee ego hs tga Case Regine Ae Sice pek pth Athi, SWE nOs sn ee PR te teens Sede hip rir wine ™“epeianie: tee TO OF ML Col Ale OM Steen ee tree we Net wt ee me te RE mE pee te ete toy Se ee oe ee Oar as H DEA an eet we Eft Of Beye TET re ee em ee

£4-00000 veel BY, A mn AR te neha oe. one of the things Mabeu did was to hire sccecre to mma techntcel surveillance on Caassis' offices, acd this becane Eno. ¥aheu’s more recent {nvolverent in the Las Vegas viretapping incitent also fatge seemed certain to receive extensive attention by the Long Comittee. orp The Long Committee presimably vould keve teen {nteresied caly in i Maheu's connection with the wiretappings thet crew out of the Cnassis/ an Niarchos affair and the ganbling syacicate operation against Castry. -perrre Ree ee minatirnens + ee The Agency decided that it vould not be in its interest to allow Maheu to testify an the bugging incidents because of the risk that his testinony «ould not be confined just to wiretapping. further, i i C Makeu has been used over the years in a rsvter of sensitive CIA operations. There was @ risk that a generel inquiry might open up a other sensitive issues. A mmber of neetings vere held vith Edvard P. Morgan, Maheu's Washington attorney, and with a close legal associate of Serator Long, a St. Louis attorney named Kerris Shenker. Finally, in direct meetirgs vith Senator Long, our General Counsel was able to have Maheu excused fron testifying before the Tong While negotiations were under way to have Maheu excused frog ‘testifying, Maheu became quite alarmed over the risk of adverse poblicity, which might jeopardize bis business with very important c'fents. Ee wes especially worried over his Howard Hughes accomt. He arplfed pressure i nett a yer einars Se Spine Aphis? aie Riot tae om. ot ee +o we wr tae Setde sO les Lantryle ates oes oe ww ES SS BS. a. Bat ce reer eee er ne nee nt Cee A dee TE ee me eee wieeere ce

0000 ROR OOP Sate" Bete ee ee 3% ween. ese an ott on the Agency in 2 varley of ways--sugzesting chat publicity eizhs $ expose his past censitive work for CIA. Heheu's teckgruucd aud past assuciutioas with CIA ere the subject of another section of this revort. James O'Connell states that at one point in the negotiations with the Long Committee Meheu indicated treat he might brief his atzorney, Edvard P. Morgan, fully edout his past activities so that Moraaa would be able to decide how best to represent hin. Whether he did or not, and, if so, wha; he told hin, is not mow. We have a discussion of 7 the possible inplications of this in a later secticn of this report. a. Maheu may very vell have told Morgen tse details of iC 7 the plan to assassinate Castro using members of the ganbling syndicate, and b. Makeu has now, on three separate occasions, seem CIA intervene in official proceedings--once for Hiarchos and twice wo for Maheu. 20 eas eo. re Se tae st te eote am: yee % te et age, ne ena. PAPEETE LO ‘eoepacor Terie eae LR GP Ea ese nt ah BRE, it EPA neta eo. “woe 2 ea getes "not wifes wee eof. elt a ee oy wet 7 > Per eee ess Ag pean wast ie votes ment’. i aa Ste eG SE ay ar eee pe mE SN PRL MI LOI Ie eet Ne me vote ba cept ne cae GI ge gepa ees Tr fa te eget Ete ete Em EE ot rte em Re ee Coe

hee Re ee ee Me Oe eee re te ee en as aety spent epee oes ae Sone ed mane spt eee te Sree oe ree sh OP ES Samo Ot Schemes in Early 1953 Skis. Diving Sult BNR he wd. At about the tise of the Donovan-Castro negotiations for the release of the Bay of Pigs prisoners 4. plan was cevised to bave Donovan present @ co ntaninated sin efying sult to Castro as a gift. Castzo was known to be a skin diviag enthusiast. ‘se cannot put a precise cate cn this scheme. Desmond FitzGerald told us of it as if it had originated after he took over the Cuba task force in January 1963. Samuel Balpern said that tegan under ‘wilhtem flarvey and «dwar ae that he, Ealpern, briefed FitzGerald on it. For rvey states positively that he never heard of it. According toe Sidney Gottlieb, this scheme progressed to the point of actually buying a diving suit and readying it for delivery. The technique involved dusting the inside of the suit with a fungus that vould produce a disabling and chronic skin disease (Madura foot) and conteminating the breathing apreratus vith tubercle bacilli. fe sammie Gottifeb does not remember what came of the scheme or vhat happened to the scuba suit. Sam Halpern, who was in on the schene, at first said the plan was dropped because Lt vas obvicusly impracticable. He later recalled that the plan was ebandoned because it was overtaken by events: Donovan had elready given Castro a skin diving suit on his own initiative. The scheze ray have been nentioned to Mike Miskovsky, who worked with Donov~, but Fitaterald bas no recollection that {t was. me ee eae AM eS le Eating: oe Be seteeg sou he 2 Per acon tein ee eee

14-00000 4 wat Me mee ern atte BM gue es wee wo PEF Oe cee aoe 4 v8 id Lae REN oe MEDED, AE EAS nee oe Halpern says that he menticn:d the plan to George Hevanus, then cms @ special assistant to the DD/P (fieims). McMacus later told Halpern eet se that he had mentioned the scheme to Mr. Helms. ‘Those who vere fnvolved >. j.caidBide in the plot or vho were identified to us by the participants as being tting are the following: Richard Helna i. William Harvey (denies any knovledge) Veenond Fitzerald Semuel Helpern George McManus Sidney Gottlieb meee Oe ay. ed. 23 oe lg we Fe “oe Frog Jal wrote 8 i te ee Fe oS: re cad Rs i ct en reel pad eer te een yng pate ne aah te oes gatn ee chee ee, ER albany USERS EE SPEER TT Pea RSP TRS ITI TE Baema Rae Te eet nate Remar © eat se at amt ES ont eel dalle lee omen se wee ee be ke te ee ee eee ne

-O0000 Aye Reba SQU2LTES CF TUFO2MATICN Files were furnished Zor review by the Director of Security, the Deputy Director for Support, che Cenerai Counsel, the Legislative Counsel, the Czstef of We Division, sx2 dy Col. J. C. Xing, former Cate? of WZ Division. Bicgraphic files and intelligence pudlications vere furatsned oy the Director of Central Reverence. ff was not rade wittlrcg of the reason for our interest im thes, end those who assendied the= for him were not toid for whom they were intended. We called tack four officers vor Llatervievs: Richard Bissell, Sheffleld Edvarés from retirenent, Willian Earvey frea sick leave, and Nestor Seashez frog his post 1 Gthervise, our intercievs were coaficed to officers assigzed headquarters installation. We opened each interview by referring to the Drew Tearson colum of 7 March 1967, citing thet as the reason for our interest in learnicg os of plots to assassinate Castro. We told those interviewed that ve were on a fact-finding nicsion on tezalf of the Director, ard thas this was not the usual sort of Insrector General investigation. We asxed each to naze any others vho were lizely to have knowledge of such plots. ‘Se cautioned each not to discuss the subject of the ioterview with anyone elze--even others «hoa we sight interviov. € This is a conplete list of those interviewed: Desmond FitzGerald Sasuel Halpern Bruce.Cheever, J.C. King von Alfonso Rodriguez J. D. Esterlize Edvard Guna Eovard Osbora Jares O'Connell Sidaey Gottlieb Sheffield Edvards Lavrence Houstoa L som Aaraee Kestor Sanctez ool Williem Harvey scone Corzelius Roosevelt Rovert EBantesmaa om, Serie Sra eben mem segs met at comes oe

TRY Boe ge APO MTT yt oes seth Vie? i. Bocby-tranped Sea Snell Some tine 12 1953, date uncertain but zobably carly in the wad year, Desrond FitzGerald, then Chief, SAS, origins ted a schese for fl doing avay vith Castro by reaas of an explosives-rigged sea shell. ote The idea «as to take an unusually spectacular sea shell that wculd i be certain to catch Castro’s eye, load i+ wita an explosive triggered to blow when the srell was Lifted, and su>merge it in an area vhere Cestro often vent skin diving. in Des bougat two books on Caribbean Mollusca. The scheme vas soon found to be impracticable. None of the shells that might conceivably ( be found in the Caribbean area vas both spectacular exough to be sure of attractiag attention and large enough to hold the needed volime of explosive. The midget submarine that vould heave had to be used i in emplacement of the shell has tco short an operating range for such an operation. FitzGeraleé states that he, Sam Halpern, and Bruce Cheevuer had several sessions at which they explored this possibility, but that no b= "one else was ever brought in on the talks. Halpern believes that he i. had conversations witn TSD on feasibility and using a hypothetical case. He does not rerenbder with whoa ke may have spoken. We are unable to identify any others who nev of the scheme at the tine it was beirg considered. «oat 7 wpe ca ae AES BE seit thiate CN APO pao allt > rh kee eit are Tee Foe ab aL eae Rep ota oe ap rreteety or eye CR Sane eed ow ea MES oe tana” af tae’ SF. oo ep fe ee eee, oe aT sped eset tee eee Le Gomme ee Meee re By dace On eet at? oe eed? t a Soe

200 ao eet ar metet yi Project AMLASE Polen2s Cutels 9 Marca 1561 an officer then assigned to the Mexico City Station, set in Mexico City with Rolando Cuzela to sound out Cudela on his views on the Cuban situation. Cubela rad been attending the leftist-sponsored Letin Anerican Conference on Natioral Sovereignty, Prancipation and Peace held in Mexico City from 5 to & March. a Cubela was noncremittal. The reeting was arranged by Carlos Tepedino (AMWHIP-1), a long-tize friend of Cubela. Cubela knew [_|easuanay from Havana vhere [i once assigred and vhere Lh ee a sinilar meet{ng kad once teen set up but had fallen through. i (Conment: Rolando CUAZIA Secades was the second-ranking leader of the Directorio Revolucionario (DR) 13 de Marso, which vas an elite group of left{st. studeat activists founded in 1956 to organize violence to overthrow the Batista regise. Cubela + zo: was believed to have been one of the participants ia the weet assassination in 1956 of Lt. Col. Antonio BLANCO Rico, then ie the head of Ratista's military intelligence service. The DR H meabers considered tremselves quite apart from tne Fidel{sta 26th of July Movement, @espite the fact thet they had reluctantly signed a unity pact. In the final days of the revolution the DR took the Presidential Palace, which they refused to surrender we et mene eer See fey eee Re te enn tee Medea et ere me eee eet es: nary ram sores ees se

‘GRRE 062 lesen treitwe “tle of De DE ae ae eed Sidadieat ree se sept to Che Guevara but eventually (end reluctantly) turned ever to Fidel Cactro. Cubela was a major in the Cutan erny, the Efzhest Cuban nilitery raakx. {A cs Information Report with ea dste of information of March 1959 reported that: “Prior to his appointsent te the post of Cuban Hilitary Atcacke to Spin and his subsequent departure for Madrid on 27 varch 1959, Rolaado Cuoela frankly expressed to Price Minister Ficel Castro his diesatisfaction over the present situation in Cuba. Cubeia privately told intimates that he was so disgusted with Castro that if he, Cubela, did not get cut of the country scon, he would xil1L Castro Himself.” (Although the March 1961 meeting betveen| land Cubela in Mexico City was inconslusive, it led to other meetings out of which grew Project AMIASH. Cubela (AMIASH-1) repeatedly insisted that the escential first step in overthroving the regize was the elinination of Cestro himself, which Cubelae claimed he was prepared to accomplish. He repeatedly requested that ve furnish him the special equipment or raterial needed to do the job. Those immedfately concerned with the rucning of the operation now recall it as one in which the Agency was interested pricarily in Keeping Cutela ective in the MYAPRON progrem directed against tints Lh re Ty Sty Pa te eran oe tas he eile aan ail EEN popacie iby anne vee comms + @ oe 2

tee ae > wn tN ceremep Cuban nilitary leaders, while resisting 243 pleas for techaical to assistance in an assass’ ition attexpt. The voluainous project files and the information furnisted us by ilestor Sanchez, ee Cubela‘'s case officer, do not «holly support those recollections. The Agency offered both direct and indirect support for Cubdela's plottings.) 28 Maren 1951 An asset of the Miami Station reported that Rolando Cubela acd tL Juan Orta wanted to defect and needed help in escaping. (Juan Orta ic was the gangsters’ “man inside Cuba" with access to Castro in the lethal pill operation we have called Garbling Syndicate Phase Oze.) i Headquarters expressed interest in exfiltrating Orta and Cubela. The exfiltration attempt was called offas a result of a report that i the Cutan police vere evare of Cubele's desire to defect and of his departure plans. wiles: Tones, (Comment Tais fs one of three naze-Links ve found in the ee Oe 22 ‘eee! wed. AMLASH file betveen Rolando Cubdelia and perscns involved in the genbling syndicate episodes. The other two links are ever nore nebulous than this. If Cubele vas in fact one of the gangsters' r assets inside Cuba, that fact was unicom to either the CIA officers running the gangster episodes or to those hendling Cudela.) iy a — Pitino vestects Sadana’ ton inion, al at Cos woe whtae te “Benge Tet Sie mle boat tee of ol ESE nile aan vets dt Peace L.. sa Sith Far tank ts Ses fetta Te Siete mate? Foinwen Toy reer teingeeentes gee we dot te eee me sea oy oo FO Pe wee ame rae Ea See eet Am eee oat tan ae ie inne Sone etn ag ead oa Al pam Wee gee Se Oe rr ae

14-00000 Shwe sete “ae Ste” oy teas + ny cere ates Fee eee owe ee me we eee Ot: panei aro ac ee eee rot The FEY forwarded to CIA a regort of a meeting with an FBI CO “+ fnfornaat fa Milani on 11 Juce. ‘Ths informant .2ported that Cubela was attending the Youth Festival in Helsinki in July-August 1962 and wanted to defect. Ina detalled transaittal mezorandin, the Fal identified its informant as Carlos Tepedino, wren toe FBI mew to be a long-time contact of CIA. ‘Tepedino offered his services to the “FBI to assist ir the defection of Cutela. Ee told the Bureau of seeing with Cubela in Mexico City in March 1961. ‘the Bureau stated in its memorandim to us that it had told Depedino Ci that his offer would be forverded to the proper U.S. agency. The Bureau also stated that it was informing its Paris representative to refer Tepedino to CIA if Tepedins should contact the Paris Legal Attache. 8 July 1962 ae The JMAAVE Station reported the substance of a telephone conversation between Tepedino and a station officer, which vas arranged ty AMCONCERT-1. ‘Tepedino identified the original source of his invorzation oa Cutela's cesire to defect as being the Echavarrias, froa whan the JMAAVe Station had received its report. Tepedino said he had approached the Fal in Miewi because of dissatisfaction with the i beaten TRE Pay ON Aare gE Sen RE! A ONE, GAD BIE Te ren GL he ten rey pe nee ae et Ne OM OL ee ee tr te cece te Cappel Rayner) aes ete ere Ne PRT en ee OS ele gt Lire tee ete ee

14-00000 tees fee corny way CLA had kacdled Cutela‘'s “planted defection” fa Paris in August t 1951. Tepedino egreed to ceet with a CIA officer and contact arrengerents were mate. 13 aad 1b July 1962 ot hotel expenses. He vas not offered a calary or bonus. fron headquarters, met vith Tepedino. in Sew York City on 13 erd 1+ July 1962. Tepedino agreed to meet in Zelsin<i, and to travel anywhere else necessary, to aid oy in an attempt to defect Cubela. Tepedino, who is a successful tf Cuban extle Jeveller in Hew York City, refused an offer to pay his i C full expenses. He did accept reimbursezent for airline tickets and July 6 August 1 epedino arrived in Helsinkt on 30 July. [ms already there. Cubela vas found, and the first of a series of meetings with Be: him vas hela on 2 August. the original objective of defecting cubela SO stew "was quickly changed ta one of recruiting him in place. Chose sare excerpts frog coatact report of the first meeting with Cubela: He said he was considering not going back to Cuba, but after talking to Tepedins, he felt that if he could do something really significant for the creation of a nev Cuta, te-—we0 tates 4 eo he vas interested in returning to carry on the fight there. gene sear ve Pitan eon 23 Re Seed IM OOS AE, Ba to Se se sale ee net ee? “te0 aren ado Tae Pl gE ae hy GBM ie ew TL 72 as aT ghtee an we ss eee ost sos rt Bo: tee Tee Tae Se fe wet we ee RE or ee: tek ge ts OG Shes Ay ents Ss oe, POE TS A Nea ere aed: ae ve ene eS ee eee ne tse STF em eaot Seine ol gh pee: Spa act te ketene it ob gactingpe tie oben. Aiase tehmpbye sw pets Tip oes kT Tia at le ne EOC pe oe ete fe eaten ek be eee ee mn

-90000 FE oa png EH Ope Me em mt ae mets He caid he vas not lsterested in risxiag his Life for any szall undertaking, but that he could be given e really large part *9 pley, he would use nisself sai several others in Cuba when ke coulé rely upo:. Ee said he head plans to blew up an oll refinery, as te felt that the continuing existence of a senblance of normal functioning in Cuba depecded upon a continuing supply petroleim, supplies of” which, as ve know, are at a critical staye today. He also vanted to plan the execution of Carlos Rodrigcez (a top- ranking Castro subordinate) aad the Soviet Ambassador, and also i to eliminate Fidel, by execution if necessary. ee ere While we were raking no committments or plans, we pointed out to Cubela thet schemes lize he envisioned certainly had tkeir place, but that a lot of coordination, planning, iaformatioa-coilection, etc., were necessary prerequisites to ensure tae Value and success of such plans. Cubela stated many tines during the course of this and subsequent C meetings that he was only interested in involving hinself in a plan of significant action, and which was truly desigzed to achieve rapidly his desire to help Cuta. Avgust 1962 fc. Because of the security hazard in too frequent meetizgs in Helsinki ,where Cubela vas surrounded by his associates in the Cuban @elegation, it vas agreed that further meetings vould be held in. Stockholm and in Copenhagen. Cubela agreed to meet with a Spanish- speaking case officer in Paris later in the month. Hothirg significant came out of the neetings iz Stockhola, 7 9 August, except Cubela's vevelation that he had told four of his Cuban essoctates of his meetings in Eelsinsd with fepedins. Ve Lore Te TR awe Mette mee ares pte hie the el erred Line dean tees Oe ta te ete eT eee ee atm me a ce eee Septem. ee oe are ber ewe tee

0000 ee walt wT PR. eee ere oe OD pene 1G 21 Augiss 1942 Gepedino, ani Cubeia set in Copentegen for furthers peetings. wrote in Bis contact report: «at one tine whea ve [__larvaya wrote of hinself as ‘ve'] were discussing the various aspects of Cubela's future role in Cuba, we used the term ‘acsassirste.‘ The use of this tern, we later learred from Tepedino and freo Cutela hisself, was most objectionable to the letter, and ke was visibly upset. It was not the ect he ob{ected to, but rather terely the czolce or the word used to describe it. ‘Elicinsate was ecceptadle.*” (Comment: It is warth noting here that Tepedins, a Cuban jeveller in New York, ves preecot at a series of meetings at which the assassination of Castro was discussed between Cubela end] [ton Tepedino knew to be a CIA officer.) Dh 23 August 1962 C. Cubela, Tepedino, fet and] in Paris acd vere jotned by a Spacish-speaking case officer fran Madrid. Cubela vas given S/¥ training and was issued appropriate S/¥ supplies. T He was taken to the south of France on 20 August for a desolition demonstration. lanmed to polygraph Cubela and asked for a polygrarh operator to be sent to Paris. Cubela iniigzasti> To """gefused to be polygraphed. bled on 17 August: Gait. POTEET WIP ay e-Eve AS epseartece bee “Have no intention give Cubela physical elimization mission as requirement but recogaize this something ke could or might try to carry out on his ow initiative.” Headquarters replied by cable on 18 August: "Strongly concur that no physical elimination missions be given Cudela.” 29 August 1952 seonfien ( Cubela left Prague by air for Eevena. woo. bee epee se: we aly ee bee SR ‘eet aes te es a Bates Mey os Aas 2s > gia So iors. Sond PAPE APIS WHATS Rotate fikeais I area, SOLE Tetras ben EET RO wag SOR STE Sears TN STE: aeeigt Mee ee ee PE AS eet ot FS oo. RF ws rs a aa ce Tec faae eee ee Sac ER ee Be. eet wm Nee ae me ee Sea Rte da ad To de Re tet. wee oe ee tarde ee ee ae oe re eet

£4-00000 “oT Sues yt <4. 1k Septerder 1553 Frosa Porto Alegre, Cubdela flev ‘to to Paris, arriving on ik Septeaner. He was there ostenibly to attend the Alliance Fraseaise, but actuslly to take an extended vacation--of which he planned to inform Pitel ae ennai after the fact. i 16 Sentender 1953 an Cubela (in Paris) wrote to Tepedino (in Kew York): "I don't intend to see (be intervieved by) your friend again,” which you i should tell them, “so they don't make the trip. I want to get avy fras politics completely 3 October 1963 mo. Nestor Sanchez arrived in Paris for meetings vith Cubela. (the record does not reveal why Sanchez vent to Paris in the face of Cubeig's stated wish not to see him. The letter may have been written during &@ Spell of temporary depression. Station officers vere already in contact vith Cubela when Sanchez arrived.) Also participating in the peed meetings were John (Red) Stent and Richard Long. At the time of these meetings ws discovered tht the French vere miflaterally keeping ioe i Cubela under surveillance. CIA informed the French that our contacts with Cubela were for the purpose of defecting him. ae ee eee se oe 11 October 1963 Sancher cabled that Cubela was insistent upon meeting with a 1 senior U.S. official, preferably Robert FP. Kennedy, for assurances Saran ot, ne, oe ee nee ME pret ERT Tee ete eee (See ia paen Rear tsd Soy repent ance enavtnt rwee fewlte pa gh hndeencs ier ate New ce ee ore OR re BNE mb gets ral hte Se ee ght BE eee Se ke et le ee ER ote Sen ee, Ce cee DAZE cent pe Ao lap nan ont en ee AA aT.

4-00000. ai Ms Ge Oe eee would support him if his enterprise were successful. een contact. Cubela is that he determined attenpt op against Castro with or without U.S. support.” 13 October 1953 The Paris Station cabled: "Sanchez ETA LOD 13 Oct. Pending change after 12 Oct meet Sanchez plans return Hqs after LOD stop in order discuss details operation before entering final round discussions with AMLASH." 17 October 1963 Red Stent cabled the results of a meeting with Cubela and Tepedino. Cubela, in a private conversation with Stent, reiterated his desire to Speak with a high-level Government official. Stent cata that basically Cubela wanted assurances that the U.S. Goverment othe cad Oh ‘other business, arranged to 29 October 1963 Desuond FitzGerald, then Chief, SAS, who was going to Ferts on to meet with Cubele to give him the essurances sense PE oi hid ee ttle ma oe oe pet ae dinette a A ashbeasires lenin: Sse, pink pe. oor peace mp ee <segensies tee Aa ey aes eee tee eke Cops Bw Ue ena Vg rah Be, Nt ee ee ete ve as or & te ose + co a leg Tere ee Ee NS el Me! Serre Fwy SP Osten ee RE EIT OE SOCEM et et ee ee mi eee of U.S. moral suppors for eny ectivity Cubela under tock in Cuda Senenez said that the ansver Cutela received aight ce crucial to CIA's relationsaip with Cubela. Sanchez resomzended that "highest ifE and profound consideration be given as reeling draw by all who in i ene ee fe (pemees ctee

00c00 an hes tet ae OR Riad ag pectin gy FB COA feany Bale Gell gegen TE Ate tnt Pee ee gee leet te hme Tt he sought. ‘The contact plea for the meeting, a copy of which in the AMIASH file, has tnis to say on cover: na FitzGerald will represent self as persczal representative of Robert FP. Kenzedy who traveled Faris for specific purpose meeting Cubela anc giving him assurances of uli U.S. support if there is change of the present coverzcent in Cuba. According to FitcsGerald, he discussed the plonced meeting with the DD/? (Helas) who decided it was rot necessary to seek approval fras Robert Kemnedy for FitzGerald to speak in kis rame. The meeting, was held in Red Stent's hcuse in Paris on 293 October 1953. ce alies James Clark. FitzGerald used Nestor ewe woot Sanchez acted as interpreter. Red Stent wes not present during the meeting. Sanchez on 13 November 1953 wrote a memorandum for the record of the meeting. It reads, in part: FitzGerald informed.Cubdela that the United States is prepared to render all necessary assistance to any anti-ccozumist Cuban group which succeeds in neutralizing the present Cutan lJeadership and assumes sufMicient control to invite the United States to render the assistance it {s prepared to give. It was emphasized that the above support will be forthcoming only efter to request U.S. (probably uder OAS auspices) recognition ard support. It was made clear that the U.S. was not prezared to 7 Coomit itself to supporting an isolated uprising, as suchan uprisizg can te exvinguished in a matter of hours if the present goverrsent is still in control in Havara. As for the pést-coup perioé, the U.S. does not desire that the political clock be turned back but will support the necessary econcaic and political reforzs vhich will benefit the mass of the Cuban aed wee wot geet 7s ere ae oe bees et me as tat Sf sf vars ve’ gelsen jd Bpiereh cenit ee TT ete Fee eee lee oa tesa Oe, & real coup has been effected and the group involved is in a position fs: oa. wR Of. RRR TET meneame Atenarrta ane wk, dee neem one We ermreees ome ee tae chert donee memoeroeteena

-O0000 Fite. tod e ene toe te ee re Tet scape LEA Recmwcsed tamed Uicws sete Tm an wt ithe 27 na het» Sa aus” ea TT On Bo nm Fate Fata Sarees aioe Sian SERA Gat Aline eee? ewes tee oruetre nidertale Stare mec rae wets ata, Stee ee he gh re ree pe eee tee Dee ce eae es PEE STIS REID: er! ey ome key EE ee U.S. simpiy does rot do such things. aS L3hs wae sy Be. ‘that, as. tt DAY, ‘the vritten’ record ‘tens a sarevhat aicterent Toa,¢ ne. Nothing of an operatiorel nature vas discussed at the (Comment: Those invo:ved now recall the purpese of the meeting as being something ‘quite different fem thet appearing’ tine of the xeeting. in writtea records ‘prepared at adout the FitzGerald recalls that Cubela spoxe reveatedly of the need for an assassination weapon. In particular, he wanted a high-povered tae rifle with telescopic sights or sone other weapon that could be used to Kill Castro fron a distance. FitzGerald vanted no “part of such a schexe and told Sander to tell Cubela thet the waen he was told this, Cubela ‘said ke wanted confirmation fron a senior U.S. official, not a mesber of CIA. FitzGerald says that whea he met vith Cubela in Paris he told Cubela that the U.S. Goverment vould wee St Set have no part of an attenpt ‘on Castro's life. Sen Ealpera, vho ior, was not present at FiteGerala's peeting with Cubela_ but vho. was. agar thoroughly fast liar vith ce that’ vas going on,” “has a recollection identical with that of Fitederaia.) eee te re Be ee Se "ye owas: ee oc “Fy ro teey <“Btory. In a Setter’ menorendim of ‘the reeting vith ‘Gubela he wrote’ oe! te, ws ew eae oo oc “ys apr eee tate ‘that: es ode eS oo. cy FitzGerald meeting. Avter tre neeting Cubela stated that he was satisfied with the policy discussion. but now desired to know vkat technical support «e could provide his. ey ee oe ec. of eat ep eye ie, we Ne ote Tate ee te ee terete weetr ee oh ef fet Bee ee Loe vrae Oe PO OHO We we ar bees +

0000 Sie dows ae pte eee se Sates eee ee An ating aes te. Spee bese ne pos fo TE en ee) ee "Bane Yoemrr eae meted “Pasa Bd ze 14 Noveaver 1953 t with Tepediro in New York City ci 14 Novesder, eo leontact report reveels Cudela's reaction (as teld to Tepedino) to his meeting wich Pitcerald. The visic with FitzGerald, vno acted in tha capacity ofa representative of hizh levels of the Goverment concerned with the Cuban problem satisZied Cucela as far es policy was concerned, but he was not at all hapoy with the fact thet ke still. °,Was not given the techzical assistance for the operational plan as he saw it. Tepeding said that Cubela dvelt constantly oa oy aoi-fyi this point. He could not understand why he was denfed certain “one @all vleces of ecuigzent which pracised a firal solution to so 28 the problez, vhile, a the other hand, the U.S. Govermzeat Le Ty gave much equlncent end maney to exile groups for their “ineffective excursions against Cuban ccastel targets. en at be to Tepedino, Cubela feels strongly on this point, and if he does not get advice and materials from a U.S. Government technictan, be will probably teccce fed-up “gain, and we will lose vhatever progress we have made to date. is cvenber 1 3 oO 24, oan of d peer wie tem 2 oot, Ps Menorandum for: ‘the record prepared by, Nestor Sanchez: _"OfSAS RRS ay ve et tert. Heres He (eiticernia) approved telling Cubele be ‘would be ete aca tes poet Ls _nimested “nctnte GEAR ar Sa jdoside cuba coc. sald “tf se be it, cine Rare ee BES “aSty pover ‘rifles w/scopes Ts wee Yo/sas reqisstnd wetter reports nae @ oetier a wo de% mee tte eS pee loa. 6 tha t BA. “T4MTASG operation be kept to mints." 20 Novenber 1563 ee 4 HT. QQWRNE © UES ER fe) fan) ery Sees ha ae are ere ppmneg eo iaee spews secant ermerneie itis ha ys Gore ARR fete oe eB!

2 hgh hn to RG EY EE AMIE es oh paentetirempgrarne & tet ee SAREE 20 RS Be, é we hn OES: SEF eee we tee neem, CIB pele odor «paren Fhe ene per i Ee op Page se aprary opuccey eee ee en atalye etn ebeae wholly cn documents found in the profect file. Zerizelag here is an eccouns of s1 episcie <a the Cutels uperation fea watch there is no éomcentary evidence. Dr. Gunn hus a record $f nice contacts and be sn bee thetr dates; otherwise, this mmmary is arama! trea tie recollections of those {avolved. bL———... — Saachez says thes, walle Cubele was anxtous to cs away with Castro, Cubela vas not willing to sacrifice his om Live in exchange for Castro's. What Cutela really wanted was a high-powered, silenced rifle with an effective range of hucdreas or thousends of yards. Cubeia fineliy said that, as a dcctor of medicine (wnaich te was), he ohdee os + was Guite sure that we could devise scre technical means of doing the sree eee job that would not autccatically cacse hin to lose his owa life “in the try. assistance. Sasuel Halpern end iestor Sanchez approached Dr. Gunn for Although nose of the participants specifically so stated, i it may be inferred that they vere seezizg a reans of assassination CDE Shoe onere wy OF 6 D ry % a oo. of a sort that Cubela might reasonably have been expected to have eee ae} bsg oe lps devised himself. What they settled upon was Black Leaf a common, ta “easily-obtainabdle “tnsecticiée containing about 40/nicotine sulphate. Nicotine is a deadly poison that may be adwinistered orally, by injectioa, or by absorptica throvgh tre skin. It is likely that there also vere discussions of means of acufatstering the poison, because Gunn was ready to move when asked. Zz contacted he plen reached the action stage when Eelpern and Sanche oom wre eee OE Sane FF ation RRL AI em ene Oe lid ee AEA ar an PRA were TAR Swale LA Se eee, TRS TR Tae pple eas Ret ae eor vost pp WO ene as aaa “wees leaner nae eS tae ee a8. 7 we we oe pL tan at ey ee J eniieeree ee tied Meee ecg cent Wea ey Renn inter are Rarer hide oF

i oo. ei tet ee Voted 1 woe Guna egaia cn the corning cf 23 Soverder 1953 end tole hia that che device for sinfnistering the poisca (a tall:oint pen rigged as a i “hypodermic syringe) ted to be ready in time for Sanchez to catch plane at roca the next day. Guna suys that he went immediately to the FI/D worzshop and spent the rest cf the dey and cost of that night fabricating the device. ‘Toose in FI/D veo vorked vith his Imev what ke was trying to cake but not for vhom it was intended. Eventually, after seven or eight failures, he succeeded in converting @ Paper-Mate pen into a hypodersic syringe that worked. He said that the needle was so fine that the victim would hardly feel it when it -4 iG ooo was inserted--he compared it with the scratch from a shirt vith teo much starch. He delivered tke workable device to Sanchez the following morning and retained tvo of the later prototypes. He states that they are still in his safe. He does not know what happened to the device he gave Sanchez; he does not remember its having been returned to his. He believes he vas told that Cubela refused ta accept the device. .He says he vould not nov be able to differentiate aye foe ee APG WA ey nn. tremes GPR APS, geetar nected + the final pen from the earlier prototypes that are in his safe. ame oe oo te Setem 22 Novenber 1963 Nestor Sanchez arrived in Paris on the ecrning of 22 Hoverber oe 4 and met with Cubela lete that afternoon. Sanchez states that he MAO STR he ene Bak aa de bed tet ire Sag ygeaincrwee emma rests as sat Re es we. wlio wt. am at ween, gree oe eee Pe ee hee aad obese ome Reet ee gee Mg eT pee me Me be ee ne

ake? 2 f ee ee oe nee Sei cece sete engee PU AE gl OE eS al xe Ly wpe tek eae — showed the per/syringe to Cubela ant explained now it worked. Ee is not ones At Bes abe ret ite bs td oF aunt yort sure, but he oelieves chat Cubele accepted the davice but said that he would ot take it to Cusa with his. Ssaches distinctly recealis that Se Sao ton “on alepains Cubela didn't think mich of the device. Cubela said that, asa doctor, roar eee rer he knew all about Black Leaf £0 asi chat we surely could. cone up with something more sopaisticatec then that. It choula te noted thet Gunn and Sanchez agree that the syringe was not leaded. Cubela vas i, expected to supply his om poison; ve merely suggested Black Leaf 40 as an effective poison for use in the syringe. Sanchez wrote a ccntact report of the meeting. It makes no 2 fare Cc wention of a yen or of poison. The folicving is a summary of the e408 contact report. Cubela said that he was returuirg to Cuta Ailly he 290° Getermined to pursue his plans to initiate a coup against Castro. Sanchez reiterated the assurances given Cubela by MtzGerald of full U.S. support if a real ecup against the Castro regime vere successful. Cubela asked for the follcwing items to be included im a cache inside Cuba 20 hand grenades, two high-povered rifles vith telescopic Sights, and approximately 20 pounds of explosive and related Ce cg Ug Ad BG ORT SOAw TIT fn ores 8 safety Om CR Wee. Fe equipment. Cubdela suggested the best place for the cache was on the finca (fara) menaged by his frtena, (sersexex/20). Since he 4 was returning to Cuba by way of Pragve, ke df4 not want to carry S/W or any other facriminating naterials with his. As they were coming 93a- OA. armas") 2hR Pa BRR PL dt weer Taner LRP 4. tee co ee ae woe need alee Seed tee AE Smee Re wee crm Fee ote sete ORAaete weap cee ad aie en

14-00000 oe oo ene Cre oe ri qe er re, mae 7 ye teow’ Ie tw weed 3 Cth he Sy weed awptotte en ey yoaanar 93 cut of the meeting, Sanches end Cub2la vere inforsed that Precsideas Kennedy bad been essascinated. Cubels was visibly moved over the Lar: wth be deads news. Ee asked, "Why do such things hapvea to good people?” The contact report does not state the time nor the duration of the Sanchez-Cubela meeting, but ft fs lively that at the very mocent President Kennedy was shot a CIA officer vas meeting with a Cutan agent {2 Paris and giving biz an assassination cevice for use egainst i oy Castro. Sanchez states that he received an OPIM cable from FitzGerald that night or early the next sorning telling him that everything was i. oe. off. We do not find such a cable in the AMLASH file. ‘here is j C a record in the file that Sanchez vas due to arrive back in Washington at 1810 hours, 23 Hovember. The AMLASH project was probably about as widely mown within 4a. “the Clandestine Services as auy other project of a similar nature. ol. However, ve can identity only four people vho kmov of the just- described episode involving a hypodemnic syringe and Black Leaf ho. eige tHe Lie Sanchez knew all of, the story, Ealpern imev most of it, and Guna knew eee eee much of it. FitzGerald did rot mention this aspect of the Cubela operation when he first briefed us on it. When ve vent back to him later with specific questions, he safd he remembered something about Black Leaf’50, but nothing whatever about a device for administering it. Gunn said be had the impression that FitzGerald 2 2 LoTR Te YO pnw (GRRE rNnERRTUA stRCreeY Cpe. Saap er os me ace ett awee meee oe ee wear Bet ae Tbe lee er ae wane be car “ae eeg aa Ts eos qe gh ss PIC ee ne recon: op aah Soin ma peme eee oe acaisiseetin Veer oeitatt pire CONE Gi AGT rn tH RECO eat a ary Rar 7 pet mee es vey sot act REO ere AE EONS Hee La ae rete Etat ge ert Ree fae ne be Ste pens ce meee te eB tele ek ke ene ee ee ee

GOO ee Re En We tenements Stans ena etn tow Ba Pe aes afer eee eee SOs He bene ae He ee eee eT ee terme ener tee ar see souk” od iY erayr ec sete i knew ubout the operaticn “but aida’s vant te xacw." Tanchez cays that FitzGerald imew that he and Ealpern were seeing Gum. Halpera egrees, but adds that Fit=Ceralda eid not know the specifics of the fatricating of an assassination device. eee & Beginning here, the narrative is again drayvn from records in the Project AHLASH files. eee & 1 December 1963 peer an ts sae FBIS reported that Cubele returned to Cuba frog Pregue. 19 February 1964. ar The JMAAVE Staticn reported by cable that two separate, a identical caches would be explaced in support of Project AMLASH during March. One would be put dow in Pinar del Rio on Cperation “ZORRO. ‘The other vould be taken by the AMTRUNKs to the AMIRUNK infiltration area. Each cache vould contain, among other things, two FAL 7.62 automatic rifles. 6 March 196) 10 AA BRED Hy? MEMES Mian OCR SOUT Ter Tian’ aa aret eae ine ner star “mc CREEL oN WIERD Geog iad Rpm ad Lee weawd Wdsw oe Lalee’ wae, ee me oe gees vege tees «ees ler. Spqepentaate ap SA NAIL End ORAL. oat. ain, ome 120, Be 8S ee Sole 62 LL eo oe hold dewhee 0 See eh ee te ET tee met ee oe coat ee Cable from the JMJAVE Station: “Unless headquarters has overriding mee Dae PN pence soem ns

10000 ace: iE tence, oe FT 8 et ee. OTE abd ten aaeen on ee. tee ee lags ss sik, roestte re ia enh as rst fawreging erect en Tate erin awtet Se peernet Pe Mat arene eA wet CTEM + Menuet amen, eee cee me re meme ne ee. reason unknowa WAVE for including FALs in cache tc te carried by i AMIRUXs, wish stress followicg point in Wave's decision to elinizate none. -abgeited FALs; FALs require 7 by 9 by 50 inch oblong cache container which is difficult to handle in the intermediate creft.” ane + 7 March 1954 ae OO ae ceregoneenge 2 ae Headquarters replied that: "Reason fer desiring include FALs is that this f£s-the main item requested by AMIASH-1.” The JMHAVE Station cabled: “Since cannot break down FALs to fit avetlable cache container shorter than 50 inches, will omit FALs frou AMLASH cache.” Wm 22 arch 1964 Bm CarR Gomes RAE Re ae homy och om see te ae BARRETT wa cot, + he AMLASH cache was put down on Operation AMTAUSK VIII. eee se eeepee fms < Headquarters cabled the Paris Station that Carlos Tepedino hed deen briefed to meet Carlos Jorge ROBRENO Mariguex, “who has an Pm ‘important message fraa Cubela.” 7a et vot, 5 wet gees ane er tre gies See Pee ete ee tet ere ot

14-00000 epee ode eae hh eg Mr momen Op ore fo bse, ra er "gO tess ane Sea NSB ENS Ric StF TIONG SOL? mms were nearest een ee wee 3 May 1¢t4 rie ‘me Paris Station reported that the message Robreno hed from 0 OY Cubela was that Cubela vanted.a sflencer for the Belgian FAL subsachine gun soonest. 5 vay 1964 SAS requested TSD to produce FAL silencers on a crash basis. There are severnl later documents in the file deseribing TSD‘'s efforts to silence a FAL and to modify its sights for firing wiler owe pes eh" poor lighting conditions. SD eventually came up vith a silencer i and modified ammunition that fairly effectively silenced muzzle, blast and eliminated sonic boom by reducing muzzle velocity. H 9 12 June 1954 Operation ZORRO put down an AMLASH cache on the north coast of Pinar eel Rio containing, emong other things, “two each FAL automatic awa rifles with five magazines per weapon.” Ko mention is made of "fe silencers. From TSD's reports on development of a Silencer, one was mot yet ready at the time the cacke was prepared. The JMWAVE Station reported receipt of an sfa message from ye int pee Steet ae aR ele ae < settee none RL Pre. Se al Se: Flite es oF Moat, haat Mt hie Seles. 82. BT Rte ee aes et te ee ek

90000 TA Atnaemee oe eae epee ee ARE eo wesw wee owe ad wi tee me os enya ga reper wa AMERUK-10 dated 16 July. It stated that the AMLASH cache put dows in the AMTRUK infiltration area had been located and that steps were being tezen to recover its contents. The message sald that it was hoped the cache contatred “tvo high-povered rifles with silencers,” because ‘AMTRIG ~15 sas not yet certain toat he cculd recover the cache put dow: in Pinar del Rio by Operation ZORRO. j 30 August 195% i Manuel Artime received infomation through Madrid that a group Of dissident members of the Castro regime desired to establish fh direct contact with Artine. Oa 7 October 1964, an Artime associate vent to France for a meeting vith an intermediary fro: the dissident Group. The intermediary was nazed as Alberto BIANCO Resariz. Be cae, -+ i 12 November 1964 Ot Fats report: “A delegation of the University Student Fedration 4 yee q- mo Rs on ial Of Cuba arrived in ‘Pregue on 11 Hoverber to participate in the meeting of the Executive Council of the Intemational Stulent Union to be held fron 14 to 17 Kovember. The delegation is made up of... Maj. Rolando Cubela, who vill attend the event as a special guest of the Tus.” is See fal yea ee Ps aero bo Rois Gee piss! dae war ehtagehdaeetaner ophete ao eeta in wtp wbeed iret mabe eaecranaittone ies tems oR an YP Pet IRL Fi, FED oige Bne ote Fee hatha eta iad ses PES ee ee

4-90000 Tale wb ace 8 ww “beset rar ee 13 Noveater 1954 Contact report of a xseeting fs Yashinston vith Artize: Artize agreed to talk to AMLASZ-1 if it tums cut that ke is the contact maa for the internal dissident group. Artine thins that if AMLASH-1 is the chief of the dissident group «e cea all forget about the operatioa.” ee erm one same Som center 25 Hovember 1964 ee cee The Paris Station reported Cubela‘s arrival in Paris. December 1964 Restor Sanchez prepared a merorandum request for $6,500 as an extraordinary budget expenditure for the travel of Artime for maintaining contact with the intercal dissident group's representatives ot im Europe during November and December 1964. ‘There is no direct “+ {Indication in the file that the request vas approved, but indirect © 200) send ane “ees “evidence indicates that it was. Artize did travel to Europe and maintained the contacts. H 6 7 Decenber 1964 Sanchez met Cubela in Paris. Tals {sa sixmmary of the details reported by Sanchez: Cubela, althosgh utkappy because he was unable EER Laser Pee Reine Rs Te bE baeetEy eeetsensia emER si teeta winger Loach ore sma Paes «545 rie 7 “or ay gnriger- oe eo capttnyt ntirtae, Sbogeinese ees ing oie gemvertaceredion EES as we oe! te, dew onal eat, Ly, CoG Bere one An ES Rep eA oe Rin os en etler a! est ee Beier tenetie eh £2 Pinte ser et, BO SES Reed Cottle Ce oti ce GE Bilas SBT DEB. Ne EE et FR an te te Bin,

EOD, nee case cies yee ew “sh. ented were me ffs a ees to carry out his plans during the past year, continued to feel that his solution to the Cuban probies wes the only cre feasible eed that eet ote EER woo be kad to coatinue trying. Cutela was told ‘tat the U.S. Goverment pines could not and would uot in eny way become involveé or provide assistance in the task he kad plenced for hicseif. Cubela appeared to understand our positicn ard said tnat if te needed help ke would iO lock elsewhere. 10 December 1964 Menorandum prepared by Senchez eni left vith of the 4 lo, “Paris Station, as backgroud on the then current status of the AMLASH j operation--excerpts: "Artime does not imov and ve do not plan to tell him that we are in direct contact vith Cubels, nor does Cubela mov and ve > do not desire he kmovw tkat we ere in direct contact with Artime. en ire “Cubela vas told end fully uderstands that U.S. Goverment wn SU, f cannot become involved to any degree in the ‘first step’ of his plan. If he needs support, che realizes that he will have to ere” ae get it elsewhere. FYI: ‘Shis is where Artise could Mt in (Comment: Sanchez explained to us that what had happened “os i was that SAS contrived to pus Artime and Cubela together in such CS @ way that neither krew that the contact kad been engineered by CIA. The thought was that Artime reeded a ran inside and Cubela wanted a silenced weapon, wnica CLA was unsiliing to furat ae Te te te owe atte ye a: rf, ve oe at teete tf card ee ey ewe Sete es Deteis as, et Tepe Boo ST et ee ay ny eet tes ae RS ee, A OD. Fee Py mur ok toe 7 eis el tee BN “Siete ee eh OT See TH TREES Aa hs Stadtrnerg ang Spano be gine

0000 Os. ee noms Foc tlaey cane mie j a8. Sete ee. te me tee to cin directly. By putting the two cogether, Artine right get his ran inside end Cubela might get his siienced veayon--fras pam Artime. CIA did not intend to furnish an assassination weapon for Artize to give to Cubela, end did not do-so.) 17 Deceater 19564 Headquarters cable to Paris: “Whe eontacts Cubela to debrief him, please confirm statement by Cubela to Sanches that only money and a few como itens were retrieved by the fishermen. i Cubela and AMIRU?K-10 unhappy that fishermen had not recovered nore i i G from the cache, but it was not possible for Cutela and AMTRUNK~10 to go to the site eof the cacke personally. (Cudela had told Sanskez “that AMTRUNK-10 had used seme "fishermen™ to recover the cache and that not all of it was recovered. ‘This was the cache put dow in the i- AMTRUMK infiltration area, which did not include the FAL rifles.) 27 Decenber 196+ ie) ne Artime end Cubela met for the first tine--in Madrid. wera. oot 30 Decenber 1954 _Artine and Cubela met for second tize in Madrid on 30 Decenter. Artine reported the results in a meeting wita Yestor Sanchez in Florida oa 3 January 1965. Cubela told Artine that he bad requested 101 EAI EN OR OhaRYe. RET eet enAER wade. AU RG s tye oe Some Se ete py Tae ay Keele wre oy mepewine et wth o6 feapemn bee Pin tee re ee

G00 i: meet me ties bese a silencer for a FAL rife from tke Anericans, which they eed scr been esle to provide. Artine agreed to furnise :ither a silencer for a YaL or a cosparable rifle with silencer. If Artine obtained a silencer for a FAL, Cubela would personaliy carry it tack to Cuta with him. If Artise had to settle for save other type of silexced rifle, he vould cache it in Cuba for Cubela. 23 January 1955 Sanchez arrived in Paris for meetings with Cubels. an 2 February 1965 C Ganchez cabled from Paris: "Cubela and Tepedino returned Peris 31 Jamary. Met 1 February. Cubela states full agreement reached i with Artime and he vell satisfied with arrangements which he outlined for our informetion (elong sawe Lines as reported by Artime).-. i-- Artie providing package in Madrid vbich Cubela plans carry back fa 20 goncner cabled from Paris: "As of Hovenber 190% when Cubele departed “Cuba neitser he nor AMIRGHE-10 kad received any part of the Matanzas cacse. AMTEUHK~-10 ‘told him fishersen recovered money and perts of comunications gear but that money was no good since it was ine series out of circulation.” saan tan beers: masse osheiesre pee ie Tee Bo nemo misgnte ttl Meedgsatale Sndap Set Ceren bE Et eat ee tbe Se onic wi ceas aac Mee eae sane Serums game ats wre wae

£4-00000 eo eet et uses AAADED TV ey Piles) 80 todinve eed CCAP PR OO ter Arete woe catied: "Fron Cutela on 10 Feorvary: On 10 or lL Februery Cubela 13 to receive one pistol vith silencer and one Belgian rAL virile with silencer froma Artime's cecretary. 30th weapons come froo U.S. and sow in Madrid." (Tais is in coatlict with the nn earifer report that Artine would cache a rifle and stleacer if chat were all ke could find. We are unable to resolve the con2lict.) i. 12 February 1953 Te cabled: “Artize reported on final meeting ie with Cubela: Artime had three pacvages of specfal items made up by i his technical people and delivered to Cubela in Madrid. Cubela seemed satisfied.“ i & Marched 1965 Carlos Tepeaino reported receiving a telephone call fra a a. friend in Bavana wo bad seen Cubela back in Eavana the previous ‘day. TE meer ts 15 March 1965 1 She cabled that one Rafael GARCIA-BUGO Dirube ro, had arrived in Madrid froa Cuba on 15 March and hed beea introduced toy set, mote ne ee fe al as re 103 ro. we aN ela ret: wre aa toa Garcia-Bango claimed to te in contact vith a gee ies CMRI SEROO EF en neal me t ela fe tg eee ot weet foe hb teres attest ae SOF tee meee “Were “SEs stoned Rs GOW te oe ge Rae ee, PA tecem re ete beta wee orto, wees mae ete ee Rte be FE ah hard mee gets gh Andie at AF cnet WE Rin gee tA ong ONS Tete pe se ee ee SO es gee. wade ee OS es PN ete

-O0000 rok 7 BFR -peenarmnman son. ore tee eee he om ee ox aaatinad BO oe wetinw ered? ee Oot group of Cuban uilitery lesders was vere planting to eliminate Castro and taze over the governzent. It quickly beceze clear that he wes referring to Cubela. Gercia-Bango said that ke ned always been Fuolicly identified as a close friend of Cubela, vhom he last saw in Eavana on 9 March. Garcia-Banzo said that he had been the lavyer for the Capri Eotel in Eavana. He was jailed: for 75 days in July teem oe set oe 1962 for defending Santos Trafficante, a U.S. citizen and ex-manager of the Capri gambling casino vho vas kicked out of Cuba. (Coment: This is another ranc-lirk between Cubela and the gembling syndicate plots reported upen earlier in this report. Trafficante vas one of the principals in Shef Edvards* Phase One of the operation. He presumably was not involved in i Phase Two under Harvey, but we cannot be sure of that. After all, oe i Trafficante was the man who brought VYarons into the operation late in Phase One, and Varona vas one of the main players during Fhase ward wo. ‘the three-man team that was sent ‘arona was reported, bo. on 21 June 1962 to be in place in Cuba.) wo. June 1965 ad Headquarters decided to terzirate all contacts with key nenbers i of the Cubele group. It had became increasingly apparent thet the circle of Cubans vho krew of Cubela's plans and of CIA's association ty mot “eh? ee sts PERI re per Mane UP IPT Mie geno cee eee mete ee eee ee ee

G00 with thes was ever-videntag. The lest straw cane in early June 1955. (Note: There 13 2 discrepancy in Gates. the time lists dates of 2, 3, and 4% May. che cemoran-un prepared as Frea other evidence in the’ file, it is apparent that the month was June--not May.) One Victor ESPIWO0SA Pernandez, a former PM trainee who was temiinated.as a malcontent on 20 March 1951, contacted an I&4NS agent on 2 June 1965 with a story that Espinosa thought affected U.S. security. I&NS wees swore heard him out and then sent him to the FBE. The FSI listened to the “story on 3 Juns aod then sent him to CIA. A CIA officer interviewed him on & June. Espinosa said that in May he had received a letter soot fros a friend in Paris urging his to seet in Peris vith a friend of ai gr wn smn. tt Demme eAane vl. te Cubela. Espindsa went to Paris and net with Alberto Blanco, one of Cubela’s closest associates in the supposed plan to assassinate Castro. Blanco claimed to have a message fron Cubela, which Cubele FT vanted Espinosa to deliver to CIA. TSe message vas that Cubela and the others with hiz were in @ position to kill Castro and others in the regine, but they needed sane help and to know vbether the CIA and the Sal RY. U.S. Govertizent were with them and willing to support them. If the ansver were affirmative, Cubela would send out details on vhat he ae moe ort os eames needed. Frow kis story it was cbvious that Espinosa mev the full details of the Cudela operation. (Comment: ‘here {5 no fadication in the file that CIA ever cee wal we me) amb, SOS Ree ee Tete fee

£4-00000 etn Oe 22 oe found out the sort of “heitp” Cutela thought he needed. Ata eae oh te te PL Se N01 te ret meeting in Paris oa 1 February 1955 te aszed fur $10,050 “so Orgenice the intercal group.” CIA refused to give hic the money Tit es aeneete i and suggested he try to get 1% fraw Artifice. Cubela was quite lif upset over the turn down. A few cays leter, in Madrid, he approacked a Cuben asset of the claining ke was stranced in Madrid with no soney. Eeadquarters approved were ame a “personal loan” of $200. On 16 February 1965, Cubela asxed Mews fe oer see atte Sanchez for $1,000, which headquarters approved giving hia. Ia a later ceeting vita Carlcs Tepedino in Kew York City, Tepedino sald that he kad gives Cubela $7,000.) 8 C: On 23 June 1965 headgarters sent a cable to the stations concerned directing termization of contact vith members of the Cubela group. It read, in part: ae + Convincing proof that entire AMLASH group insecure and that further ccntact with key members of group van constitutes menace to CIA operations against Cuba as well as we to the security of CIA staff personnel in Vestern Europe. el oo, Bt ON “Under the circmmstances beadqamrters desires that contact i iets ee, with key sezbers of the group be eliciceted as rapidly es possible, and that assets vho =ay be in contact with individual i members of the group or peripherally involved in AMLASH conspiracy be warned of danger implicts in these associations and directed to elisinate contacts ASAP.” mt em mee cist eo vom cae: siats Heine S9 mniemie ee ameated weet mee Se P 80 ce eo eat rates ty athe? tedete Psa ee eee aes er ete Re tte La RE Sar sated tate Hae pratt ae rg! bf me Bao Oe eh ao me RY rete ee ae et are ae

4-00000 Re aad wee se 2tt Pee Pt bs enero ee shsowe Me states ee et ging me ron es ice eye 2 cacrae SA spree sat @omp SN samnebatren © ae Beart ee SRT ee on Me serh Olesen PPPs TUR, ceey Geld emg ee 1 Marsh 1955 Reuters reported feos Havaae that the Cuban security police had arrested two military officers for alleged comterrevolutiozary activities favolving “the U.S. Central Intelifgence Agency. They vere 7 identified as Maj. Rolasdo Cubela ead Maj. Facon Guin. TMarch 1966 FBIS quoting Havara Domestic Service: “The trial of the accused Rolando Cubela, Ramon Guin, aad others wre are linked to H the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, was begzm in the revolutionsry 2C a court of Havang district in Ia Cetena today at 1500 hours.” 8 March 1966 Excerpts from first day's trial proceedfsgs eas reported by mo. the Havana Domestic Service and copied by FAIS: rn Former Majcrs Rolando Cubela and Rascn Guin es well as others who are under indictuent have confessed their guilt. Tae defendants are being tried for crises against the integrity and stability of tre nation by baving planned the assassination 4 of Maj. Fidel Castro. The defendants are Rolands Cubele Secades, Razon Guin Diaz, Jose Luis Gonzalez Callarreca, Alberto Blerco Remariz, and Juan Alsina Navarro, eil of sham confessed their gail: in the imputed facts of the case. Also appearing in the trial were Guillerao Cunill Alvarez ami angel Zerrero Veliz. ao aed ote Yee 3 id aos LL ame ~wtses ra ce oe ss oe eh read ct 77 fae telat eo. mee "Me eh, mg Noe. ogee lee ae eta amet ES oon one eel tr Grit ALS 9a Ries — See mo EF oe. ay, nyive rece titties Pa temretieeen can NED Le trading ccd Syrahts mt, nn ne ene Oe tee ee woe oes agate yo eg ete!

14-00000 OT eset eres Oe epereey sree wer nwarme Ge ee wee RereR ot tn cc. She accureé Jose Luis Gonzales Gellearreta, «20 worked as 3 Giplosatic attacke in the Cuban Sxgassy in Sratn, betreyed his country for 100,C00 dollars given his cy CIA agents whoa he ccatected only a month after his errival in Spain. (Ee) met Po, with an offictal of the aforenentiosed orgznizetios of international subversion nazved James Sicel who covered his activities by appearing as an officiel of the U.S, Entassy in Spain. Noel cemanied that biograpale informtica and isformation ebdsut wae Cuban dipicuatiz aissien be furnished hin under this arzangesent. Cubela duricg kis stay in Europe sakes three trips to Spain, i on 26 December 190+, and on 6 ani 20 Peorcary 1965. ‘The revolutiorary ringleader Artime goes to Madrid at the beginning i fo. of February 1965. A meeting is held between Cubela and Artine in which they egree on the final plen. This plen would begin wit!: a persoral attack aimed at Maj. Fidel Castro Ruz. This crininai act would be followed by an arsed invasion of the comtry 48 hours later by U.S. troops. The attack against Conrade Fidel Castro would be nade using a 7.62 es. FAL rifle that Cubela owned. This weapon would be fitted with a powerful ‘ixt0 teflescopic sight and a silencer. Artine sent Callego to the United States to get the telescopic sight and the silencer. Once obtained, this ey equipment was delivered to Blanco Ramariz. He in turn delivered at it to Gonzalez Cailarreta who then delivered it to Cubela the ‘+. aay before he left Madrid. In order to insure the successpf his plans, Cubela meets with @efenéent Gofi=* Crin had been recruited since Septexber: if. 1953 as a spy for the Yankee CIA. This recruiting wes done by. ! GIA agent Higuel Diaz who infiltrated Cute in order to recruit him, and did so. i AE AG Gries PR ah on te Re Re ate oe Seized in Cubela’s residence was a Tasco bread telescopic Bight with accessories, the FAL rifle, lerge quantities of weapoas rl. and arenmition for them, fregmentatioa end incendiary grenades, nn oe end other military equipment ani materiel. AMAL & vee Rie A! was C) iy) whe Fake Pere ale: pee ase ve sie Be ee oF aed Be ee cee Bad! me ew govitigs we gst, see, Sq giiedes ah weanes*o, ee Vigeetaiapate.e ¢fadets irs carteeeetey oe pod Reema ten wed magyar nianety haan) separates were Soe ae apg tet” Yo dott hey nee ws Bee nent PEE ERR emcee we ee we oe Deere se.

14-00000 ae Troe 7 Te Fee sa eg TIN, Sip ek hm Sete Peet, ee RE. ee Pome Me ieee ee cml oe mentee abe were The Gee hiiee ve ee Ae POMS tat, Re brs REED eM me AO ae oats (onan 8628 Cte enema, ne tk. wee Peatetne share. NEN. + tome te ee ee eee CTU tay Ss cess wt at “olswd The punisntent to vatican the defen3ants are Subject and wnich tais prosecution wishes {-rsted fs as follaws: For 2siande Cuvela Secades, Reon Guin Diez, Jose Luis Gonzalez Galtarseca, and Alberto Zlanco Ronariz--the deata penslty by Tiring squad. For Juan Alsica Maverro, Cufllerso Cuntll Alvarez, end Angel BRerrero Veliz--30 vears isprisomment pius corresscndircg additional pensities. Q varch 1956 FBIS report frog Eavana Dowestic Service: “Prize Minister Fidel Castro has sent a letter to the prosecutor im the case agairst Majors Rolando Cubela, Raron Guin, and other defendants. Ia Lt, the Prine Minister says that it must be reccgnized from all this, a bitter but useful lesson may be drawn, edding, ‘XY suggest thet the court mot ask the death sentence for ay of the accused.” 10 March 1956 FSIS report of testimony given in court on 8 March: Question: Do you recall when the silencer broke? Gubela: ‘he silencer? Actually, the silencer did not break. 2h The silencer agtually aid not break. So Question: Where is the silencer? Cudcla: I threv the silencer avay because it was burnirg sy kends. Prosecutor: Have you sposen with Conrade Fidel Castro recently? Cubdela: Yes.. Prosecutor: Can you tell the court when you spoxe vith Covrade Fidel? prt es tate be an oe ey, tte ae SATE era aS wean cea el ies ae ete rae et gts ee See abe ot ETE pes rine Taepcie eee es ee i. ee ae carteiass epee eee Siz

0000 e Fe rg een mee wwe. Ayowee meet mz cos Uae aes coc uew Vv. Sidud 2 Sys on 4 vod Cudela: I delieve was in January, let =e sea, in Jerry, in January. Prosecutor: In Janzsry! Do you recall tke converzatfon you hed te with Conrede Fidel, end did Comrade Fidel offer to help you? Be, + F Cubela: Conrade-Pidel opened the doors, opened the doors to re. He gave me, be gave ce to uuderstand that he Imev wat vas doing but I did sot keve enough courese to tell hfs. yo Defense Attorney: Cubela Secades, what, in your view, is the punishzent merited by conduct of this nature? Cubela: Th: worst? Question: What do you mean by “the worst?” >. ENT ah! oe CG Question: eWhat do you mean 1 by "tse wall?® Cubela: Deserved execution by a firing squad. 32 March FBIS report quoting Havara Domestic Service of 10 March: -Revolutionary Court Ho. 1, which has tried case-108 in crimes "wa ioe against the integrity and security of the nation, has pronounced oe sentences on the accused Rolando Cubela Secades, Ramon Guin Diaz, end others. Aees PASM Pieter FoI lat > geome «st Cee SEER TECR PAGAN WHR sare,’ According to the sentences, Eolando Cubela and Remon Guin vere sentenced to 25 years inpriscemment; Jose Luis Gonzalez Gallerreta and Alberto Blanco Rosariz, 20 years; and Jvan Hilario Alsins Ravarro, 10 years. -Guillerso Cunil Alvarez en? Angel Herrero Veliz were absclved c? guilt. They were released provided they are not liable to any other charges. 110 eon noe ret ete wegen ec Sn Sa nash eg Bae eo wee wt ek wee yee ee ah eee asthe te te es bios sos od com patie AS eS ad ke ole: mca SATs. se naan “Vee PATI AN AITO Ot es a to. tase BL ee te ae ae cease ake, Stepp ope ttt Ce Loctite Oa tt Naigeeten ee Are ty a's eT hare OA nee OE ee Hewat ele ve Rida oe ee cee ete ad Ce ee wae dod whe TRY.

4-90000 see rag RO BOPP LAROU TRA, (Comzexnt: It is worth nozing chat nose cf Cubela's dealings with CIA from March 1951 unci? Sovester 195: vere sentiozed in the “os é trial proceedings. The first assoclation of Cubela vith CIA. rr was in connection with his trip to Surupe ia late 195% and early 1955 during waich he kad nis reetings vith Artize. The trial evidence was confined to Cutela's couterrevolutiozary activities groving out of those reetings with Artine ia December 1964 and February 1965. Yone of hfs many direct contacts with CIA officers, sose of whom ke icew by trve name, vere mentioned. There is not even a hint of the ballpoint pen/ 4 end ypodermic/Black Leaf 40 episode. ‘he Cutan authorities may have gotten that information from bin and decided not to. introduce it in evidence, but we can think of no convincing © reason why they would have withheld it. The closest we can come T é to a decent reason, and it is pure conjecture, is this: Castro pay have thought i politically iuprudent to allow the execution of someone so close to his inner circle, who had merely plotted 7 on en se. aAlee: age, ay cs culipar dGrereny eacongnast 2 without acting. If the full details of Cubela’s involvement with CIA had came out in court, Cestro might Lave had little em hae emme tem we © excuse for asxing for lenfency.) Chet. om ltty MT ine gael Wye Ue eae tee

14-00000 Pipi amen ene coo. oo. Sok ee Lotte meee ee ie Ae ee TPA Faces lated O23 oad the be de St § Bae Dissussios of Assassi{zatios 2+ Blch-Leve! Covermest Meetings Drev Pearson clsins to have a report that there was a high-level i reeting at the Departzent of State at which plans for the assassiza- it tion of Castro were discussed. ‘2 find record of tvo high-level, Hd interagency meetings at watch assassizaticn of Castro was raised. The first (and probably the oze to which Pearson refers) was at the Department of State on 10 August 1962. It was a meeting of the ete Oe ae fee oem meme Syecial Group (Augmented). The second meeting ve have identified was held on 30 July 196%. It was a meeting of the 303 Comittee ams oe woo ees erent ee and probably was held in che Waite House Situation Roos. ‘The tvo I meetings are described separately below. 10 August 1 The Special Group (Augmented) net at the Department of State, either in Secretary Rusk's office or in his conference room. ‘The < folloving are recoried as being present: ag ee SES Poke Tet State Dean Rusk, Alexis Johnson, Edwin Martin, ae es pine de Ss Richard Goodvin, Robert Hurvitch White House Haxvell Taylor, McGeorge Bundy (Bill Harvey's notes record that Robert Kennedy was absent ! and that Bundy bad nis proxy.) DeZense Robert McNamara, Rosvell Gilpatric, Lyran TS al ee Sige non sat gf? apeen Siwienest Bet seer og tht en othe ee we aN “Eas ale ee lod Pe. 3 PRN age gry PO nee sso isha he can eet swe Ae, nee ve te ae, 3 Bee Pere Nee MN pe Pe) nies PATS Dect ete AAP ET Ay Nhe Pbetee pia Owed ep dnt ame ok eee See ee

14-00000 ee. ee ee “ee er ees am rece re me etm ertete ne tee Le nen ere et: os eee te Sry 7 t rey: poms 3s adenw wolae CIA Jona HeCone, #ilifaa Varvey ae USIA Edvara Hioreyv, Donald wilson Secretary Thocas Parrott Tom Parrott’s minutes of the xseting waxes no mention of the subject of assassination. Both McCore and Hervey recall that McNamara raised the subject. Harvey's notes taken at the meeticg arese meer pene sme nee thee show that it was alsa centioned by Murrow, but the nature of the coments was not recorded. Mr. McCore states, im a memorandum of Aprtl 1967, that he recalls meetings on 8 or 9 August in the sot 1 JCS Operations Room in the Pentagon and an 10 August 1962 in ‘Secretary Rusk"s conference rom. At one of these meetings (and > "++ NeCone now recalls it as being at the JCS) the suggestion vas nade “that top people in the Cutan regine, including Castro, be Iiquidated. (Comment: As it vill later be seen, Mr. McCone's recollection nis 4s probably faulty. It is quite clear that assassination cane Up for discussion at the 10 August neeting at State.) an fos ee iets we emg wee oT ot Hr. MeCone cays that he took immediate exception to the disccssion T and prosptly after the meeting called on Secretary McHerara persomally to enphasize his position. According to McCone, McHanara “heartily agreed.” McCone states in his memorendtm that at no tine did the OTR pee suggestion receive serious consideration by the Special Group (Augzerted) 34 og Oss tay ete Sete my ees we Te eR nt LT AA ete le re erage veneoas sid “gi Ve fm. lat ss re we a TE Lote ott ee Lote. weg Lem pee eT wy SOREL ce area re mines og: fag Ata Sng tint Hie: ge eee some tanec ee ment ne TL ex. ete ata Nr Teg. Bo ee CES mam Opec pa Rear a cigar aes NI FA enn be dine Be Fue tw ee tts seer ee

Pg we camer oneness aqlTeT sey eran rtes ige ed twa dse eme pa omens ote soe or by any individual resroastoie for polisy. <McCone edds that througa the jears the Cuban prodlen was discussed in terms such as "éLepose of Castro,” “renove Castro,” and “mock off Castro,” etc., but that eee wens these phrases vere always construed to mean the overthrowing of the coOmanmist govermzent in Cuba. Harvey recalls that, when McCone told bis of the McCone-McKamara conversation, McCone said that if ke, mee Ee camppedest + McCone, were to be involved in such a thing he would be exccenunfcated. Folloving the 10 August meeting, and without reference to the reported exchange betveen McCore and MeNemare, Iansdale addressed Bam GEM eed te ROPER. dese Saye 618 mes @ memorandics on 13 August to Williaa Zarvey (CIA), Robert Hurvitch (State), General Harris (Defense), and Don Wilson (USIA). The memorandum assigned responsibility for drafting papers on varlous subjects related to the Cuban operation. Harvey's assignment oo included: “Intelligence, Political (splitting the regize, /Gortion excised froa the CIA file copy/). ss er On 14 August, Earvey sutal tted a memorandia to the DD/P (Selms) "reporting the Lansdale ccamunication and what Harvey had done about it. Harvey's necorandum to the DD/P states that the excised portion had consisted of the phrase: “including elintnatton or Yeaders” Harvey wrote that he had phoned Lansdale's office and bed spoken vith. seh Prank Hand fn Lansdale's absence. Eazvey said he hed protested the use of the phrace en nd had proposed that steps be taken to have it ee ema ose soe ia atte wo ge MEER Ca LS aiaiadeel eee ne Oy CER tebep “en Seager setecliggee ev temas fa OE 9h EHS: ee Set aan roe ra Fark ears signee tie Ot a co gee ee Amat eee coe. Qe oo oe hee eat! eae er er iad tbe Nella wine ope dcr thetaggtp degen © fa Re Se IGE MAE Te pt eA OP EL BERS 07 OBE IEAS on stp neds nahin wayne tates! aptdarpme Sent thringtng 292

0000 aor OF ee wen ED OR cong oot os TRADED RE Demme Ram Remee. YE One eee oe oe Cuba fitem was discussed. excised from all copfes. This was agreed to. darvey teleted the phrase from his om copy and assumes that instructims sere ,iver to other recipients to do the same. Farvey told us that Iansdele repeatedly tried to raise the matter of assassization of Castro with Harvey over the next several weeks. darvey says that ke alsays avofced such discussicas. Earvey estizates thet five persons in Lansdale's office were gererally avare of the sensitive details of mee eee tones ce ewe Project HGWOOSE and of Lansdale's interest in assacsimation es es aspect of it. 30 July 196% The 303 Camittee met in regulnr session, protably in the Sitvation Room of the White House. (Desmond FitzGerald recalis that such meetings vere generally held there.) ‘The folloving are recorded as being present: McGeorge Bundy, Cyrus Vance, John McCone, Thoras Hughes Col. Ralph Steakley was present for another item o= the agency, but it is not shown if he was present when the Peter Jessup as secretary The minutes of the meeting record this in the context of the discussfoi of Cuba: aS rae vant mu 3) aenvonan sisetemres alto ncn oren et Seccrinicn tinct Greer eee ee ees iar te res hasBeertenstiee pes SES TES ONS et bee eet we eae ay “gene “EON on RE 7 Sree wo eer ee be Le fri apesrentunviseni tre dy ap. Aiea Gprtatinty Fie nears nse hese Be fr eeieeii eat Poor Suen eaten a! at near ee tie meee Aeaaimettes Os

4-90000 wo OID nD eo ee ere mae rors Sey Le 868. ee ese ea a”, tier Pe Paes ES rrr "It was agreed that Mr. FitzGerald would contact “dr. Sana Papish of the F3i fn vegard to the earlfer ceport o7 an alleged plot witz Mafia overzones to essassinate Castro and which the Attorney General ssreed to randle as a matter of law enforcerent.” The reference is clearly to a 10 Jume 195% renorandum information report fron the DD/P to the Director. ‘ke folloving additional “elite” dissemination was cade of it: Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Assistant Secretery, Inter-American Affairs, Departaent of State Director of Intelligence and Research, Devartzent of State Director, Devense Intelligence Agency The Attorney Gereral -Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation Deputy Director of Central Intelligence Deputy Director for Intelligeace The report related a proposal for the assassination of Castro that was rade to proxinent Cuban exiles. The Mafia appeared to be involved im the schese. ‘The asking price for doing the job vas $150,000, with a guarantee of $10,000 for expenses. A wealthy Cutan exile, Jose Mario “Pepin” Bosch, President of Bacardi Rim Interzattons}, “yas reported ready to contribute $50,000. Bosch approached the Chief of Station, JMWAVE, and suggested that the U.S. Goverment also contribute funds. The suggestion was rejected out of Land. The record indicates that CIA's only Involverent in the plot was to report information of its existence. Pine last recozd we find of the incident sie woes ar gene ool. nce en eet as sete Hem aimee es we mmeoo acess

-90000 oe Meter gs ee {s a zenozandus froa the DCI (‘cCose) to Bunty, ested 19 August 195%, reporting the results of Far isterviews with whe ellezed parcvicipasts. Ooviously, nsthicg came of the plo. (Comment: It may be only coincidence, but we are struck Dd De Oo he ot aneead wees fe tmoma pee ty the point that this group o2 plotters, ellesedly inclxting gangster elezents, offered to assassinate Castro for $153,000, which is precisely the suz that CIA offered to pey in an eeee ame monte ot earlier plot that very definitely involved gangster elezents. It could be the same group of gangsters, or it cculd te that the crizinal underworld mows the "going price.”) + cemumee Gs As ve have ‘said earlier, 1f Drew Pearson hss firm infor=ation on high-level meeting at which assassination of Castro was discussed, it is likely that the reference would be to the 10 August 1962 meeting of the Special Group (Augmented). ‘The 30 July 1954 303 Comittee Meeting .is described only because its reference to assassination of Oe acces Castro might be distorted to assuze sowe of the characteristics of oo” "the Pearson story. soc. 26 SES an sem metwunmetions be tg eee te Say own tel tg emt ge Deer pre othe SL ek, PRR BTA Fee oot apne AW enim ee eet Poel wa ae wR Te ee Ra oe Dee eo ee oF ty ee ae re weg SE ca teen be ee Bie adept Ser Be yiey ee EVES ee ante ede ML ge ae HATES EN

4-00000 Meo. ‘ame 0s andend nen nametivn it sane ee es cath as wee ge meee salyepgion. ad jibe i. ae OF TT ee nee, MIE DREW PEARSON STORY YR Publiched Ne'ails The Facts Aa We Know Then cn The CIA hatched a plot to knock off Castro. True. Cog Robert Kennedy may have approved an Not true. Ho was briefed on Gambling Syndicate-Phasa Wk, avoaustination plot. One after it was over. Je wo not briefed on Phase Two. of Undervorld figuren were actually recruited True. i to carry out the’ plot. Three hired antasains were caught in avana Ronelli informed Harvey on 21 June 1962, preoumobly whexe a lone survivor is still supposed © on the basic of information from Varona, that a team ead to ba languishing in prison. of three men wos inside Cuba, We do not know thelr i myo identities nor what pay have happened to them. We have oo r no proof that they were actually dispatched. Nona ¢ of the aanounced captures and executions during this at or peried fite this team. B Caotro learned enough at least to believe the This reportedly has come cut in the Garrison investie ft 1 CIA was ceeking to kill him. He io reported gations. It also wae stated by Castille in the aA to have cooked up a counterplot against Philippines under direct interrogation. We have no i President Kennody. independent confirmation ef any sort. (Note that oan Garricon met with Ronelli in Lao Vegas in March 1967.) “bee Unpuvitched Details Pills wore sent to Cuba for use in the Trve. At least we were told by Roselli that the pille og aceassination. were sent in during Phase One and again in Phase Two. log Tvere was 4 neoting at the Department of State True. The subject was raieed at a meeting at State on “oo at which the acsassination of Castro vas 10 Auguct 1962, but it ie-unrelated to any actual discussed. attempts at assassination. It did result in a MONGOOSE Mie action memorandum by Lansdale avsigning to CIA action j nt for planning liquidation of leaders. The offending 3 phrare was later excised from copies forwarded to CIA, Btate, Defence, and USIA, but the damage may alroaay re have been done. ft ce voy 8, foe ? ry fe ane ? “4 hee Fa cored

4-00000 wwe: oy cs seree, mere ge No es SUE Bee meee fre Fassible Resificaticas o2 the Genslic~ Syatteate Gveratica The earlier sections of this report describe all of the CIA pe oe. ati schemes 2ined at the assassination of Castro that we have beea able to discover. The accounts of the two phases of the geadling syndicate operation are factual to the exteat that they are based on what those intervieved recall or belleve the facts to have been. 22 teeny amage epee see ae It is evident that some of those facts Lave leazed, are being tatxed about, or are being peddled. On the opposite page is a list of the ember 2 Le main “etails of the story Drew Pearson has, as they are Imown to us, tegether with a brief coment on the apparent accuracy of each. iC — There 1s support in fact for most of the details in Pearson's story. i He has a garoled account of the role played by Robert Kennedy, and be errs in telling the story as if all of the details are part of nts @ Gingle story, which they are not. For the most part, though, ‘his facts are straight and he has the truly important aspects of the gambling syndicate operation. Lae are SRT Until Janes "Connell returned cn 2 May fron his peetings in ST Las Vegas, ve vere faced with the difficulty of being unable to rn, estimate the dimensions of the problen facing the Agency unless ve could discover vhat has been leaxed, by vboa, to when, and for what purpose. None of those things could te deduced with confidence rea 7 gee Ps eet ee Fir BGPP ert omtsnapeaeecanl Ne2a% ead oe fe de Se ete ere oe alee’ ge et wt mo ao. Lt so Bt aera! x wed, tet Veta se ie tthesnadd pain cntaeyed et ee ee ee Oe OL ee ee Tr Ste ned

4-00000 98 al apstrcweetrwece se en Gos ob yee < i the :iformation then evallable co us. O'Connell, who nas alreacy + t woe “ee i reperted to you orally end will be suzaitt!ng his written report pe tera [evened directly to you, is able to shed some light on the Mikely sources of Pearson's information. He has elso briefed us on his conversations with Maheu. These are the key poincs; a. Maheu did brief attorney, Edvard P. Morgan, on Meheu's Farticiration in Fiese (me. b. Kaheu kcew nothing cf Pousa Tyo walle it was under vay ee eee io and kas never heard of it from Roselli. wo Morgan and Roselli were ecqusinted, independently of Maheu, vell before Mabeu becace involved with Roselli in the gambling syndicate operaticn. Eoselli vas steered to Morgan by let M. Greenspun, editor ané pobltsher of the Las Vegas Sun. hee, we oe @ Usaheu suspects that Roselli is a client of Morgan's. @- Roselli is drinking heevily. Morgan has been in Las too ‘Negas ance or trise recently, vas drinking too meh, and was eof "sndtscreet." f. sim Gexctem, Pivacd Horeca, ond Rouettt vere att ta las Vegas at the saze tine this past March. Garrison was in touch with Roselli; so was Morgan. it is our impression that Greenspun was also involved in the conversations. We do not krow the date, but it might be noted that ome of Pearson's columns e ans + ee. ae oF oe tn tad ‘Pein ere tasntey Mae scene ee ez see a Loe ae aes ot tine “nat ee eee tgs apenaier ee ee eC eee ene ee tren amr ste ca she. bese ee eee igmre ee Sen aes Sankyo Salah facies ene eae tee Ped bn ing BGP aes mae. coy ten AD By oR Re Gpe Set, eet Oh ot es con pene ee Heh ewe tle St ein Eh wet ee ter we wet eM Eh OS aadert rte?

bee Oo eee OR oa oe OR eats con Bien oe 016 ane ss meee «cea “Lethal Pills Briefing of Zennedy+ Three-Man Teen State Dept. Meeting eee tee yous, nate ro. CTA See) Parvey Rosellt Maheu O'Connell Edvard3 Earv2y Rosellt Maheu O'Coanell Edvards Harvey Farvey Roseili 8s de ee, erm memes nt Pe Pee Houston Houston Varona Varona Varona‘’s Varona 60n-in-law son-in-law Maceo Maceo an Glancang mg fra fficante ! oe 7 Lalla an 24 6 By LY v9 It is quite possible that the fact of Robert Kencedy's having been “Tetetes and perhaps the substance of the briefing, is more widely Ny known to goverrzent officials than this List would indicate. We know that Mr. McCone on 16 August 1953 asked for and received a copy of the memorandum record of the triefing. Others in Justice end the FBI besides Kennedy may know of the sesorandim and of fits contents. wht eee Leese rapes my poe vo pany oO, ve ep eign eae RAY magia, sa vik bc paicasehevltacer« eelpnoetn forte tge Ble Caters: oa Sale hegre iets” rica STD eee inns ssines won Dem Tea ee me Sere es an wo Rady came Pet tht ta

14-00000 RO cient ost same ste whe eee CP cater mrmns: yous Semmens: ate appeared on 7 Marca. According to Maheu, Morgan ead Jack cadersoa, Drev Pearson‘s associate, are very close. Tois seems clearly to: point the finger at Roseili as the ulticate source of the information on the cesbling syaiicate plot and to confirm Morgan as Pearson’s source. We can test the accuracy of this assumption against analysis ve had done earlier in ean effort to identify the lixely source of Pearson's story. Ca the opposite page is a listing of persons definitely known be wittirg of certain key facts now in Fearson's possession. The list includes CIA officers vho knev more than one of the key facts, plus all imown outsiders. These were our conclusions: a. If Drew Pearson has a single source, and if Pearson's imeediate source is the ultimate source of the leak, and if compartmentation was not violated, then Bill Earvey exerges as the likely candidate. Ee was the only person we found in the course of this inquixy vho knew all four of the key facts at the tine the Pearson columms appeared. We preferred not to think that Bill Harvey was the culprit. We could find no_ persuasive reason why he vould wish to leak the story deliberately, and we doubted taat he would te so indiscreet as «90 ees ene rr abe emma oO eee em one Ot omen 06 ctemmme to Sig 2 ink ite. ceatrantS ER. CSS PS aS CRB I bd «he es ae eaey ane lian NGA See ea eee Aas aSse fag DER eee oe pee he oe dae

4-00000 wat > Doe Leen wee ee on, i. to leak it accidentally. Further, if ne were the sourse, ve could expect Pearson’s story to be cocpletely a=curate, because Earvey knew tae truta. b. If we ruled out farvey as the source, then it apzeared that there oust be at least tvo ultizate Sources of leaks. The State Department meeting was not known to any of the otner participants in the operatioa--asziming that Hervey cid not mention it to any of then. Therefore, it is quite possible that the leak on the State Department meeting bas ceze fron sozeone who hag no direct knowledge of the gambling syncicate operation but does know of the meeting. c. From the standpoint of who-knev-vhat, the next most lixely source of the origiral leak is Jotm Roselli. He is, in fact, the only person vith direct ané continuous participation throughout both phases of the gambling syndicate operation. He introduced Maheu to Sam Ciancana as the first step in getting the operation under way, and he was the one who made the final break with Varona when the operation was abandoned. He knows everything that went on with the gangsters, with Orta, and with Varona between those dates. He and Robert Maheu are the oaly non-CIA participants with f=nedfate knowledge of the Robert Kennedy aspect.- Shef E’wards tad lunca vith Roselli and Maneu 123 APA ee gt -@ eon, ie Uhustet ts hte Mean eerste nocemme pn te

14-00000 arb BAN ence sey cerean so. see eee east oer Se mwteeg Tp 4 ry in Los Angeles in the summer of 1952. Edwards says that Posellt knew Edvards' true saze and his posit tion in the Agency. Edwards said he tcox the occasion <9 to express his personal apprecfation to Roselli; and told Roselli that he, Edvards, had personally HEE rine Cot me ete told Attorney General Kecnedy of what Roseilt had trie’ to do in the cational interest. We xanow that Kennedy vas nerely briefed on the operation--ard only on Fease One at that--but Roselli ray have inferred that Kennedy hed an active role in the operation. none POTN Cres Hn ere. ae d. We did not know what Robert Maheu knew of the operation firsthand, because ve had conflicting inforzation on Cc precisely vhen he vas cut off from direct participation. He has direct knowledge of the first phase, but probably little af any of the second phase (from which Pearson's story seems > ot allies oe ee to cone). If Maheu knovs of the second phase, he could have ‘learned of it only from Roselli. re, ir Haceo, about whom we know very little, was “Roselli EER mam set ae oes man” in the second. phase. He presumably knows of the pills and of the three-man tess, but the other details he could have known only from Roselli. Varona's knowledge and that of his son-in-law would be ere limited to the pills and the team, but they should know considerably a ‘eos eo. Senet te C) ke are tote Br te ET oe tere moe, om Pied aR SB ein, Bar NNO Sai ate ae! oer Bee hg Absa tee sata) Ton felles ince eh bose ds er Fog tbo ery bt iY Sa ee Bae Cerna ioee ty Fo ent Oho ay et at ainmamnly BS aes

£4-00000 AT INET ty es Mecteee bea Ye i 7 nore of the speclitss; s224 as, who received the sills, the Cocposition of the cea, and the eventual fate of the -aan. 7 g- Giancena ext Trafficante were presumably cut out of aa Poke cme Pease Tso. They ccul2 tave learned of it only from Roselli. oe About all thet exerzed fros this reviews of “who had direct. movledge of what" was support for tre hypothesis that Drew Pearson's story probably fs @rawm fron more than one informant: oze on the State tf i 7 Departrent reeting and acotzer (or others) on the gambling syndicate Operation. We also postulated that Roselli is the most likely ultimate source of Pearsoa's story. This line of reasoning and the C information O*Connell got froa Makeu are consistent. oO -Qur supposition until acv wes that the immediate and the Ultinate sources, if. different people, vere leaking or peddling the story vith ulterior motives in mind. What those ulterior nctives might be vere difficult to fathom--for these reasons: ote a. If protection was vhat the source was seeking, he ie TIE could be better assured of getting it by a direct approach wt Se: to CIA for help. oo, Le b. Maheu was the only known link associating Morgan with te sveltcste Bloty ant taneu stants ocly to lose by baviag bts ©. Those who know Horgan, Maheu, and Roselli this: ought it. Dido: eb ce ee aoe etree wo ee ties eh eA LS tL. 125 read ae Boe fe. og oe ae mh, Few ag BEE a oe Bat he) TE. 2 meinen ro De een te eee aed yo ot > an TO inet: eames ce SABE, ocean ge nen ae ee weno Lor rab. ebete Hosen dre tate oS eee be ee ee ea ce ee bee ta ol

4-00000 oPF Pere come Betwcee Oot ss quite out of churacter for any of the tarde to be spreaciig the story dellberately for a private purpose. In learning of the Roselli-Morgan link, we are relieved of tize need for speculatios as to how the story kas gotten out. It is quite lively that Roselli is the scurce, Morgan tke channel, acd Anderson and Pearson the reciplents. We cay also be relieved of the need for speculatica as to why the story is being told. ‘he inference to be drawn froa O'Connell's discoveries in Las Vegas is that Roselli is drinking too much and talking and that Morgan is alsa drinking and talking to a nevspapercan friend. lo Put in it¢ best Light--that there is no ulterior motive in i spreading the story—it is questicnable whether ve are any better off now than we were before; our position say be even worse than ve tad suspected. te. a.We may now assume that Pearson's story is not patched together from vats and pieces picked up here and there. His i aetemte source, Roselli, imovs more about certain details of 1 the gambling syndicate operation than we do, and he evidently has talked. ‘Trying now to hush up further leaks might d3 more hans than good; the story is already out asd probably in a "+ gonsiderable detail. an Cane ae oe Sats Serr Paes 126 + te we ny ramones iii arrersie rae be a Asien toot iret PRs ctr nk ec os Peete At hy tke pier Sip de gs teen ates we PT OF nade eye SE ARGS aden, mate print tre etic tet pe dae Pee ee Fat ee ee Fee

4-00000 oe ap ASCs Qbetteeiaetigr ements, inte genes ni se raters tit me ma eu ebeit vend ered aS yy taeeggrgy py Neetu rete tert “Agate op ktn Bashy ie Hater ose be peek empath dpicine we PSO AS DOBBS Lar hte Ae at wants BSCS CEG LALLA LS Pre ROIOCERRBR SENIESONS STEN WS et geeBD AN cot Petia anaaa apa keto) Sanya em meee ep RR RE eg eee tee ae ote Sean Ey ~ameee. ee wits seed wedded b. Tee Rosel2t-Garrison coatact in Las Vegns in March is particularly e{stursing. I[% lends substance to reports thst i i Castro had something to’ do with the Kennedy assassination in. leeae ey sa. retaliation for U.S. attempts on Castro's Life. We do not krow net ee + that Castro actually tried to retaliate, but we do know that there were such plots against Castro. Unhappily, it now appears that Garrison may also know this. tema arama game atete The publicity on this subject has protably not yet mm its course. @. Drew Pearson has not yet, as far as we know, used tvo -4 of his best goodies: the atory of the pills and the fact of the State Department meeting. BD. Garrison has not yet revealed his ‘un case. When he does, ve should expect to find CIA presinently displayed. e. The Philippine National Bureau of Investigation has a Puerto Rican in custaly who claims he participated in a Castro- inspired assassination plot in Telias. He also claims that Castro nade a speech in July 1962 threatening to try to oo assassinate Kennedy in retaliatioa for two Kennedy attempts on Castro's life. (we have found no record nor recollection of Castro having maze such a speech.) ‘he Puerto Rican is in the at ghee eS oy WE ow. fo. pe te nS go Bay Bae oe" ont es. ooo tne Lad yeh Tt BBB om bac Spe bach aie EAL ene OO minke attic Lait yaa TS TE Tes ors feet ih ales ct Rag Fe lee coe meee ne eg EET SS Se bee ele} Ps wile Sal tet Gee ire

0000 FOS Fee age em PP re Ps or eee ere bars Philippices fllegally ead protabdly will de cepsried to the U.S. i We may expect the FBI to taze his over and wring hin ary. ees We fuce the lizelikood thes things vill get worse before they begin to get better. In the foliasing paragraphs ve explore sone of the yeslf?ications and discuss «mat aight be done accut then. Should ve try to silence chose vho are talking cr night later tal? It appears to us that this tactic offers little chance of pee success. For one thing, the story is already out and probably in about es full detsil as it ever will be. ‘he only participant on I when ve have aay real leverege is Maheu, and be has already done all of the talking he is likely to do (to his lavyer, Morgan). We have no ae hold oa any of the others vho right furnish confirmation for Roselli's story. a. Varona is alzcst certainly not annem of the Agency. 7 As the Bay of Pigs operation developed, feas one of the most ms Pyle erttical of the lack of Cuban control of the operation and of Mae Bie the people involved in it. He vas bitter over termination of 7 Agency support of his exile group (and the consequent loss of his ow, income). The last ve know of hin he vas in Kew York living a hand-to-mouth existence as a part-time auto salesnan. renter tae yr ote Meera tee rae oR Ste. mie TERY tes AoE fetter Sater fae wt nt, oe ae ees dna Pidcenegtije piece Ober watt ean «OF adh ce. ed Quon LEE OM eh ghee SES Cyn gE EOE my ae ae on dated ue Eee Poa ant eS

0000 me meme net he Al ahem gin ae oa te PW came wowemn cane woeeete eo Cad e+ AG armne ts ty wig cane 08 me we ee we mee ae women oe amare sch. tty Ezhewistee sos inet Seow b. Poseltf£, Giunsena, and TrafMcunte have fallea oa "evil" days. Giancasa is reported {in a Chicago nevspaper of recent date) to have been deposed es the “afia head in Chicago and was moored to be hiding in Mexico. Makeu reports that Trafficante is in jail in Tazpa. Foselli is persona non grata in Las Vegas, being required to register with the police any tise he is in tom. None of thes would have compunctions about dragging ir his CIA connection wren ke was being pusized by law enforecement authorities. Giancaca has already done it when the Fal was crovding his in 1963. Reseili eppears to be doing it in his coaversations with Morgan end Carrison. (Comment: The cover story used with Roselli, Glancana, Trafficante, Yarona, and presumably with Orta was that the sponsors vere U.S. businessnen vith interests in Cuba. Roselli soon concluded that CIA vas the teve sponsor ané so tci2 O°Conzell. In Roselli's subsequent dealings with Harvey and ‘Edwards he came to know this for sure. Giancana named CIA in 1963. We must assume that the others, vith the possible “exception of Orta and persaps Varoz:, are equally sure that CIA was the true sponsor.) Se Sac abe a8 eee mat Seas eek pines eee eerste te ge ores fo Fe we cet Na ign SO iy tent Bt BRS el eben ae Ey SEAR rein tree he me eed oN ee ce. Horgan may elvays retire cehird the screen of an attorney- earners ent ot

Coral ine ete hji.ca the Pearson ctory. i @ Pearson, Anderson, and Creensma (in Las Vegas) are Een ! revspaperzen with a newsvorthy story. Pearson kas already i published much 6f it. i e. Maheu Goes have gcod reason for =o% wanting the story j aired further. Unfavorable publicity =fzht cause hin to lose his lucrative client, Howard Hughes. There might be same value to be gained fram endorsing his suggestion that he approach Horgan and perhaps Roselli and urge discretion. 4. What do other components of Governzert tnow about this operation? Forzer Attorney General Robert Kennedy was fully briefed by Houston and Edvards on 7 May 1962. A memorand:: corfirming the oral briefing vas forwarded to Kemedy o2 34 May 1962. Tse mesorandim does not use the word “assassinate,” but there is little room for nisinterpretation of vhat was meant. Presusably the original of that vo yO memorandum 1s still in the files of the Justice Department. Tt should H be noted that the briefing of Kemedy was restricted to Phase (ne of the operation, which had ended about a year earlier.. Phase Two was already under way at the time of the briefing, but Kennedy was not tolé of it. As far as ve know, the FBI has not been told the seusitive erie se a4

G00 +e Keer ay Seat wesad operatiozal details, bur ft would be naive to assme that they have not by now put two and tvs together and come out wich the right answer. They mow of CIA's involvement with Roselli and Ginncena as @ result of the Las Vegas wiretapping incident. From the Chicago newspaper stories of Aug:st 1963, and from Giancaca's ow statesent, it appears that they “nov this related to Cuba. Waren Roselli’s story reacked them (Rosellf to Morgan to Pearson to Yarren to Rowley to the FBI), ‘all of the pieces should have fallen into place. They 7 should by now have concluded that CIA plotted the assissinatioa of Castro end used U.S. gangster elewents in the operation. There is scale support for this thesis in the conversation I kad with Sem Papich on 3 May 1957 when I told him of the expected meeting between Roselli and Harvey. Sam commented that Roselli and Gilancana have CIA “over a barrel" because of “that operation.” He said that he doubted that the FBI vould be able to do anything about either Roselli or Giancana because of “their previous activities with your people." Cen ve plausibdly ceny that ve plotted with gangster eleseats to assassinate Cestro? Ko, we cannot. We are reescaably confident that there is ‘nothing in writing outside of the Goverazent that vould cenfirm Pearson's oan Bo we fil we, Ame AP MEADS SS some aertes sete tah tam tas Se Riptind geen ed IT me Se se tO as Bity yO ots Flew tat et rs Eh neo. (ghee le bearer 288 SLT Pe SRS Te we eT ee Sia eee ae x so to. te an ne fos oe ge ue 22, ee MY NOEL? Set ee Oates dee So (ties Stat ng are ee ews OEE eres aetmatpommne ae so

ems pit PR ee ary te enon de qreertnt teewrene Beem PEW etree tl ber ME ed weosze story of the gocbling syadicete operatica, but the: are plenty of mon-gangster witnesses who could lend confirmation. @. Maheu can confine that Shef Edvards told Rosellt that Edvards had told the Attorney General of Rocelli's i activities oa Lenalf of the Gover=ment. b. Varora and VYaroza's soa-in-lew can confixs the pill and three-man team elements of the story. e. Orta can confirm the pill clecent of Fhase One. AE cee eget wine ae a If an independent investigation were to be ordered, ‘the investigators could learn everything that ve have learned. Such an investigation probably woul2 uncover details uiimow to me seag tmmnapeets eBate cbs us, because it would have access to the non-CIA participants. an CIA state or imply that it vas rerely an instmoent of policy? Kot in this case. While it is trve that Phase Two vas carried out in an atmosphere of intense Kennedy administration pressure to- 0s: re He do something about Castro, such is not true of the earlier phase. Phase One was initiated in August 1960 usder the Eisenhower adninistration. Phase Tso is associated in Harvey's mind with the Executive Action Capability, which reportedly was éeveloped in xesponse to White House urgicss. Ageia, Paase One had been started and abandoned months before the Executive Actioa Capability appeared ee oS all 132 foyer > este" red CFgemer se Bhatt ie Rak ta AL nr see aoe oe pm ara % ereez iar et rath ten mS hake 53 ee oe ci agentes cdbliaine TAME 1p bleette ves toescy lawn pee Sees Je pie pee RA hat ADS ache ere BS ee searin nity peegtehe wore. Eee Ste aee Pie

24-90C09 Qeereny se CES etre hm PEG te on the scene. one detail that is found only in Phase Two; What measures Bight be taken to When Robert Kennedy was briefed oa Phase One in strengly adnont shed Zouston asi Edvards to chece with the Attcormey General in advance of eny future intended use of U.S. criminal eleseats. This was not done with respect to Phase Two, vhich was @lready well under way at the tise Kennedy was briefed. Pearson story, waich is now causing us so much distress, includes lessen the damage? oot eee seereag, 712 ei ay se iOEB best Sy sSergSier tle ng Eee FOR. tee Makeu, Morgan, or Roselli. C Ve see little to be gained from personal approactes now ts u has much to lose and might be able te prevail upon Morgan and Roselli not to spread the story further. Et is questionable whether easy such urging would be effective with Roselli, because Roselli stands.only to gain frou having the story bee, of his CIA connection know and accepted. We cannot rov suppress Garrison case. If we were to approach any of the participants and: lend cretence to a tale that aow sounds somevhat improbable. tent See sees Fee eons aR San cts res: Bre we Be ape gree et apt cant 558° abate Sane the three-man teag. the story, because it is already out and cay boil wo afresh frou the urge discretion upom hin, and if this became Imown, it vould perely Saeh eee as oae vor weet: oat a a