The CIA Inspector General's inspection of MKULTRA (1963)

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 j eo. “MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence ‘SUBJECT 3 Report of Inspection of MKULTRA In connection ¢ with our survey of Technical Services Division, DD/P, it was deemed advisable to prepare the report of the MKULTRA program in one copy only, in view of its unusual ‘sensitivity. 2. This report ‘is forwarded herewith. 3. The MKULTRA activity is concerned with the research and development of chemical, biological, and radiological — materials capable of employment in clandestine operations to + €ontrol human behavior. The end products of such research are subject to very strict controls including a requirement for the personal approval of the Deputy Director/Plans for any operational use made of these end products. 4. The cryptonym MKULTRA encompasses the R&D phase and a second cryptonym MKDELTA denotes the DD/P system for control of the operational employment of such materi (b)(1) ~The provisions of the MKULTRA authority also cover‘ (AVR) The administration and control of ‘this latter activity were found to be generally satisfactory and (b)(3) are discussed in greater detail in i the main body of the report i on TSD. ee os co 5.. MKULTRA was authorized by the t then Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen W. Dulles, in 1953. The TSD was assigned responsibility thereby to employ a portion of its R&D budget, ‘eventually set at 20%, For research in behavioral ‘materials and ve tterther oe purely internal and com- \-partmented coftrols, (further fetails are provided in paragraph 3 of the attached report), Normal procedures for project approval, ca -funding, and accounting were waived. However, special arrange- ments for audit of expenditures have been evolved in subsequent "years. -185209/1 Copy) of J Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Attachments as stated Fe an Vk, Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 Socce Dele ee eae te ee eee + 6 The scope of MKULTRA is comprehensive and Fanges from the search for and procurement of botanical and chemical substances, through programs for their analysis in scientific laboratories, to progressive testing for effect on animals and human beings. The testing on individuals begins under laboratory conditions employing every safeguard and progresses gradually to more and more realistic opera- tional simulations. The program requires and obtains the services of a number of highly specialized authorities in many fields of the natural sciences. 7. The concepts involved i in manipulating human "behavior are found by many people both within and outside the Agency to be distasteful and unethical. There is considerable evidence that opposition intelligence services are active and highly proficient in this field. The experience of TSD to date dndicates that both the research and the employment of the materials are expensive and often unpredictable in results. ‘Nevertheless, there have been major accomplishments both in research and operational employment. 8. The principal conclusions of the inspection are that the structure and operational controls over this activity néed strengthening; improvements are needed in the administration of the research projects; and some of the testing of substances ‘under simulated operational conditions was judged to involve excessive risk to the Agency. 9. Attached for the signature of the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence is a memorandum transmitting the report to the Deputy Director/Plans requesting a summary of.action taken or comments on the recommendations contained therein. J.fJ. Barman Inspector General NC an eB ne WEF Sas oe ee ss ee NE en ne are Er ge So ge ETE TEI aye MERE TS ET Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 TS: “ss acy BOE Sa See ¢ REPORT OF INSPECTION OF MKULTRA/TSD I. Introduction 1. Technical Services Division (TSD), (then Technical Support Staff), received authorization from the then Director of Central Intelligence, Mr. Allen W. Dulles, on 3 April1953 to develop and maintain continuing operational capabilities in the fields of a b) chemical and 2 biological materials capable of producing human behavioral and physiological changes, (see Tab >A). The cryptonym MKULTRA was assigned to encompass TSD's research, development and equipment activities in these two fields. The cryptonym MKDELTA had already been assigned by DD/P Notice No. 220-1 on 20 October 1952 (since revised see Tab B) as the indicator covering DD/P policy ‘and procedure for the use of biochemicals in clandestine operations. 2. The MKULTRA charter provides only a brief presentation of the rationale of the authorized activities. The sensitive aspects of the program as it has evolved over the ensuing ten years aire the following: a. Research in the manipulation of human behavior is considered by many authorities in medicine and related fields Declassification Review E.0. 12065 Conducted on 17 June 1981 Derivative Classification by 531925 ‘Review 17 June 20017 ate Derived from C9c.2; C9e ee? Mowngraded 61140 Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 to be professionally unethical, therefore the reputations of professional participants in the MKULTRA program are on occasion in jeopardy. b. Some MKULTRA activities raise questions of legality implicit in the original charter. c. A final phase of the testing of MKULTRA products places the rights and interests of U. S. citizens in jeopardy. d. Public disclosure of some aspects of MKULTRA activity could induce serious adverse reaction in U. S. public opinion, as well as stimulate offensive and defensive action in this field on the ‘part of foreign intelligence services, 3. In recognition of the sensitivity of MKULTRA, TSD was authorized exclusive control of the administration, records, and financial accountings of the program. Simple statements of certification were all that were required of TSD to obtain advances of funds from Finance Division. The DCI's memorandum also exempted MKULTRA from audit, but this provision was modified to permit limited audit before the end of the first year. Funding of MKULTRA was eventually stabilized at 20 percent ‘of TSD's annual research and development budget. It has fallen in the neighborhood of! b er year over the ten-year history of the program, of which about 30 percent has been allocated to ere ba emt Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

came Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 “support of the cf. Tab C for MKULTRA funding record FY 60-63. i 4, The inspection of TSD activities in the field of while chartered under MKULTRA is discussed for reasons H noted below in the section of the Inspector General's Survey dealing with the| lof TSD, cf. dis- cussions beginning with paragraphs| be significantly different from those governing manipulation of human The security considerations applyin |were found to external projects in support of the behavior. a) Many ‘are being funded and managed securely outside the ‘MKULTRA mechanism. b) Chief, Support, TSD, believes that it may also be possible in the future to fund ULTRA projects by --gecure methods more compatible with DD/S responsibilities. c) The very nature of the requires that a high percentage of its staff contribute and be witting of each operation. security practices are tight and the Inspector General's survey recom- 5. The inspection of MKULTRA projects in biochemical controls of human behavior raised questions in the following area of policy and management which are dealt with in the balance of this. report: mends further refinements in security procedures. oe

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 ( a. Scope of.the MKULTRA charter: (1) Over the ten-year life of the program many additional avenues to the control of human behavior have been designated by the TSD management as appropriate to investigation under the MKULTRA charter, including radiation, electro~shock, various fields of psychology, psychiatry, sociology, and anthropology, graphology, harrassment substances, and paramilitary devices and materials. (2) Various projects do not appear to have been sufficiently sensitive to warrant waiver of normal Agency procedures for authorization and control. (3) Other secure channels for establishment and funding of Agency-sterile activities have been evolved over the past ten years by Deputy Director/Support (DD/S) and in some cases could reasonably be employed by TSD in lieu of MKULTRA procedures. In view of these developments there is substantial agreement among all parties concerned that redefinition’ of the scope of MKULTRA is now appropriate b, MKULTRA management policies: (1) The original charter documents specified that TSD maintain exacting control of MKULTRA activities. ee peewee Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 fel Noe In so doing, “however, ‘TSD has pursued a philosophy of minimum documentation in keeping with the high sensitivity of some of the projects. Some files were found to present a reasonably complete record, including most sensitive matters, while others with parallel objectives contained little or no data at all. The lack of consistent records precluded use of routine inspection een procedures and raised a yariety of questions concerning see management and fiscal controls. (2) Lack of records essential to inspection o: MKULTRA moved to the forefront among jesues as the present survey proceeded. Under normal circumstances the inspectors would have examined an inventory of dis- crediting, disabling, and lethal substances perfected or procured from whatever sources, The records on representative items would have been reviewed according to such standard criteria as: (a) How were the substance and its ‘properties identified? (b) What researcher was selected to perform the research, and why? (c) When was the work begun, where, involving what costs, at what rate of progress, based on what tests? oo oss, we baat oe eed Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 C (d) What are the present capabilities and limitations of the substance for clandesinte operations ? (e) What further research is being conducted on this and related sub- stances and how does this reflect existing TSD capabilities, opera- tional requirements and budget factors? (3) MKULTRA records afforded no such approach to inspection. There are just two individuals in TSD who have full substantive knowledge of the program and most of that knowledge is unrecorded. Both are highly skilled, highly motivated, professionally competent individuals. Part of their competence lies in their command of intel- ligence tradecraft. In protecting the sensitive nature of the American intelligence capability to manipulate human behavior, they apply "need to know" doctrine to their professional associates and to their clerical assistants to a maximum degree. Confidence in their competence and discretion has been a vital feature of the management of MKULTRA, Advanced testing of MKULTRA materials: It is the firm doctrine in TSD that testing of materials under accepted scientific procedures fails to disclose the full pattern of reactions and attributions that may occur Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 in operational situations. TSD initiated a program for covert testing of. materials on unwitting U. S. citizens in 1955. The present report reviews the rationale and risks attending this activity and recommends termination of such testing in the United States, cf. paragraphs 10-18 below. Modus Operandi 6. The research and development of materials capable of producing behavioral or physiological change in humans is now performed within a highly elaborated and stabilized MKULTRA structure. The search for new materials; e.g., psilocybin from Mexican mushrooms, or a fungi occurring in agricultural crops, is conducted through standing arrangements with specialists in universities, pharmaceutical houses, hospitals, state and federal institutions, and private research organi- zations who are authorities in the given field of investigation in their own right. Annual grants of funds are made under ostensible research foundation auspices to the specialists located in the public or quasi-public. institutions. This approach conceals from the institution the interest of CIA and permits the recipient to proceed with his investigation, publish his findings (excluding intelligence implications), and account for his expenditures in a manner normal to his institution. A number of the grants have included funds for the construction and equipping of research ee ere rte ete noe tac wp Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 Snead wes fala tond facilities and for the employment of research assistants. /Key individuals must qualify for top secret clearance and are made witting of Agency sponsorship. As a rule each specialist is managed unilaterally and is not witting of Agency support of parallel MKULTRA research in his field. The system in effect "buys a piece" of the specialist in order to enlist his aid in pursuing the intelligerice implications of his research. His services typically include systematic search of the scientific literature, procurement of materials, their propagation, and the appli- cation of test dosages to animals and under some circumstances to volunteer human subjects. No quarrel is found with the rationale of -this program to the extent that it fits the original MKULTRA charter. However, for inspection purposes, there were lacking records, year by year, of the progress of each project and the recorded judgments of the project monitors on operational benefits vis-a-vis costs. 7.| The ‘funding of sensitive MKULTRA projects by sterile grants in aid as noted in the preceding paragraph disclosed one of the principal controversial aspects of this program, ‘The original charter of MKULTRA assumed that the sensitivity of activities would be sufficient to justify both a) special protection for the researcher; and b) compartmentation of MKULTRA knowledge within the Agency. On this basis the inherent safeguards of DD/S procedures were waived, the DD/S was not consulted in the design of the MKULTRA m nagement- system, and established Agency Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515. audit procedures were waived, In the subsequent administration of the program, however, TSD has found it feasible to contract for some of the research on MKULTRA objectives in accordance with prescribed DD/S procedures. The DD/S, in'turn, has evolved various secure systems for the funding of sensitive activities. It appears feasible and appropriate, therefore, to propose that the DD/S be consulted during the re-chartering of MKULTRA in the design of an administrative system that does justice to his responsibilities as well as ‘to the manage- ment and security requirements of TSD. The Inspector General accordingly has ns recommended(at the end of this réport that tne bD/ S be consulted in 4 the re-design of the system; that the Chief, ‘Support, “TSD, be assigned responsibility for the day-to-day support of MKULTRA; and that the latter" constitute a bridge to the DD/S for monitoring the future evolution of the system, 8. The next phase of the MKULTRA program involves physicians, toxicologists, and other specialists in mental, narcotics, and general hospitals and in prisons, who are provided the products and findings of the basic: research projects and proceed with intensive testing on human subjects. These specialists are also recipients for testing purposes of the flow of new products from pharmaceutical laboratories. Materials and procedures with intelligence potential may be identified through this leanne 3 i? Ook Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 Dae lat ee ae Ns Ne te C relationship. The testing programs are conducted under accepted scientific procedures including the use of control populations, the employment of placebos, and the detailed observation, measurement, recording, analysis, and publication of findings. Where health permits, test subjects are voluntary participants in the program. 9. A current development in the testing of new products is the tightening of controls over dosages and procedures by the U. S. F:ood and Drug Administration. Since MKULTRA files contained no docu- mentation on this subject, it was not possible to appraise the signifi- 7 cance of this development for MKULTRA objectives. However, cee interviews with the. TsD officers concerned indicated that the new rules ‘are affecting procedures and causing controversy in research hospitals and pharmaceutical houses|| The TSD officers have close relationships with key individuals in many of the leading U.S. pharmaceutical houses and count on their continued close cooperation in obtaining materials and services deemed vital to intelligence, tog.) 10. The final phase of testing of MKULTRA materials involves their application to unwitting subjects in normal life settings. It was noted earlier that the capabilities of MKULTRA gubstances to produce disabling or discrediting effects or to increase the effectiveness of interrogation of hostile subjects cannot be established solely through ‘testing on volunteer populations. Reaction and attribution patterns are Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 clearly affected when the testing is conducted in an atmosphere of confidence under skilled medical supervision. ll. TSD, therefore, entered into an informal arrangement with certain cleared and witting individuals in the Bureau of Narcotics isi in 1955 which provided for the release of MKULTRA materials for such testing as those inl ividuals deemed desirable and feasible. The initial arrangement obtained the services of a senior representative of the Bureau and one of his assistants on the West Coast. A parallel arrangement was established on the East Coast in 1961. The Director ‘of the Bureau has been briefed on the activity, but the Deputy Chief, TSD, who has guided MKULTRA from its inception, is of the opinion -that the former would disclaim all knowledge and responsibility in the event of compromise. The MKULTRA program director has, in fact, proyided close supervision of the testing program from the beginning and makes periodic visits to the sites. The sum oto, 000 ras been provided annually to each of the two projects to cover cost of cultivation oo —wgssa of targets and of maintenance of a safehouse in each area for the observation of effects of substances on selected test individuals, 12. The particular advantage of these arrangements with the Bureau of Narcotics officials has been that test subjects could be sought ~naee and cultivated within the setting of narcotics control. Some subjects oo’ Be eles wee wee Nee Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 Os: opty era ea have been informers or members of suspect criminal elements from whom the Bureau has obtained results of operational value through the tests. On the other hand, the effectiveness of the substances on individuals at all social levels, high and low, native American and foreign, is of great significance and testing has been performed on a variety of individuals within these categories. 13. A significant limitation on the effectiveness of such testing is the infeasibility of performing scientific observation of results, The Bureau agents are not qualified scientific observers. Their subjects are seldom accessible beyond the first hours of the test. The testing may be useful in perfecting delivery techniques, and in identifying surface characteristics of onset, reaction, attribution, and. side- effect. In a number of instances, however, the test subject has become ill for hours or days, including hospitalization in at least one case, and the agent could only follow-up by guarded inquiry after the test subject's return to normal life. Possible sickness and attendant economic loss are inherent contingent effects of the testing. 14. The MKULTRA program officer stated that the objectives of covert testing concern the field of toxicology rather than medicine; further, that the program is not intended to harm test individuals, and that the medical consultation and as sistance is obtained when appropriate through separate MKULTRA arrangemetts. The risk of compromise of Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 the program through correct diagnosis of an illness by an unwitting medical specialist is regularly considered and is stated to be a governing factor in the decision to conduct the given test. The Bureau officials also maintain close working relations with local police authorities which could be utilized to protect the activity in critical situations. 15, There have been several discussions in the public press in recent months on the use of certain MKULTRA-type drugs to influence human behavior. Broadly speaking, these have argued that research knowledge of possible adverse effects of such subsiances on human beings is inadequate, that some applications have done serious harm, and that professional researchers in medicine and psychiatry are split on the ethics of performing such research. Increasing public attention to this subject is to be expected. 16. The final step in the research and development sequence is the delivery of MKULTRA materials into the MKDELTA control system governing their employment in clandestine operations. The subject is discussed further in the next sectinn; however, it is appropriate here to note that the employment of MKDELTA materials remains an art rather than a scientific procedure. A significant number of variables in the target individual, including age, sex, weight, general health, social status, and personality structure, may account for widely varying and unpredictable reactions to a given drug in a given dosage. Py tw ee ne nd, Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 17. The final stage of covert testing of materials on unwitting subjects is clearly the most sensitive aspect of MKULTRA. No effective cover story appears to be available. TSD officials state that responsibility for covert testing is transferred to the Bureau of Narcotics. Yet they also predict that the Chief of the Bureau would disclaim any knowledge of the activity. Present practice is to maintain no records of the planning and approval of test programe. The prin- cipal responsibility for the propriety of such testing rests with the MKULTRA program director and the Deputy Chief of TSD. The -handling of test subjects in the last. analysis rests with the Narcotics agent working alone. Suppression of knowledge of critical results from ‘the top sD and CIA management is an inherent risk in these operations. 18. Final phase. testing of MKULTRA substances or devices on unwitting subjects is recognized to be an activity of genuine importance in the development of some but not all MKULTRA products. Termination of such testing would have some, but an essentially indeterminate, effect on the development of operational capability in this field. Of more critical significance, however, is the risk of serious damage to the Agency in the event of compromise of the true nature of this activity. As now performed under Bureau of Narcotics auspices, non-Agency personnel are necessarily fully witting of the true nature and signficance: of their assignments, and of the sponsorship of CIA. Compromise of 74 fet Saw SECRE Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 reac eaten eee wl) oe N Pei 4t this information intentionally or unwittingly by these individuals at some time in the future is a hazard that cannot be ruled out. A test subject may on some occasion in the future correctly attribute the cause of his reaction and secure independent professional medical assistance in identifying the exact nature of the substance employed, and by whom. An extreme reaction to a test substance could lead toa Bureau request for cooperation from local authorities in suppressing information of the situation. This would in turn broaden the circle of individuals who possessed at least circumstantial evidence of the nature of the activity. Weighing possible benefits of such testing against the risks of compromise and of resulting damage to CIA has led the Inspector General to recommend ‘termination of this phase of the MKULTRA program.. Existing. checks and balances on the working level management of such testing do not afford the senior command of CIA adequate protection against the high risks involved. 19.[ does not follow that termination of covert testing of MKULTRA materials on unwitting U. S. citizens will bring the program to a halt. Some testing on foreign nationals had been occurring under the present arrangements. Various U. S, deep cover agents overseas would appear to be more favorably situated than the U. S. narcotics agents to perform realistic testing. Finally, the operational use of the substances clearly serves the testing function in view of the lack of predictability of human ee C reactions. Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 sree Ul. Current estimate of the MKULTRA/MKDELTA capability 20. The present Deputy Chief of TSD, Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, in his then capacity of scientific advisor to the Deputy Director/Plans (DD/P), released a study (hereafter referred to as the Gottlieb report) on 21 April 1960, covering his six-month investigation of "Scientific and Technical Problems in Covert Action Operations". Appendix B of the report was entitled, ''The Applicability of Special Chemicals and Biologicals to Qandestine Operations", The inspectors found this Appendix to be a carefully prepared and very useful treatment of the ‘subject. The remaining paragraphs draw on the Gottlieb report, take account of developments since that date, and discuss management :and funding aspects of MKULTRA. 21. The author opened his discussion with the question of what the operational returns had been from an: eight-year program involving an investment of approximately He observed that the Clandestine Services had encouraged TSD on yarious occasions to develop and maintain the operational capability in special drugs and chemicals, but that TSD had received little or no guidance in directing the work and that the Clandestine Services had up to that time shown little inclination to use the end products operationally. He indicated that there had been approximately 100 operations over the eight years iat ONE OO SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Lf. Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 employing harrassment materials (not controlled under the MKDELTA regulation) and only nine operations employing disabling drugs, (NB: two-thirds of these involved the use of drugs ininterrogations). No use of lethal substances was reported. 22. The factors accounting for the low rate of use of this capa- bility were considered to be the following: a. the technical shortcomings of the drugs the problem of testing in realistic pilot operations c. limitations on the dissemination of pertinent information to operations officers d. organizational and administrative restrictions on operations negative attitudes toward the use of MKDELTA mnaterials f. problems in the training of case officers in this field g. the risk of stimulating increased use of MKDELTA materials by opposition intelligence services 23. Technical shortcomings of the > drugs: As of 1960 no effective Amockout pill, truth serum, aphro- “disiac, or: 'Fecruitment pill was v ‘known to exist. _MKDELTA was described as inherently a high-risk, low- _yield field of operations. Three years later the situation remains substantially unchanged, with the exception that real progress has been made in the use of drugs in support of interrogation. Ironically, however, the progress here has occurred in the development of a total psycho- logical theory of interrogation, in which the use of drugs has been relegated to a support role. SEORE whNNE Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 wegeie 24. The problem of testing in realistic pilot operations: This subject has been discussed above, beginning with paragraph 10. It should also be noted that testing on operational targets overseas is considered by some operations officers to be quite impracticable. Unilateral operations are imperative _which substantially complicates the delivery problem. The possibilities of unexpected or critical reactions in test subjecte and of ensuing compromise of the activity make most senior ¢pmmand personnel unwilling to take the risks involved. 25. Limitations on the dissemination of pertinent information ‘to case officers; organizational and administrative restrictions on operations: The present-day situation conceming both of these problem areas is improved over 1960. TSD now regularly briefs a variety [Pree Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 of senior officers’on its MKDELTA capability. Approval of the use of MKDELTA materials is now accomplished within. the chain of command of the DD/P, The DD/P may consult, for example, with the Chief, Medical Staff, concerning medical risks involved in MKDELTA operations, but the latter surely would not expect to exercise final authority for the disapproval of operations. 27 26. TSD has found that TDY visits of MKULTRA officers to the field in support of specific operations increases the awareness of the MKDELTA capability and stimulates proposals for.additional projects. Of equal significance, ‘however, has been the TSD decision in 1961 to station in ip informed on MKDELTA matters. A second officer is scheduled to officer who is move PCS ta during the summer of 1963 to support and adjacent stations. While the principal responsibility of these officers lies in the field the arrangement in the i has proved useful in the MKDELTA field--notably in interrogation--as well. It now appears that increased reliance can be placed on this approach to promoting responsible use of the MKDELTA capabilities, 27. Negative attitudes toward the use of MKDELTA materials; problems in the training of case officers in this field: The 1960{ Goteiieb Feport observed that some case officers have basic moral objections to the concept of MKDELTA and Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 therefore refuse to use the materials. Some senior officers were reported to believe that the proper employment of the capability required more sophistication than most case officers possessed and that there would be a tendency toward over-reliance on and misuse of drugs in lieu of perfecting classic espionage techniques. Finally, it was suggested that MKDELTA controls were so restrictive as to have generated a general defeatism among case officers concerning the chances of getting approval for use of materials in routine rather than extreme situations. These matters will be reviewed in future field inspections of DD/P area divisions. the meanwhile, the stationing of qualified TSD consultants in the field and oe increasing operational experience will tend to develop over time a category of case officers who have acquired direct appreciation of the potential ant limitations of the MKDELTA capability. 28. The risk of stimulating increased use of MKDELTA materials by opposition intelligence services: The| Gottlieb feport stated that opposition intelligence services are active in the MKDELTA field and recommended that the CI Staff of the DD/P conduct a systematic study of the evidence. This recommendation has not been implemented. It is a subject of increasing significance as new materials and techniques become available. Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 It is recommended that: Deputy Director /Plans instruct Chief, CI Staff, to perform a study of the evidence of use of MKDELTA materials by opposition intelligence services and recommend appropriate measures for training DD/P case officers to recognize and counter hostile activity in this area, ne 29. In summary, present evidence concerning the operational value of the MKDELTA capability would appear te confirm the principal judgments of the 1960[Gotstied keport. There is an extremely low rate of operational use of the controlled materials. [on the othe xr hand, significant progress has been achieved in the development of an inter- rogation theory employing chemical substances, and in providing com- petent guidance to the field in MKDELTA matters through TSD officers ‘working overseas. aad IV. Management of MKULTRA 30. TSD has initiated{144/projects relating to the control of human behavior; i.e. ]auring the ten rnb years of operation of the MKULTRA program. Twenty-five (25) of these projects remain in existence at the present time, while a number of others are in various stages of termination. 31. Active projects may be grouped under the following arbitrary 2) meres Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 tree rete fm tare tes

wate Reneneey Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 headings. Many projects involve activity in two or more of the areas listed. a. basic research in materials and processes b. procurement of research materials c. testing of substances on animals and human beings d. development of delivery techniques e. projects in offensive/defensive BW, CW, and radiation f. miscellaneous projects;Je. g.{ (1) petroleum sabotage, (2) defoliants, (3} devices for remote measurement of physiological processes 32. The current management of TSD has initiated a policy of directing the activities of MKULTRA and of the Behavioral Activities Branch towards operations and away from long-range research. Prior to this change in policy which occurred in 1962, MKULTRA sponsored ‘a large number of projects in the fields of.applied psychology, sociology, anthropology, and graphology. The present management is unlikely to return to these fields of research under the MKULTRA charter. The inspectors concluded that many of these projects were of insufficient sensitivity to justify waiver of normal Agency control procedures. It is recommended at the end of this report that projects falling outside the authorized scope of MKULTRA henceforth require the prior written approval of the DD/P to qualify for MKULTRA processing. 33. The TSD chain of command for administration of the MKULTRA program comprises the following: a. Chief, TSD providing overall management b. Deputy Chief, TSD, (a trained scientist) providing top substantive guidance for the MKULTRA program c. Assistant Chief, TSD, for Research and Development, contributing management but not substantive guidance

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 ae ako 2g BET Saw d. Chief Scientist (reporting to c., above), (a trained scientist), contributing substantive guidance in some areas and responsible for the technical administrative processes of MKULTRA. He is supported by a GS-12 budget officer. e. program manager for MKULTRA, also serves as Chief of Biology Branch, (a trained scientist) f. project monitors located in various branches of TSD and specialized in the subject fields of the specific projects for which they are assigned responsibility To date this chain of command has rélied primarily on oral communica- tion in the management of MKULTRA. Files are notably incomplete, poorly organized, and lacking in evaluative statements that might give perspective to management policies over time. A substantial portion of the MKULTRA record appears to rest in the memories of the principal officers and is therefore almost certain to be lost with their _departures. The senior officers in the MKULTRA chain of command who are not substantively qualified need better records ts measure the © validity of projects through time and to identify key areas .in which to require detailed periodic briefings from working specialists. 34. It will be noted that the Chief of Support, TSD, does not parti- cipate in the MKULTRA. administration. The predecessor of the present Chief of Support served in TSD throughout the life of the program until 1962 without ever being associated with its management. In his stead, the Chief Scientist and a GS-12 budget officer have provided administrative support. The Chief Scientist has set policy on the funding of MKULTRA pees ee eet wee Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 foa, a ( projects in all respects including salaries, overhead rates, fees, material, equipment, facilities, travel, and the like. The support officer was only added in 1962 under pressure of critical audit findings. This use of the Chief Scientist in a field where Chief of Support possesses superior qualifications and facilities constitutes a misuse of talent. The proposed new charter for MKULTRA should take account of this anomaly and also provide that Chief of Support ‘advise in the future on decisions to fund projects under the MKULTRA authority and thereby to waive the application of DD/S procedures. It is recommended that: Deputy Director/Plans draft and submit for the approyal of the Director of Central Intelligence a revision and re~confirmation of the authority granted him in 1953 (Tab A) to operate the MKULTRA program, incorporating the following provisions: a. Deputy Director/Plans assign Chief, Technical Services Division, to operate MKULTRA as a program for research and development of chemical, biological, and radioactive materials, and of techniques for the employment of elegtro-shock, capable of producing human behavioral or physio- logical change. Subsequent changes in scope of MKULTRA shall require the written approval of Lo the Deputy Director/Plans. fmm ee ee Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

ear oe Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C0676751 5 Deputy Director/Plans arrange with Deputy Director/ Research for the coordination of research relating to MKULTRA objectives to control duplication of effort and to provide for exchange of information of new capabilities. Chief, Technical Services Division, consistent with established policy, :may negotiate for research in MKULTRA materials and techniques to be conducted by Deputy Director/Research and by other component offices of CIA. He shall consult regularly with the appropriate officers of such components to control duplication of effort. Chief, Technical Services Division shall approve the ‘addition of MKULTRA developed materials to the © list of operationally available MKDELTA substances. and keep the Deputy Director/Plans advised of such additions. (cf. Clandestine Services Instruction No. 220-10, MKDELTA MATERIALS, dated 22 July 1960--Tab B--which governs the employment of behavioral control materials in clandestine operations. ) “Deputy Director/Plans, jointly with the Deputy Director/ Support, establish policy for the administration of support functions under MKULTRA. Such policy shall seek to limit to the maximum the waiver of established Agency support procedures for activities. of unusual sensitivity. Chief, Technical Services Division shall maintain exacting internal controls and records of all substantive and support matters within each MKULTRA project. Records shall include: (1) A plan of the research and development to be performed. (2) An administrative annex setting forth security, budget and accounting arrangements agreed to by the parties to the project. Chief of Support, TSD, shall then certify to the DD/S for each such project that this annex is in accord with the agreed DDS/DDP policy. Pursuant to this Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 ‘responsibility, Chief of Support, TSD, shall have right of unlimited access to the substantive and administrative records of MKULTRA. i (3) An annual written review by the project monitor setting forth in reasonable detail the nature of the work performed, the nineed prospects for results of eventual opera- tional significance, and a recommendation ! for continuance or termination of the project. g. Testing of MKULTRA materials and devices shall only be performed in accredited ‘research institutions under accepted scientific procedures’ h. Chief, Technical Services Division, shall brief the Deputy Director/Plans at least semi-annually on MKULTRA activities. The Deputy Director/Plans after each briefing shall promptly notify the Deputy ‘Director of Central Intelligence that he has personally conducted a semi-annual review of the program. The MKULTRA program be audited in accordance with the provisions of HR 31], including auditor access to substantive as well as administrative records. ee TY ri SECT ET Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

sem ee ey

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 ent eee april 1953 MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence ‘SUBJECT: [Two Extremely Sensitive Research Programs ‘1. Approximately 6% of the TSS research and development effort lies in “two highly sensitive fields in which it is not possible to conduct the work through the customary contracts for security reasons and other considerations. vd 2. These two sensitive fields are: a) ‘Covert studies of biological and chemical warfare b) 3. Permission of the DCI is requested to handle work in these two fields in the manner outlined in Tab A without contracts and with reimburse-_ ment to be made. against invoices properly certified by TSS. h. All controls established in the PRO approval of the original Re- gearch Program (other than signing of a contract) would remain unchanged. Periodic financial and progress Teports will be made. All documents will be retained by TSS. Se No new ‘funds are involved. “This procedure would apply to funds previously approved for research. 6. Tab B is a memorandum to the Deputy Director (adnind stration) for your signature suthori2ing this Procedure. Richard Helms Acting Deputy Director (Plans) attachnents: @) Fs rn fab A Description of Project MKULTRA and the controls which will be exercised over its execution He fab B= Suggested Memorandum from DCI to rn ae DD/A authorizing payment of invoices bi under Project: MKULTRA a ar Addressee orig &l1 w/attachnents ae we C DD/P -l w/attachments at + $88/0C w/attachments st oye Exec. Rege~ V/attachnents es ne eset ee Co SR CATON voce ce tee pani Approved for Release: 201 9/04/03 C06767515 T. Se 8762h, bese #t of. 5 covies poe

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 Security taferegton J wh ig a fo Pe RET S74 #1 D Seep of en ees Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

as La)” Research to develop a capability in the covert use of: Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515. ae et Pores Security Informetion TAB A: "PROJECT MKULTRA Extremely Sensitive Research and Development Programs a On 6 June 1952, the Project Review Committee approved the TSS Research Program for Fiscal ke nee Year 1953. SO ee tees 2. The PRC approval authorized the Director of Research, at his dis- cretion and with the approval of the Research Chairman, to apportion and obligate the research funds among individual projects, such projects to be subject to the usual Agency procedures and administrative ‘controls, This Research Program has been actively underway since the middle of 1952 and has gathered considerable momentum during the past few --months. It is now evident on the basis of work currently underway that approximately 94% of the projects contemplated can be handled through regular procurement channels by means of the customary contracts signed jointly by the Agency and the organization undertaking to carry out the work, It has also become apparent that approximately 6% of the projects are of such an ultra-sensitive nature that they cannot and should not be handled by means of contracts which would associate CIA er the Government with the work in question, This 6% of the current research effort now lies entirely within two well- defined fields of endeavor, namely: biological and chemical materials, This area involves the production of various physiological conditions which could support present or future clandestine operations, Aside from the offensive potential, the development of a compre- hensive capability in this field of covert chemical and bio- ‘logical warfare gives us a thorough knowledge of the enemy's theoretical potential, thus enabling us to defend ourselves against a foe who might not be as restrained in the ude of Security Information Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

on ie so ete Bee we ——Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 these techniques as we are, For example: we intend to investigate the development of a chemical material which causes a reversible non-toxic aberrant mental state, the specific nature of which can be reasonably well predicted for each individual, This material could potentially aid in dis- crediting individuals, eliciting information, implanting suggestion and other forms of mental control; (b) Research and engineering development in the field of ‘4, Itis highly undesirable from a policy and security point of view that contracts should be signed indicating Agency or Government interest in either of these two fields, Ina great many instances the work in field (a) must be conducted by individuals who are not and should not be aware of our interest, In all cases dealing with field (b), it is mandatory that any connection with the Agency should be known only to an absolute minimum number of people who have been specifically cleared for this purpose. In no case should any manufacturer or supplier be aware of Government interest. 5. In many cases in field (a) where the researcher can be cleared and. may be aware of our interest in the program, he is unwilling to have his ‘mame on a contract which remains out of his control in our files, Experience has shown that qualified, competent individuals in the field of pharmacological, physiological, psychiatric and other biological sciences are most reluctant to enter into signed agreements of any sort which connect them with this activity since such a connection would seopardize their professional reputations, 6. Even internally in CIA, as few individuals as possible should be aware of our interest in these fields and of the identity of those who are working for us, At present this results in ridiculous contracts, often with cut- ~outs, which do not spell out the scope or intent of the work a: SECRET Security resin Copy Z ofS copien Se nee ee ee Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 clea ya “Security Informs! tion Sana which contain terms which the cut-out cannot incorporate in his gontract with the researcher without revealing Government interest. Complete Government audits of such contracts are impossible for’ the same reason, It is, therefore, requested that the DCI authorize TSS to handle 6% of the previously approved research budget for FY 153 without the establishment of formal contractual relations, This program will be known as ‘Project MKULTRA, 8. Itis suggested that payment of invoices under Project MKULTRA forwarded by TSS be authorized, provided that: ‘(a) the total of such invoices does not exceed 6%. for Fiscal Year 1953; ns) the invoices carry a certification by the TSS Research Director that payment of funds is authorized and that the "invoices represent work accomplished within the program approved by the DCI under Project MKULTRA as outlined in this memorandum; oo te) the invoices carry ‘the certification of the Executive Secretary of the Research Board that the scope of the program has been approved; (a) the invoices carry the certification of the cognizant TSS Division Chief that the work has been satisfactory from a technical point of view, of 9. It should be emphasized that this authorization does not involve any a new allocation of funds, but merely applies to a portion of a previously approved budget. The TSS certifications mentioned above will mean co Pe a the project is being handled under the conditions set forth in this description and specifically falls within one of the ‘two ultra-sensitive fields mentioned above; wo. (b) the pro ject has been approved in the manne? provided for in the PRC document which originally set up and approved ‘the over-all TSS Research Program, Each project will thus have been presented by the Chief of the Division monitoring "Security informstion a nn Parr S3l oa my scones oe ee Gate atria tietre that Ts en, mm it ace Se Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

advisable and will be available for inspection in TSS files Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 SL 2. SECRET So ecurily Information se T. S. 87624 the work to the Research Director and to the Research Chairman and will have, as in the past, to be approved by both before any expenditures are made; (c) technical control over the project will be exercised by the TSS Division Chief and Project Engineers to the same extent now applying to projects handled in the normal fashion, Technical reports will be rendered when necessary and at any time; (4) in the case of each project, TSS will reach an understanding © with the individuals who will perform the work as to the conditions under which the work will be performed and re- -imbursement arranged. No standard contract will be signed. _In some cases when possible, a memorandum of agreement will be signed and retained in the TSS files. Under no eircumstances would copies of such agreements leave TSS files where they will be kept available for inspection; ‘e) the manner in which the work will be handled and methods of maintaining Agency and Government sterility will be worked ‘out with the Inspection & Security Office as in the past, and clearance of individuals to the extent deemed necessary by TSS and & SO will be obtained; (f) invoices, when received by TSS, will be forwarded to Finance Division for payment and will be certified as outlined in Paragraph 8 above. Whenever documents are available supporting a portion or all of a given invoice, such as cancelled ehecks, receipted bills, etc., these will be requested by TSS and retained in the TSS files in support of the invoice, where a they will at all times be available for inspection. They wilh © not be forwarded with the invoices. Such documents at best ee| will only cover a portion of the total expenditures, and regular oe audit procedures will not be followed; other provisions and controls over the Research Program specified in the original PRC approval will remain unaltered. Technical progress under the separate pro jects, ‘handled under Project MKULTRA will be included whenever necessary in QP SECRET ity information he Copy he of 5 5 copies lene eee towel ot oe Tie SS to ae sore ers Boman meme So ee erry aati eae + ate els — eet _— 4 eee ee Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 em P SeCRel oT, 87624 Security bLlcrmation the regular progress reports now submitted by the Director of Research, The monthly budget and financial report being submitted by TSS to DD/A will include full financial informa- tion on these projects, including how much of the “6% has been committed, how much has been spent and how much remains, 10, The establishment and approval of Project MKULTRA will allow TSS to undertake highly desirable and necessary research in these two pensitive fields which would not be possible unless the work canbe © handled in this manner, Distribution: ee ve Addressee Orig. & 1 TSS/OC 1 CO Exec, Registry-1 Be ats wena eee sete — Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

d for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 Security Infocmation pprove Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 ate erin Set whiieei eae Sete Fit ow SECRET rv) Seearity Information _CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY WASHINGTON 285. D. cs Le. 28 OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR MEMORANDUM FOR: DEPUTY DIRECTOR (ADMINISTRATION) SUBJECT Project MKULTRA Extremely Sensitive Research and Development Program fe 1. On 6 June 1952, the Project Review F Committee approved the DD/P/TSS Research Program for Fiscal Year 1953. 2. The PRC approval authorized the Director of Research, at his discretion and with the apcroval of the Research Chairman, to obligate the research funds and apzortion them among individual ro- .jects, such projects to be subject to the usual Agency procedures and administrative controls, ‘3. A small part of the Research Program contemplated by TSS and discussed with me consists of ultra-sensitive work, The nature of the research and the security considerations involved preclude handling the projects by means of the usual contractual agreements. oo he 1 have, therefore, approved the obligation and exrenditure by TSS of 6% of the total budget ) already approved by the PRO ‘for research for FY '53 without the signing of the usual contracts or other written ‘agreements, os (8. This 6% will be handled as Project MKULTRA, Would you please make the necessary arrangen.ents so that invoices forwarded by TSS applying to MKULTRA will be paid, provided that: a) in the aggregate, they do not exceed 6% for FY '53 Without further authorization from me; oe b) each invoice is to bear a certification by the Chief, “SECRET "Security tnformation Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 SECRET QO Becurity Informatiott ie) DD/P/TSS, as the Research Director, that the invoice applies to Project MKULTRA and that the conditions outlined in the DD/P memorandum for DCI dated 3 April have been com,lied with. The certification will also request that payment be made; _€) the invoice shall bear the certification of the Executive Secretary of the Research Board that the scope of the program has been approved; the invoice shall bear the certification of the cognizant TSS Division Chief that the work has been satisfactorily performed from a technical. point of view and has been carried out in accordance with the understandings reached between TSS and the individual or concern doing the work. 6. No further documents will be required to justify payment of © the invoices. Exacting control will be maintained over the Project by TSS. Although no formal contract will be signed, it will occasionally be possible for TSS to sign an informal agreement with the individual or concern performing the work, In such cases, TSS will retain in its files all documents. TSS will endeavor wherever possible to obtain documentary support of invoices, such as cancelled checxs, receijted bills, etc. and these will remain in TSS files. Such documents at best will only cover a portion of the total expenditures, and the regular audit procedure will not be followed, 7% Other provisions and control over the Research Program gpecified in the original 1 RC apzroval remain unaltered. The monthly budget and financial record being submitted by TSS to DD/A will include e financial information on the work being conducted under Project MAULTRA, showing how much of the 6% has been committed, how much has been spent, and how much remains, ol. Os ALLEN W, DULLES Director, Central Intelligence. Distribution: oo 7 or Addressce Orig. & en FSS/0C -1 oe Exec. Registry 1 SECRET ky sod “ae tama teal ee ra wie pied st aaa eel sat ek aaa 7 a. Re nibth orr eeee Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 SECRET. Becurity Irfsemation Apri 1953 MEMORANDUM. FOR THE FILE SUBJECT 3. Project MKULTRA 1, Project MKULTRA was established by means of a memorandum dated 3 April 1953 from DD/P to DCI as a result of which on 13 April 1953, DCI wrote to DD/A approving the project subject to certain controls and limitations which TSS has agreed to maintain, wt, Ceca Lean On Te Te UMaREaES UiRias an cele ee LOL ra PM oe 2. ‘In order to comply with these controls, subprojects ‘under MKULTRA will be handled as outlined in the DD/P memorandum to the DCI dated 3 ‘April 1953. In brief: fap A separate file will be kept on each subproject, The foundation of each file will be an agreement between TSS and the contractor outlining the work to be done, the conditions under which it will be accomplished, the estimated costs of so doing, etc. Wherever possible, “this agreement will be signed by both parties, but in extreme cases need not be signed by the contractor. In such an event, it is still necessary to prepare such a document outlining the verbal agreement and listing dates and places when meetings took place. (b) At the same time, the Division Chief will prepare a ot memorandum for file outlining the scope of the program, the reasons for its activation, etc., and containing all pertinent information, This memorandum will bear the following: PROGRAM appnoven APPROVED FOR AND RECOMMENDED: OBLIGATION OF FUNDS: Research Chairman Research Director ie te Date: So Date: ro or SECRET yy ergy prs eer cet Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

—AK Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515— we Beeurity Informahon (c) When preparing (b), the Division Chief will also prepare @ memorandum addressed to the Comptroller, Attention: Finance Division. This memorandum will state that subproject has been approved, and $ "of the over-all project MKULTRA funds have been obligated to cover the project's expenses, This memorandum will be signed by the Division Chief and will provide space for the approval of the Research Director and the Research Chairman as outlined above, This memorandum will allow Finance to obligate funds so they will not be lost @t the end of the Fiscal Year and will provide a document against which action can be taken when invoices are later presented for payment, This memorandum should contain absolutely no technical details or information as to the scope of the work. Copies of the memorandum will TS be prepared for: oA Comptroller, Original and aA Fy Exec. Sec'y., Res. Board 1 Lae TSS/Budget 1 € 4 TSS Registry 1 Initiating Division, whatever number is ah required Ps (d) Memoranda (b) and (c) will be presented together to the ae Research Director and the Research Chairman for 4 signature. Memorandum (b) will be returned for inclu- fe 4 sion in the project file, and memorandum (c) will be al routed to TSS/Budget, TSS/Supply & Services, TSS Registry and Comptroller, is "+ It will be the responsibility of the Division Chief handling 4 the project to see that the Research Director is kept in- i formed of progress and that reports, correspondence with the contractor and other documents are kept in the project (f) When an invoice is received by the Division, it shall be forwarded to Chief, Finance Division, via TSS/Budget Officer, with a memorandum stating it applies to subproject ‘under Project MKULTRA. The memorandum should provide any special instructions involving method of payment, i.e., whether by check or cash, etc, The following certifications must appear. on the invoice or be SECRET Ws Security Information vk. LAN alee py PRE TF Rae Bem olf Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 Becucity Informatied attached to it: (1) “It is hereby certified that this is Invoice No. applying to subproject of Project MKULTRA, that technical performance by (name of the contractor) has been satisfactory, that the work was accomplished in accordance with the mutual agreement reached with (mame of contractor), that this bill is just and correct and that payment thereof has not yet been made, Date: an (Division Chief)" (2) “It is hereby certified that this invoice applies to subproject under Project MKULTRA which was duly approved and that the project has been carried out in accordance with the DD/P memorandum to DCI dated 3 April 1953 and the DCI] memorandum to DD/A dated 13 April 1953, Payment is authorized and requested, Date: Research Director" (3) “It is hereby certified that the scope of the program of. subproject of Project MKULTRA has been approved. Date: TSS /OC:cvsr /jel (20 April 1953) Distribution: ne OO 7 7 TSS/ADMIN 1 “SECRET oo 7 Security Information

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515 oe SECRET 7 ten Lite PO TECHNICAL SUPPORT 82 July 1960 ‘MKDELTA MATERIALS Rescission: ‘j20 October 1952 1. GENERAL @& MKDELTA materials are certain chemical and biological materials (including K and L tablets) capable of producing human behavioral or physiological changes. Such materials may be obtained only in accord- ance with the provisions of this instruction. © b. The provisions of the instruction are not intended to cover those mate- rials commonly known as harassment materials. 2. POLICY a.. The use of MKDELTA materials will be limited to situations in the ex- ercise of official duties which clearly justify such use. b. Their issuance will be strictly controlled and will require in each in- stance the written approval of the Deputy Director (Plans). MKDELTA materials not used for the purpose for which they were issued will be promptly returned to TSD; on-the-shelf storage against possible future needs will not be permitted. 8. PROCEDURES Informal discussion of the requirement to determine its technical feasi- ote bility will be held with TSD before preparation of any formal request or So any coordination with other elements. ne TET eg tegen b. Requests for the issuance of these materials will be nejared in memo- mo, fandum form for the signature of the Chief or Deputy Chief of the Op- wo erating Division or Staff concerned. No other signature is authorized. eh © This memorandum will be routed first to any other division(s) or staff(s) co Ls ‘Whose coordination is necessary, then to the Chief, TSD, who will append mt > ls comments and return it to the originator for transmittal to the Deputy Director (Plans) for approval. Transmittal of the memorandum will be Onan Eyes Only basis. da. Procedures used in the past that may have differed trom the above will “po ‘longer be used. Ae ee ee nites oF we so, Ty et Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C0676751 5 a TECHNICAL SUPPORT 42 July 1960 4. RECORDS The Chief, TSD, will maintain a record of all issuances, to include the date of issuance, the name and signature of the immediate recipient, and a refer- ence to the approved memorandum request, which he will keep ina readily available Supporting file. RICHARD M. BISSELL, JR. Deputy Director (Plans) ‘SECRET Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

asi heise Bie te se ete Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C067 Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515

pproved for Release. 2019/04/03 CO6/675 opeaieansiaas Rote Approved for Release: 2019/04/03 C06767515