The Soviet "War Scare" (PFIAB, 1990)

SECREP UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON ttle yok H.W sh 500% The Soviet "War Scare" President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board February 15, 1990 Classified by Multiple Sources PFIAB Control # 99 Declassify OADR Copy # DECLASSIFIED IN PART PER E.0. 13526 01d — 0426-2 WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “POP—-SEGRET- UMBRA GAMMA

OP-SEGREP UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON Never, perhaps, in the postwar decades has the situation in the world been as explosive and, hence, more difficult and unfavorable as in the first half of the 1980's. Mikhail Gorbachev February 1986 WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON TOP-SEEREP UMBRA GAMMA

POP-SECREP UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON CONTENTS Executive Summary PART PART Is U.S. Handling of the “War Scare": The Estimative Process Early Perceptions of the Soviet War Scare British Assessment U.S. Perceptions Entrenched An Alternative Opinion The Rebuttal New Information Perceptions Evolve. But Doubts Remain The Last Word The Record Muddied Conclusions: The Estimative Process And Unfinished Business. II: The Soviet "War Scare" Introduction Origins of the Scare Vulnerability of Soviet Nuclear Forces to a US Surprise Attack Soviet Analysis of the US-USSR Strategic Balance The “War Scare" Late 1970's: Changing Soviet Perceptions of US Intentions 1980: Heightened Concern 1981: Reducing Vulnerabilities 1982: Strategic Preparations 1983: Nearing the Precipice Growing Pessimism, Additional Precautions Mounting Tensions WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON 2OR-SECRET-UMBRA GAMMA ii

POR-SECRET- UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON Able Archer 83 1983-1984: Winter of Crisis Summer 1984: Preparations for War Autumn 1984: Reason Restored The Legacy Implications for Today This document is classified PeP-SECREP/UMBRA/GAMMA/WNINTEL/ NOFORN/NOCONTRACT/ORCON in its entirety. WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON ~POP-SECREP UMBRA GAMMA

“PoP—-SECRE?T UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON Executive Summary From the late 1970's to the mid-1980's, the military forces and intelligence services of the Soviet Union were redirected in ways that suggested that the Soviet leadership was seriously concerned about the possibility of a sudden strike launched by the United States and its NATO allies. These changes were accompanied by leadership statements some public, but many made in secret meetings arguing that the US was seeking strategic superiority in order to be able to launch a nuclear first strike. These actions and statements are often referred to as the period of the “war scare." The changes in Soviet military and intelligence arrangements included: improvements of Warsaw Pact combat readiness (by recalling reservists, lengthening service times, increasing draft ages, and abolishing many draft deferments), an unprecedented emphasis on civil defense exercises, an end of military support for gathering the harvest (last seen prior to the 1968 Czech invasion), the forward deployment of unusual numbers of SPETSNAZ forces, increased readiness of Soviet ballistic missile submarines and forward deployed nuclear capable aircraft, massive military exercises that for the first time emphasized surviving and responding to a sudden enemy strike, a new agreement among Warsaw Pact countries that gave Soviet leaders authority in the event of an attack to unilaterally commit Pact forces, creation within the GRU of a new directorate to run networks of illegal agents abroad, an urgent KGB (and some satellite services') requirement that gave the highest priority the gathering of politico-military indicators of US/NATO preparations for a sudden nuclear attack, establishment of a special warning condition to alert Soviet forces that a surprise enemy strike using weapons of mass destruction was in progress, and the creation of a special KGB unit to manage a WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON 26P-SECRE?P UMBRA GAMMA v

PUP-SECRET UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON computer program (the VRYAN model) that would objectively measure the correlation of forces and warn when Soviet relative strength had declined to the point that a preemptive Soviet attack might be justified. During the November 1983 NATO “Able Archer" nuclear release exercise, the Soviets implemented military and intelligence activities that previously were seen only during actual crises. These included: Placing Soviet air forces in Germany and Poland mt heightened alert, OER eeesieaprenia rt een ROO OE The meaning of these events obviously was of crucial importance to American and NATO policymakers. If they were simply parts of a Soviet propaganda campaign designed to intimidate the us, deter it from deploying improved weapons, and arouse US domestic opposition to foreign policy initiatives, then they would not be of crucial significance. If they reflected an internal Soviet power struggle for example, a contest between conserva~ tives and pragmatists, or an effort to avoid blame for Soviet economic failures by pointing to (exaggerated) military threats then they could not be ignored, but they would not imply a fundamental change in Soviet strategy. But if these events were expressions of a genuine belief on the part of Soviet leaders that the US was planning a nuclear first strike, causing the Soviet military to prepare for such an eventuality by, for example, readying itself for a preemptive strike of its own then the "war scare" was a cause for real concern. During the past year, the President's Foreign Intelligence WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “POR-SECRET UMBRA GAMMA vi

6P-SECREP UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON Advisory Board has carefully reviewed the events of that period to learn what we (the U.S. intelligence community) knew, when we knew it, and how we interpreted it. The Board has read hundreds of documents, conducted more than 75 interviews with American and British officials, and studied the series of National Intelligence Estimates (NIE's) and other intelligence assessments that have attempted over the last six years to interpret the war scare data. Additionally, we have offered our own interpretation of the war scare events. We believe that the Soviets perceived that the correlation of forces had turned against the USSR, that the US was seeking military superiority, and that the chances of the US launching a nuclear first strike perhaps under cover of a routine training exercise were growing. We also believe that the US intelligence community did not at the time, and for several years afterwards, attach sufficient weight to the possibility that the war scare was real. As a result, the President was given assessments of Soviet attitudes and actions that understated the risks to the United States. Moreover, these assessments did not lead us to reevaluate our own military and intelligence actions that might be perceived by the Soviets as signaling war preparations. In two separate Special National Intelligence Estimates (SNIE's) in May and August of 1984, the intelligence community said: “We believe strongly that Soviet actions are not inspired by, and Soviet leaders do not perceive, a genuine danger of imminent conflict or confrontation with the United States." Soviet statements to the contrary were judged to be "propaganda." The Board believes that the evidence then did not, and certainly does not now, support such categoric conclusions. Even without the benefit of subsequent reporting and looking at the 1984 analysis of then available information, the tone of the intelli- gence judgments was not adequate to the needs of the President. WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON POP-SECRET- UMBRA GAMMA vii

“FOP—SEGREP UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON A strongly stated interpretation was defended by explaining away facts inconsistent with it and by failing to subject that interpretation to a comparative risk assessment. In time, analysts' views changed. In an annex to a February 1988 NIE, analysts declared: “During the late 1970's and early 1980's there were increasing Soviet concerns about the drift in superpower relations, which some in the Soviet leadership felt indicated an increased threat of war and increased likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. These concerns were shaped in part by a Soviet perception that the correlation of forces was shifting against the Soviet Union and that the United States was taking steps to achieve military superiority." The Soviets' VRYAN program was evaluated as part of an effort to collect data and subject it to computer analysis in a way that would warn the USSR when the US had achieved decisive military superiority. Reporting from a variety of OUR ie sources, including Oleg Gordiyevskiy (a senior KGB ‘officer who once served as second in command in the London Residency and who has since Gefected to Great Britain), taken as a whole, strongly indicates that there was in fact a genuine belief among key members of the Soviet leadership that the United States had embarked on a program of achieving decisive military superiority that might prompt a sudden nuclear missile attack on the USSR. Although some details of that belief became known only recently, there was at the time evidence from secret directives and speeches by Soviet authorities that a major change in Soviet political and strategic thinking had probably occurred. For example, we knew by 1984 at the latest that a Soviet general had interpreted President Carter's PD-59 as preparing US strategic forces for a preemptive strike, that the Head of the KGB's First Chief Directorate, General Kryuchkov had told key subordinates that the KGB must work to prevent the US from launching a surprise attack, that KGB and Czechoslovak intelligence Residencies had been WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON OP-SECREP UMBRA GAMMA viii

TuP-SECREP UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON tasked to gather information on US preparations for war, and that missile submarines had been placed on shortened readiness times. Many of these facts were summarized in a memorandum from the National Intelligence Officer for Warning (NIO/W) to DCI William Casey in June 1984, a memo that Casey then forwarded to the President. Pope ete ah hs 5 aa altered the official position of the intelligence community as expressed in the May 1984 SNIE and as reasserted, in almost identical language, in the August 1984 SNIE. Analysts will always have legitimate disagreements over the meaning of inevitably incomplete and uncertain intelligence reports. Moreover, part of the confidence that PFIAB has in its own assessment of the war scare derives from information not known at the time. Our purpose in presenting this report is not so much to criticize the conclusions of the 1984 SNIE's as to raise questions about the ways these estimates were made and subsequently reassessed. In cases of great importance to the survival of our nation, and especially where there is important contradictory evidence, the Board believes that intelligence estimates must be cast in terms of alternative scenarios that are subjected to comparative risk assessments. This is the critical defect in the war scare episode. By “alternative scenarios," we mean a full statement of each major, possible interpretation of a set of intelligence indicators. In this case, these scenarios might have included the following: 1. Soviet leaders had not changed their strategic thinking but were attempting by means of propaganda and intelligence decep- tions to slow the US military build-up, prevent the deployment of WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON TOP-SECRET UMBRA GAMMA ix

“foP—-SECREP- UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON new weapons, and isolate the US from its allies. 2. Soviet leaders may or may not have changed their strategic thinking, but a power struggle among Kremlin factions and the need to deflect blame for poor economic conditions made it useful to exaggerate the military intentions and capabilities of the US. 3. Soviet leaders had changed their strategic thinking and, in fact, believed that the US was attempting to gain decisive strategic superiority in order, possibly, to launch a nuclear first strike. By "comparative risk assessment," we mean assigning two kinds of weights to each scenario: one that estimates the probability that the scenario is correct and another that assesses the risk to the United States if it wrongly rejects a scenario that is, in fact, correct. In 1984, one might reasonably have given the highest probabil- ity of being correct to the first or second scenario (even though, as we argue in this report, we believe that would have been an error). But having done this, it would surely have been clear even then that if the third scenario was in fact correct and we acted as if it were wrong, the risks to the United States would have been very great greater than if we had rejected a correct first or second scenario. As it happened, the military officers in charge of the Able Archer exercise minimized this risk by doing nothing in the face of evidence that parts of the Soviet armed forces were moving to an unusual level of alert. But these officers acted correctly out of instinct, not informed guidance, for in the years leading up to Able Archer they had received no guidance as to the possible significance of apparent changes in Soviet military and political thinking. By urging that some major estimates be based on a comparative WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON OP-SECREP UMBRA GAMMA

TOP-SEEREP UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON assessment of fully developed alternative scenarios, we are not arguing for "competitive analyses" or greater use of dissenting opinions. An intelligence estimate is not the product of a governmental debating society in which institutional rivals try to outdo one another in their display of advocacy skills. We are arguing instead for adopting the view that since it is very hard to understand the present, much less predict the future, it is a mistake to act as if we can. On the most important issues, it is aifficult if not impossible to say with confidence that we know what is happening or will happen. We can, however, say that there are a small number of possibilities, each of which has a (rough) probability and each of which presents to the policymaker likely risks and opportunities. When analysts attempt to arrive at a single strong conclusion, they not only run the risk of being wrong, they run two additional and perhaps more worrisome risks. They are likely to underestimate the possibility of change (the safest prediction is always that tomorrow will be like today) and they are likely to rely on mirror- imaging (our adversaries think the way we do). In this era of unprecedented, breakneck change, the first error grows in importance. And since we cannot know what individuals will next hold power in the USSR or when, it is an especially grave error to assume that since we know the US is not going to start World War III, the next leaders of the Kremlin will also believe that and act on that belief. In short, our criticism of the 1984 SNIE's, though in part substantive, is in larger part procedural. We do not think there is any simple organizational change that will correct that procedure. If strategic intelligence estimates are to give policymakers a better sense of risks and opportunities, it will only happen if policymakers insist that that is what they want and refuse to accept anything less. WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “POP -SECREP UMBRA GAMMA xi

“~f6P-SECRET UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON This review of the war scare period also suggests another lesson. It is quite clear to the Board that during the critical years when the Kremlin was reassessing US intentions, the US intelligence community did not react quickly to or think deeply about the early signs of that change. The war scare indicators began appearing in the early 1980's; the first estimate to address this was not written until 1984. At the time it was bins the cans Soe authors wrote ‘confidently about "soviet leadership ‘intentions. We recommend that the National Security Council oversee a reassessment of the intelligence community's understanding of Soviet military and political decisionmaking, both in general ‘terns and in light of the judgments made in the 1984 estimates. Our own leadership needs far better intelligence reporting on and asgsess- ments of the mindset of the Soviet leadership its ideological/ political instincts and perceptions. As part of this reassessment, it should exploit the current opening in the Iron Curtain to interview past and present East Bloc and Soviet officials about the sources and consequences of the war scare in order to obtain a better understanding of the perceptions and inner conflicts of Soviet decisionmakers. Finally, we suggest that the US review the way in whith it manages nilitary exercises, be ats own intelli ence iaitoria al ramprretive to indications and warning for war. In 1983 we may have inadvertently placed our relations; with the Soviet Union on a hair trigger. Though the current thaw in US- Soviet relations suggests that neither side is likely in the| near WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON 2OP-SECRET UMBRA GAMMA xii

“PFOP—SECREP UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON term to reach for that trigger, events are moving so fast that it would be unwise to assume that Soviet leaders will not in the future act, from misunderstanding or malevolence, in ways that puts the peace in jeopardy. WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “FOP-SECRET UMBRA GAMMA xiii

POP-SECREP UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON PART I US HANDLING OF THE "WAR SCARE"; THE ESTIMATIVE PROCESS INTRODUCTION The Board has divided its presentation into two parts, The first (Part One) deals with a review of what the US (and the British) thought about the war scare both at the time and subsequently. It also summarizes some of the key characteristics of the estimative process and offers our conclusions for improvement. The second half (Part Two) summarizes the evidence that leads to the conclusion that the Soviet leadership genuinely developed a “war scare" in the early 1980's. We believe eis to be a plausible version of events based upon new information as well as a reconsideration of evidence known then. Inevitably, there is some duplication between the two parts, but this is necessary in order to tell the story in an orderly way. Part One, then, is a summation of what we knew, when we knew it, and how we interpreted it. It is not a competitive estimate. Rather than catalog the actual events in detail, we chose to summarize them and to focus instead on how the intelijligence community reacted, as manifested in its analysis. Our conclusions mirror our profound dismay at what we believe to be the intelligence community's single largest failing the failure to provide policymakers with an adequate understanding of the risks and consequences associated with alternate scenarios involving uncertain events of grave import. There were many other directions that we, given unlimited time, would have liked to embark. Intelligence issues| that impacted upon our review of the war scare are identified din the WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON -POP-SEERET-UMBRA GAMMA 1

PEP-SEECREP UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON final section of Part One. We regret that these important issues received short shrift? we encourage a complete review of them so that US indications and warning might be improved as we enter into the evermore complex, polycentric, and uncertain 1990's. As the Carter years wound to a close, America's bildteral relationship with the USSR was on the downswing from the earlier detente. The Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan brought bitter NATO condemnation, and SALT II languished unratified. As the new Republican Administration took up the reins, President Reagan announced in his State of the Union speech a /major peacetime military buildup. By May 1981, the “era of sel f-adubt,," personified by the failed Iran hostage rescue attempt, had énded. United States foreign policy took on a new ansertivdness: President Reagan declared that arms control treaties were no substitute for military preparedness and characterized the Soviet Union as an “evil force," the antithesis of the US. Soviet meddling in Afghanistan, Poland, Central America, and elséwhere increasingly proved a constant irritant to the new Administration, and seemed only to reinforce its "get tough" posture. Recriminations flew between Moscow and Washington, and relations continued to slide. As the Administration settled into its first term, an intense "war scare" theme began to more in the Soviet media and in private fora, accompanied by anomalous and often provocative USSR behavior. At first, such activity was easily dismissed as predictable Soviet responses to US efforts to deploy INF missiles in Europe in order to counter Soviet SS-20's and to modernize its strategilc and conventional forces. United States officials understandably were suspicious of Soviet motivations as Washington struggled to) gain public support in Western Europe and in the US for these force WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON -POP-SECREE- UMBRA GAMMA 2

“FGP—SEECREP UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON improvements. 1 In 1983, Soviet rhetoric had sharpened. Moscow had accused President Reagan and his advisors of "madness," "extremism," and "criminality" in the conduct of relations with the USSR. The United States was portrayed as a nation singularly panto a first-strike nuclear capability as a prelude to eradicating communism. Westerners, including some well-known experts. gn the Soviet Union, reported alarming conversations with Soviet citizens and officials that indicated a large portion of the Soviet population believed nuclear war was dangerously close. As Giplomatic relations ebbed to near a postwar low, US analysts attributed Soviet anxieties and belligerence to a number of factors: initiation of INF deployments; a strong US posture in the START talks; US action in Grenada; deployment of Marines in Lebanon; US aid to insurgencies against Soviet client regimes; the Reagan Administration's perceived political "exploitation" of the KAL shootdown; and the Administration's perceived unwilling- ness to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Soviet regime or to treat the Kremlin with the "superpower" deference it desired.” Moreover, US analysts concluded that certain developments could have heightened Moscow's uncertainties about its Long-tera geostrategic position: © A possible adverse shift in the overall strategic balance, precipitated by resolute US moves to significantly bolster its strategic posture as well as its conventional capabilities. lus officials detected a vigorous Soviet "active neaqures" campaign intended to thwart US strategic objectives. Thinking on the Possibility of Armed Confrontation with the United States," Foreign Policy Issues Branch, Policy Analysis Division, 2crey Hodnett's memorandum of Dec. 22, 1983, entitled "ines Office of Soviet Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency. WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON <POP-SECRET UMBRA GAMMA 3

P6P-SECREP UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON The perceived lower priority accorded by the ‘Reagan Administration to arms control negotiations, as "evidenced" hy its unwillingness to accommodate Soviet interests and its nortcent intention to proceed with weapons programs Moscow may have thought were on hold. o The end of the "Vietnam syndrome" and readinegs of Washington to use force once again in the Third World, ofthe by supporting insurgencies against Soviet client regimes, as in Nicaragua, or acting directly, as in Lebanon and Grenada.” Although US analysts aptly identified signs of emotional anda paranoid Soviet behavior and offered an analysis of the potential causes, they reasoned that Moscow was fundamentally concerned not about any hypothetical near-term US nuclear attack, but about possible shifts in the strategic balance five-to-ten years |hnce. It was easy to distrust the USSR, they reasoned, because Soviet leaders had many plausible motives for trying to cleverly manipulate Western perceptions: i © To foster the "peace movement" in Western Europe so ps to derail INF deployments and encourage neutrality within NATO.| © To portray President Reagan as an incompetent warmon sO as to deepen cleavages among nations in the West. © To increase public pressure in the United States for providing a more conciliatory posture toward the USSR via lower defense spending, arms control concessions, and less “inter- ventionist" policies. Analysts also estimated that, for the Soviets, the inbagan Administration was the "least loved of any US Administration bince WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON 3rpia.

+POP-SERERET UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON that of President Truman." It would be just like them ta "undercut the President's reelection prospects. "4 Thu abnormal, emotional Soviet behavior could be, and was, essentially in political terms in minor analytical products Soviet leadership decisionmaking as rational, even omni United States intelligence clearly did not have sufficient 8 urces to derive a precise picture of the Kremlin's decisid process, nor did it have a thorough understanding of the leadership's strengths and weaknesses. United States ana nevertheless, described Soviet policy as "driven by p calculation of interests and dogged pursuit of lon objectives, even in the face of great adversity, rather sudden swells of fear or anger." Furthermore, analysts can that, “However disturbed Soviet policymakers might be by the Reagan Administration, they also have a sense of the: strengths and of [US] vulnerabilities the perception from the Kremlin is by no means one of unrelieved gloon." loscow's economic problems, while described as "taut," were suaga not likely to deter them from accelerating the pace of military spending to challenge the us. Undeterred by what was termed the "Soviet propaganda campaign" and very concerned about the threat posed by thia large numbers of S&-20 deployments, America continued to firm up her defenses by, for example, deploying cruise missiles and Pershings in Europe, adopting a forward-based military strategy, rking on a path of force modernization and improved readiness, and invigorating a strong "continuity in government" strategy designed to protect US leadership during a nuclear exchange. 4tpia. Stpia. WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON -POP-SECRET UMBRA GAMMA 5

-26P-SECRET UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON As the second Reagan/Bush campaign swung into high géar, US intelligence analysts began to compile solid evidence from within the Soviet bureaucracy of growing concern about nuclear war: © In a briefing to Soviet and East European officials| in the fall of 1983, a Soviet diplomat warned that the world was on the brink of war. Immediately following Brezhnev's death, KGB ah GRU Residencies in Soviet missions abroad received orders to th mitor US installations for indications of US military mobilization. o Shortly after the second inauguration, Moscow enjoin Residencies worldwide to work to detect any sign that the States and its allies were about to unleash a first strike|an the USSR. Already in mid-1981, reporting on possible US preparations to launch a first strike had been added to KGB col] requirements worldwide. In early 1983, Moscow warne © In early 1983, Soviet military intelligence, the| GRU, created a new @irectorate to organize and manage "illegal" agent networks worldwide. The urgency of this move reportedly reflected perceptions of an increased threat of war. Be the eved war could break out at any moment. Ss “while preparedness for war was not a new Paottch, it had taken on a sense of urgency not seen in the past. Directives from GRU Headquarters constantly reminded field elenen to prepare for war. As a result, all Residency operations were geared to work under both peacetime and wartime conditions, WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON -BOP-SECRET UMBRA GAMMA 6

“PUP—-SEGREP UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON reise (believed Able Archer 83). This order reportedly followed from priority requirement} by Moscow a y before strike. Warsaw Pact leaders reportedly were convinced Reagan Administration was actively preparing for nuclear was capable of launching such an attack. By the fall of 1983, the beat of Soviet "war scare" almost lost in the cacophony of the international thunde Massive demonstrations erupted in Germany and other NATO to protest the INF deployments. The Soviets shot down Grenada. Against this backdrop, NATO held its annual comma exercise to practice nuclear release procedures in early Nea 1983. This recurring exercise, known as Able Archer, NATO forces from Turkey to England. Aithough past able exercises were monitored by Soviet intelligence, the rea te} on by Warsaw Pact military forces and intelligence services to exercise was unprecedented. Air armies in East Germany placed on alert. nae 5 OGrOR PRES SUS ge GeReTSS At the same time, mane conducted significantly more reconnaissance flights 3 previous years, and sent special intelligence requirenents to KGB WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON “POP—-SECREF UMBRA GAMMA 7

“POP-SECREP UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON and GRU Residencies in western countries to report any unusual military activity that might signal an impending NATO surprise attack. This abnormal Soviet behavior to the annual, announ Able Archer 83 exercise sounded no alarm bells in the US Indications and Warning system. United States commanders on the scene were not aware of any pronounced superpower tension, and the Soviet activities were not seen in their totality until long after the exercise was over. For example, while the US Getected a "heightened readiness" among some Soviet air nae divisi: extent of the alert as well| ff AGB alte nage "was not known unt, weeks had ee “after the completion of the exercise. The Soviet air force standdown had been in effect for nearly a week fore fully armed MIG-23 aircraft were noted on air defense alert in East Germany. There were plenty of reasons why the Soviet military response to Able Archer was missed; there was no context by which to/ judge the behavior. First, Moscow's "war scare" activity was not yet the focus of intelligence or policy attention. ally, Soviet intellige peter aa ic ARE ge ele reover, the air aT ead, was not at first pexcsived staaraaliy because it occurred during the § Revolution Bousasy? about midway Ehrongt the exernian, Te uae ame evaluated the Soviet response as unusual but not mila arily significant. Analysts reasoned that more indicators should have been detected if the Soviets were seriously concerned about a NATO WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON 4FOP-SECRET UMBRA GAMMA 8

POP-SECREP UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON attack. 6 But beyond the puzzling Soviet reaction to the Able Archer 83 exercise, US analysts, by spring of 1984, had also detected a Clear trend: Soviet forces, over the past decade, had "made an effort to respond more rapidly to the threat of war and to develop the capability to manage all aspects of a nuclear war.07 In fact, Soviet exercise activity in 1983 highlighted "the continued test- ing of concepts necessary for avoiding surprise attack .® Common to all these exercises were the themes of continued concern over force readiness and vulnerability to attack; ensuring, that Gispersal and launch orders were complied with; and testing) what previously had been paper or small-scale wartime concepts under actual operational conditions using larger numbers of forces. Analysts estimated that the attainment of the above objectives could increase the Soviet military's capability to respond ckly to an enemy surprise attack or launch an attack of their BRITISH ASSESSMENT By March, 1984, the issue of the war scare broke into ba ry fact, a potentially dangerous analytic assumption was also apparently at work. Despite indications of increased readiness with some units, other units upon which no positive intelligence watered regarding readiness were assumed to have not incre readiness. 7SNIE 11-10-84 "Implications of Recent Military-Political Activities." © WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON -R6P- SECRET UMBRA GAMMA 9

TOP-SEGREP UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON Despite or perhaps because of its disturbing mes WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON -2OP-SECREf UMBRA GAMMA

TOP-SECRET UMBRA GAMMA WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON Defensa were also skeptical. The British Foreign Ministry, however, was sure that something was amiss. The British Ambassador to the US paid a visit to the State Department's Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Lawrence Eagleburger, to discuss the issue. But according to the responsible briefing official from State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), INR's position at the! time (and thus State's position) was that the Soviets were pursu a massive propaganda campaign. The INR officer present to Eagleburger a skeptical version of events, designed, in his words, to "discourage the British." The British case apparently was not helped by the Ambassador's presentation; he was not entirely clear about events, and his intelligence aide most familiar with the war scare was out of country. There was even suspicion in| some American quarters that the Foreign Office was simply capitalizing on a good political occasion to force President Reagan to tone down his rhetoric and delay deployments of the INF missiles. Thus, the Foreign Office's expressions of worry fell on deaf ears. In May 1984, US intelligence addressed for the first time in a national estimate the possibility that the Soviets were fearful of a preemptive first US nuclear strike a full six months after the Able Archer NATO exercise. Despite the evidence of secret directives and speeches by Soviet authorities to prepare for sudden nuclear attack and of unique Soviet military activities, WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON -POR-SEGRET UMBRA GAMMA 22

~FSP—GSEERET UMBRA GAMMA al WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON the issue was not treated as an evolutionary process. [In |fact, several intelligence officers told the Board that the estimate was undertaken essentially to explain a series of short-term abnormal events, rather than to examine the accumulated long-term reporting on the war scare. In the estimate's "Key Judgments," the intelligence community noted, "During the past several months, a number of coincident Soviet activities have created concern that they reflect abnormal Soviet fear of conflict with the United States, belligerent intent that might risk conflict, or some|other underlying Soviet purpose." The "coincident" activities consisted o Large-scale military exercises including a major |naval exercise in the Norwegian Sea, unprecedented SS-20 launch activ- ity, and large-scale SSBN dispersal; © Preparations for air operations against Afghanistan; oe Attempts to change the air corridor regime in Berlin; o New military measures described as responsive to NATO INF deployments; and o Shrill propaganda attributing a heightened danger of war to US behavior. United States analysts categorically concluded: "We believe strong) na Seviet actions are no nspired 4b ang. So% pagers Go no perceive a genuine danger of imminen ONT AAG s This judgment is based on the absence of force-wide combat readiness or othe war preparation moves in the USSR, and the absence of a tone of fear er belligerence ig Ae eee OES am WNINTEL NOFORN NOCONTRACT ORCON -POP-SECRET- UMBRA GAMMA 12