'The Trust': the CIA's unpublished study of the OGPU's great deception (c. 1969)

4 Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 vegeta ____-ADMDAESPRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY 15 JAN 1988 MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy. Director of Central Intelligence STAT FROM: Curator, Historical Intelligence Collection SUBJECT: Beichman Request for "The Trust" 1. Attached is a copy of the document referred to in Arnold Beichman's letter of 4 January. I recommend you send the copy to Beichman and have drafted an appropriate letter for your signature. 2.. The passage in Anthony Cave Brown's book cited by Beichman is taken from the last paragraph on Page 10 of the document. Several months ago I sent a copy of the entire document to Cave Brown. The subject had come up in a telephone conversation. I knew the document is and always has been unclassified and has been circulated to individuals outside CIA. I was and remain grateful to Cave Brown for having persuaded the Donovan family in May a 1986 to donate Wild Bill's uniforms and numerous personal effects to the Agency. 3. On 12 January I verified the document's unclassified nature and outside distribution in telephone conversations with Walter Pforzheimer, who was Curator when the Historical Intelligence Collection acquired the document; STAT with Agency staff employee, lassistant to both Pforzheimer STAT and his successor; and with CIA retiree! a specialist on "The Trust" and the history of Soviet intelligence. 4. I also alerted the Freedom of Information Act Staff on this matter. Their records show no formal request for the document under FOIA. Their function, however, particularly with regard to recordkeeping, is to monitor the release of declassified documents. This document does not fit that category. 5. Per your instructions, this response has been coordinated with the Office of Public Affairs, the Deputy Director for Administration, and the Office of General Counsel. STAT Attachments: As Stated ec: DDI DDA OGC PAO ADMINISTRATIVE-——TNTERNAL USE ONLY Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 'NTERNMAL CLA STUDY Com pleted CA. PNarclhlge g Nece prbtoobee el DHE TRUST In his speech at the Ninth Congress of the Soviets in Moscow on 23 December 1921, Lenin referred to this meeting as the "Congress for Peace", because the civil war had been brought to a victorious conclusion,and overt foreign intervention on Russian soil had ceased. He said that the rebuilding of the country was the next task of the Bolshevik party. Dwelling on this topic,he indicated that a new policy, the NEP, would ease considerably the daily life of the average Russian by opening the door to private enterprise, but it would also’ entail great risks to the Bolshevik party, since it constituted a clear deviation from its teachings. He therefore called for increased vigilance against dangers from abroad and from within. Irritated by the stance of the Soviet Union, some foreign powers might still be tempted to exploit the obvious weakness of the country. The second enemy was the White russian emigration, which was trying to stir up the people of Russia against the new ruler. Officially, Lenin's call for vigilance was addressed to the Red Army; but there are indications that it was directed at the Cheka also. This meant, among other things, that the Cheka was expected to increase its penetration of the emigre organizations at home and abroad. The Cheka had not been idle in this field. As early as 1920 _UNSHLIKHT had established the operation MAYAK (Beacon), the prupose of which was to create confusion in emigre organizations so they could not distinguish between foe and friend. It was also designed to learn their intentions and assess their capabilities. The Supreme Monarchist Council in Berlin had been penetrated through the recruitment of one TRETYAKOV. A Cheka agent, MIKELSON, had eclassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved f

eclassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 become a member of KERENSKI's entourage in Europe and had managed to pilfer important documents from his files. Inside the USSR parallel efforts had been made. Lev NIKULIN, in his book about the Trust, hints that STAROV (whose true name was STYRNE or KOZLOV) had specialized in this field. Nor could the Cheka disregard the internal opposition, that is, officers and bureaucrats working for the Soviet government but secretly devoted to the Tsarist regime. The position of these Monarchists had become hopeless and tragic. Living autside the law "without a biography", they were constantly in danger of being betrayed, arrested ,and shot. In no position to develop a significant political opposition, they gathered together in cells chiefly for self-protection. Yet there was a chance that they might get noticed together for mischief. Indeed, in November 1922, the Cheka believed they noticed signs of incipient coalescence. Between certain groups there appeared to be a connection that was loose and nebulous Owing to Cheka vigilance and poor communications that existed at the time. In Moscow there existed the Monarchist Association of Central Russia (MOTSR) of Which one A.A. YAKUSHEV was a leading member. This fledgling organization had fairly regular communication with the White groups in Petrograd, and little contact elsewhere. The hypothesis that MOTSR was an invention of the Cheka, to be used as cover for penetrating all Monarchist cells in the country, is not convincing; the suspicious nature of the former Tsarists would have precluded the use of such a contrived organization for a penetration of their ranks. In 1921/22 MOTSR and its affiliations posed no real danger to the

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 Bolshevik regime. But, with the introduction of the NEP policy, certain freedom of action was given back to the Russian people, and a feeling developed that the Bolshevik regime had seen its best davs, and was about to be replaced by some other form of government. It provided opposition-elements with an. opportunity for starting a political movement, and a better one still of establishing contact with emigre organizations abroad. This was the potential danger facing the Cheka and the one possibly in Lenin's mind when he issued his warning. Thus the Cheka gave priority to an attempt to penetrate all White Russian groups in and outside of Russia. Agents suitable for such a task had to be found, and in this connection the attention of the Cheka was drawn to A.A. YAKUSHEV. In Novemberl921 YAKUSHEV, a high-ranking employee of the Ministry of Waterways, had been sent on TDY either to Norway or Switzerland, and en route he had stopped in Tallin (Estonia) to visit a former White Guardist, Yuriy ARTOMONOV. Different reasons are ascribed for this visit. R. WRAGA states that YAKUSHEV was in love with Mrs. ARTOMONOVA (who had remained in Moscow) and he wanted to persuade her husband to grant her a divorce. Lev NIKULIN maintains, more plausibly, that YAKUSHEV (an old ladies' man) had a mild affair with Varvara STRASHKEVICH, a cousin of ARTOMONOV, and called to deliver a letter from her. Whatever the truth of this matter, during the visit YAKUSHEV told ARTOMONOV that although he was serving the Bolshevik regime, he-was opposed to it and that, in this, he was by no means alone. He said that many ex-Tsarist officials and officers remained strongly anti- Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 Bolshevik at heart. So heavily were the government apparatus and the Red Army infiltrated by this element that the Bolshevik regime itself was undergoing a subtle change; hence the NEP. To ARTOMONOV this sounded like important news and he lost no time in reporting it, by letter, to his sufgperiors, the Monarchist Council in Berlin. Somehow, by means not disclosed, the letter fell into the “hands of the Cheka. WRAGA speculates that TRETYAKOV might have intercepted it but4ives no evidence in support of this opinion. On his return to Moscow, YAKUSHEV was immediately arrested, and after lengthy interrogations, was recruited to serve Cheka in its battle against the Monarchists. There are two different versions to this recruitment. OPPERPUT, after his so-called defection, testified that he was in a death-cell with YAKUSHEV, and that it was he who persuaded YAKUSHEV to cooperate with the Cheka to avoid being shot out of hand. NIKULIN gives a different and more detailed account of the affair, as follows: Before YAKUSHEV's return to Moscow on 22 November 1921, ARTOMONOV' s letter had been intercepted and brought to DZERZHINSKIY. Realizing YAKUSHEV's potentialities, DZERZHINSKIY entrusted the task of his recruitment to two Cheka officials, ARTUZOV and PILLAR. Together they set up a carefully planned scenario. YAKUSHEV was sent on another TDY mission to Irkutsk, and on his way to the station was arrested and brought to the Lukyanka. There he was told not to worry about his “family; they would be informed in due course by telegram from Irkutsk that he had come down with a severe case of typhoid. For the first three weeks, YAKUSHEV was interrogated mostly about his past, that is, about his work during the Tsarist regime. In this Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 way he was kept in a state of tension, and also kept in the dark about ts real purpose of the investigation. ARTUZOV, the chief interrogater, also dwelt on YARUSHEV's extramarital affairs and his lack of morals to further sensitize his conscience. Having made his point, ARTUZOV interrupted the interrogation for a week to let it sink in. When recalled, YAKUSHEV assumed he would be questioned further on the subject of girls; but ARTUZOV gave the subject a sudden twist. He said that the Cheka knew YAKUSHEV ned met Mr. MASSINO in the dressing-room of a female dancer in 1917; that the future of Russia had been discussed; that MASSINO had mentioned the concessions the British government would request for its continued support; and that YAKUSHEV had in general agreed to his proposals. Now ARTUZOV played his trump card. MASSINO, he said, was Great Bri- tain's greatest spy, Sydney REILLY, a sworn enemy of Russia; so, ob- viously, YAKUSHEV had shown himself willing to sell Russia to the British. What kind of patriotism was this? How could such betrayal of the motherland be defended? Again YAKUSHEV was left alone for another week to think things over. The next time YAKUSHEV was called, it was to a well-appointed office, and both ARTUZOV and PILLAR were there. After a few casual questions, the crucial one was posed: what had YAKUSHEV discussed with ARTOMONOV in Tallin? When YAKUSHEV denied having visited any- one in Tallin, Mrs. STRASHKEVICH was brought into the room, and she stated that he must have called on ARTOMONOV because she had given him a letter to deliver. After she left the room, YAKUSHEV was~ shown the letter ARTOMONOV had written to the Monarchist Council, and at this point, he fainted.

errr rr Siena Sion Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 Back in his cell,expecting to be executed at any minute, YAKUSHEV began writing a complete report on MOTSR ‘and about the role he had plaved ‘in the organization. After a few days, ARTUZOV told him that, after careful consideration of his case, it was decided that he was not a complete traitor, for he had counselled emigres against terrorism, and against expectations of any quick return to Russia; therefore mercy would be shown. He was to r@urn to his home, resume his work, and forget what had happened in te Lubyanka. From now on, he reported regularly to ARTUZOV on his contacts with members of MOTSR. Then, in the spring of 1922, «4 DZERZHINSKIY, appealing to his patriotic feelings, asked him to collaborate formally with the Cheka, and YAKUSHEV agreed. While YAKUSHEV was still in prison, a Cheka official, KOLESNIKOV, contacted ARTOMONOV on behalf of "his good friend" YAKUSHEV, explaining that the latter was sick in Irkutsk. He confirmed all that YAKUSHEV had previously said about disaffectim in Russia, and, getting down to specifics, disclosed’ the existance of MOTSR, led by supposedly anti-communists like General ZAYONCHOVSKIY (the chief), General POTAPOV (specialist in military matters), and YAKUSHEV (the political brain). ARTMONOV and his friend SHCHELGACHEV were delighted and agreed to establish contact with the organization. They further agreed to KOLESNIKOV's suggestion that the middleman, for the time being, should be a member of the Estonian embassy in Moscow, Roman BIRK. (Not to be confused with the Estonion Minister, Ado Birk, about whom, more later.) Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 KOLESNIKOV explained the activities of MOTSR, stressing its program and goals, but remaining vague as to personalities involved, owing to the rules of conspiracy allegedly in effect. He did, however, mention in Bassing that the membership was approximately 400. MOTSR, he said, would pose abroad as a "Trust"; and the code to be used in communications to and from emigres abroad would be based on normal business terminology appropriate to concerns operatio& under the NEP. Thus, conmunists were to be referred to as "competitors", the MOTSR Central Comittee as "The Board Management of the Trust", etc. Such a code was childishly Simple and easy to décipher, but appears appropriate to the spirit of the times. So too does the cover name for the Trust (i.e., Moscow Municipal Credit Association) seem appropriate to a time when new enterprises were springing up every day under the auspices of the NEP. But code names selected Se certain leaders of. MOTSR, such as the "Supreme Commissar" of "Boyar VASSILIY"* for General ZAYONCHOVSKIY, and "Captain Prisoner" for the political council, were Singularly inappropriate, starkly smaking, as they did, of ‘the clandestine. Be this as it may, ARTOMONOV- and SHCHELGACHIEV saw nothing wrong- with any part of. the deal. They bought the story, lock, stock and barrel. They informed the Monarchist Council by open mail. In due course, Roman BIRK was in business, with a steady flow of letters between the emigres in Tallin and the so-called "Trust" in Moscow. In this exchange of information, the emigres gave their order of battle, the numerical strength and location of battle units, etc,, but the Trust for its part supplied nothing but doctored-up *Boyar means “nobleman" or "knight". Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 information. Before long, ARTUZOV decided that YAKUSHEV should go to Berlin and gain direct access to the Monarchist Council and Similar circles. At this point the stage for the Trust operation must be set up; otherwise the drama’ may be unintelligible. Between one and two million Russiens left their homeland when the Bolsheviks defeated the White Russian forces in the civil war, and they scattered over the world, mainly in the capital cities of Europe. Homeless, impoverished, with no positions they could aspire’ to, and barely tolerated by the host countries, their lot was a sorry one. This outward misery was topped by exhaustion and frustration, which stimulated recrimination and the search for scapegoats in a hopeless cause. They banded together in political organizations, either leftist sr monarchist, in wreched hope of giving meaning to their lives. The so-called leftist groups accepted the February revolution and favored the parlimentary system that had ensued, while the monarchists hoped for the re-establishment of a Monarchy, with little’ understanding of how this could be brought about. It was the latter group, in its various splintered forms, that the GPU hoped to reach, exploit and destroy through careful manipulation of the so-called "Trust". The senior leader of the Russian emigres was Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevich, the grandson of Tsar Nikolai I. Taciturn, ascetic and devout, yet imperial in bearing, he was a model of Russia's military virtues. His goal was as Simple as it was unrealistic: a return of the "Old and Holy Russia", under the rule of a patriarch-- the Tsar. His call had a strong appeal to some emigrants, even though Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 he bore a strong responsibility for the disaster that had over-run Russia. Prior to World War I, as Inspector-General of the Cavalry, he had stubbornly resisted the modernisation of the Russian Army; and during the war this same army had suffered its worst defeats under his leadership. This had alienated the loyalty of many Russian officers. Further, he was mistrusted by his own family, because it was he and his wife who had introduced the mad monk RASPUTIN to empress Alice. He and his Supreme Monarchist Council lived in virtual isolation near Paris, begrudgingly respected by some emigres, but disliked by nearly all. The most outstanding of the White Russian leaders (even according to Soviet historians) was General Petr Nikolayevich Baron WRANGEL, a “political general" with a breath of vision not normally found in the old school of Russian generals. This made him a tragic figure. Time and again, during the civil war, he had pointed out mistakes made by White generals, and at the very moment when he realized that all was lost, he was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the White Forces. This made him accept defeat as final. He now knew in his heart that the Bolsheviks would rule for years to come. All he could now hope for was to keep the emigres together as a national group until the Bolsheviks permitted their return to Russia. On September 1923, with this in mind, he created the "Russian Armed Services Union" (Russykiy Obshcho-Voyenskiy Soyuz), to which all Russian veterans were supposed to belong. This organization, (i.e. ROVS) established posts in most European countries, and its policy was determined by WRANGEL's "wait and see" attitude. He considered the sending of terrorist groups across the border or otherwise trying to foment internal disorders as inappropriate, Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 and ridiculed such actions as "pinpricks". His headquarters were in Yugoslavia, and there his command was supreme. But elsewhere in Europe, his authority at best was only nominal. In Paris, General KUTEPOV, with neither the patience or foresight of WRANGLE, decided to follow an independent course. He had seen how the Bolsheviks had come to power through brute force, and concluded that only by the use of brute force could they be dislodged. Terrorism on a large scale was needed. This would confuse the Bolsheviks, force them to commit blunders, and ultimately bring about the collapse of their regime. For this prupose, he pulled out from WRANGLE's "ROVS" (to which he was deputy commander) the most daring and ruthless members and formed his own "Combat Organization". He gave them training in clandestine activities and sabotage; and for their protection against Soviet penetration, he formed a special CI unit which was later called the "Inner vineQ In theory, the emigres appeared to be organized for some kind of effective action, but in reality they floundered. Eking out a living took precedence over patriotic service, and the emigres mulled over paper plans as a spare-time activity. As a whole they were divided by internal friction, geographical divisions and a lack of funds. Lack of funds was both a psychological and operational handi- cap because it forced the emigre organizations to depend on hand-outs from western intelligence services. The latter, concerned with their own particular interests, often rode rough-shod over the idealism of emigre activities, and provided food for Soviet propeganda which claimed the emigres were simply hirelings of hostile western intelligence. eclassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 The GPU could not have been very well informed about the actual activities and living conditions of the emigres, for,otherwise, YAKUSHEV. would not have been sent to Berlin to penetrate the upper strata of all emigre organizations and report on their activities A controlling upper-strata simply did not exist. There were too many chiefs, too many self-serving plans, too much dissension, undermining and mischief making. Before his trip, YAKUSHEV was briefed by ARTUZOV and STYRNE- STAROV. In approaching emigre circles, YAKUSHEV was to make it clear that the "Trust" considered the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolayevid as the only man acceptable as the future leader of the newly emerging RusSia. Further, he was to support the views held by the Grand Duke, namely, that the Monarchy was to be re-established with not one iota of change. YAKUSHEV was also advised to get in touch with the Grand Duke, as a way of gaining prestige with a minimum of effort. This would have an additional advantage, for among all the emigres, the members of the Supreme Monarchist Council were the most uninformed about actual conditions in Russia and would, in all probability, be the least critical. In November 1922, YAKUSHEV took off for Berlin, ostensibly as an official representative to the Koenigsberg Fair. His first meeting was with members of the Monarchist Council headed by E. MARKOV. He delivered the following messages: Russia was beginning to awaken from a horrible revolutionary nightmare; anti- communist elements were gaining control of the system. The "Trust", with YAKUSHEV acting as its "Foreign Minister" would supply all- necessary information about the movement and fulfill all intelligence missions. The emigre groups should forego all activity inside Russia, Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 and should dissuade foreign powers from aggressive acts. Work inside Russia would be performed by members of the Trust, and their efforts should not be jeopardized by outside interference. YAKUSHEV conducted himself with aplomb and an air of authority; and he appears to have convinced the Monarchists of his sincerity. A few days later, YAKUSHEV had a meeting with three of WRANGEL's representatives; his chief of intelligence, General KLIMOVICH; his political adviser, N. CHEBYSHEV; and a well-known journalist, SHULGIN. On this occasion, YAKUSHEV's charm failed to impress, “4 and his story failed to convince. Sharp questions were posed and YAKUSHEV parried them as best he could. When KLIMOVICH asked how all this activity could take place in the midst of Cheka agents, YAKUSHEV said that obviously KLIMOVICH was not well-informed about conditions in the USSR, but he saw that he was now confronted with men who would not simply accept his words at face value. The meeting was soon over. SHULGIN proclaimed himself convinced of YAKUSHEV's Sincerity. KLIMOVICH voiced some skeptical reservations. CHEBYSHEV told his colleagues outright that he believed YAKUSHEV was a Cheka stooge. His views on Monarchism were simply too pat for a man who had lived for years under Soviet rule; in other words, he had learned his lessons too well. At another meeting with the Monarchist Council, it was agreed that the Council would appoint representatives in several capitals to act as liason-men with the Trust. Later, for this purpose, Captain ARTOMONOV was sent from Tallin to Warsaw under the name~ of LIPSKI, and in Paris young Prince Shirinskiy SHAKHMATOV was asSigned to the job. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 Back in Moscow, YAKUSHEV reported to ARTUZOV on the results of his trip. He pointed out that a barrier divided the Monarchist Council and WRANGEL's organizations (i.e., the ROVS), and that the Trust would have to work with one of the other; to keep in touch with both might not be possible. He also reported that the young emigres were disenchanted with both these organizations and suggested that a third organization, "the Eurasians", should be approached as possible unwitting collaborators. YAKUSHEV's report and suggestions were favorably recieved, but decision as to the best course of action was postponed. YAKUSHEV returned from his Berlin trip with greatly enhanced self-assurance. He considered himself more that a match for the leaders he had met, and had convinced himself that none had the caliber to lead a change of government in the USSR. This left him with the heartfelt conviction that Russia's future was in the hands of the Bolsheviks for better of for worse; and this being so, he could now devote himself to the activities of the GPU-controlled Trust with no twinges of distaste or hypocrisy. The Trust now started to get involved with foreign intelligence services. the mechanics of these contacts have not been disclosed, but it seems likely that this was done through the emigre laison-men located in capital cities. WRAGA claims that the Trust was in contact: with ten Western intelligence services, but he provides no evidence in support of the allegation. From available documents it can be deduced that, at best, the Trust was in laison with the Estonians, Polish, Finns and the English, and that communications moved along two channels: (1) through diplomatic couriers such as Roman BIRK Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 (who brought Trust material out in the Estonian diplomatic pouch) or (2) through so-called "windows" (1i.e.,controlled points on the border for letting Trust agents in and out of Russia.) Thus, fabricated information of every description found its way into foreign countries, with sufficient accurate data to make the remainder appear authentic. Most of the material was prepared by. "RAZVEDUPR", which had a special "Disinformation Bureau" for the purpose. All the information sent out was designed to convey the same message: Don't make war against the USSR of execute acts of terror, for great changes are taking place and Russia soon again will become a respectable member of the community of nations. As this traffic in disinformation became more or less routine in character, ARTUZOV planned a deeper penetration into emigre’ circles, and towards this end, YAKUSHEV was slated for a trip to Paris to meet Grand Duke Nikolasesich. Aware of the importance of such an encounter, ARTUZOV decided that YAKUSHEV should be accompanied by General POTAPOV, ostensibly now a leading member of the Trust. Actually POTAPOV belonged to the General Staff of the Red Army, but he had been given leave of absence (as arranged by the GPU) to enable him to devote himself to Trust, affairs. The selection of POTAPOV as an emmisary was an astute choice, for he had occasionaly been received at the Tsar's court by the Grand Duke in former times. Both YAKUSHEV and POTAPOV arrived in Paris in August 1923 and had a meeting with the Grand Duke which lasted for three hours... YAKUSHEV pushed his well-known line, which, merely being a re- iteration of the Grand Duke's own, found a sympathetic listener. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 Nilolai Nikolayevich promised his cooperation and, although he did not later measure up to the promise, the visit was a success for YAKUSHEV, for he now was able to trade on the prestige given him by a senior member of the Imperial family. This newly acquired prestige paid off in two ways. It enabled YAKUSHEV to conclude a working agreement with the KUTEPOV group in Paris. And, because of it, he now was listened to with increased respect by his old MOTSR co-conspirators inside Russia. The GPU had started the Trust’ operation with some idea of its importance, but without realizing the full extent of its potentialities. As its possible scope became clear, DZERZHINSKIY wrote a memorandum delineating its goals. The Trust, he said, was to control "public opinion" among emigres, to convince them of the futility of terrorism and debunk their idea of intervention. They must be persuaded that a counter-revolution was in the making, in which they could only play a supporting role. Dissension must be provoked by keeping alive controversial issues such as the elimination of classes, the nation- alization of heavy industry, the agrarian problem. KUTEPOV and WRANGEL should be put at loggerheads, by fanning the rumor that the latter was a future Bonaparte. These, according to NIKULIN, were the goals outlined by DZERZHINSKIY, but apparently there were others. A check on the activities of Monarchist.elements inside Russia was, certainly part of the operation, as was the feeding of disinformation to foreign intelligence services. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 The Case of Boris Savinkov Emboldened by success, the GPU decided to go after special game, and Boris SAVINKOV was chosen as a target. DZERZHINSKIY himself made this decision in the summer of 1923 after learning that Savinkov's personal adjutant, Leonid Danilovich SHESHENYA, had been captured while crossing the border into the USSR. At that time SAVINKOV was the only remaining anti-communist leader with a charisma of his own, acquired in continuous battle for a democratic Russia against totalitarian forces both right and left. SAVINKOV began his political career at an early age and achieved fame during the Tsarist regime as a member of the SR Party terrorist group. In this capacity, he took part in the assassination of the Grand Duke Sergius and of PLEHWE, the Tsarist Minister of the Interior. He was several times imprisoned, but always escaped miraculeusly. “After the February Revolution, he joined the Provisional Gavernment of KERENSKIY. When the Bolsheviks seized power, he turned his revolutionary experience against them, and organized counter- revolutionary conspiracies in Moscow and Jaroslav. These activities were successfully combatted by the Cheka. With the defeat of the White forces in 1920, SAVINKOV founded "The People's Association for the Defense of the Motherland and Freedom", with headquarters in Warsaw. An intellectual, Dimitriy Vladixerovich FILOSOFOV,and an activist Yevgeniy Sergeyevich SHEVCHENKO, were selected to run the show in Poland. SAVINKOV himself, with his two assistants, Aleksandr Arkadyevich DICKHOF-. DAEHRENTAHL and Colonel Sergey Eduardovich PAVLOVSKIY, chose to reside in Paris. This higher echelon maintained contact with Polish, Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 French and British intelligence services, also with the governments of these countries in a marginal sense. By 1922, SAVINKOV had been able to set up an impressive organization inside the Soviet Union, under the direct command of the ruthless general, BULAK-BULAKHOVICH. Members had succeeded in spread- ing terror among the Bolsheviks. In 1923, the tide began. to turn. The Peace Treaty of Riga, concluded in 1921, had forced the Poles to disband military units belonging to SAVINKOV, and could no longer give him open support. His cells within Russia began to flounder and were picked up by the GPU one by one. Worse still, SAVINKOV began to lose faith in his own life-long ideal of a democratic Russia, and started to flirt with new ideologies such as the facism of Mussolini. DZERZHINSKIY, aware that SAVINKOV was capable of staging a come- back if given the slight opportunity, decided that the time was ripe for-his elimination. He called together certain trusted GPU offi- cials, ARTUZOV, PUZITSKIY, PILYAR, SYROYEZHKIN, DEMIDENKO, and FED- OROV. He explained that SAVINKOV, adventurous, vain and intelligent, yet so egoistic that he could not bear the humiliation of set-backs, might now be willing to run great risks for uncertain gains. Ina psychological ploy, SAVINKOV was to be fed information about an anti- communist organisation of Liberal Democrats inside Russia, which was incapable of action simply for want of an able leader. In this way SAVINKOV, with his colossal conceit, could be lured into the Soviet Union and into the clutches of the GPU. The Trust, as such, could not be used for such an operation, be- cause SAVINKOV detested Monarchists as much as he did the Bolsheviks. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 A parallel Liberal Democrat (LD) organization must be set up under the control of a few selected GPU officials. Unlike the Trust, its recruited agents would be kept under strict control, with no freedom for personal initiative. ARTUZOV (as Nikita Nikitovich TVERDOV) was appointed as head of the bogus LD; PUZITSKIY (as Nikolay Nikolayevich NOVITSKIY) was made head of the Moscow LD unit; FEDOROV (as MUKHIN) was given the job of ‘getting in personal touch with SAVINKOV, ostensibly on behalf of im- patient LD elements in Russia. Almost simultaneously with the capture of SHESHENYA (mentioned above), the GPU apprehended a group of Savinkov partisans, under the leadership of one ZEKUNOV. SHESHENYA and ZEKUNOV were placed under pressure and soon gave their promise to collaborate. ZEKUNOV was sent to Poland on a courier mission ostensibly asa LD representative. There he informed both Polish intelligence and Savinkov representatives that both he and SHESHENYA had managed to establish contact with an anti-soviet underground in Moscow (i.e., the LD) and that the latter were anxious to have contacts abroad for the furtherance of their somewhat parochial activities, To give weight to his story, he handed certain military documents to the Poles. And here a departure from Trust operational methods is to be .noted. Whereas the Trust passed material that was for the most part fabricated, material given to the Poles through LD channels, thoigh outdated and not of first class importance, was genuine. DZERZHINSKIY knew that the LD was. bona fide, otherwise the latter could never be Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 lured to.Moscow. The use of authentic documents was a high price to pay, but appeared necessary as a means to an end. Both recipients of the news about the LD manifested interest to Such extent that a direct approach seemed warranted, and a GPU official, FEDOROV (alias MUKHIN), was despatched to Warsaw and Paris. On this occasion, however, MUKHIN did not go to Paris, because he was advised in Warsaw that SAVINKOV refused to see him. SAVINKOV's message stated that MUKHIN should return to Moscow accompanied by a genuine Savinkov disciple, FOMICHEV. The latter would meet SHESHENYA, satisfy himself that he was not under GPU control, meet other LD people, then return arid report directly to SAVINKOV. FOMICHEV's stay in Moscow was carefully stage-managed. He u- was unable to detect any Signs of duplicity in SHESHENYA, and he even attended a LD meeting chaired by ARTUZOV (alias TVERDOV) «ui without suspecting possible deception. Thus his reports to SAV- INKOV were so convincing that the latter agreed to meet MUKHIN, and the meeting was arranged to take place in Paris in the spring of 1924, At this time SAVINKOV was losing the support he had received from the French and the British. He had begun to realize that his cause was almost hopeless, and he suffered from acute mental dep- ression. He was ready to clutch at any straw, for anything, £25 his mind, was better than being dumpéd on the dungheap of history. When he met MUKHIN, he was more than half prepared to be con-’ vinced. Yet, his naturally suspicious nature asserted itself, and, Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 in a desparate exercise of caution, he decided that one more check must be made. With this in mind, he sent his trusted assistant, Colonel PAVLOVSKIY, to Russia without any prior advice to the so- called. LD leadership. But, by this time GPU penetration of the Savinkov group was so extensive that PAVLOVSKIY was apprehended without loss of time. Given the treatment, he too promised his co-operation and, thus, the trap for SAVINKOV was set. The script for the scenario to follow was borrowed from the Trust operation. Since 1923, Russian emigre circles had been told about friction within the Trust leadership; of how aétivists led ly OPPERPUT were opposed by "procrastinators" headed by YAKUSHEV. The same tactics were to be used in the case of SAVINKOV. PAVLOV- SKIY was to despatch dictated letters explaining the LD situation _in similar terms, and suggesting that SAVINKOV come to Moscow to support the activist.:faction, lest the whole movement fall apart. For almost a year SAVINKOV had been told of terrorist acts by daring members of the LD, and one who invariably participated in such acts was SHESHENYA, according to reports. And in support of these alleged acts, SAVINKOV, by one way or another, had been pro- -vided with copies of Izvestiya doctored up by the GPU in coroboratinpn of each event, original articles having been deleted and substitut- ed by fabricated reports. Colonel PAVLOVSKIY, now under GPU control, informed SAVINKOV by letter of a terrorist act which had failed, and in which he reportedly had been wounded. This, he said, left the activist faction without a leader, making SAVINKOV's presence a matter of increased urgency. This event, staged by the GPU, was Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 reported in Izvestiya, primarily for SAVINKOV's benefit. This struck SAVINKOV as being too flawléss to be entirely true, so once more he sent FOMICHEV to RusSia, this time to check on PAV- LOVSKIY. The arrival of yet another inspector embarassed the GPU, but somehow they contrived to fool him as thoroughly as they had done on his first visit. In all this, DZERZHINSKIY saw signs of SAVINKOV's growing impatience and decided to bring the play to a close. MUKHIN accompanied FOMICHEV back to Paris and presented an ul- timatum from the LD to SAVINKOV: unless he banished mistrust from his mind and came to Moscow to take charge, the organization would break with him promptly. After a few days of lingering doubt, SAV- INKOV suddenly made up his mind. He decided to take the plunge, despite the protestions of his friends. In early August 1924, ac- companied by DICKHOF-DAEHRENTAL (and the latter's wife), he cross- ed the Polish-Soviet border through an ostensible LD "window" and the three were arrested in Minsk on the following day. The sensational two-day trial of SAVINKOV opened on 27 August 1924. According to contemporary western sources he unequivocally recanted his former views and unconditionally recognized the right of the Bolsheviks to govern the country. According to Soviet writ- er Vasiliy ARDAMATSKIY, in his book Vozmezdenive (Retribution), this was not strictly true. He recognized the right of the Bolsheviks to rule because of their demonstrated strength, not because of merit in any other respect. His one mistake, he said, had been to under- estimate the power of the regime. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 According to reports of the trial appearing in western newspap- ers, SAVINKOV, during interrogation, disclosed all the secrets of his organization and betrayed all its members. ARDAMATSKIY has nothing to say on this matter, neither by way of confirmation or denial. The so-called frank confessions of SAVINKOV, outside the court, might therefore be nothing more than disinformation put out by the GPU to camouflage the extent of its infiltration of the SAV- INKOV organization. Once SAVINKOV was’ shown to be a complete turn- coat the GPU could act boldly on information which presumably came from his babbling. And this was an important consideration in view of the developing Trust operation. On 29 August 1924, SAVINKOV was given a death sentence, later commuted to ten years imprisonment. He was given a comfortable two- room apartment in the Butyrki prison and treated well. Finally, on 7 May 1925, under mysterious circumstances, he sumped or fell from the apartment window to his death. The DAEHRENTAL's were released without trial and given jobs with. Intourist, probably to cast suspicion on their integrity vis-a-vis SAVINKOV and to detract attention from the real culprits. NIKULIN, in his account, makes no references to the DAEHRENTAL's, as if he found it more expedient to ignore their involvement than to clarify it. Meanwhile, General KUTEPOV was. busy organizing his Combat Organ- ization (CO) to create mischief inside the USSR. Although without experience in the intelligence field, he was an excellent soldier endowed with common sense, and from the start he entertained Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

suspicions about the Trust. He could not understand how YAKUSHEV and his colleagues could operate inside Russia with seeming immunity, and he was unconvinced by the explanations given’ for this strange state of affairs. He decided it would bear looking into. For this task, he selected five persons in whom he had full con- fidence. As laeder of the group, he appointed his niece Maria ZACHARCHENKO-. SHULTS; the others were Maria's third husband RADKO- VICH, one KARINSKIY, Colonel SUSALIN and SHORIN. The Trust was in- formed in advance of their intended arrival. By way of reply, KUTEPOV was told that the group would be welcome, but that it would have to confine itself strictly to the Trust's instructions, other- wise its safety could not be assured. In this connection reference was made to the arrest of a Navy lieutenant BURKHANOVSKIY about a month before as he tried to cross the border on an intelligence mission for WRANGEL. KUTEPOV and Maria SHULTS chose to disregard these warnings. She and her husband crossed the Estonian border into the Soviet Union without using a Trust "window" and arrived in Moscow in Sep- tember 1924. The time was inopportune for the Trust, because YAK- USHEV and POTAPOV were in Warsaw negotiating with Polish intelli- gence. Von STAUNITZ-OPPERPUT, who was YAKUSHEV's deputy and "Fin- ance Minister" for the Trust, was told to take the new arrivals under his wing. He was given a “dacha" where his guests could live in reason- able comfort. They were introduced to certain Trust members (all Chekists) with whom they could discuss Trust activities. When Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 YAKUSHEV returned from Poland, he made a great impression on the couple, and they were made members of his staff. Their job was to code and decode messages allegedly being sent or received, to and from points abroad. They were also supposed to write propaganda. material for distribution inside the USSR. This went well fora time, and Maria SHULTS sent enthusiastic reports to KUTEPOV in Paris. But Maria was a restless person and she began to demand the initiation of terror, all of which posed difficulties for YAKUSHEV, whose standing orders were to frustrate terrorism of any kind. By the beginning of 1925, ARTUZOV began receiving disturbing news from Paris. KUYFEPOV was receiving financial help from some unknown source, waS increasing his activities, and, worse still, was build- ing up his counter~intelligence organization, the "Inner Line". ARTUZOV discussed this development with YAKUSHEV and it was decided that the latter should go to Paris to meet KUTEPOV and the Grand Duke to ascertain what they were up to, precisely; and it was fur- ther decided that Maria SHULTS should go along to bolster up the Trust position. They arrived in Paris in June 1925, and YAKUSHEV was assured, both by the Grand Duke and KUTEPOV, of their continued faith in him. KUTEPOV, however, did not disclose his future plans, and discussions were confined to financial problems, YAKUSHEV pleading for monetary support, and KUTEPOV explaining the difficulties of finding. finan- cial angels for such a risky enterprise. The meeting was friendly. but its practical results were small and did little to alleviate the

ae coat rer Saeed Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 growing disquiet of ARTUZOV. ARTUZOV, as chief of the GPU counter-intelligence, ran the Trust Operation at three levels: (1) penetration of various Russian emigre organizations, (2) dealings with hostile intelligence services, and (3) special operations as designated by the GPU chief, DZERZHINSKIY. In the third category, the capture of the British Master Spy, Sidney George REILLY, was considered a primary objective, and plans towards this end were on.the drawing-boards.in 1925. This in itself warranted a continuance of the Trust, even though ARTUZOV found reasons to be dissatisfied with the operation in other respects. An old supporter of SAVINKOV, Sidney REILLY had been an implac~ able foe of Bolshevik regime ever since the Revolution, and in 1918 he had organized a counter-revolution which had put the regime in jeopardy and which had been thwarted by the narrowest of margins. Although REILLY had escaped from the Soviet Union he had continued his anti-Bolshevik activities abroad, which made him a primary GPU target on a continuing basis. SAVINKOV had been lured into th e USSR through a psychological approach, and it was proposed to draw REILLY into the trap in a similar way. In preparation for the oper- ation, a special "window" was opened on the Finnish border, with a GPU border guard, Ivan Mikhailovich PETROV (alias Toyvo VYAKHI), in charge. This was accomplished sometime around May 1925, and the GPU was ready for the next step. Immediately after her return from Paris, Maria SCHULTS and her husband were transferred from Moscow to Leningrad, and from there they wrote a letter to REILLY alluding to "big business possibilities Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 in Russia which, in all probability, would have a big influence on Furopean markets." REILLY received the letter through a British intelligence officer in.Tallin, and, knowing Maria SHULTS person- ality, he interpreted the message in terms of a budding counter- revolution. He went to Paris and informed KUTEPOV of this development, and it was arranged that he would go to Helsinki in September to consult with one BUNAKOV, a representative of KUTEPOV in that city. Apprised of this plan through Trust channels, YAKUSHEV sent to Helsinki beforehand and saw BUNAKOV to arrange for RFILLY's reception. BUNAKOV was not cooperative until YAKUSHEV promised to bring his brother out of Russia for a re-union in Helsinki; and when YAKUSHEV lived up to this promise in August, BUNAKOV was fully won over, convinced at last that the Trust was, indeed, a potent force. YAKUSHEV now took Maria SEULTS and her husband to Helsinki through the newly established “window". This ostensibly was supposed to be a trial-run in preparation for the arrival of REILLY, and, naturally, the GPU: saw to it that no hitch occurred. In- September 1925, RFILLY duly arrived in Helsinki together with General KUTEPOV, and there he met Maria SHULTS, her husband RADKOVICH, BUNAKOV, and YAKUSHEV. All assured him that he could visit Moscow with minimal risk. When REILLY demurred, YAKUSHFV proposed that he should go to Moscow and Leningrad for a meeting with the political committee of the Trust and return to Finland two days later. To this REILLY agreed and he wrote to his wife that a three-day trip to Moscow and Leningrad was necessary, and added "There is absolutely Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 no risk to it." The next evening he was taken to the border and passed through the "window" under the guidance of the GPU border guard, I,M, PETROV. In Leningrad he was met by so-called leaders of the Trust, which in- cluded General POTAPOV, Aleksandr LANGOVOY, STYRNE-STAROV, YAKUSHEV, and OPPERPUT. He then went to Moscow with this group for further discussions. Of all sources who have written or speculated about this affair, NIKULIN, who obviously had access to GPU records, is in the best position to know the truth of it, but whether his written account is Strictly accurate is another matter. He does not, for example, men~ tion the involvement of OPPERPUT. And there are other discrepancies. According to NIKULIN, at the meeting held in Moscow the funding of the Trust was high on the agenda, and REILLY proposed an ingenious vlan. He would, he said, establish a company in the West to sell Russian antiques which the Trust would steal from Soviet museums and smuggle out of the country. Further, support of the British govern- ment for the Trust could be obtained in return for intelligence in- formation, particularly concerning the Comintern. To both these pro- posals the group remained non-committal. It is interesting to note that, according to this Soviet account, the impending counter-revo- lution was not discussed. This is more than passing strange, for it was the promise of such a development and not the financial diffi- culties of the Trust, that lured REILLY into Russia. On his way back to the railroad station REILLY was arrested. Fearing that this, once known abroad, would damage the reputation Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 of the Trust irrevocably, the GPU put the following plan into effect: STYRNE-STAROV went to the Finnish border on the night of 28/29 September and staged a sham shooting incident, followed a report that REILLY, along with a few smugglers, had been killed. Actually REILLY was kept in prison and interrogated. At firs he remained tight-lipped; however, when he was shown a clipping from a British newspaper announcing his death, he saw that the game was up and talked freely. Acording to NIKULIN he even vol- unteered to divulge British intelligence secrets in return for his life. But, NIKULIN adds, he had been sentenced to death in absentia in 1918, and now this sentence was carried out. Despite the pains taken by the GPU to disguise the true nat- ure of the REILLY affair, the reputation of the Trust was blem- ished, for certain elements were inclined to discredit news put out by the Soviets for consumption abroad. Another operation was therefore initiated to repair the damage, and refurbish the tarn- ished image of the Trust. This time the target was a prominent emigre journalist, SHULGIN, who had a consuming desire to see his son, lost in the Crimea since 1920. YAKUSHEV invited SHULGIN to the USSR and promised that the Trust would make every effort to locate his son, and SHULGIN accepted the invitation, despite the warnings of WRANGEL and his staff. On the night of 23 December 1925, he passed through a "window" at Stolbtsov, and was sent to Kiev in the company of "Anton Anton- ovich" (i.e., DOROZHINSKIY). From the first day to the last, he was guided through Russia by members of the Trust. In Moscow he was Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 greeted by his old friend YAKUSHEV, who introduced him to an "Otto" (i.e. OPPERPUT) Then he was put under the tutelage of Maria SHULTS and her husband, which re-assured him since therelcould be no doubt "whatever that they were true anti-Bolsheviks. He was amazed by everything he saw: Russia was not dying as so many emigres had been led to believe. The Trust made real or sham attempts to find SHULGIN'’s son and reportedly found no trace of him, so that, at last, SHULGIN was forced to admit that his hope was dead; and he declared himself ready to return to Yugoslavia. Before his departure, YAKUSHEV suggested that he write a book about his experiences and observations inside the USSR, and when he demurred on the grounds that this might unwittingly compromise the Trust, it was further suggested that he send a preliminary draft of the book to the Trust through usual channels for careful editing on that scare. By April 1926 SHULGIN was back in Belgrade and his book Three Capitals was soon published. Although he tried to write objectively, the book reflected the Trust propaganda line, namely, Bolshevism was vanishing, so there was no sense in fighting it; everything was as it was before, only somewhat worse; Russia was on the way to recovery and any kind of outside interference would only retard this trend. In 1927, after the Trust had been unmasked as a GPU operation, SHULGIN published a postscript to the Three Capitals, admitting that he had been thoroughly hoodwinked during his stay in Russia and that his book had been edited by persons whom he now realized were GPU officials. As noted ealier,YAKUSHEV, after returning from his Berlin trip Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 in 1922, told ARTUZOV that the emigres were split into various groups and that organizations parallel to the Trust might have to be initi-. ated in the interests of wide penetration. This suggestion led to. the ‘creation of a"“Eurasian"chapter in Moscow under a GPU official LANGOVOY, to exploit a so-called "Eurasian" group of emigres centered in Bulgaria, whose ideas were rather nebulous but nevertheless pop- ular with Russian youth abroad. This group of intellectuals held that Russia was neither Europe nor Asia, but a continent in itself--Eur- asia; and it concluded that Bolshevism was an unavoidable stage of development, not to be interfered with by a decadent West. Sincé such pseudo-scientific concepts wholly coincided with the aims of Soviet policy, couriers were despatched to Europe to tell emigre "Eurasians" that their movement had many partisans in Soviet Russia. The "First Conference of Eurasians" was held in Moscow in 1924; and the guest of honor was ARAPOV, a Eurasian from the West who walked across the border illegally under the sponsorship of the Trust "Directing Committee". Most, if not all, of the delegates appear to have been GPU agents, so that ARAPOV was able to take back interesting comments made at the conference. It was stressed that idealogical warfare was preferable to "the sword and torch of At- tila", and it was recommended that Eurasian: cells be established in all important European centers and "if possible, in America." A.A. LANGOVOY (alias General DENISOV) had been given leave from the Red Army to run this show. His purely military backround did not qualify him for this type of psychological operation, and the movement seemed to have languished. However another Moscow confer- Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 ence was scheduled in 1926, and when a professor SAVITSKIY arrived,. as a,prominent representative of western Eurasians, the GPU gave him the standard red-carpet treatment. An anonymous writer "A.B.", in an article first published around 1928 and ayain in 1953, claims that he knew SAVITSKIY well, and that the latter was well aware that the Moscow chapter of the "Eurasians" was under GPU control; however, his vanity was such that he believed himself capable of pushing the GPU in the direction of his own designs. In 1926 and again in 1929 a Eurasian representative, P. MALEVSKY-MALEVICH, approached the United States State Department, and on both occasions submitted the program and philosophical basis of his organization. In the paper submitted in 1926, it is stated that the Eurasian movement inside Russia had been growing since 1921. In the 1929 paper this claim was not repeated. But the main thesis remained the same, namely, the transition from Bolshevism to a new regime should be accomplished without civil war or chaos; the change of regime must be the result solely of internal action. Thus it is clearly seen that the Eurasians did not cease to progagate the standard Soviet line, even after GPU meddling in emigre organizations had been rudely exposed. The Trust did not limit its activities to the field of emigre and anti-Bolshevik counter-revolutionary affairs. By 1926, the Soviets had decided to use the Trust to achieve certain devious aims in international politics. The inclination of the Baltic States towards the formation of a Baltic Bloc, and the endeavor of the Soviet Government to induce these states to conclude a non-aggression pact Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 set up political tensions. A decision was made to attempt the re- cruitment of one or more Baltic ambassadors, by force or guile, to. serve Soviet ends. One man selected as a pawn in this game: was Ado BIRK, the Estonian minister in Moscow. The case of Ado BIRK is bizarre, Over-complicated, ambiguous and in many respects contradictory, being based on the evidence of Ado BIRK himself, and that of OPPERPUT after his defection, both self-serving witnesses. According to OPPERPUT, by 1926 Ado BIRK was being treated as a favorite by the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs. At the same time, OPPERPUT, as a representative of the Trust, was cultivating the Estonian Military Attache, Colonel E. KURSK, and gave him a hint that BIRK might be thinking of switching sides. There was no love lost Between Ado BIRK and KURSK, and the latter lost no time in reporting these misgivings to his superiors. Thus the stage was set for a blackmail operation against BIRK. Members of the Trust who had gained the confidence of BIRK gave him a document ostensibly of great importance and warned him agains telling any of his legation colleagues about it. An identical document was handed to Colonel KURSK with the same warning. The two documents were identical, excepting that the one given BIRK lacked four vital photographs which were attached to the one given KURSK. The photo- graphs. were later given to BIRK, but the damage was done, for the GPU had circulated a rumor that BIRK had communicated the contents of tle documents and sold the photographs to the Polish Embassy in Moscow before submitting them to his own government. Thus enmeshed, BIRK resigned in June 1926 and prepared to return to Estonia to defend himself against possible charges of treason. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 Enroute, he was overtaken at the Finnish border and returned to Leningrad. STETSKEVICH-KOLESNIKOV, posing as a Foreign Commissariat employee and as BIRK's friend, advised him to remain in Russia. BIRK remained non-commital and soon made a second attempt to leave the country.’ This time, STETSKEVICH, accompanied by other agents, stopped him at the station. When he pleaded diplomatic immunity, he was knocked down 77 and taken to a dacha near Moscow. Here he was joined by his former secretary, Mrs. KERY, and soon after both were taken from city to city in a seemingly senseless peregrination. Sometimes BIRK was granted a semblance of freedom, but he was never free from surveillance. Twice he met an old friend, LOGANOVSKIY, and on each occasion he was bullied into signing a statement for the press, in terms that were hostile to Estonian interests. Both statements appeared in Izvestiya. In March 1927 BIRK escaped into the Norwagian Embassy in Moscow. Stories regarding this episode differ. According to OPPERPUT, BIRK managed to outwit his GPU guards. WRAGA, however, claims that the GPU wanted to get rid of him, and deliberately gave him a chance to escape. The latter hypothesis seems the more plausible, because he now without delay reciéved official permission to leave the USSR. He arrived in Tallin 9 March 1927, and during his trial, which ended in acquittal, he described the Trust as a GPU-controlled organization. This seemed like a fantastic story at the time, and not much credence was given to it. The story was soon to be confirmed by OPPERPUT after his defection; but before an account of this event is given, reference to Trust activities inside Russia would seem to be in order. NIKULIN's description of these activities suffers from obvious propaganda and inbuilt contradictions. Monarchists inside Russia Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 are portrayed as old fogies and depraved criminals; yet the GPU seemed to consider them a real danger to the Bolshevik regime. Nikulin debunks an idea held in certain emigre circles that YAKUSHEV agreed to work with the GPU to save his monarchist friends. According to NIKULIN, YAKUSHEV was recruited by playing on his love of the fatherland and he reported regularly on any and every monarchist he came in touch with. After writing his confession in a GPU cell, he had to work fer as a penetration agent in Moscow for almost a year before being sent abroad. The MOTSR operation within the USSR was not completely successful from the GPU point of view, for the Trust was not able to unite all the scattered monarchist groups, nor was it able to prevent contact between all local groups and emigres abroad. For example, agents of WRANGEL, KUTEPOV and Atamen ULAGAY were able to enter Russia and contact local monarchists through channels not controlled by the Trust. Further, the Trust was unable to maintain tight discipline over all the monarchist cells it nominally controlled. MOTSR, or the Trust, was initially run by a "High Political Council" consisting of the following regional members: Chairman: General ZAYONCHOVSKIY (Moscow) Foreign Minister: A.A. YAKUSHEV (Moscow) Military Advisor: General POTAPOV (Moscow) Secretary: OPPERPUT-STAUNITZ (Moscow) Regular members: RTYSHCHEV /OSTEN~SACKEN/PUTILOV (Leningrad) STRUYSKIY (Tsaritsin) Baron NOLDE (Tver) MIRZOYEV (Southern Russia) Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 The first four members mentioned were GPU agents, and the last six were genuine monarchists. If NIKULIN is to be believed, OPPERPUT also was a monarchist and not a GPU agent, a view for,which he gives no credible evidence. He doe not even try to explain how OPPERPUT got away from the clutches of the GPU in 1931 after his arrest. For a time the MOTSR group in Leningrad, under the leadership of RTYSHCHEV and PUTILOV, was perhaps the most active, in direct contact with ARTOMONOV in Tallin, the Finnish intelligence service, and a foreign consulate in Leningrad. It gathered intelligence for its foreign contacts and did propaganda work by distributing pamphlets brought in from abroad. But in 1925, PUTILOV ordered the execution of one ZABELIN who was suspected of being a GPU plant; and the GPU, unwilling to accept such a challenge, decided that the group must be destroyed, and its leaders disappeared from the scene. In Moscow, OPPERPUT appears to have one of the main activists, but, according to NIKULIN, he was constantly at loggerheads with his superiors and little seems to have been accomplished. In 1925, a man identified as “"Dyadya Vasya"(i.e. uncle Vasiliy) got in touch with Maria SHULTS, and they made plans to rob a bank to obtain money for the Trust-- a time-honored way for Russian revolutionaries to obtain funds. "Dvadya Vasya" carried out this operation alone, succesfully robbing the bank, but killing a militia-man in getting away. YAKUSHEV learned of this and, fearing that it might get MOTSR into serious trouble, he ordered that "Dyadya Vasya" should go into Turkey with the money. Meanwhile the GPU was kept fully informed, and when "Dyadya Vasya" tried to cross the Turkish border he was shot, according to plan. According to NIKULIN there existed strong anti-Bolshevik group Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 in the Northern Caucasus that gave their allegiance to a former Cossaek leader, Ataman ULAGAY, then residing in France. ULAGAY had steadfastly refused to have any dealings with the Trust, despite YAKUSHEV's persuasive arguments. In the spring of 1927, at the bidding of YAKUSHEV, one Aleksy ZUBOV (a GPU penetration agent) and BASAKOV (a genuine monarchist under the alias of KUZEN) were sent to the Caucasus to contact an anti~Bolshevik group in an attempt to have it abandon ULAGAY and join MOTSR. When the two men arrived in Krasnodar they were unable to get in touch with any of the men they hoped to meet, and this surprised them for they were unaware that the members of the group had been apprehended by the local GPU and executed a few days before their arrival. Then ZUBOV received a telegram and after reading it stated that he had to return to Moscow immediately. He tore the telegram into small pieces and threw them in a trash can, and this aroused the suspicions of BASAKOV. Left alone, the latter retrieved the pieces and, putting them together, he saw that ZUBOV had been given a devious warning about the fate of the Krasnodar group and that the message had been signed by FEDOROV (the alias for YAKUSHEV). From this, BASAKOV concluded that YAKUSHEV must be an agent of the GPU. How else could he have learned so quickly what happened in Krasnodar? And BASAKOV reasoned. further that, this being so, the whole of the MOTSR organization was probably penetrated by the GPU. When both emmissaries returned to Moscow, BASAKOV immediately got in touch with OPPERPUT and told him about YAKUSHEV's telegram and its serious implications. OPPERPUT saw the point at once and decided it was time to give the Trust the coup de grace. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 OPPERPUT quickly informed Maria SHULTS, with whom he was having an affair at the time, that they had both been unwittingly working for the GPU and not for the monarchist cause as they had supposed. Both decided that they must leave the country at once, OPPERPUT to save his skin, and Maria SHULTS to warn General KUTEPOV of this calamitous development. Maria insisted that her husband and two other White Russians, KARINSKIY and SHORIN, should be warned. OPPERPUT agreed and this was done in great haste. (The account given above was provided by NIKULIN, and it differs radically from the story given by OPPERPUT himself after his defection). It is a matter of record that Maria SHULTS and OPPERPUT arrived in Finland on 14 April 1927 and reported to the local authorities. A few days later RADKEVICH, KARINSKIY and SHORIN crossed the border into Poland. Under detention, OPPERPUT was interrogated by the Finns but precisely what he disclosed during these sessions has never been revealed. From May to October 1927 his story, as written by himself, appeared in issues of the Russian language newspaper SEGODNYA, published in Riga. In this account he describes himself as a GPU “agent under duress in which capacity he had worked for the MOTSR inside the USSR. He described the Trust (MOSTR) operation beginning with the recruitment of YAKUSHEV, the capture of Sydney REILLY, and he gave his version of the Ado BIRK affair. These articles created a sensation. abroad; they were hotly debated, with OPPERPUT's veracity either accepted or impunged. General POTAPOV and YAKUSHEV wrote General KUTEPOV a letter branding OPPERPUT as a traitor who had made public enough information to enable the GPU to exterminate monarchist. groups inside Russia. The truth of OPPERPUT's Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 defection is still open to speculation. Three theories exist: (1) he was a disenchanted GPU agent who defected and told the truth, (2) he was a GPU agent who ostensibly defected under orders, to create confusion abroad and enhance the image of the GPU as an omnipresent agency, (3) he was a genuine monarchist who fled when he found reasons to believe his liquidation by the GPU was imminent. Whether his defection was genuine or just another ingenious maneuver of the GPU may never be known. But there can be no doubt that it dealt a severe blow to the emigre organizations in Europe by making them appear ridiculous not only to themselves, but to the Western powers as well for having been so easily duped. No move could have been better calculated to spread confusion, dissension and suspicion, for OPPERPUT left the indelible impression the the emigre groups were well infiltrated by GPU agents, without revealing the identy of a single one. Maria SHULTS was one person who was convinced that OPPERPUT had been a GPU agent and that he had undergone a change of heart. Why else should he have given warning to KUTEPOV's couriers? Further, he now advocated the launching of a campaign of terror in the USSR, and this appealed to Maria, for she was a terrorist at heart. For years she had pestered YAKUSHEV to initiate acts of violence, only to be met with his usual bland arguments in favor of moderation. She saw now how she had been tricked and she thirsted for revenge. General KUTEPOV was in Finland at the time and, after hours of arGument, he was finally swayed into allowing her to assume the direction of a "Military National and Terrorist Society" as she called her new project. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 In this capacity, she selected two sabotage teams of three persons each, one group destined for Leningrad, the other for Moscow She was to lead the latter group accompanied by OPPERPUT and PETERS (VOZNESENSKIY). OPPERPUT allegedly had insisted on being included in the mission to prove that his conversion was real. In his writings CHEBISHEV criticizes the inclusion of OPPERPUT as being unprofessional for, assuming his change of heart to be genuine, he should have been kept .on KUTEPOV's staff to unravel much that remained murky, and as a safeguard against his perpetrating some new mischief for the GPU. That he was, at his own request, sent back into the USSR, provides additional proof that the emigre organizations were naive and amateurish in their approach to clandestine operations. On 390 May 1927, the Helsinki-Vyborg night train carried six conspirators to the border. There the two groups separated. One, under the leadership of Captain Victor A. LARIONOV, proceeded to Leningrad, where it sgccessfully bombed a Communist meeting-hall before returning safely to Finland. The mission of Maria SHULTS' team, however, ended differently. On 10 June, the Tass agency came out with the announcement that an attemot had recently been made to blow uv the headquarters of the Moscow GPU. On 5 July, TaSs issued another statement according to which all three members of the sabotage group had been caught and licuidated: OPPERPUT on 19 June; Maria SHULTS and Georghi N. PETERS a coupvle of days later. The next day, Deputy OGPU Chief, YAGODA, called a press conference at which he reported that a diary had been found on OPPERPUT, proving conclusively that both the Moscow and Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 and Leningrad sabotage attempts had been engineered by General KUTEPOV and British intelligence at Raval. This statement by YAGODA is lacking plausibility, for it is not likely that an old hand like OPPERPUT would have kept such a. compromising diary on his person. In 1928 the Soviet Government published an official account in which OPPERPUT's name is not mentioned at all. According to this version the Moscow team consisted only of Maria SHULTS and VOZNESENSKIY (PETERS),and it was the latter who had the incriminating diary. F.FOMIN, in his Memiors of an Old Chekist, holds to the second 1927 threw a bomb into the OGPU building in Moscow. If FOMIN's statement can be taken as authentic, only two persons in the three- man team were real saboteurs, and the third an agent-provocateur. version; he makes reference to only "two" terrorists, who in June Epilogue While the Trust operation was not able to achieve all of its objectives in full, the GPU, by its implementation, was able to boast of the following accomplishments: it gained a clear picture of White emigre organizations, their character, membership and objectives; it was able to deepen the antagonism existing in these ‘organizations, and discredit the various groups inside the USSR; it succeeded in duping foreign intelligence services, particularly the Poles, Estonians and Finns. Its most striking and lasting success was psychological; the GPU found, by means of the Trust Operation, that it possessed trade-craft equal not only to security demands at home, but also, with some modifications, commensurate Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 with the requirements -of psychological operations abroad. From this point on, Russian intelligence became a force to be reckoned with in a world-wide sense. It must be noted however, that the Trust operation succeeded not because of its inherent merits, but rather because of the inherent weakness of elements it was targeted against. According to V.V. SHULGIN, in a candid account of his,dealings with the Trust, the organization impressed emigre circles bv its use of resources indicating real power: This put it in sharp contrast to other emigre activities which seemed to consist of little more than good intentions. Some emigres marvelled at the way Trust people crossed and re-crossed the border with impunity, leaving Moscow ostensibly for the provinces and appearing in Paris and Berlin before returning to Moscow to pursue their old duties. They were astonished, if not dumbfounded, by the ease in which these people obtained visas to travel freely about Europe. It is true that such marvels aroused suspicions in certain skeptical individuals, who reasoned that only GPU agents could be capable of such legerdemain. But on the whole, the emigres believed what they wanted to believe; and they accepted the Trust at its face value. The Russian emigres were without means, without jobs, without a future, living on dreams, ready to follow anyone who promised them a way out of their wretched existence. Aware of this, the GPU gave substance to the dream by selecting for its principle agent- provocateurs, men like YAKUSHEV, POTAPOV,OPPERPUT and LANGOVOY, who were intelligent and apparently strong and fearless. Whatever the private misgivings of these agents might have been, ARTUZOV, as toe head of the operation, managed to make them Rew the line, eclassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 with the possible exception of OPPERPUT at the moment of his so-called defection. The position vis-a-vis the foreign intelligence services, particularly the Poles, Estonians and Finns, was different. The latter had not been defeated, and they did not suffer from lack of self-confidence. But they had a weakness juSt the same, in that they were fledgling states without leadership equal, to the job of contending with various fronts at one and the same time. Their main enemy were local Communist party members in their midst and, owing to lack of funds and trained personnel, the gathering of intelligence from inside the USSR was of secondary importance. Thus they accepted information willy-nilly without checking its validity or mistrusting its source. This, precisely, is the weakness the Trust undertook to exploit, and they gave out spurious information in abundance. Against this complex of weak opponents, the GPU was able to direct the efforts of a tightly knit group of trained personnel with unlimited means and power at their disposal. Strict security measures and discipline made it virtually impossible for an outsider to know what was going on in the inner sanctum: and the GPU might have continued to play its game indefinitely had OPPERPUT not made his damning disclosures, by mischance or calculated design. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 1. 2. 3. 5. FOOTNOTES Nikulin,Lev. The Swell, Page 3. Wraga,Richard. The Trust, Page 35. Nikulin, Lev. The Swell, Page 91. -Wraga, Richard. The Trust, Chapter 2. ibid Chapter 3. Nikulin, Lev. Chapter 17. -Wraga,Richard. Page 24. 7Baily, Geoffrey, The Conspirators, Page 9. 8. 9. 13. 14. 15. Chebyshev, N. The Trust, Part 1, Published in Vosrozhdeniye 'Paris Nikulin, Lev. The Swell, Page 121. -ibid. Page 170. .Ardamatskiy, Vassiliy, Retribution. The intire SAVINKOV story has been taken from this book -Nikulin, Lev. The Swell, Page 156. ibid. ‘Page 227. Kendrashov, R. Commandant of the “window to Europe" Published in Pravda November 1965. ‘Shulgin, V.V. Postscript to the Three Capitals. Published in Rossiva October 1927. -Annonymous. Legend and Reality. Published in Vosrozhdeniye. Paris, May/June 1951, Pages 114-129. _Malevskiy-Malevich, Memorandum to the State Dept. Written in New York, on March 23, 1929. -Opperput, Edward. Provocation in the Birk Case, Published in Segodnya, Riga 3 November 1927. 1935 eclassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 19.Nikulin, Lev. The Swell, Page 223-226. 20.Opperput, Edward. Exposures by the GPU Agent Opperput-Staunits. Published in Segodnya, Riga, May/October/November 1927. 21.Amfiteatrov,A. Explosion on the Mayka. Published in Vosrozhdeniye, Paris 1935. % eclassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 BIBLIOGRAPHY ANONYMOUS. Legenda i Deistvitelnost. (Legend and Reality) Published in Vozrozhdeniye, Paris, 1951, No 14/15 A.B. .Evraziysty/Trust. (The Eurasians and the Trust) Published in Vozrozhdeniye, Paris November/December 1953 AMFITEATROV, Aleksandr. O Treste. (Regarding the Trust) Published in Vozrozhdeniye, Paris, 1935. _ARDAMATSKIY, Vasiliy, Vozmezdeniye. (Retribution) Published by Molodaya Gvardiya Moscow, 1968 A.SH. Tri Vstretchi S Opperputon. (Three Meetings with Opperput) Segodnya, Riga, 28 October 1927 BAILEY, Geoffrey. The Conspirators. Harper's (New York) 1960 BURG, David. The Mystry of Reilly. (Letters to the Editor) The Sunday Times, London, March 20,1966 BURTSEV, Vladimir. Ispoved Savinkova. (The Confessions of Savinkov) Published in Segodnya,Riga, 18 October 1927 Borityes o GPU (Fight the GPU) Published in Obshcheye Dele Paris, 1932 V Setyakh GPU. (In the GPU Net) Illustrirovannaya Rossiva, Paris, 26 October 1927 CHEBYSHEV,N. Trust-Istoriya Odney Legendyv. (The Trust- History of a Legend) Published in Vozrozhdenive, Paris, 1935 COLEMANN, F.W.B. (USA Legation Riga-Latvia) The Birk Case. Official Report to the Dept. Of State. 21 November 1927 DRYMMER, W.T. Trust. Published in Culture, # 11/217, 1965, page 98-106 GRANT, Natalie, A Thermidorian Amalgau, The Russian Review. (Hannover= New Hampshire) July 1963, page 253-273 Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 TLVIN, I. The Trust Against Reilly. Literaturnaya Gazeta # 51, December 1967 KICH“YASOV, NN. Belogqvardevskiv Terror Protiv SSSR. (White Guardist Terror Against the USSR) Moscow 1928 KONDRASHEV, F. Kommandant Okna V Evropu. (Commandant of "The Window To Europe") Published in Pradva, November, 1965 LEBEDEV, V. Taina Posmertnogo Raskaza "V Tyurme" Borisa Savinkova. (The Secret of Savinkov's postshumous story inJail) Published in Volya Rossii, Praque, #11, 1926 LEVITSKIY, V.M. Plany Razlozheniyea Emigratssi. (Plans for Demoralization of Emigrants) Paris, Monograph, 21 May 1936 MALEVSKIY Malevich, P. Two memorandums submitted to the Dept. of State on 15 March 1936 and 10 April 1929 MFPLGUNOV, C. Provokatsiya GPU. (GPU Provocation) Published in Borba Za Rossiya Paris, # 47 October 1927, pages 1-4 MIKULICH, I. Savinkov i Opperput. (Savinkov and Opperput) Novyy Zhurnal, # 75, pages 185-194 NIKULIN, Lev. Mortvaya Zvb. (The Swell) Moscow 31965 Istoriya Puteshevstviva. (The Story of a Voyage) Nedelya Moscow 11-17 October 1964 Konets Sidneya Reylli. (The End of Sidnev Reillv) Nedelya Moscow 9 Agust, 1965 OPPERPUT-Staunits Edward. Exposures by GPU:Agent Opperput-Staunits. Segodnya Riga, 13 May, 1927 Opperput e Sebe samon. (Opperput about Himself) Segodnya Riga, 13 May, 1927 Provokstsiya GPU v Dele Birka. (GPU Provocation in the Birk! Case) Segodnya Riga 4 November 1927 Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 PIDSKIY, Peter.Birk, Segodnya Riga, 22 March 1927 REILLY, Sidney George. The Adventures of Sidney Reilly-Britains Master Spy. Published hv Elkin, Mathews’ and Marrot, London ,1931 SAVELYEV, S. Zhizn Dopysivaet Knigu. (A Book Filled Out bv History Itself) Published.in Vechernaya Moskva, Moscow 17 July 1965. SFMENOV, Y. Chelovek i Ego Imya. (A Man and his Name) Published in SEMYONOV, J. Vtoroy Trust (The Second Trust) Published in Vozrozhdeniye Vozrozhdeniye,Paris #3720,1935 Paris 16 November 1967 SELYANINOV- OPPERPUT. Narodmyy Zayus Zashchity Rodiny i Svobody. (The National Alliance for the Defense of The Fatherland Freedom) Berlin 1922 SHULGIN,V.V. Poslesloviye k "Tri Stolitsi" (an Epilogue to "The Capitals") Published in Rossiya, Paris, Oct. 1927 and in Segodnva, Riga 18,19,20 October 1927 “SHIMANOV, N. (Col. Gen. ret.)My Supplimentary Comments on a Novel. Published in Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow, 22 Sept. 1965 TOBENKIN, E.B. Savinkov, The €onversion of the Soviets MostSpectacular Foe. Published in Current History, London Dec. 1924 TREADGOLD,D.W. The Ideology of the White Mavement: Wrangel's Leftist Policy from Rightest Hand. Published in Russian Thought and Politics, Harvard, Slavic Studies, Series e, Vol 1V, pages 496-497 TSYBOV, S.I. and CHISTYAKOV, Front Taynoy Voynv. (Front of the Secret War). Moscow, 1965, pages 6-19

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 UNKNOWN. VASILYEV, N. Chte zhe The Soviet Azef. Published in Segednya, Riga, May 13 1927 Pekushenive na Vzvv GPU novaya Provokatsiya. (Attempt to blow up the GPU or a new Provocation) Published in Segodnya, Riga, 6 July 1927 Trest i GPU. (The Trust and the GPU) Published in Segodnya Riga, 1 November 1927 Novoye ob Opperput. Opperput zhivet po prezhnemu rabotayet v GPU. (New Information About Opperput. Is Opperput alive and working as before for the GPU.) Published in Segodnya, Riga, 3 November 1927 govorit V.V. Shulgin? (What did V.V.Shulgin Say?) Published in Segodnya, Riga, 16 October 1927 VINOGRADOV, N. K Istorii Boevoy Organizatsii Gen. A.P. Kutepova. VLADIMIROV, Viadimir, (Toward a History of the Fighting Organization of Gen. A.P. Kutepov) Published in Pereklichka New York, #126, 127, May/June 1962 From The Past: On the So-Called Trust. Published in Pereklichka New York, # 45, Julv 1955 Kto Takoi A.A. Yakushev~Foedorev. (Who is A.A. Yakushev-Foedorev) Published in. Segodnya, Riga, 21 October 1927 Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 VOYTSEKHOVSKIY,S.L. Sovetskiye Sverkh-Azefy. (The Soviet Super-Azefs) Published in Vozrozhdeniye, Paris April 1950 P.B. Struve v Varshave. Iz Istorii Tresta. (P.B. Struve in Warsaw. From the History of the Trust) Published in Vozrozhdeniye, Paris, # 9, 1950 Trest: Vospominaniya V.T. Drymmera. (the Trust: The Memories of V.T. Drimmer.) Published in Pereklichka New York, February 1967, pages 11-15, March/April pages 6+10, May/June 9-16 WRAGA, Richard The Trust. (Manuscript) London/Paris 1953? Russian Emigration After Thirty Years in Exile. Published in Eastern Quarterly, London, Jan. 1951 The Trust-History of a Soviet Provocation Operation. Published in Vozrozhdeniye, Paris, §AN/FEB 1950 Trest i Vnutrennaya Liniya. (The Trust and the Inner Line) Published in Vozrezhdeniye, Paris #11 1950 Trust. Published in Cultura, Paris, # 4/21-5/22 eclassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 APPENDIX I Three main groups of persons were involved in the Trust operation: genuine anti-Bolsheviks; GPU officials, agents and colaborators; officials of foreign governments. There follows a list of such persons, by category, showing the nature of their involvement. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 A. Anti-Bolsheviks who played a part in the Trust affairs ARTOMONOV, Yuriy Aleksandrovich Aliasses: LIPSKIY ALEXANDROV (According to R. Wraqa) He and YAKUSHEV attended the Imperial Aleksandrov Lycee (High School) and both graduated in 1907. In 1918 he was on the staff of Cossack Hetman SKOROPADSKIY in Kiev, and after the defeat of the Whites he went to Tallin (Estonia), working first as a lumberman, then in the passvort office of the British Embassy. In 1922 he received a visit from YAKUSHEV, and on this occasion the latter disclosed his anti-Bolshevik sentiments. A few months later, he was visited by STETSKEVICH-KOLESNIKOV, and a means of communication between ARTOMONOV and YAKUSHEV was arranged, the Estonian diplomatic courier, Roman BIRK, to serve as intermediary. All messages received were to be forwarded by ARTOMONOV to the Monarchist Council in Berlin, to General WRANGEL or to General KUTEPOV in Paris, according to their contents. In 1924, under the alias of LIPSKIY, ARTOMONOV was sent to Warsaw to serve as liason between General KUTEPOV and the Trust, and also Polish intelligence. He introduced DENISOV-LANGOVOY and General POTAPOV to Col. TALINKOVSKIY and Col. BAYER of the Polish IS. He attended the “Eurasian Congress" in Berlin in 1925, and helped V.Vv. SHULGIN pass through a "window" into the USSR the same year. After the collapse of the Trust in 1927, his position in Warsaw became untenable and he went to Paris. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 BALMASSOV, Aleksandr With another member of Kutepov's Combat Organization, SOLSKTY, he went on a terrorist mission into the USSR in August 1927. Both were captured and executed. BASAKOV,fnu (Captain) Receives mention only in Lev NIKULIN's book, and could be fictitious. Reportedly a Captain of the police during the Tsarist regime and worked in the Moscow security division under KLIMOVICH. Joined the MOTSR at its inception, and belonged to the OPPERPUT group, under the alias of KUZEN, acting as a safe-house keeper. Early in 1927, he was sent with a GPU officer ZUBOV to the Northern Caucasus to contact a local monarchist group in Krasnoda¢ There ZUBOV committed a breach of security by failing to destroy a telegram he received from YAKUSHEV. BASAKOV was able to decipher the message and learned that the Trust was a GPU controlled organization. On his return to Moscow he informed his chief, OPPERPUT, and, thus warned, the latter fled to Finland. BUNAKOV, N.N. A representative of General KUTEPOV in Helsinki, in contact with British and Finnish intelligence. .He was skeptical of the -Trust until YAKUSHEV got his brother out of Russia for a re-union in Helsinki in August 1925 and this persuaded him that the Trust was a bona fide monarchist organization with real power. In this frame of mind, he made arrangements (on the Finnish side) for Sydney REILLYts ill-fated trip to Moscow. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 GUCHKOV, Aleksnadr Ivanovich hws A member of the Duma during the Tsarist regime, and leader of a moderate leftist party. One of the persons who forced the Tsar to abdicate, and Minister of War in the Provisional government that followed. After the November revolution, he joined General WRANGEL and worked for him in Berlin, where he met YAKUSHEV and became one of his partisans. Young monarchists like Maria SHULTS disliked and distrusted him. KARINSKIY, fnu A member of the second team sent to the USSR by General KUPEPOV to observe and report on the activities of the Trust. When Maria SHULTS and OPPERPUT decided to fly to Finland in April 1927, they warned KARINSKIY (as well as RADKEVICH and KORIN), and this enabled the three to escape into Poland. KLIMOVICH, Yevgeniy E. (General) The much feared mayor of Moscow in 1915, and a year later the chief of the Tsarist Police Department. After the revolution he became General WRANGEL's chief of intelligence, residing first in Berlin and then in Paris. He was assigned to deal with Trust matters, and he served as liason between WRANGEL and General KUTEPOV, using this position to keep the two_..enerals at loggerheads. A firm believer in the Trust, he did all he could to help YAKUSHEV and POTAPOV gain entryeS to emigre circles. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 KOKOVTSEV, Viadimir Nikolayevich (Count) A former statesman and financial expert in Tsarist Russia, he belonged to the entourage of Grand Duke Nikolay Nikolayevich in Paris in the twenties. YAKUSHEV gained his cooperation bv promising that he would be made Prime Minister once the MOTSR (Trust) succeeded in unseating the Bolshevik regime. KUTEPOV, Aleksandr Pavlovich (General) Of humble beginnings, KUTEPOV rose to fame by his bravery during World War I, and gained the rank of colonel. During the Civil War he was made a general in command of White units in the northern Caucacus and later joined WRANGEL's army in the Crimea. In Gallipoli, he was _made Commander-in-Chief and, a strong-willed person and a martinet, he quickly brought order in the ranks of a disorganized and defeated army. From there, as WRANGEL's deputy, he went to Bulgaria with a part of the troops, and headed the officers' society "Gallipolitsi" to which all officers who had been interned on Gallipoli could belong. In 1923, he went to Paris and organized his Combat Organization (CO) to fight the Bolsheviks, and also started a CI group called the “Inner Line". In these organizations he gathered energetic and capable officers from the “Gallipolitsi" and gave them training in sabotage and clandestine operations in preparations for missions into the USSR. Prom 1923 to 1927, he worked closely with the Trust mainly through Maria SHULTS and her husband RADKEVICH, and he also managed to send agents into the USSR without the knowledge of the Trust. In 1930, his abduction in Paris by the GPU gained world-wide attention; and with his disappearance, CO terrorist missions into the USSR ended. In 1945 his only son, Peter, then living in Bela Cerkva (Yugoslavia) Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 was lured into the USSR by the incoming Red Army on the pretext that KUTEPOV was there, serving in the Red Army under the alias of General ZHUKOV. Peter was not heard from again. LARTIONOV, Victor A. Leader of a three-man team of saboteurs who successfully bombed a communist meeting hall in Leningrad in June 1927, before returning to Finland. LARIONOV describes the event in his book Boyovaya Vylazka v_SSSR_ (Paris 1931) and exerpts from the book were published by A. AMFITEATROV in Vozrozhdeniye (Paris, 27 and 39 May 1936) under the title "Explosion on the MoyKa". MARKOV, Nikolay Yevgenyevich Head of the Monarchist Council in Berlin, and one of YAKUSHEV's first contacts in 1922, Von MONKEVITZ, Nikolay A. (General) As Chief of Intelligence for General KUTEPOV, he played a prominent role in the Combat Organization. Owing to his checkered past and love of intrigue, he was widely known as the "Red Spider". He and KLIMOVICH were two of the most ardent sponsors of the Trust among the emigres. In November 1926 he vanished from his apartment after leaving a suicide note, and rumors spread that he had defected to the Soviets. SRULGIN, however, believes that von MONKEVITZ misappropriated Combat Organization funds, and this was the reason for his suicide, real or pretended. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 MONOMAKHOV, Vladimir A member of LARIONOV's three~man team which bombed a communist meeting hall in Leningrad in June 1927 and returned safely to Finlana. A few months-later he and RADKEVICH (Maria SHULTS' husband) were expelled from Finland because their anti-Soviet activities were embarrassing the authorities. Both men returned to the USSR on another sabotage mission in July 1928 and were killed. PETERS, Georgiy N. (aka Vossnesenskiy) Accompanied Maria SHULTS and OPPERPUT into the USSR in June 1927 to bomb the GPU quarters on the Lubyanka in Moscow. According to a while on their way to the Polish border and killed in an exchange of gun-fire on 27 June. According to A. AMFITEATROV (in Vozrozhdeniye, Tass release on 5 July 1927, both Maria SHULTS and PETERS were trapved Paris, 27 and 30 May, 1936) PETERS was born in Mustamyski on the Finish-Russian border, the son of a railway engineer. The PETERS family were half Finnish, half Russian, and nearly all members were Bolsheviks. When PETERS' father went to the USSR to stay, he (the son) remained with his mother and was sent to a religious school in Finland. Soon after leaving school, he became a professional anti-bolshevik agent and border crosser for hire, and that is why he was chosen by Maria SHULTS as a member of her team. PUTILOV, Aleksandr Sergevevich A landowner near the citv of Ryazvansk during the Tsarist regime, and earlier a student of the Aleksandrovskiy Lvcee, where he met YAKUSHEV. He later became a government official in Petrograd and remained there after the Revolution. The most active leader of MOTSR in Petrograd, Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 he was probably liquadated in 1924 when the GPU decided that his group must be destroved. RADKEVICH, Georgi (Aka KARPOV) The husband of Maria ZAKHARCHENKO-SHULTS, more commonly known as Maria SHULTS. Both were in Moscow from 1924 to 1927 as emissaries of General KUTEPOV, to check on| ‘the activities of the Trust. RADKEVICH escaped to Poland at the time that his wife and OPPERPUT fled to Finland ih April 1927. In July 1928; he went to the USSR again, this time on a sabotage mission with Vladimir MONOMAKOV and both lost their lives. ROMANOV, Vikolay Nikolayevich (Grand Duke) Senior member of the ROMANOV family. His wife, Militsa, was the daughter of the last king of Montenegro, where General POTAPOV had been Military Attache. During the emigration the Grand Duke lived in a suburb of Paris, the acknowledged head of the Supreme Monarchist Council, whose goal it was to return him to Russia as regent until the question of succession among the ROMANOV's could be threshed out. He died in 1928, respected but disliked. RTSHCHFV, Aleksandr Nikolayevich A high-ranking official in Petrograd during the Tsarist regime. He remained in Petrograd after the revolution and, around 1922, became the leader of the MOTSR group in that city. Lev NIKULIN pictures him as an old fogevy and ineffectual leader, who died in 1926. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 SAVINKOV, Boris L. An arch enemy of the Bolsheviks, who was lured into the USSR in August 1924, arrested, tried, and sentenced to ten vears imprisonment. On 7 Mav 1925, he jumped or fell from his prison window to his death. It was widely reported that during his trial he completely recanted on his former anti-Bolshevik views. A leading member of the Socialist Revolutionary Party. He was also chief of the party's "Combat Organizations" and was directly involved in the assassination of high Tsarist officials. During World War I he was exiled in France, but after the fall of the Tsar returned to Russia and hecame Deputy Minister of War in the Provisional Government. After the November Revolution (1917) he directed his efforts against the Bolsheviks. He met the British master spy, Sydney REILLY, in Paris for the first time. A vear later he went to Poland where, with the help of RFILLY and Marshal PILSUDSKI, he organized a large group of guerillas who were fighting the Bolsheviks in the eastern part of Belorussia. After the signing of the Peace Treaty of Riga in 1921, this effort had to be abandoned. He then went to Prague and, with the help of a Czech General, GAYGA, an anti-Bolshevik group, the "Green Guards" was organized, and some members of this group were sent into the Western Ukraine for small scale operations. In 1922, REILLY introduced SAVINKOV to Winston Churcill, hoping to get British intelligence more interested in Bolshevik affairs. SAVINKOV was directed to Lloyd GEORGE, who showed no interest whatever in further British involvement. By 1923 SAVINKOV was thoroughly disillusioned with the prospects Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 7 of bringing force to bear on the Bolsheviks from the outside. The RusSian emigres were a bewildered and ineffectual lot, incapable of taking concerted action; and western powers, pursuing short-term policies, were equally indecisive. SAVINKOV began to feel that the only hope of unseating the Bolsheviks lay in some organized effort of anti- Bolshevik elements within the USSR. Persuaded by GPU agent-provacateurs that such elements did exist and that they were only waiting for a leader of his stature, SAVINKOV was lured into Russia, and his career was brought to an untimely end. SHCHELGASHCHEV, Vsevolod Ivanovich A nephew of the last TSarist Minister of Justice; and General WRANGEL's representative in Tallin (Estonia) as of 1921. As a close friend of ARTOMONOV, he took part in the latter's discussions with YAKUSHEV in 1921, and in later discussions with KOLESNIKOV. According to NIKULIN, he had direct contact with RTYSHCHEV, the MOTSR leader in Petrograd-~ an informal link which YAKUSHEV tried to break without success. SHIRINSKIY-AKHMATOV, Prince, A leading member of the Monarchist Council in Berlin who met YAKUSHFV during the latter's first visit to that city in 1922. He did not participate further in negotiations, but appears to have been directly involved in communications between the Monarchist Council and the Trust, through intermediaries such as ARTOMONOV-LIPSKIY in Warsaw and SHCHELGASHCHEV in Tallin. SHORIN fnu Went to the USSR in 1924 with KARINSKIY and SUSALIN to check on the Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 activities of the Trust, on behalf on General KUTEPO’. ‘,ittle is tnovn of their activities, hut 7. "™ac7 sveculates ther assiqned (throudh GProsonnivance) to murder GP officials who had Fallen in Ais*avor; and Vatalie WeviT, in her article NAN Thermidorian Amaleam, sneculates 2lono similar lines. “Yelither of the autnors can, however, cive evitence for such a hvoothesis. Tn *9ril 1927, both SORT) ana TD IREUISNIY were warne? about the impending JPPM APT Asfection, and both wer2.able to escane to Poland. Te raturnaed to fhe Teo in Aucust 1927 on a sabotage mission and presumably was killed, SruLuTc, “aria, nee LYSOv (ala ZANVANCUEPNNO, RADKMVIC™, “IKENO, BEEN GOVE! MAYA, MRASNOSETAMOVA) Accorfting to CL CNNRYSUMY (lTozrozhdenive Sept/Oct 1935), “Maria AC an early ace she married a “MT™EMO, an a@jutant of the Semenovshiyv recireank, whoa died of v9unds “urine “Yorid “ar I. Ser next husband was fad Cantain ZATHRRCUMINO, a famous horseman. Roth fought in the armies of was the 4Aauqhter of a Russian nobleman, LYSOY, living near Smolensk. W™wTT TT and MONTGPh: hota emiecratet to Yuaoslavia, ane, sometime later, ens Lo. a4 AYIA Aone yer unt. mn dain > aa 12, “Tanaxral Uroaygy, in Paris, and becane a leadina mamber of Fis Combat Ireanization. AL avout tris time (1922/1923) one o* ner colleacues (unnamed) Aascribed her as fallows: 2% sort, Slender woman, she moved aracefully and calcklv., Ver face Art prominent cheek bones; Her head vas covered with dark,*ine ciair; her ev25 carayv but subject to changes in’ color and often flasiina aaily as sie talled...... She lived on her nerves, craved Aancer ane action: to her rest anc ».eace seemed tantamount to sufferinc. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 er soeach w33 ranid, abriot, an? often vith a rising inflection. “any were struck by ‘ier mannerisms and her vassion. 4 1924 “tarin and her third Ciushand, RAIMEVICH were sent to “oscov £9 check on the activities of the Trust, both travelling with German Socuments unter the name of SMNLtsS. In “Moscow, OPPrRPTT ant them other German aAncuments, ers under the name of BERPZOVEMEVR «Near Hushane's under the name “ARPOY. rey staved in ‘toscow until 1927, and meanwhile, in 1925, thev were une TeELINe tools in lurine Svanevy 27ILLY into "ussia. In roril 1927 342 *leA to Pinlan? wits, OPPRPPMT, Hut soon returned to “fascow on A swaotace mission, and was killee@ in an exchandg? of acunfire. congqure, Gardai vy memher of the LARIONO team that went to Leninarad in June 1927 and successfullv hombed a communist meetina—-hall before returnina to RTinlane. In Yueust of the same vear he and SNORIN entered Russia on a secone sabdotade misson, and both were killed in the Petrozavod district. SOUS" IY, Fnu Ment to Russia on a terrorist misson "ith Alelsandr VATIAASCON in *tucust 1927, ant both were killed. “Tank to Russia in 1924 with “ARINSNIY and SHORT] to check on the activities o* the Trust, on behnal® of General “"TFPOV. Reference is iva) ere is no record reoardine Ais subsequent activities, or of his fate Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 2°iTSCeyY, fnu (Colonel) Chief of the “Inner Line", the CIE branch of General “UTTPOV's Combat Waanization. Ve Was, considerec an able man, but after the ayduction death) of =rIT™RpoWv, (1939), he was made the victim of emigre intrigues; as a result, he as devosed and his organization dissolved. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 3B. OPM OPP ICTALS, AGHITS AND COLLABORATORS INSION THER TST OPRRATION ARAPOV, fnu (aka SHMIDT) One of the leading "Furasians" in Paris, who with the helv of the “rust, entered "ussia in 1924 to attend the “First murasian Conference" in Moscow, aS a cuest of honor. ‘linder the alias of “tr. SHMINT, he addressed the conference and delineated the vroqram of the oraqanization. hs they did in reqard to "!0TS™, the GPI' set un a branch of the "Rurasians" in the USSR as a means of infiltratina and directino the "Furasian" group in Furone. ADMTAOWT, Fnu (aka 2TOCT, PPNUCTT, TRATCMI) Chief of the Counterintellicence Section of the GPU an2 one of its Yice-Presidents. According to 2. PAAGM aAPTEZOV was born in Trieste with Ttalian Dlood in his veins, and his real name was ?ICCI. During World War I, he served with Austrian intelligence, syent some time a3 a POW in PBussia, and then became a member of the Cheka. Recordina to G. U7 TiEey**, Nis true name was RUNUCCL. Lev IIENULEI simoly refers to him as APTUZOV, and descrives him as a former andineer with very carl eves and a small vointed heard. On Ais tunic he wore a golden letter "VW" with crossed swords-- a medal hestowel on outstanding Chekists at the forth anniversary of the Theka. Recording to ©.T. TEYROY ane CUISPOVANOY, his true name was PAYA Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 YECRMOP-PAPRHPENTHAL, fnu, and VIPR Secretary of Poris SMVINMOV after “Norld “ar I, and, like his chief, an old revolutionary fighter. is wife came from similar circles. O21 19 Ancaust 1924, both NICMHOF and his wife accomoanied SAVIMNKOV to Russia and were arrested with him. Reportedly released on SAVIMMOT's request, they remained in Moscow unmolested, and worked as Tnitourist ouides. The real relationshio between SAVIIKOY and this couvle remains obscure. On one occasion, VYAGONA told American newsnavermen that SATTINW hal been lured into the USSR hy a "“heautiful overator™ and that she hal been vermitted to spend nichts with SAVIMNKOVY after his arrest. Since “ANS. DICZHOT as the only woman known to have enjoved this vorivileae, she was most probably the "beautiful operator" in question. YOROZHINS “IV, Serqei Vladimirovich (aka Anton Antonovich) hioh-ranking GPU officer, who was probably a denuty of ARTUZOV's, In 1922/23, he was working with the Petrograd monarchist oraqanization "Throne and Yonor"; and in 1924, he was a case officer for Maria SHULTS her Husband, RAYWEVICT--a dutv which he shared with OPPRPPUT, ane Ne achieved some ocrominence ‘v servina as a quiee for Sanrpe4r) during the latte: $s trio through “ussia in 19325, and he received frequent mention in SUNLGIM's book, “he Three Canitals, under fhe name Anton *ntonovich. LANGOQVAV, Pleksandr DRleksevavich (aka General JENISO") ™ a son of a well-known orofessor of medicine in “Moscow, he was a Ree Army officer durina the Civil “ar and was decorated with the Neer Panner medal for bravery. Wis first recorded job for the GPY Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 was to establish ae branch of the "Surasian" organization in “Moscow and arrance the "First Furasian Congress" in Moscow in 1924. In the Sollowine vear he attended another "Furasian Conaress" hela in Berlin. “By this time he had become liason man with Polish intelliqence ostensibly for the Trust, and in this canacitv he established two "windows" on the Soviet-Polish border. Misquised as a smuggler, he met SeUuery at the border in 1925 and helped him cross into the "SS", again on behalf the “rust. According to 'RAGA, he was a member of the Soviet “‘tilitary ‘fission Conference in Geneva in the late twenties, under the name of General AmaITeQy VTIMULIN, who interviewed him extensively before writing his hook The Swell, states that LANGOVOV died in Moscow on 26 February 1964. ANvEPPiT™ Eduard (see NIPPNINSE) NANEOV, Fnu ™ha heare of a letter from “Colonel PAYVYLOVSXIVY to SAVINKOV, requesting the latter's vresence in the USS". Roth PAVLOV and PAVTOVINTY wo under the control of the GPT] at the time, and both vere instrumental in settina the tran into which CAYVIN“OY fell. DAIT OVEN TY (Colonel) Commander of SAVINKOV's auerilla units in western 2ussia and his most trusted lieutenant, he was cavtured by the GPY in 1922 and forced under torture to work for the downfall of his chief. At the dictates of the GPU, he wrote a letter tosAVINKOY in 1924 urdqing him to visit the UES" as a matter of urgency ant this was one of the factors that intuced StV7IMNMOY to take the risk. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 DEPP, Tyan “Mikhailovich In the Soviet newsnaner “loskovskava Pravda in November 1965 there anneared an item regardina this former border cuard who vlaved a Gouble role in leadina fyiney TPILLY across the Finnish-Soviet border in 1925. that time, PRPTROV, under the alias of Tovvo VYZ"UT, was in charae of a so-called trust-"window". von DPILCHAT, Pilar ™ mamber of the German-Raltic nobility, he olayed a leading role in Trust affairs, credited with the recruitment of VANUSHEY, the amrest o* SAYINZOW and cavture of Sydnev RrILLY. “e was for a time Head of the Pvelorussian GPU with headquarters in “linsk, porazavav, (General) Accordina to the Yoenno-istoricheskiy Zhurnal in January 1968, General POTAPOV was born on-14 March 1871 in “Moscow, the son of a cam small covernment emplovee of peasant stock. “ith a scholarshiv he anrolled in a military school in 1881, and until 1897, he attended various other militarv institutions, includina the first cadet school in “Moscow, an artillerv school ane the General Staff Academv. “raduating with honors, he was sent on extended TOV to western “urove_, orincivally to “Vienna and Berlin. “rom 1991 until 1993 he was denuty militarv attache in sae “Vienna, and for the next: twelve years he was a military advisor in the kinedom of “ontenearo. Rack in “Moscow in 1915, he hecame SCeneral ONuartermaster of the army, @ oosition he held until the October “evolution. At this juncture, Tenin found it difficult ¢ deal with the old armv, and he turned to PATRON for helo, havine heard from cts. MPNnav and POPVOISKIY Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 shat Seneral POTAPOV had maintained contact with communists for years. On 23 Tlovember 1917, POT™POY promised Lenin his full cooveration and was annointed chief of the general staft in a reshuffle of army leadershin. On 31 ‘larch 1913, he nersuaded Lenin to issue an order through the Central Committee statina that svecialists who had served under the Sarr reaime could be annointed to resvonsihle vositions. n 1922, when the Trust was set up ostensibly for the purpose of staging a coup d'etat, it anveared necessarv to co-opt a prominent military flaure to keeo in touch with mussian military leaders exiled abroad, and POTAPOV was chosen for this role. At the request of the. eet, he was aiven leave of absence from the army and devoted himsel£ to affairs of the Trnst until its collavose in 1927. Ue then turned to PUGTNSTIV, fn (aka PUZITSXKIY) *% devutv of APTNZOY in the GPU, who versonally placed S¥ydnev PEILLY under arrest in 1925 as the latter was about to leave “Moscow for Finland after consulting with the so-called leadership of the Trust. omomenrvicn, ‘Victor (aka ADLESNIKOV, KOSINOV, XIAKOWSYI, ROSSINSKI, VAMINS™L, ORTROVSET) snborrinate of AR™MIMZOV in the GPU, selected’ to maintain vrersonal lecturina and writing on military affairs, and died in February 1946. contact with 'hite Wussians abroad. "sec ordinge to ARVIN, Vieutenant Victor sTrers KRVICT? (STEZKIEWVIC2) was sent to trie SS on an intelliaqence mission in 1919/29 »by the Polisn “ilitary Organization. He was avoorehended in “Moscow and, interroaated and hroven hv OST RAZUINGYIV himself, he hetrayed the entire Polish undergqroun? in the Soviet Mnion. From then on he was a loyal Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 servant the Cheka and GPU and held the corresnonding rank of {army corns) aeneral in 1922. mmnen™ confirms the backaround given above, but svells the name SOMTSXPYTO™ instead of CTEZKINNICZ, WRAGR adds that strrexruvtcn (ander the alias of MOZINSNI) was attached to the Soviet missions in Velsinki and Rica immediately after the Polish-Soviet war. Lev NIRMLIN refers to the man bv the name of KOSINOV, but provides no bachkeround information. STRASUKPVIC!, Varvara sousin of. White-quardist ARTOMONOV in Paliin, who had a mild affair with VAtUSHnN’. This brought her into the hands of the GPU, and she was forced to write a letter of introduction for STFETSYRYICH to ARTOMOANOT, which qave STETSNFVICY access to White Russian circles in Tallin as a bona fide memher of “MOTS?, STvaNe, fnu (aka STAROV, KOZLOV) Aasvutv of ARTUZOV an the GPT CI Section who vlaved a prominent role in Trust affairs, varticularly in the case of Svdney REILLY. Lev NIXVRIN refers to this official as STRROV, KOZLOV, or STAROV-V“OZLOV, ann avoids the real name of STY™IN for unknown reasons. TRETVANOYW, Env CPN penetration acent of the “Monarchist Council in Rerlin. “hen a letter from “PTAMONOY to the “Monarchist Council in Rerlin e211 into the hands of the oPm, it led to the arrest of VANUSHFV and the real Seoinnina of the “rust oneration. "M7. attributes the interceotion LO MPRMMVTANOV Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 UMSELINeET, fnu leading member of the GPll foreign devartment and a deouty to EO RZNIMSMIV, Ae initiated »vrojiect "Beacon" (“Mavak) for the venetration of “hite russian emicre organizations. ‘'"24GA alone credits "Beacon" with havino aiven birth to the Trust. UDPNINS", Fdwards (aka Pduard OPPRRPUT, von STAUNITS, Otto OTTOVICH, SPLY*NINOV,UPFLNITS,Baron Alexander von MANTTUFFEL) The most controversial fioure in the Trust operation and one of its most Avnamic. Me defected to Finland in April 1927, and from ‘Mav 16 Movember of that vear, his testimony anveared in issues of Segodnv2, “laa. In brief, he had the following to sav about himself: Rorn in Latvia in 1894, he craduated from the Tukumshove Trade School, Studied for a time in the Riga Politechnical Institute, enrolled in the Aleksandrovshkoye Military School in 1915, then took courses in an infantry school. In 1916 he fought. first against the Germans, then aqainst the ™urks in the “aucasus. After the Revolution, he joined the 2d) Suards and, in 1920, he was Assistant Chief of Staff of Ped troops near the Polish border. Yevolted bv the terror and brutality of the ca, he joined the oraanization of Boris GAVYIMN"NOV' whom he met versonally in "Warsaw. “ae was arrested and interroaated in “linsk bv Mhehist IPANSKIV, Tis will was broken by the use of chemicals (drugs?) anv he idehtified several “hite agents, such as PAGRATSRY and General TLUMIGUTEY, Uavina been drawn into the service of the Cheka under intolerable oressure, he vas put in contact with A.A. VAXUSHEV, who was confined in a death-cell of the Lubyanka »orison in 1922, and it was he who versuaded VAYUCEMY? to coonerate with the Cheka, under its new desionation, the opm, eclassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 The strict accuracy of this story is oven to question, according to “MACK there are nersons who remember OPPRHRPUT in 1918 as an assistant to the chief of the Riaca SCoviet s cret service and claim he ordered the execution of hundreds of the bourgeois as "“csounter-revolutionaries.” Qcher oersons met Aim in 192) in Smolensk, where he beqan his career of provocation. There, oosing as a left-wing anti-Sdéviet militant under the aliases of SPFETORSYI and SELVYANINOV, he curried favor with SAVTINKOW and ohtained his svonsorshin of an anti-Soviet organization, "Peovle's Union for the Defense of Freedom and the Fatherland". Then, one dav, DIPPrRPUT was arrested an® this was followed bv a rai on the "DPagnile'ts Tmion". All its members were arrested and executed; but APPENPMP himself, the leader, survived. Later, in 1922, a booklet anveared in Rerlin, written by OPPRHRPUT and bearing one of his aliases, P. SPLYANTNOWV, on the cover, It described the organization and goals of the "Peonle's "nion", and vortraved the exiles, »articularly the SANTVMKOAY groun, as croo™s and fakers. OVRRYSURY and WRAG™ appear to accept OPPERPUT's story, namely, that he was cenuinely under arrest in 1921 and that he agreed to collaborate only afer reveated torture. Rut Lev “NIKUGLIN, as a snokesman for the Soviets, outs OPPRPPUT in a comoletelv different light. Vea males 2assing reference to the arrest o* OPPARPI'T anid merely states that he was teleased hv a "miracie". Fe has. OPPURPMT meet VANTISHEV, not in a prison cell, but as A aqenuine monarchist member of MOTSP. He mates no attempt to exnlain how OPPERPUT, as a monarchist, hanpened to tnow so much about TPT onerations, as revealed in his written testimony after defection--he simmly ignores the testimony altogether. He admits “OPpranimt'=s>s Jefection but aives an imolausible account of the motivation, by chance OPPrRPrm Aiscovered that the Trust was nenetrated “ete Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 by the GP, Te doer not explain how the shifty and mercurial person he describes could have wormed himself into the confidence of so many oennle, ant have volaved such an immortant vart in the Trust overation. Tn June 1927, OFPFRPUT accompanied ‘laria SNULTS into the UJSSP on a sabotade mission, and his death, as well as her's, was announced in the Soviet press. Vet, rumors continued to circulate that he was alive and still working for the GPU. According to one story, he was workino amona the “hite Russians in Shanghai, but an investiqation initiated bv the ™%merican Leoation in “ioa nroduced necative results. Th his book The Consvirators G. PAILEY relates how in 1941/42 Sf, VTOTANMNOVS"IV, the head of the “hite Russian Credentials O*fice in “arsaw, was visited hv one Paron Alexander von MANTRUFFRL, who wanted to establish business contacts for his antique shov in “iev. A. faw weeks later, another “hite Russian leader, General BISHIPS™TY, confided to VOITSPRROVSY TY that this MANTEUPTPL was actually OPPNPPUT, and that after his “larsaw trin he had been caucht in “iev hy the Gestano and executed for esnionade. VATMSGHEV, Aleksandr Aleksandrovich (alias FRENDOR0V) VRMUST' was born in the citv of Twer on 7 Agust 1876, the son of an academy orofessor. Me araduated from the Emoeror Aleksandr Uve@um and later tauaqht at this A&chool. His last sosition under the S3arist reaime was chief o° a denartment in the Ministry of Naterwavs: En 1919, helieving that the davs of the Bolsheviks were numbered, jerqrounc cells in Petroqrad, but when the local Cheka most of the varticinants, he escaved to “Moscow, to earn a livelihood bv selling old china and silverware. The Soviet “linistrv of Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 “Waterwavs got in touch with him, and versuaded him to become one of its denartment heads. In this cavacitv he was sent to Norway on TDY in 1921. tis return to Moscow he was immediately placed under arrest by Stories reaardine the manner of his recruitment bv the Cheka vary, but all aaree i SS8ens2: ne was finallv versuaded to serve the Cheha Ha) aS A nenetration agent in the local MOTSR organization, and as an agent-ofovocateur when meeting White Pussian emigre circles abroad. Under the alias of FFDOROV, he became one of the orincinle acents in the GP" controlled Trust overation. ZAVOIOTIVUSE IV ALM, (General) resnected aeneral of the Tsarist army who was made "Suoreme- FPmissarv" of the Trust. "RAGA claims that the GPI! forced him to accent this role on the threat that his daughter would otherwise be killed, but he aives no evidence for this belief, and the qeneral's motivation 2ins obscure. did not varticivate in Trust operations, other than to sien documents with the oseudonym "Povar Vasiliv", presumably to aive them an air of distinction. NIKULIN ma™es only vassina reference to 2avororaTerty, statina that he died in 14926. SURO, Rleksev 2UR9OV fiaqures nrominentlv in “TIkMLT account of the Trust overation, particularly in connection with the activities of Maria StUTS during her stav in “Moscov. Renortedly he was Killed hy a “hite Dussian two Aavs hefarea OPPPePrm and Maria SENLTS fled to Tinlani. In every respect, 2MBOV is y~ortraved as an ideal Chekist, which qives rise to the suspicion that he may be an invented model of nerfection. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 PORRIGN OFTECIALS INVOLVED IN TEE TRUST DPPAINS RIPX, Ada former “Minister of Foreian 2£fairs in “stonia, who was apnointeda Pstonian Fnvoyv in “oscow, where he hecame the victim of a SPU nrovocation in 1926/27. “e returned to Fstonia and was tried on charges of treason, with a verdict of acquittal. During the trial, he described how he had been framed, and claimed that the Trust was a GPU controlled overation, bunt his testimony in the resvect aained little credence. mI", Roman “astern and Soviet sources differ as to the background and role of Poman BIR” ordina to RAG, he was given the job of »vress attache in the Fstonian Lecation in “toscow ‘bv his uncle, Minister Ado BERK. weak character and self-indulaent he became an easv taraet for the SPU, Initially, he was wined and dined by STETSNFVICH and alleqedlv given so-called “state secrets". Then, in a staged affair, he was caught red-handed, s9 to sneak, and blackmailed into GPU service. From then on, N@ sont Trust reports out of the country in the divlomatic vouch; and he orovited the GPT with hard intelligence acquired in his official canacitv. Xccording to Lev MINNLIN, the Coviet writer, Roman BIRX was an old Communist and an officer in an Fstonian unit of the Red Army. fter beinc wounded? in a hattle near Tartu, he tore off his Ped insignia, and joined the “stonian nationalist forces to save his life. Fventuelly ye was transferred to thie office of the Estonian military attache, “Maqgor HAVPTTS, in Mosc@y ant, by 1923, he was being used for intelligence activities acainst the Polshevils, at a time when his 01d colleacues were being executed. This rested heavily on his conscience. One dav eclassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 he met his old Pec commander, “slonel MORK, and thev had a heart to Heart talk. As a result, Roman RIN decided to correct the evil tenor of his wavs hy becoming a GP™ agent. Me informed “ORX accordingly, and word was passed to STRTSXEVICT, who became nis case-officer. MARS TEL (Lr Colonel) The Fstonian militarv attache in Moscow in 1926/27, on bad terms with the Fstonian “tinister, Ado BIRN. fxploiting this relationshiov, the SPU, through its Trust overation, enmeshed BIRK in a frame-up that Sadly compromised him in the eves of his government. “URS apvarentiv was an unwitting pawn in this affair. Tr ITS, ftnu (“*ajor) “he "stonian military attache in “Moscow in 1922/23 and the suverior of Poman BIRT at that time, TT TLLY, Sidnev George (ava ZYFLPZNVY, MASSINO, STEINBERG ,CONSTANTING, ROSP*IBLUM) Xecording to RTTLLY himsel£, he was born in Clommele, Ttreland, under that name; hut “ITKRULIN claims he was born in Odessa with the Jewish name of POSENSLN™M, Te began his husiness carzer at the turn of the century in the far mast with the lumber firm "Gunberg and Reilly", and a little later, Ne was also a director of the Danish firm "Danish “Yestern 2sian CO. TH 1906, after the Russian- Javanese war, he narticivated in an enterorise, "Mandrehkovich & Shuberskiy" which Helned rearm the defeated Russian fleet. Sis linguistic abilities ana knowledge of German maritime matters, Sroucht him to the attention of British intelligence. Recruited by the Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 ™IS at the outhreal of “Morla “ar I, he served with outstanding success, even onerating within Germany as a German naval officer. Sometime in 1917, he was sent to Petrograd as a svecialist in Levantine affairs under the alias of ‘ir. M™SSIMO. In 1918, after the Octoher (1917) Revolution, he and a British diolomatic aqent, Robert Rruce LOCNRART, trie@ to oraanize an anti-Bo0lshevik counter- revolution, an enterorise which narrowly failed owing to a nre-mature attemmt on the lite of Lenin. LOCNPAR?T was devorted and RF ILLY fled, “oth were tried and sentenced to death in absentia on 3 December 1918. ~*ter his return to London, REILLY was sent to the headquarters of Saneral NE YIXIN to revort on the situation obtaining tiere. Rack in Pnalane, Ye remained with the RIS, an implacable foe of the Bolshevik recime. He was in close contact with Boris SAVINKOY and supported him financially with personal funds and monev from the BIS. Tn 1925, he received a letter from “laria SHULTS (under the pseudonym Of VPASNOSHTANOV) urdine him to visit the USSR on the voretext that a counter-revolution was immendina. After some hesitation ye decided to take the risk. Mm 25 September 1925, he crossed the Finnish border into the Soviet Tnion and was heard of no more. According to MIRULIN, he was arrested and the death sentence imoosed on Aim in 1918 was carried out. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified APPEYNAVIY RTIMPTANOS TITTY TT ACTT in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 WoOToME ABOUT THR TRUST “eitars who have Aivided into two ceneral orouns: yedqaxttdinag some varticutlar }ave cained an over-all view of the “ost, not all, writers on the crind, some noink to nrove, 390 that eistortet hv bias and attenuated by AROAMAMETIV, Vasily Tn this Coviet writer's book oublished articles or hooks ahont Tozmezda che Trust can MNarticivants with knowledae the oneration, and writers who overation through research. Trust anpear to have an ax to nive- (% the GCavinhov £ the G7) which inticates that it was Sys WUIAMMTEV TV, unliks “TIVE OT, wt nresents State Securitv in Pussian neonle how couraqeously thev are jles, (oresumahly in the hanes written with the anoroval, if Like Lev *“IIXUGIN's book, flattering terms, showing the ~rotected from their enemies. does not describe versonalities as Deine either rooues ox anoels. sees them all as human beinas wi end2 ano had chixracteristics; aven GIVEN TOY was not a villain, but 2 cracic fiaure whos hed trint to do the best and had gone astray. NENT TATE TS, OF sauyse, ataise of the leownd surronnding him, was aluays riaht, 23 subort of Hyman frailty. seeming Fran Fash bhak waywsremertvls hans was syrrrtre opttta 1 aneration3s yalocome in vocue, r Aamented stwvle, ealism in oresenta inates vere subiect to the errors hrness mav be attributed to the ten in 1968, three vears after tation as the rw) CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 749 indulees in disinformation or blatant ovopadanda. “or examole, he reters to 4 Ur TITIAN PVTANS, 293 a Cclaver dwarf wv livectina anti-Tolshevil: activities on hehalf of American intelliaence. In this capacity, P'7NS was in touch with SAVINNOV and tried to recruit him into Ais network, Fyan revresentatives of French and Rritish intellicaence treatel this enternx~ising dwarf with respect. Als author's book The Consoirators contains a section devoted £9 the Trust oneration, sunnorted bv an extensive bibliogravhy. If oaTurv exes it is in ascrihine motivations to various actors, in an annarent a*fort to aive coherence to his thesds. For examole, he vortravs WA TTIQTIOT vy) Jo. S Tan who Dlaved a dowble role for reasons of vatriatism. “he Saviets themselves admitted, somewhat belatedly, that he served the eP™ our Of Fear, AVasire for rwrard, and as a wav of hotstering his eso; in short, was a 30v, no more, no less. TTT t 5 MAD mxtept for sunerficial defects, such as the mispelling of names, 90% 15 well-written and reflects a minimum 9£ versonal bias. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 AUP DY GUT MI Xs General “VMANCEL's nolitical adviser, CUBAVSFR’ first met Ararrrcsrrmry ft in Rerlin in 1922 and immediately recnanized him for what he VTAS-- AN acent o* the GPr, ‘Ta nnblished three articles in 1935 uneer the title "The Trust-- The “story of a Legend". Fe describes his om negative involvement: Wis vefusal to deal with YAVNSHEV, his warninas to “RANG IL, his vain attemnts to keeo Vl. SEVLGIN from making a trio to the Soviet Union.. "a aqives an assessment of leading versonalitites, such as VARUSUPY, aprenpmm and “aria sruyms, hans to him, as Tr evsury relates it, the GPU were not able to Aune all emicras, an? “ANGEL, as a notable examole, remaine? unsmilet. wrote his articles for the obvious nmuirpose of showing that certain Russian ericres were more than equal to the machinations o* the GPU. cmenam, Vassiliy Vitalvevich A wall tnown dournalist and writer during “sarist times, with a clear ave for realities, he joined the “hita forces ‘dnrinea tie Civil “War, first wien We ITITIM, then with “"RVIGTL. In the emiaration, he remained close hecause he hal been instrument3l in versuading the Tsar to abdicate. jen the invitation of vayrouryv he visited the Soviet Union in 1925, ane heaow.13s siown the country bv anites wnom he took to be aqenuine memoers of the monarchist trust, Sut who were in fact acants of the GPU. An his return, we vrote a hook "™hree adLtals" in -Fiich he Jescribed Kis trin in olowinag terms. Later, after the disclosures of QOPOErRPIT in “inland, he realizet how he hat been duved, and he wrote a Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 “Postscrint"™ to his boot, giving a forthricht account of the Trust ana its overations, as seen in retrospect. Fe also went at length into the state of mind of “ussian emiares to show that it was this ‘factor, more than anv other, that had made the boaus “ru3t activities possible gpprnprm, Payarad (alka von STAINITS ,UPPMINSK, etc.) “fter his so-called defection in Moril 1927, OPPRRPII™ wrote an recount of his involvement with the GPU and the Trust, and this account pany WAS serial; et in Seaodinva in October “lovember of the same year, some four months after the revorted death of the author. an unferlvine treme in OPPEPPMT's testimony has caused eve-raisine amona analvsts, for he took nains to vnortrav the GPM as all-vowerful not onlv within the SS 2 hut on the outside as well. Fe claimed that tre |Pm had extensive nenetrations throudhout Eurove; vet he did not identify a sinale aaent abroad. ™he real reason for his fliqht to Finland and his disclosures is still omen to enestion, and there are two schools of thought in this tter. One holds that his defection, disclosures, and warnings to rw) miares and western nowers, were oenuine. The other holds, with equal conviction, that he vas still followina orders of the GPM, who decided to ‘rina the Trust oneration to a close in a wav that would create maximum confusion in emiare circles. Certain setails civan in the articles have stood un to scrutiny, but Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 PIO MOUSE Tn the May/June 1351 issue of the Russian emigre newsnaner Vozrozhdenive an anonvmous writer sublished an article "Legends and Paalitw", with the claim that he was an “inside man" svneahina from anverieance. "ating issue with other writers, he states emphatically that the "Purasians" were the dominant factor among Russian emiares after 1923. Taig Jee ves an account of the "Furasian" ideoloqy and qoals, as derived “rom renvorts o* the FPurasian Conaress in “Moscow in 1924, and states fhat the Toneress was dominated by ARAPOV (alias CIMINT), a renresentative from the west. In reference to the conneration betveen emiare arouns anc the TTust, Ae argues, unconvincingly, that this was a low-level affair; ™rust reoresentatives; only certain intelligence services, varticularly the Poles, Nad been taken in. The article is an obvious attemot to white-wash the Russian emiares hv imoungina tne credulity o* foreion intelliqence services. Inter alia, it gives a ao01 description of the goals of the "Nurasians", and convevs that leaders like “TAYGFL and “UTEPNOYT had alwavs been suspicious of the imoression that the writer was a member of that grou. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 Nowe orm ote ssistant militarv attache at the Polish embassv in Tallin from 192) to 1927 ane later m hot litary attache. In 1965, almost ‘fortv vears latar he nublishet an articl in the Polish lanoguace newsnaver Cultura (Paris) about his extensive dealings with the Trust. Avvarentlv relyvine on memorv, he wrote a muddled viece, confusina versonalitieés anc. otherwise deviatine from fact. Me had foraotten, if he ever knew, that TTNaR (Lie. VAXUSNPY) and OPPFPPIIT were two different characters, not one and the same man. Ne describes the intriaues inside the Polisi intelliaence community, and it anvears that he was the onlv verson invariably in the riche. WOACA, Richard “or manv vears the chie*£ of the Russian desk in the Polish General he, Sta t,,qnad researched the staff archives reaardina the "rust overation, irst article about his findinas, then and later, was ovublisned in 1959; and in a hook of uncertain date he elaborated on the same them2. Roth works, oarticnlarly the book, vointed uo the cunnina of the GPM in avoloitina the inherent weakness in anv emicaration, and this immediately aroused the ire of Russian emiares, asoecially that of one WTOC WIN pwho ctharaed that “MAG. Cisparaged emicrants as a means and cave lectures on the subject in the General Staff Acadamv. His of avoneratina Polish intelliaence. WEMOGPADOV accused “PACA of makina sweeving assertions without proo*, an® there is no Goubt that the latter's writinas suffer from this defect; vet they offer, for the first time, a full history of the trat 1t must aviod vitfalls that proved disastrous to the old. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 NISUMASOV, N, Tn 2928, TUSMMASOYW yublished a small book, Reloavardevshkiv Mevcw Protiv sR (White Cnard Terror Against the MSS) in “toscow and rainst a USS=) in “Moscow, an foe may be assumed that he was vrovided with official. materials relevant to the subject. ‘“hite Russians are vortraved as terrorists anqd denraved hirelinas of foreign intelligence. An air of authenticity is imparted to the book by the use of courtroom revorts. Court testimony of “hite Pussians, TLVFERGREFRN an? PALMASOV, ani the testimony of Sydnev "MILLY under interrogation are cited, then elaborated and interoreted4, to point the Jenravityv of "site Russians and their foreign masters. That the GPT had techniques for extracting confessions from prisoners is a matter the author chooses to ianore. GRAM™, Ttatalia ™ne wife of Richard "MAGA, who, after “orld “ar II, as an emiaqre in the Mnited States, oublished an article A’ Thermidorian Amalaam concernina the Trust, and more svecificallv about the case of Ado BIR. “he sveculates freely on certain asvects of the oneration, without offering anv hard evitence for her views. She admits frankilv that: "Tn haneling Soviet vroblems, research is often compelled to introduce, acaAinst all rules, surmises and coniecture in what should he a scholarly a*fort exclusivelv." She has two pet theories: (1) that the attemoted recruitment of “stonian “finister in “oscow, Ado BI2%, wris ordered by the GPr to orevent thie Baltic States from sianina a treaty of mutual assistance, and (2) that Stalin at one time toved with the idea of using White Russians, Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 varticularly those in the Trust, in a scheme to disyose of Trots tiv. frch theories micght have has some basis in fact, but no facts are Given in their sunvort, so that thew emain nothing more than theories amona manv others that are equally ereditable. Thev find no con*irmation, or supnort, in the events that followed, for the Baltic States did sion their pact of mitual assistance, and Stalin disvosed Qf Trotskiv without the hel» of Trust members or anv other “hite Russians. MINULIN, LV NIEVLIN's book, “Mertvaya 2vb, (The Swell), published in 1965, describes the "rust oneration in detail, with some notabha ommissions (e.g., the involvement of the DAFHROUNTYUALS, the case of Ado BIPM, etc.) Although NINULIMN frequently oversinplifies events, he vresents an abundance of factual material, indicatino that he had access to x3 files. Mis one defect, both as a writer and revorter, is a tendency to portrav personalities in black and white, that is, aS rogues or heroes. He Gescrihbes ALALVYAMUSREWV in such terms, a man who maje no mistakes once he aoreed to work for the GP", a man who anticivated every move of the enemy and found wavs to thwart them, all for the vourest of motives-—— love of the fatherland. “olonel General MB. Stroy, in a critique aonearino in the Moscow vrasnave Zvezda on 22 Sentember 1965, takes excention to “MINULIM's oroclivitv for "window dressing and thins that in lionizina vaotreery his hook was weakenel. We savs, "VARUSHEV, dved-in-the-wool monarciist and counter-revolutionary, respecting nothing in life hut monev, “ound it no creat strain to become a counterintelligence aqent". MNIRUGIN's norinciovle villains are not individuals, ver se, but grouns and oreanizations, namelv, "hite “ussian emiares, ani foreign intelligence Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 services. SFIMANOV takes issue with NIXWLIN in regard to this attitude also, and thinks the latter has mistakinalv followed the lead of contemp- orary ©ov1et historians, who assume that all western aqovernments ar veroccunied with the vroblem of Rolshevism and that their secret services share in the obsession. Jn his ovinion this is a misreadina of history, for during the Trust period (1922-1927) the vorimary concern of western mowers was Sermany, and thev qave but marginal attention to the Trust, or the Soviet secret services in aeneral. This notwithstandina, NINETY maxes everv success achieved through the Trust aovear like a resounding defeat of the enemv. SMIMAMOV helieves that NIKULIN erred acain in devictina “hite 2ussian emiares as “short-sidhted counter- revolutionaries", a vack of roques with the common mercenary aim of having their old vrivileaes restored. To the critic this is an over- simnlified view of a comolex situation. YIMULIN differs markedly from western sources in his story of the "rust, it is in portravino OPPF2PUT as a aenuine monarchist who was not, at any time, in the service of the GP™. here is much in OPPEPDIT's estimonyv, aiven after his so-called defection, that makes it almost rtain that he was a GP™ acent, even if a reluctant one. “INULIN ines not try to discredit this testimonv; he merely ignores it. CREMTIOT mates no reference to NIXMLIN's treatment of <OPPEDPUT and the role he allecedly played, annarently thinking this a matter best left alone. Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4

Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4 SPIMANO’, (Colonel General of the Airforce) In a critique of NINMNLIN's book, The Swell, aopearing in the Moscow Vrasnava "vezda on 22 Seactember 1965, SPTMANOQY qives the author credit for Nis research of vertinent documents, »ut accuses him of vresentina a biased account in a few major respects. (Por the nature of his crit cism, see review of NINULIN's book above.) Declassified in Part Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2013/02/22 CIA-RDP90G01353R001700020002-4