Full text · October 1961
The Inspector General's survey of the Cuban operation (1961)
Machine-read (OCR) from the released scan, page by page. Typewriter faces, stamps, handwriting and poor copies produce misread words; where this text and the scan disagree, the scan is the record. Black redaction bars are marked [REDACTED] where we could detect them; whited-out passages simply leave gaps. FOIA exemption codes such as (b)(3) mark withheld text.
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CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM
RELEASE AS SANITZiD
1997
INSPECTOR GENERAL’S SURVEY
of the
CUBAN OPERATION
and
ASSOCIATED DOCUMENTS
Part 1 ot 2 Parts
Page 2 (page 2 of the original)
16 February 1962
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Inspector General Survey of the Cuban Operation
(dated October 1961)
It is my understanding that you have requested information con-
cerning the distribution of the IG Survey of the Cuban Opemation and
the DD/P comments on it. At the time the report was written it was
understood that copies of the report would be sent to the President's
Board and consequently 20 copies were made. However, the only
distribution made of the report is as follows:
Copy 1 Mr. McCone 21 November 1961
2 DCI (then Mr. Dulles) 24 November
3 + DDCI (then Gen. Cabell) 24 November
4 -DD/P (then Mr. Bissell} 24 November
5 IG (Mr. Kirkpatrick)
On file in office of Acting IG (Mr. McLean)
C/WH (Col. King) 24 November
8 Mx. Esterline (WH Division) via Col. King 24 November
Ne)
On file in my office
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, via
Mr. Earman at request of DCI, 18 January 1962
11 through 20 On file in my office
Lymdn Kirkpatrick
rem
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Sane Een aman ome anne
INDEX
NOTE
This document contains the items listed below and should
not be breken up. This is at the Sirectian of Mr. John A. McCone,
Director of Central intelligence.
Tab:
1. Inspector General's Survey of. the Cuban Operations;
October 1961;
2. Memorandum ce} "transmittal of IG Survey of the Cuban Operation
to Mr. John’ “MeCone from Inspector General; 20 November 1961.
3. Memorandum of, trahsmittel of IG Survey of the Cuban Operation
to DCI from Inspector General; 24 Nowember 1961.
4, DDCI Memorandum for the Record concerning restricted distribution
of IG's Report on Cuba; 28 November 1961.
5. Memorandum for the DCI from IG, subject: Report on the Cuban
Operation; 1 December 1961.
6. Memorandum prepared by DDCI, subject: The Inspector General's
Survey of the Cuban Operation; 15 December 1961.
7. An Analysis of the Cuban Operation by the Deputy Director (Plans),
Central Intelligence Agency; 18 January 1962.
8. Letter to Dr. James R. Killian, Jr., Chairman, President's
Foreign Intelligence Board, from DCI, transmitting the IG
Survey and the DD/P Analysis of the Cuban Operation;
19 January 1962.
Qe Memorandum for Deputy Director (Plans), from C. Tracy Barnes,
subject: Survey of Cuban Operation; 19 January 1962.
10. Memorandum for Mr. C. Tracy Barnes from Lyman B. Kirkpatrick
referencing Barnes' 19 January memorandum; 22 January 1962.
11. Memorandum for DCI from DD(P) transmitting Mr. Barnes’
19 January memorandum; 27 January 1962.
TS 173160
Copy &
Page 4 (page 4 of the original)
12. Memorandum to Mr. Kirkpatrick from Messrs. [REDACTED] [REDACTED]
13.
14,
[REDACTED] [REDACTED]
and @M@MBKIG staff officers), subject: The IG's Survey and
the DD/P's Analysis of the Cuban Operation; 26 January 1962.
Memorandum for Mr. John McCone, DCI, from Allen W. Dulles
subject: The Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban
Operation; 15 February 1962.
DCI's letter of acknowledgement of Mr. Dulles! 15 February
memorandum; 19 February 1962.
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No text on this page (blank, image only, or unreadable).
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INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
of the
CUBAN OPERATION
October 1961
TS No. 173040
Page 7 (page 7 of the original)
eer en eee ee
Page
Introduction... secsseseseesseeeteeseeeeetseessensee od
B. History of the Project. .ecetececsccsceeevceesecenee
Cc. Sumery of Evaluation. ieeeeeceeeetenceeeseeeens Sr ae
D, Evaluation of Organization end Command Structure. 36
E, Evaluation of Staffing... ses eee sees eee seeeeceees AD
F, Evaluation of Planning. .ccecescesccecceecrecsseenes ub
G. The Miami Operating Base. .ssereeereceseeeees ate eees 67
H. Intelligence Support. :esesees seseee Le ceccapaceaeuce “75°
I. The Political Front and the Relation of Cubans
to the Project. ..cccceccveeveserecesseceereeceres 81
J. Clandestine Paramilitary Operations Alr.sssececs 98
K. Clandestine Paramilitary Operations Maritime.... 110
L. Clendestine Paramilitary Operations Training
Underground LeaderSrscccrceeccveccccscescecconcers 125
M. SeCuritysscrescerececcvecesesssscvcscrcsscevenceene 135.
N.. Americans in Combat..ccsceccsccscccesceceecescceees 140
O. Conclusions and Recommendations. .crceescrerrecevvece 143
INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY
of the
CUBAN OPERATION
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page 8 (page 8 of the original)
ANNEXES
Basic Policy Plan of 17 March 1960
Briefing Paper of 17 February 1961
Operational Plan of 11 March 1961
Operational Plan of 16 March 1961.
Operational Plan of 12 April 1961
Page 9 (page 9 of the original)
A. INTRODUCTION
This is the Inspector General's report on the Central
Intelligence Agency's ill-fated attempt to implement national
policy by overthrowing the Fidel Castro regime in Cuba by means
of a covert paramilitary operation.
2. The purpose of the report is to evaluate selected
aspects of the Agency's performance of this task, to describe
weaknesses and failures disclosed by the study, and to make
recommendations for their correction and avoidance in the puture
3. The report concentrates on the organization, staffing
and planning of the project and on the conduct of the covert
paramilitary phase of the operation, including comments on
intelligence support, training, and security. It does not
describe or analyze in detail the purely military phase of the
effort.
4. The supporting annexes have been chosen to illus-
trate the evolution of national policy as outlined in Section
F of the body of the report. Annex A is the basic policy paper
approved by President Eisenhower on 17 March 1960. Annex B
is paper prepared by the project's operating chiefs for the
briefing of President Kennedy in February 1961. Annexes C, D,
and E are the planning papers successively prepared during
March and April 1961 in the last few weeks before the invasion.
Page 10 (page 10 of the original)
5. The report includes references to the roles played by
Agency officials in Presidential conferences and interdepart-
mental meetings at which policy decisions affecting the course
of the operation were taken, but it contains no evaluation of
or judgment on any decision or action taken by any official
not employed by the Agency.
6. In preparing the survey the Inspector General and his
representatives interviewed about 125 Agency employees of all
levels and studied a large quantity of documentary material.
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@ B. HISTORY OF THE PROJECT
1. The history of the Cuban project begins in 1959 and for
the purposes of the survey ends with the invasion of Cuba by the
Agency-supported Cuban brigade on 17 April 1961 and its defeat and
capture by Castro's forces in the next two days.
2. Formal U.S. Government adoption of the project occurred
on 17 March 1960, when, after preliminary preparations by the
Agency, President Eisenhower approved an Agency paper titled
"A Program of Covert Action Against the Castro Regime" (Annex A)
and thereby authorized the Agency to undertake this program:
a. Formation of a Cuban exile organization to attract
Cuban loyalties, to direct opposition activities, and to
C provide cover for Agency operations.
b. A propaganda offensive in the name of the opposition.
ec. Creation inside Cuba of a clandestine intelligence
collection and action apparatus to be responsive to the
direction of the exile organization.
d. Development outside Cuba of a small paramilitary force
to be introduced into Cuba to organize, train and lead
resistance groups.
3. The budget for this activity was estimated at $4,400,000.
The breakdown was: Political action, $950,000; propaganda,
$1,700,000; paramilitary, $1,500,000; intelligence collection,
$250,000.
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hk. This document, providing ‘for ‘the nourishment of powerful
internal resistance program through clandestine ‘external assistance,
was the basic and indeed the only U.S. Government policy paper
issued throughout the life of the project. The concept was classic.
The Cuban exile council would serve as cover for action which
became publicly known. Agency personnel in contact with Cuban
exiles would be documented as representatives of a group of private
American businessmen. The hand of the U.S. Government would not
appear.
Preparatory Action
5. Some months of preparation had preceded presentation of
this paper to the President. In August 1959 the Chief of the
Agency's Paramilitary Group attended a meeting [REDACTED]
ee discuss the creation of a para-
military capability to be used in Latin American crisis situations.
At this time Cuba was only one of a number of possible targets,
all of which appeared equally explosive. The Chief of the Para-
military Group prepared a series of staff studies for the Western
Hemisphere (WH) Division on various aspects of covert limited war-
fare and urged the creation of a division paramilitary staff. He
also set up a small proprietary airline in [REDACTED] eventual
support use.
6. In September 1959 the WH Division assigned an officer to
plan potential Agency action for contingencies which might develop
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in a number of Latin American countries. There was a lack of
sufficient readily available operational information on potential
target areas, so a requirement, with special emphasis on Cuba,
whose Communist control was now becoming more and more apparent,
was sent throughout the intelligence commmity, and resulted in a
three-volume operational study.
By December 1959 these studies had produced a plan for
training a small cadre of Cuban exiles as paramilitary instructors,
these in turn to be used for training other Cuban recruits, ina
Latin American country, for clandestine infiltration into Cuba to
provide leadership for anti-Castro dissidents.
Organization of Branch
8. On 18 January 1960 the WH Division organized Branch
(wH/4) as an expandable task force to run the proposed Cuban opera-
tion. The initial Table of Organization totaled 40 persons, with
18 at Headquarters, 20 at Havana Station, and two at Santiago Base.
9. The branch also began negotiations for a Panama training
Site. Its officers reconnoitered the area of Miami, Florida, in
search of suitable installations for office space, warehouses,
safe sites, recruiting centers, communications center, and bases
for the movement of persons, materiel, and propaganda into or out
of Cuba.
10. At the same time Headquarters and the Havana Station
were conducting a study of Cuban opposition leaders to prepare
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for the formation of a unified political front to serve as the
cover instrument for clandestine operations and as a rallying
point for anti-Castro Cubans. They were also making a map
reconnaissance of the Caribbean, seeking a site for a powerful
medium-wave and short-wave radio station.
Preliminary Progress
li. As a result of this intensive activity over a relatively
brief period the Agency was able to report considerable preliminary
progress and to predict early performance in a number of respects,
when it carried its request for policy approval to the President
in mid-March of 1960.
12. Among the facts so reported (Annex A) were: That the
Agency was in close touch with leaders of three major and reputable
anti-Castro groups of Cubans whose representatives, possibly
together with others, would form a unified opposition council
within 30 days; that the Agency was already supporting opposition
broadcasts from Miami, had arranged for additional radio outlets
in Massachusetts, [REDACTED] [REDACTED] and that a powerful
“oray”™ station, probably on Swan Island, could be made ready in
two months; that publication of an exile edition of a confiscated
Cuban newspaper had been arranged; that a controlled action group
was distributing propaganda inside Cuba, and that anti-Castro
lecturers were being sent on Tatin American tours.
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13. The President was further informed that an effective
intelligence and action organization inside Cuba, responsive to
direction by the exile opposition, could probably be created within
60 days and that preparations for the development of an adequate
paramilitary force would require "a minimm of six months and
probably closer to eight."
Policy Discussions
abe Discussion at high pblicy levels of the Government had
preceded submission .of this progren to the President. In the last
months ‘of 1959 the Special Group, composed of representatives of
several aepartnents and agencies and charged by NSC 5412 with
responsibility for policy approval of major covert action opera-
tions, considered several Agency proposals for exile broadcasts
to Cuba. During Jammry and February of 1960 the Director of
Central Intelligence informed the Special Group of Agency planning
with regard to Cuba, and on 14 March an entire meeting was devoted
to discussion of the Agency's program. Concern was expressed over
the length of time required to get trained Cuban exiles into
action, and there was discussion of U.S. capabilities for immediate
overt action if required. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff is reported to have said that forces totaling 50,000 men
were ready if needed and that the first of them could be airborne
within four hours after receipt of orders. Members of the group
urged early formation of an exile junta. The Agency announced its
Page 16 (page 16 of the original)
intention of requesting funds to pursue the program, and no
objections were.raised by the group.
15. The project to unseat Castro had thus become a major
Agency activity with the highest policy sanction, engaging the
full-time activity of the personnel of a rapidly expanding operat-
ing branch, requiring a great amount of detailed day-to-day atten-
tion in higher Agency echelons and entailing frequent liaison with
other agencies and departments of the Govermnent.
16. The activities described to the President continued at
an accelerated rate, but the financial approach to the project: was
relatively cautious in the early weeks.
Financial Preparations
17. On 24 March 1960 the project was approved by the Director
of Central Intelligence in the initial amount of $900,000 for the
rest of Fiscal Year 1960. However, only two weeks later, on
7. April, WH/4 Branch reported that 85% of the $900,000 had been
obligated. By 30 June an additional $1,000,000 was obligated.
18. In April the Director of Central Intelligence told a
meeting of WH/4 personnel that he would recall people from anywhere
in the world if they were needed on the project. From January 1960,
when it had 4O people, the branch expanded to 588 by 16 April 1961,
becoming one of the largest branches in the Clandestine Services,
larger than some divisions. Its Table of Organization did not
include the large number of air operations persomel who worked
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on the project and who were administered by their own uit, the
Development Projects Division (DPD), nor did it include the many
people engaged in support activities or in services of common
concern, who, though not assigned to the project, nevertheless
devoted many hours to it.
19. In the early months of the project there were intensive
efforts to organize an exile front group, to get a broad and varied
propaganda program under way, to begin a paramilitary program, and
to acquire sites in Florida and elsewhere for training and. recruit-
‘ing activities and for office space.
20. The so-called "Bender Group™, composed of project politi-
cal action officers, was set up as a notional organization of
American businessmen to provide cover for dealing with the Cubans.
After a series of meetings in New York and Miami a nominally
unified Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD), composed of several
Cuban factions, was agreed upon on 11 May 1960.
Propaganda Activity
21. Radio broadcasts from Miami into Cuba were continued
under the sponsorship of a Cuban group. Preparations were made
for exile publication of Avance, whose Havana plant had been seized
by Castro. Anti-Castro propaganda operations were intensified
throughout Latin America, and a boat for marine broadcasts was pur-
chased. The Swan Island radio station, on which the President had
been briefed, was completed and on the air with test signals by
17. May.
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22. The action-cadre instruction training program was being
prepared, and $25,000 worth of sterile arms were being sent to the
Panama training base, which was activated 11 May. At the same time
Useppa Island, Florida, was acquired as a site for assessment and
holding of Cuban paramilitary candidates and for training radio
operators. Screening of paramilitary recruits had begun in Miami
in April, and the training in-Panama began in June.
.23. The Miami Base was opened on 25 May in the Coral Gables
business district under cover of a New York career development and
placement firm, backstopped by a Department of Defense contract,
and on 15 June a commmications site, with Army cover, was opened
at the former Richmond. Nayal Air Station, which was held. under
lease by the University of Miami. .Safe houses were also acquired
_in the Miami area for various operational uses. The use of other
sites for project activities, in the United States and other
countries, was acquired for varying periods as time went on.
24, Project officers were engaged in liaison on mumerous
matters. In April they reached an agreement with the Immigration
and Naturalization. Service on special entry procedure for Cubans
of interest to the operation. They consulted with Voice of America
and the United States Information Agency on propaganda operations.
There were many discussions with the Federal Commmications Com-
mission on the licensing of Radio Swan and with the Defense Depart-
ment concerning its cover. The State Department was regularly
consulted on political matters.
Page 19 (page 19 of the original)
Uneasy Front
25- Although Cuban leaders had formed a "front" at Agency
urging, it was an uneasy one. They were by no means in agreement,
either among themselves or with Agency case officers, on politics
or on operations.
26. Power struggles developed early in the life of the FRD.
The Cuban leaders wanted something to say about the course of
paramilitary operations. As early as May 1960 one of the more
prominent leaders was urging-an invasion on a fairly large scale”.
from a third country.
eT. By June the Amexican press was beginning to nibble at
the operation, principally at Radio Swan, some of the stories
implying that it was not a completely legitimate commercial venture.
Another indication that operational security was less than perfect
was a statement by a defected Cuban naval attache that it was com-
mon knowledge among exiles in Miami that a certain Cuban leader
was backed by the Agency and that “there were entirely too many
Americans running around the area waving money."
28. On 22 June the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
briefed the National Security Council on the project. Ultimate
objective of the training program, according to the paper prepared
for this briefing, was a minimm force of 500 men split into
approximately 25 teams skilled in organizing, training and leading
indigenous dissident groups, each team to be provided with a radio
Page 20 (page 20 of the original)
operator. Preparations were under way for creating an exile Cuban
air force, and attempts were being made to develop maritime
capabilities for support of paramilitary groups.
29. “This briefing contained an expression of doubt that a
purely clandestine effort would be able to cope with Castro's
increasing military capability, pointing out that implementation
of the paramilitary phase of operations would be contingent upon
the existence of dissident forces who were Willing to resist and
that such groups had not as yet emerged in strength.
Training in Panama
30. The air training program began to get under way in July
1960 with the screening of Cuban pilot recruits and negotiations
with Defense for 12 AD-5s and the Navy being asked to supply 75
® instruction and maintenance personnel.
31. In mid-June 29 Cubans had errived in Panema to begin
training in small-wnit infiltration.
32. The FRD was resisting Agency attempts to persuade it to
move its headquarters to Mexico and was demanding direct contact
with the State Department or with some high government official in
order to argue its case. It also showed reluctance to become
involved in the recruiting of Cuban pilots. It presented a budget
for $500, 000 @ month, excluding paramilitary costs, but was told
it would have to get along on $131,000 and would get this only if
it agreed to move to Mexico. It did agree to furnish 500
none. deat
Page 21 (page 21 of the original)
paramilitary candidates and finally gave in on the issue of moving
to Mexico. It remained there only a few weeks because of harassment
by the Mexican Government, in spite of prior agreements to the
contrary. It appears that one reason why the FRD leaders were 80
reluctant to be based in.a third country is that they desired to
establish a direct, official channel to the U.S. Government.
Emphasis on Resistance
33. In August WH/4 Branch prepared papers for use in briefing.
the President and the Joint Chiers of Staff, respectively. By
about 1 November it was expected to have 500 paramilitary trainees
and 37 radio operators ready for action. It was stated that this
&roup would be available for use as infiltration teams or as an
C invasion force. The briefing paper for the Joint Chiefs made the
point that “obviously the successful implementation of any large-
scale paramilitary operations is dependent upon widespread
guerrilla resistance throughout the area."
34. The paper prepared for the President's briefing identified
11 groups or individuals with whom the Agency had some sort of
contact and who claimed to have assets in Cuba. The paper for the
Joint Chief's spoke of the problems of obtaining support bases and
trained man power and warned that an exile invasion force might
have to be backed up by a contingency force, augmented by U.S.
Army Special Forces personnel.
Moe pane te ee oe
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35. The terms "invasion", “strike", and "assault" were used
@ in these documents although the strike force concept does not seem
to have been given any sort of policy sanction until the Special
Group meetings which took place toward the end of 1960.
‘Plan of Operations
36. The Presidential briefing paper of August 1960 outlined
the plan of operations as follows:
"The initial phase of paramilitary operations envisages
the development, support and guidance of dissident groups in
three areas of Cuba: Pinar del Rio, Escambray and Sierra
Maestra. These groups will be organized for concerted
guerrilla action against the regime.
"The second phase will be initiated by a combined sea-
alr assault by FRD forces on the Isle of Pines coordinated
with general guerrilla activity on the main island of Cuba.
This will establish a close-in staging base for future’
operations.
"The last phase will be air assault on the Havana area
with the guerrilla forces in Cuba moving on the ground from
these areas into the Havana area also."
37. Expenditures were rapidly running beyond the original
estimates. The WH Division estimated operating costs for four
weeks starting 1.July at $1,700,000 and for the fiscal year at.
approximately $25,000,000. On 19 August an additional $10,000,000
Page 23 (page 23 of the original)
BGR Gale.
was requested and obtained. About half of this figure was the
estimated cost of paramilitary activities, with about another
$2,000,000 estimated for propaganda.
Anti-Castro Broadcasts
38. Propaganda activity had gotten off to an early start
and had developed rapidly. After an initial shakedown period
Radio Swan had gone on the air first with anti-Trujillo, then
with anti ~Castro broadcasts. Radio programs were also originating
in Miami and [REDACTED] The newspaper Avance in Exile was being
published by the end of the summer, and a second paper and a
weekly magazine were planned. There had also ‘been some successful
black operations. Most such operations had thus far been conducted
without participation by the FRD.
39. By the end of August the FRD had a lawyer team set for 4
latin American propaganda tour and was ready with its first broad-
cast on Radio Swan, which was reported to be getting world-wide
reception with many listeners in Cuba. An anti-Castro comic book
was being reprinted, and a Spanish-language television program was
being preparéd in Miami.
4O. At the end of August WH/4 Branch was reporting that a
machine run search had failed to find any bilingual Agency employee
suitable as a Radio Swan announcer. (This search went on for some
time. On 28 December the branch reported finding a candidate, but
on 18 January 1961 that he had backed out.)
1522
Page 24 (page 24 of the original)
41. Late September 1960 saw the almost simultaneous occur-
rence of the first maritime operation and the first air drop over
Cuba. The former was successful. The latter, the first of a
series of failures, resulted in the capture and execution of a
paramilitary agent on whom the project had set great store.
Maritime Operations
42, Several successful maritime operations took piace during
make them almost impossible. But the project had only one boat
regularly available during this period, and the process of supply-
ing and building up a resistance movement through clandestine
means began to seem intolerably slow, especially since during this
same period Castro's army was reported to have been strengthened
with 30 to 4o thousand tons of Bloc arms, and Cuban internal
security was being tightened.
43, .The strike force concept which, as noted, had already
begun to be associated with the project as early as July, began
to play an ever greater role in WH/4 Planning. This role became
dominant in September 1960 with the assignment to the project, as
chief of its Paramilitary Staff, of a Marine Corps colonel
experienced in amphibious operations.
kt. In late October the Nicaraguan Government offered the
Agency the use of an air strip and docking facilities at Puerto
Cabezas, some 250 miles closer to Cuba than the facilities in
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Guatemala. At about the same time, the Agency requested the Army
to supply 38 Special Forces personnel as instructors. Due to
prolonged policy negotiations, these trainers did not arrive in
Guatemala until 12 January 1961.
Switch in Concept
45. On k November 1960 WH/ took formal action to change the
course of the project by greatly expanding the size of the Cuban
paramilitary unit and redirecting its training along more conven-
tional military lines. Appropriate orders were sent to the
Guatemala Base, which had 475 air and ground trainees on 10 November,
and to Miami where recruiting efforts were increased.
46, By this time Miami Base, through liaison with the FRD
military staff, had already recruited and dispatched to Guatemala
101 air and 370 paremilitary trainees, plus six specialists (doctors,
dentists, and chaplains). ‘The base had also recruited 124 maritime
personnel for manning the invasion fleet that was being acquired.
47. By 28 January 1961 the strike force strength was 644, on
3 February it was 685, by 10 March it had risen to 826, by 22 March
to 973. On April 1961 brigade strength was reported at 1,390.
48. On 3 November 1960 WH/4 reported it had only $2,250,000
jeft for the rest of Fiscal Year 1961, and by 16 December this was
almost gone. A supplementary budget estimate was prepared, and an
additional $28,200,000 was obtained from the Bureau of the Budget.
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Freedom Fund Campaign
4g. There were also financial problems on a smaller scale.
To publicize Radio Swan, and perhaps to enhance its cover, the
Cuban Freedom Fund Campaign was organized in November to solicit
donations through newspaper advertisements. The radio station,
which was budgeted at $900,000 for Fiscal Year 1961, received
$330 in gifts during the next few weeks.
50. Bohemia Libre, a handsome weekly magazine, budgeted
at $300,000 but actually costing about $35,000 an issue had
bad luck from the start in seeking advertising and once missed
an issue on that account. Additional funds had to be sought
for it several times. Yet it developed an audited circulation
of 126,000, said to be second only to the Reader's Digest in
the Spanish-language field.
D1. While the project moved forward, acquiring boats,
planes and bases, training men, negotiating with foreign govern-
ments, seeking policy clarification, training an FRD security
service, publishing magazines and newspapers, putting out radio
broadcasts, and attempting to move arms, men and propaganda
into Cuba by sea or air, the FRD, in whose name most of this
activity was being carried on, was making little progress
toward unity.
52. Members would resign in a huff and have to be wheedled
back. Each faction wanted supplies to be sent only to its own
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followers in Cuba, while groups inside were reluctant to receive
infiltrees sent in the name of the FRD. ‘The FRD coordinator had
his own radio boat which made unauthorized broadcasts until
halted by the Federal Commnications Commission and the Federal
Bureau of Investigation.
Provisional Government Plans
53. Tentative- plans for a provisional government were first
discussed with FRD leaders in December, and this set off a flurry
of intrigue and bickering which delayed the recruiting process
'and did nothing to advance the cause of unity. In mid-January
Miami Base reported that "the over-all problem is simply to main-
tain the Frente (FRD) as an operational facade until military
action intervenes and a provisional government can be established."
Until the question of how and by whom such a government was to
be selected could be answered, the base reported, "we are at
political dead center."
54. This dead center remained until very near the target
date and was only resolved by an ultimatum to the FRD Executive
Committee directing its members to agree on the chairman for a
Revolutionary Council or risk the loss of all further support.
However, in selective ways the FRD proved to be a
responsive and useful instrument. An example of this was the
counterintelligence and security service which, under close
project control, developed into an efficient and valuable unit
in support of the FRD, Miami Base, and the project program.
Page 28 (page 28 of the original)
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56. By mid-March 1961 this security orgenization comprised
86 employees of whom 37. were trained case officers, the service
having graduated four classes from its own training center,
Whose chief instructor was a [REDACTED] police officer.
Security Activities
of. The FRD's service ran operations into Cuba, -many of
them successful. It built up a voluminous. set of card files
on Cuban personalities. --One of its most helpful services was
reporting on meetings of FRD committees and other -anti-Castro
groups and on political. maneuvering within the :FRD hierarchy.
It also helpea in recruiting for the strike force at a time
when the political leaders were sabotaging this effort. Security
and counterintelligence teams were also trained for integration
with the strike force. These had the primary mission of securing
vital records and documents during the invasion and a secondary
mission of assisting in establishing and maintaining martial law.
58. he service also carried on radio monitoring and con-
ducted interrogations and debriefings. An indication of its
alertness and efficiency is the fact that it supplied Miami Base
with its first information on the location of a C-5k plane which
was forced down in Jamaica after a mission over Cuba. The chief
of the service was largely responsible for personally persuading
the crew. of the downed plane to return to the training camp.
Page 29 (page 29 of the original)
Se ane aeenees one ee
29. %In the first three months of 1961 the problems faced
by the project were many and complex. Although the Army Special
Forces instructors had finally arrived in Guatemala the brigade
trainee quota was still only half fulfilled and a call went to
the training camps for special recruiting teams to be sent to
Miami. Meanwhile trainees who had been in the camp for several
months had had no contact with the political front: and were
wondering what sort of a Cuban future they were expected to
fight for. Disturbances broke out, and the project leaders
persuaded three FRD figures to visit the camp and mollify the men.
training in the U.S.
60. During this period the Nicaraguan air strip which
had been placed at the project's disposal was being made ready
for use and two new training sites were activated. Although
a definite policy determination on the training of Cubans in
the U.S. had never been made, 25 tank operators were success-
fully trained for the strike force at Fort Knox. Another
eleventh-hour training requirement was fulfilled when the
project acquired the use of Belle Chase Ammmition Depot near
New Orleans. This was used for the training of a company-
sized unit hurriedly recruited for a diversion landing and of
an underwater demolition team.
61. During the period between the U.S. national elections
and the inauguration of President Kennedy the Government's
Page 30 (page 30 of the original)
ioe oe
pees ane omer cad
ee oan eee
policymaking machinery had slowed down. A number of piecemeal
policy decisions were vouchsafed, but not all the specific ones
the project chiefs were pressing for, for example, authority for
tactical air strikes and permission to use American contract pilots.
-62. President Eisenhower had given a general go-ahead signal
on 29 November and had reaffirmed it on 3 January 1961, but the
impending change in administration was slowing matters down. For
exemple, a proposed propaganda drop was turned down on 13 January
for this reason. On 19 January, at the Special Group's last
meeting before the inauguration, it was agreed that a high-level
méeting, to include the new Secretaries of State and Defense,
should be set up as soon as possible to reaffirm the basic concepts
of the project.
Preparations Endorsed
63. Such a meeting was held 22 January, and the project and
current preparations were generally endorsed. At a meeting with
the new President on 28 January the Agency was authorized to
continue present activities and was instructed to submit the
tactical paramilitary plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for
analysis. Shortly thereafter, in an attempt to get a high-level
internal review of the plan, it was briefed to Gen. Cabell,
Gen. Bull (consultant) and Adm. Wright (ONE). By 6 February
the Joint Chiefs had returned a favorable evaluation of the
strike plan, together with a number of suggestions.
22.
Page 31 (page 31 of the original)
64. On 17 February the Agency presented a paper (Annex B)
to the President which outlined three possible courses of action
against Castro.
65. Noting plans for early formation of a government in
exile, the paper described the growing strength of the Castro
regime under Bloc support and observed: "Therefore, after
some date probably no more than six months away it will become
militarily infeasible to overthrow the Castro regime except by
the commitment to combat of a sizeable organized military force.
The option of action by the Cuban opposition will no longer be
open.”
66. This paper found the use of small-scale guerrilla
groups not feasible and advocated a surprise landing of a mili-
tary force, concluding that the brigade had a good chance of
overthrowing Castro "or at the very least causing a damaging
civil war without requiring the U.S. to commit itself to overt
action against Cuba."
67. Following presentation of this paper to the President,
the project leaders were given to understand that it would be
at least two weeks before a decision would be made as to use
of the invasion force. They thereupon withheld action to expand
the force up to 1,000 for the time being.
Movement of Agents
68. Although the invasion preparations were absorbing
most of the project's energies and funds wH/) Branch was still
Page 32 (page 32 of the original)
eae ae oe
attempting to nourish the underground. There were six success-
ful boat operations, carrying men and materials, in February
and 13 in March, and two successful air drops in March. Infil-
tration of agents was continuing. As of 15 February Miami Base
reported the following numbers and types of agents in Cuba:
Counterintelligence, 20; positive intelligence, 5; propaganda,
2; paramilitary, 4. As of 15 March the base reported that
these numbers had risen, respectively, to 21, 11, 9, and 6.
69. By the invasion date the personnel strength of Miami
Base had grown to 160. The intensity of activity there during
the latter months of the operation is indicated by the record
of a day picked at random it happened to be 9 February
when 21 case officers spent 140 man hours in personal contact
with 125 Cubans.
7O. Suecessive changes in the operational plan and post-
ponements of the strike date are discussed later in this
report and are documented in Annexes C, D, and E. Detailed
policy authorization for some specific actions was either never
fully clarified or only resolved at the eleventh hour, and even
the central decision as to whether to employ the strike force
was still somewhat in doubt up to the very moment of embarka-
tion.
fi. During the weeks preceding the invasion the pace of
events quickened. In early March the State Department asked the
Page 33 (page 33 of the original)
aan ar SI 2 oa
@ Agency not to announce formation of the Revolutionary Couritil
or to commit any untoward act until after the 5-9 March Mexico
City Peace Conference. The Cubans conferring in New York dis-
agreed on various aspects of a post-Castro platform. The Guatemala
camp was having counterintelligence problems.
Sabotage Action
72. On 12 March the LCI “Barbara J" successfully launched
and recovered a sabotage team in an action against the Texaco
refinery in Santiago.
73. During 13-15 March project chiefs were working inten-
sively to prepare a revised plan wach would meet policy objec-
tions cited by the State Department. On the 15th the new plan
C was presented to the President.
74. In mid-March ten members were added to the FRD Execu-
tive Committee, the politicians contimued their platform talks,
and 23 March wag set as deadline for choice of a chairman. An
intensive defection project was started from Miami Base. A
survey was started with the object of determining the trainges'
knowledgeability of U.S. involvement in the strike preparations.
Trainees at Guatemala were impatient, and a number had gone
AWOL.
75. Jose Miro Cardona was unanimously elected Chairman
of the Revolutionary Council.
Page 34 (page 34 of the original)
Paeielie Gale
76. In late March the (iii presse,
ostensible owner of the Swan Island radio station, thanked all
the sponsors of political programs and advised them that no more
tapes would be required; purpose of this action was to clear the
way for a unity program during the action phase of the operation.
A Radio Swan listener survey had received 1,659 replies from 20
countries. .Ships with strike force equipment were arriving in
Nicaragua, and the Guatemala camp was still receiving trainees
as late as the week of 4 April.
Overflights Suspended
Tf. Cuban overflights were suspended on 28 March. ‘Two
reasons have been given for this suspension: (a) that the air-
craft were needed to move the strike force from Guatemala to
Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, for embarkation on the invasion ships 3
(b) that the Agency wished to avoid any incident, such as a
plane being downed over Cuba, which might upset the course of
events during the critical pre-invasion period.
78. For a White House meeting on 29 March papers were pre-
pared on these subjects: (a) The status of the defection program;
(b) internal Cuban support which could be expected for the landing
operation.
79. On 5 April the B-26 "defection" plan was prepared in an
effort to knock out some of Castro's air force before D Day in a
manner which would satisfy State Department objections. Project
Page 35 (page 35 of the original)
chiefs agreed that in event of a policy decision to call off the
invasion they would move the troops to sea, tell them that new
intelligence made the invasion inadvisable, and divert the force
to Vieques Island for demobilization.
80. On 12 April at a meeting with the President it was
decided that Mr. Berle would tell Miro Cardona there would be no
overt U.S. support of the invasion. The President publicly
announced there would be no U.S. support. On 13 April all wH/4
headquarters sections went on 2k-hour duty. The Revolutionary
Council was assembled in New York and advised that it would be
briefed in stages on the military aspects of the project. On
14 April the Council agreed to go into "4 solation" during the
landing phase of the military operation.
81. The raids on three Cuban airfields were carried out by
eight B-26s on 15 April, and destruction of half of Castro's air
force was estimated on the basis of good post-strike photography.
Afterward, according to plan, one of the pilots landed in Florida
and announced that the raids had been carried out by defectors
from Castro's own air force. The Council was briefed on the air
strike. The diversionary expedition by the force which had been
trained in New Orleans failed to make a landing on two successive
nights preceding the strike.
82. “Immediately before D Day, Radio Swan and other outlets
were broadcasting 18 hours a day on medium-wave and 16 hours on
short-wave. Immediately after D Day, these totals were increased
ann mlipnretaneltine
Page 36 (page 36 of the original)
to 55 hours and 26 hours, respectively. Fourteen frequencies
were used. By the time of the 4nvasion a total of 12,000 ,000
pounds of leaflets had been dropped on Cuba.
83. Late on 16 April, the eve of D Day, the air strikes
designed to knock out the rest of Castro's air force on the
following morning were called off. The message reached the
field too late to halt the landing operation, as the decision
to cancel the air strike was made after the landing force had
been committed.
84, he invasion fleet which had assembled off the south
coast of Cuba on the night of 16 April included two LCIs owmed
by the Agency, a U.S. Navy LSD carrying three LCUs and four LCVPs,
all of them pre-loaded with supplies, and seven chartered commer-
cial freighters. All these craft participated in the assault
phase, except for three freighters which were loaded with follow-up
supplies for ground and air forces. These vessels were armed
with 50-caliber machine guns. In addition, each LCI mounted two
75-mm. recoilless rifles.
85. In addition to the personal weapons of the Cuban exile
soldiers, the armament provided for combat {necluded sufficient
numbers of Browning automatic rifles, machine guns, mortars,
recoilless rifles, rocket launchers, and flame-throwers. There
were also five M-41 tanks, 12 heavy trucks, an aviation fuel tank
truck, a tractor crane, a bulldozer, two large water trailers,
and numerous small trucks and tractors.
pn: ata eae ae
Page 37 (page 37 of the original)
Se nanan Le can eel
86. The invasion brigade comprised 1,511 men, all of them on
the invasion ships excepting one airborne infantry company of 177
men. The brigade included five infantry companies, a heavy weapons
company, an intelligence-reconnaissance company, and a tank platoon.
87. These troops had been moved by air on three successive
nights from the Guatemala training camp to the staging area in
Nicaragua where they embarked on the ships which had been pre-loaded
at New Orleans. The ships had moved on separate courses from
Nicaragua, under unobtrusive Navy escort, to the rendezvous 40 miles
offshore in order to avoid the appearante of a convoy. From there
they had moved in column under cover of darkness to a point 5,000
yards from the landing area, where they met the Navy LSD. These
complicated movements were apparently accomplished in a secure
manner and without alerting the enemy.
88. Of the three follow-up ships, one was due to arrive from
Nicaragua on the morning of D Day plus 2 and two others were on
call at sea south of Cuba. Additional supplies were available for
air landing or parachute delivery at airfields in Guatemala,
Nicaragua, and Florida. At a Defense base in Anniston, Alabama,
there were also supplies ready for 15,000 men. Altogether there
were arms and equipment available to furnish 30,000 dissidents
expected to rally to the invasion force.
89. The landing was to be carried out at three beaches about
18 miles from each other on the Zapata Peninsula. The left flank
of the beachhead was Red Beach at the head of Cochinos Bay; Green
Page 38 (page 38 of the original)
wes
Beach was at the right flank, with Blue Beach at the center. .The
lodgment to be seized was thus a coastal strip about ho miles
long, separated from the interior by an impassable swamp penetrated
only by three roads from the north and flanked by a coastal road
from the east.
-90. In the early hours of 17 April Cuban underwater demoli-
tion teams, each led by an American contract employee, went ashore
to mark Red and Blue Beaches. Each of these parties engaged in
fire fights with small enemy forces but accomplished their tasks, ©
and the troops began moving ashore in small alumimm boats und
ICUs. Before daylight small militia forces were encountered at
both beaches. These offered little opposition, and many of the
militiamen were quickly captured.
Ql. Not long after daylight the airborne infantry company
was successfully parachuted from c-h6 aircraft to four of the five
scheduled drop zones where its elements were given the mission of
sealing off approach roads.
9e. At dawn began the enemy air attacks which the project
chiefs had aimed to prevent by the planned dawn strikes with
Nicaragua-based aircraft against Castro's fields. Action by
Castro's B-26s, Sea Furies, and jet T-33s resulted. in the sinking
of a supply ship, the beaching of a transport, and damage to an
ICI. The plan for a landing at Green Beach was thereupon abandoned,
and these troops, with their tanks and vehicles were put ashore at
Blue Beach. Shipping withdrew to the south under continuous air attack.
Page 39 (page 39 of the original)
TOP
93. The air attacks continued throughout the day. The 11
B-26s of the Cuban exile force which were available for ‘close
support and interdiction were no match for the T-33 jets. However,
at least four of Castro's other aircraft were shot down by machine
gun fire from maritime craft, assisted by friendly air support.
94, Whe first ground attacks by Castro's fortes occurred at
Red Beach which was hit by successive waves of militia in the
morning, afternoon and evening of 17 April. While ammmition
lasted these attacks were beaten off with heavy enemy tasualties,
and several of Castro's tanks were halted or destroyed. by ground
or friendly air action. On the morning of 18 April, the Red
Beach Force, nearly out of ammmition, retired in good order to
Blue Beach without being pressed by the enemy.
95+ In addition to supporting the ground forces and protect-
ing shipping on 17 April, the friendly B-26s also sank a Castro
patrol escort ship and attacked the Cienfuegos airfield. Four -of
the friendly B-26s were shot down, while three returned safely to
Nicaragua, and four landed at other friendly bases.
96. Attempts were made to resupply the brigade with ammmi-
tion by air drops. On the night of 17-18 April one C-54 drop was
made at Red Beach and three at Blue Beach, and on the following
night Blue Beach received two drops. Preparations for resupply
by sea had to be cancelled due to enemy air action.
Page 40 (page 40 of the original)
97. At Blue Beach the enemy ground attacks, supported by
aircraft, began from three directions on the afternoon of 18 April.
Six friendly B-26s, two of them flown by Americans, inflicted
heavy damage on the Castro colum moving up from the west using
napalm, bombs, rockets, and machine gun fire to destroy several
tanks and about 20 troop-laden trucks. Air support to the Blue
Beach troops was continued.on the morning of 19 April, -when three
friendly B-26s, including two piloted by Americans, were shot
down by Castro T-33s. Jet cover from the Navy aircraft carrier
"Essex" had been expected to protect the 19 April sorties, but a
misunderstanding over timing hampered its effectiveness.
98. In spite of this air action, however, and in spite of a
reported 1,800 casuslties suffered by the Castro forces y the
brigade's ability to resist depended in the last resort on
resupply of ammunition, which had now become impossible. “On the
night of 18 April, when failure appeared inevitable >. the Cuban
brigade commander refused an offer to evacuate his troops. And
on the morning of 19 April, with ammmition rapidly running out,
the brigade was still able to launch a futile counterattack
against the forces relentlessly moving in from the west.
99. In the last hours of resistance the brigade commander
sent a series of terse and desperate messages to the task force
command ship pleading for help:
“"We are out of ammo and fighting on the beach. Please
send help. We cannot hold."
oof
Page 41 (page 41 of the original)
® "In water. Out of ammo. Enemy closing in. Help must
arrive in mext hour."
"When your help will be here and with what?"
“Why your help has not come?"
100. “The last message was as follows: "Am destroying all
equipment and commmications. Tanks are in sight. JI have nothing
to fight with. Am taking to woods. I cannot repeat cannot. wait
for you."
101. An evacuation convoy was headed for the beach on the
afternoon of 19 April. When it became known that the beachhead
had collapsed the convoy reversed course.
102. During the next few days two Americans and 4 crew of
Cc Cuban frogmen succeeded in rescuing 26 survivors from the beach
@ and coastal islands.
Page 42 (page 42 of the original)
ee wate aareares eee
en em ee esfion
C. SUMMARY OF EVALUATION
1. In evaluating the Agency's performance it is essential
to avoid grasping immediately, as many persons have done, at the
explanation that the President's order cancelling the D-Day air
strikes was the chief cause of failure.
2. Discussion of that one decision would merely raise this
underlying question: If the project had been better conceived,
better organized, better staffed and better managed, would that
precise issue ever have had to be presented for Presidential
decision at all? And would it have been presented under the
same ill-prepared, inadequately briefed circumstances?
3. Furthermore, it is essential to keep in mind the
possibility that the invasion was doomed in advance, that an
initially successful landing by 1,500 men would eventually
have been crushed by Castro's combined military resources
strengthened by Soviet Bloc-supplied military materiel.
4. The fundamental cause of the disaster was the Agency's
failure to give the project, notwithstanding its importance
and its immense potentiality for damage to the United States,
the top-flight handling which it required appropriate
organization, staffing throughout by highly qualified personnel,
and full-time direction and control of the highest quality.
5. Insufficiencies in these vital areas resulted in
pressures and distortions, which in turn produced numerous
Page 43 (page 43 of the original)
serious operational mistakes and omissions, and in lack of
awareness of developing dangers, in failure to take action to
counter them, and in grave mistakes of judgment. There was
failure at high levels to concentrate informed, unwavering
scrutiny on the project and to apply experienced, unbiased
judgment to the menacing situations that developed.
Page 44 (page 44 of the original)
D. EVALUATION OF ORGANIZATION AND COMMAND STRUCTURE
1. The project was organized at the level of an operating
branch, the fourth echelon in the organization of the Agency, in
the Western Hemisphere Division. Its chief, a GS-15, was not
given the independence and the broad, extensive powers of a task
force commander Instead, he had to apply constantly for the
decision of policy questions and important operational problems
to the Deputy Director (Plans) (DD/P), who was in fact directing
the project, although this was only one of his many responsibilities.
The DD/P delegated much of his responsibility to his Deputy for
Covert Action, especially the handling of policy matters involving
contact with non-Agency officials. The office of the DD/P and the
offices of the project were in different buildings. Consideration
was given by the DD/P in late 1960 to raising the project out of
WH Division and placing it directly under his Deputy for Covert
Action, but this was not done.
2. The Chief of WH Division was in the chain of command
between the chief of the project and the DD/P but only in a partial
sense. He exercised his right to sign the project's outgoing cables
until the week of the invasion even though the project's own signal
center was activated at the end of December 1960. He supervised the
staffing activities and attended some of the meetings of the Special
Group. But the Dp/P and his deputy dealt directly with the project
chief, and gradually the Chief of WH Division began to play only 4
diminished role.
Page 45 (page 45 of the original)
3. The DD/P, in turn, reported to the Director of Central
Intelligence (DCI) and the Deputy Director of Central Intelli-
gence (DDCI) who usually represented the Agency at the meetings
of the 5412 Special Group.
4. The Director delegated his responsibility for major
project decisions to a considerable extent. He relied on the
DDCI, an Air Force general, for policy matters involving air
operations. For military advice he relied on the military
officers detailed to the project. This reliance deprived the
Director of completely objective counsel, since the project's
military personnel were deeply involved in building up the
strike force and the DDCI was taking an active role in the
conduct of air operations.
Fragmentation of Authority
5. Thus, the project lacked a single high-level full-
time commander possessing stated broad powers and abilities
sufficient for the carrying out of this large, enormously
difficult mission. In fact, authority was fragmented among
the project chief, the military chief of the project's Para-
military Staff, and several high-level officials, whose wide
responsibilities elsewhere in the Agency prevented them from
giving the project the attention it required. There were too
many echelons; the top level had to be briefed by briefers who
themselves were not doing the day-to-day work.
3T6
Page 46 (page 46 of the original)
Qahirah aipenifin
6. Three further extraordinary factors must be mentioned:
(1) The Chief of Operations of the Clandestine
Services (COPS), who is the DD/P's chief staff advisor on
clandestine operations, played only a very minor part in the
project. On at least two occasions COPS was given express warn-
ing that the project was being perilously mismanaged, but he
declined to involve himself with the project.
(2) ‘The three Senior Staffs, the Agency's top-level
technical advisors in their respective areas, were not consulted
fully, either at the important formative stages of the’ project
or even after grave operational difficulties had begun to develop;
instead, they allowed themselves to be more or less ignored by
the chief of the project and his principal assistants. This
state of affairs is partly attributable to the inadequate
managerial skill and the lack of experience in clandestine pare
military operations of the WH/4 chiefs; -it was not corrected by
the DD/P or his deputy or by the Chief of WH Division.
(3) There was no review of the project by the Agency's
Project Review Committee, which would at least have allowed the
views of the most senior review body in the Agency to be heard.
Independence of DPD
7. Still another important factor in the diffusion of
direction and control was the insistence of the Agency's air
arm, the Development Projects Division (DPD), on preserving
Page 47 (page 47 of the original)
ALA St mR
its independence and remaining outside the organizational
structure of the project, in which it hada vital, central
role, including air drops to the underground, training Cuban
pilots, operation of air bases, the immense logistical problems
of transporting the Cuban volunteers from Florida to Guatemala,
and the procuring and servicing of the military planes. ‘The
project chief had no command authority over air planning and
air operations. The DPD unit established for this purpose was
completely independent.
8. The result was a divided command dependent upon mutual
cooperation. There was no day-to-day continuing staff relation-
ship, which is essential for properly coordinated operations.
Headquarters of the two units were in different buildings far
away from each other. The chiefs of air operations in Guatemala
and Nicaragua were DPD representatives independent of the wH/4
chiefs of these bases, and the Headquarters confusion was
compounded in the field.
9. In October 1960, shortly after his assignment to the
project, the paramilitary chief noted coordination difficulties
between WH/4 and DPD. He pointed out that the organizational
structure was contrary to military command principles 3 to
accepted management practices, and to the principles enunciated
by the DD/P himself in 1959, and recommended that the DPD wit
be integrated into wH/}, under command of its chief.
Page 48 (page 48 of the original)
Fallure of Integration Effort
10. The pp/P rejected this recommendation as not being the
most efficient solution for technical reasons. The insufficiently
effective relationship between the project and the DPD unit was
one of the gravest purely organizational failures of the opera-
tion. The pp/P has subsequently confirmed this conclusion and
has ascribed this lack of effectiveness to personality frictions
and to the "classic service rivalry." (We would note that this
does not exist in present-day combined commands. )
il. The organizational confusion was augmented by the
existence of a large forward operating base in the Miami area,
which in turn had loose control over several sub-bases. The
mission of this base was vaguely defined and not well understood..
In theory the base had a supporting role; ‘actually it was con-
ducting operations which for the most part paralleled similar
operations being conducted by WH/4 from Headquarters. ‘This
divided effort was expensive, cumbersome, and difficult to
coordinate. In some cases the efforts of the two elements
were duplicating or conflicting or even competing with each other.
le. The upshot of this complex and bizarre organizational
situation was that in this tremendously difficult task the
Agency failed to marshal its forces properly and to apply them
effectively.
Page 49 (page 49 of the original)
een ae ea
E. EVALUATION OF STAFFING
1. In April 1960 the Director of Central Intelligence
stated that he would recall from any station in the world
personnel whose abilities were required for the success of
the project. This recognition of the need for high-quality
personnel is nowhere reflected in the history of the project.
The DD/P's Deputy for Covert Action advised his subordinates
that the Director's words did not mean that the project was
to be given carte blanche in personnel procurement but that
officers could be adequately secured through negotiation.
2. In actual fact, personnel for the project were
secured by the customary routine method of negotiation between
the project and the employee's office of current assignment;
no recourse was had to directed assignment by the Director of
Central Intelligence. The traditional independence of the 55
individual division and branch chiefs in the Clandestine
Services remained unaffected by the Director's statement. The
lists prepared by the project for the purpose of negotiation
for personnel naturally reflected the preferences of the chief
of the project and the willingness of the person in question
to accept the assignment. In many cases, the reason for assign
ing a given person to the project was merely that he had just
returned from abroad and was still without an assignment.
Page 50 (page 50 of the original)
3. The basic mistake was made of filling the key spots
early, without realizing how much the project vould grow and
that it should be staffed for a major effort. In some cases
officers originally selected to supervise five persons ultimately
had to supervise 15 or 20 times as many. Of the three GS-16
officers assigned to the project, none was given top-level
managerial responsibilities. The result of all these factors
was that none of the most experienced, senior operating officers
of the Agency participated full time in the project.
An Indication of Quality
4, An interesting insight into the quality of the personnel
of WH/4 is afforded by the initial "Relative Retention Lists"
prepared in April 1961 by the divisions and senior staffs of the
Clandestine Services and other Agency units pursuant to the
requirements of Regulation 20-701 (Separation of Surplus Personnel).
Each such unit was required to group its officers in each grade
into ten groups, on the basis of the performance and qualifica-
tions of each one. (Under the prescribed procedure, these lists
are to be reviewed at several levels before becoming definitive. )
5. Of the 42 officers holding the principal operational jobs
in WH/4 in grade GS-12 through GS-15, 17 officers were placed in
the lowest third of their respective grade, and 9, or 21% in the
lowest tenth. The ratings of 23 of these 42 were made by WH
Division, which placed seven in the lowest third, and 19 were rated
by other units, which together placed ten in the lowest third.
Page 51 (page 51 of the original)
En PgR
6. It is apparent from these ratings that the other units
had not detailed their best people to WH/4 but had in some
instances given the project their disposal cases.
7. Furthermore, although the project eventually included
the large number of 588 personnel, there were long periods in
which important slots went unfilled, due to difficulty in
procuring suitable officers. For example, the counterintelligence
officer of the Miami Base was never supplied with a case officer
assistant, there was a long period in which the project professed
inability to find a CI officer for the Guatemala Base, and
months were spent in search of an announcer for Radio Swan. Few
Clandestine Services people were found who were capable of serving
as base chiefs; the support services had to supply most of them.
All of the paramilitary officers had to be brought from outside
WH Division, or even from outside the Agency. (Air operations
presented no staffing problem for WH/4, since DPD supplied its
own people. )
8. There were in fact insufficient people to do the job
during the latter stages of the project. Personnel worked such
long hours and so intensively that their efficiency was affected.
Personnel shortages were one of the reasons why much of the work
of the project was performed on a “crash" basis.
Page 52 (page 52 of the original)
ee coe ee
Scarcity of Linguists
9. Very few project personnel spoke Spanish or had Latin-
American backgrowmd knowledge. In a number of instances those
senior operating personnel in the field stations that did
speak Spanish had to be interrupted in their regular duties
merely in order to act as interpreters. This lack occurred
in part because of the scarcity of Spanish linguists in the
Agency and in part because WH Division did not transfer to the
project sufficient numbers of its own Spanish speakers.
10. There were many other examples of improper use of
skilled personnel. In many instances, case officers were used
merely as “handholders" for agents and technical specialists
were used as stevedores. Some of the people who served the
project on contract turned out to be incompetent.
ll. Staffing of the project was defective because the
whole Clandestine Services staffing system, with absolute
power being exercised by the division and branch chiefs, is
defective. Each division seeks to guard its own assets; scanty
recognition is given to the respective priorities of the various
projects.
12. In spite of the foregoing, there were a great many
excellent people in the project who worked effectively and who
developed considerably in the course of their work. It should
also be emphasized that, almost without exception, personnel
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AP SN ae aa soe
worked extremely long hours for months on end without complaint
and otherwise manifested high motivation, together with great
perseverance and ingenuity in solving the manifold problems
that the project constantly raised. It should be stated that in
general the support people sent to the project by the support
component were of excellent quality and effective performance.
13. Unfortwuately, however, while many persons performed
prodigies of effort, these were often directed towards over~
coming obstacles which better organization and management would
have eliminated. Such efforts were especially necessary (a) in
support, of the chimera of "non-attributability" of the operation;
(b) in negotiating with the Armed Services for equipment, train-
ing personnel, etc., which the Agency should have been able to
request as of right; and (c) in providing the support for an
overt military enterprise that was too large for the Agency's
capabilities.
Page 54 (page 54 of the original)
an eee aoe ae
F, EVALUATION OF PLANNING
1. Before proceeding to an evaluation of the Agency's
planning, the over-all policy decisions of the United States
Government with reference to the Cuban operation will first
be stated in summary form. These decisions not only consti-
tuted the background against which Agency planning was
conducted but also presented numerous important factors that
limited or otherwise determined its scope.
2. We will next endeayor to point out the various
occasions on which we believe that the Agency officials
responsible for the project made serious planning errors,
both of commission and of omission, which affected the project
in vital respects.
Between the plan approved by President Figenhower
on 17 March 1960 (Annex A) and the invasion plan actually
carried out on 17 April 1961 (Annex E) there was a radical
change in concept. Originally the heart of the plan was a
long, slow, clandestine build-up of guerrilla forces, to be
trained and developed in Cuba by a cadre of Cubans whom the
Agency would recruit, train and infiltrate into Cuba.
4. But thirteen months later the Agency sponsored an
overt assault-type amphibious landing of 1,500 combat-trained
and heavily armed soldiers. Most of them were unversed in
guerrilla warfare. They were expected to maintain themselves
Page 55 (page 55 of the original)
Ate me Len acm ee ce
Sar ne ae ae ee
for a period of time (some said a week) sufficient to
administer a "shock" and thereby, it was hoped, to trigger
an uprising.
Discard of Original Plan
5. By November 1960 the original planning paper (Annex A)
had for practical purposes ceased to exist as a charter for
Agency action. By that date the Special Group had come to
be umanimously of the opinion that the changed conditions,
chiefly Castro's increased military strength through Soviet
support and the increased effectiveness of his security
forces, had made the original covert activities plan obsolete.
6. The Special Group had however, not yet agreed on a
substitute plan and strong doubt was expressed whether any-~-
thing less than overt U.S. forces would suffice to obtain
Castro's downfall. But there appeared to be agreement that,
whatever the ultimate decision, it would be advantageous
for the United States to have some trained Cuban refugees
available for eventual use, and that CIA should continue to
prepare such a force.
7. At the end of November 1960, the Agency presented
revised plan to President Eisenhower and his advisors.
This included (a) infiltration into Cuba by air of 80 men
in small paramilitary teams, after reception committees had
been prepared by men infiltrated by sea; (b) an amphibious
aoe ee
Page 56 (page 56 of the original)
derbi penenlerlipeleenipaapalieee
landing of a team of 650-700 men with extraordinarily heavy
firepower; (c) preliminary air strikes against military
targets. CIA stated that it believed it feasible to seize
and hold a limited area in Cuba and then to draw dissident
elements to the landing force, which would then gradually
achieve enough stature to trigger a general uprising. At
this stage of the planning clandestine nourishment of
resistance forces was still an important element, though
now overshadowed by the overt strike force concept.
8. President Eisenhower orally directed the Agency to
go ahead with its preparations with all speed. But this
meeting occurred during the U.S. political interregnum and
the proposed target date was later than 20 January 1961,
so that in effect the President's instructions were merely
to proceed and to keep the preparations going until the
new Administration should take office and should make the
definitive decisions, especially whether and under what
circumstances the landing should take place.
Search for Policy Decisions
9. As an example of the decision-making process, at
the meeting of the Special Group held 8 December 1960 the
Agency requested authorization (a) to make propaganda leaflet
flights over Cuba; (b) to screen non-official U.S. personnel
for use in maritime operations; (c) to resupply Cuban resistance
Page 57 (page 57 of the original)
por ralelenweniapeneediemdizasliion
elements from U.S. air bases at the rate of two flights a
week. Only the first authorization was given at that time.
10. In mid-January 1961 various major policy questions
were, at CIA's request, under discussion by the Special Group.
These included: (a) use of American contract pilots for
tactical and logistical air operations over Cuba 3 (b) use
of a U.S. air base for logistical flights to Cuba; (c)
commencement of air strikes not later than dawn of the day
before the amphibious assault and without curtailment of
the number of aircraft to be employed from those available;
(a) use of Puerto Cabezas, Nicaragua, as an air-strike base
and maritime staging area.
ll. In the end only one of these policy questions was
resolved in the affirmative, that with regard to the use of
Puerto Cabezas. It should be especially noted that the
project's paramilitary chief had strongly recommended that
the operation be abandoned if policy should not allow
adequate tactical air support.
Conflicting Views
12. The raising of these questions and the failure to
resolve many of them demonstrates the dangerous conflict
between the desire for political acceptability and the need
for military effectiveness. It also indicates the Pluctuat-
ing policy background against which the officers running the
Page 58 (page 58 of the original)
project had to do their day-to-day business. This policy
undertainty was, in several respects, never satisfactorily
resolved right up to the very hour of action, and many
problems arose out of the changing limitations to which
authority to do certain things was subjected in the name
of political necessity.
13. “Thus, during the months immediately preceding the
inauguration on 20 January 1961, the Agency was recruiting
and training Cuban troops and otherwise proceeding with a
changed plan not yet definitely formulated or reduced to
writing, with no assurance that the invasion, which was now
the essence of the plan, would ultimately be authorized by
the new Administration. The Agency was driving forward without
knowing precisely where it was going.
14. The first formal briefing of President Kennedy and
his advisors took place on 28 January 1961. (He had received
priefings on earlier occasions, even before his election.)
At this meeting there wes a presentation, largely oral, of
the status of preparations, and President Kennedy approved
their continuation. But there was still no authorization,
express or implied, that military action would in fact
eventually be undertaken.
15. In the ensuing weeks, the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Deputy Director (Plans),. accompanied in
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angen enone Gunes
some instances by other Agency representatives, attended a number
of meetings with the new President and his advisors. (The paper
prepared for a 17 February meeting is appended as Annex B.) In
the course of these meetings, the Agency presented three informal
planning or "concept" papers, dated 11 March 1961, 16 March 1961
and 12 April 1961, each a revision of its predecessor (Annexes Cc,
D and E, respectively). These papers served chiefly as the bases
for oral discussions at these meetings.
Successive Alterations
16. According to our information, the revised concept, as
exposed by the paper of 12 April 1961, was apparently acceptable
to the President although he indicated he might order a diversion.
Before that he had authorized the Agency to proceed with mounting
the operation, but had reserved the right to cancel at any time.
The President was advised that noon on the 16th was the last hour for
a diversion. The DD/P checked with Mr. Bundy shortly after noon on
the 16th, and no diversion being ordered, authorized the landing to
proceed.
17. These three papers disclose that, starting with the World
War II commando-type operation outlined in the 11 March 1961 paper
(Annex C), the plan had been swiftly and successively altered to
incorporate four characteristics which had been deemed essential
in order to ensure that the operation would look like an infiltra-
tion of guerrillas in support of an internal revolution and would
therefore be politically acceptable.
as eae ae aoe oe
Page 60 (page 60 of the original)
type, diversionary landing in Oriente Province two days before
the strike and provided that supplies should be landed at night
during the initial stages. It also provided for air strikes
on military objectives at dawn of D Day as well as on D Day
minus 2.
the invasion was no longer conceived as an effort to assist
Cuban guerrilla forces in a coordinated attack. The papers
make no claim that significant guerrilla forces existed with
SPOS Gahealgalion
18. The four characteristics were:
an unspectacular night landing;
b. possibility of conducting air operations from a
base on seized territory;
c. a build-up périod, after the initial landing,
to precede offensive action against Castro's forces, and
d. terrain suitable for guerrilla warfare in the
event the invasion force could not hold a lodgment.
19. The airfield requirement obliged the planners to shift
the invasion site from Trinidad to Zapata. The former area was
close to the Escambray Mountains and therefore offered better
guerrilla possibilities, but only the latter had a suitable
airfield.
20. The third paper also introduced a plan for a guerrilla-
Guerrilla Role
21. Close reading of the three papers also discloses that
Page 61 (page 61 of the original)
Gelinas
whom after evaluative reports from our own trained agents,
confirming their strength, sufficiency of arms and ammunition,
and their readiness we had worked out plans for a coordinated,
combined insurrection and attack against Castro. As the 12 April
1961 paper expressly states the concept was that the operation
should have the appearance of an internal resistance.
22. With reference to the strength of the resistance in
Cuba, the 11 March 1961 paper refers to an estimated 1,200
guerrillas and 1,000 other individuals engaging in acts of
conspiracy and sabotage, but it makes no claim of any control
exercised by the Agency or even that coordinated plans had been
made and firm radio communications established.
23. The 12 April 1961 paper states the estimate at “nearly
7,000 insurgents" (without specifying the number of guerrillas
included therein), who were "responsible to some degree of
control through agents with whom communications are currently
active." It locates these in three widely separate regions of
the island and states that the individual groups are small and
very inadequately armed and that it was planned to supply them
by air drops after D Day, with the objective of creating a
revolutionary situation.
2k. The foregoing language suggests existence of {7,000
insurgents but refrains from claiming any prospect of immediate
help from trained guerrilla forces in being. The term
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apne eae ie
"insurgents" seems to have been used in the sense of "potential"
insurgents or mere civilian opponents of Castro. A statement
about military and police defectors was similarly vague; the
Agency was in touch with 31 such persons whom it hoped to induce
to defect after D Day.
Arrests of Agents
25. These tacit admissions of the non-existence of effective,
controlled resistance in Cuba correspond to the intelligence
reports which clearly showed the unfavorable situation resulting
from the failure of our air supply operations and the success
of the Castro security forces in arresting our agents, rolling
up the few existing nets, and reducing guerrilla groups to
ineffectiveness.
26. It is clear that the invasion operation was based on
the hope that the brigade would be able to maintain itself in
Cuba long enough to prevail by attracting insurgents and
defectors from the Castro armed services, but without having
in advance any assurance of assistance from identified, known,
controlled, trained, and organized guerrillas. The Agency
hoped the invasion would, like a deus ex machina, produce a
"shock", which would cause these defections. In other words,
under the final plan the invasion was to take the place of an
organized resistance which did not exist and was to generate
organized resistance by providing the focus and acting as a
catalyst.
Page 63 (page 63 of the original)
nee Gaee
27. The Agency was matching the 1,500-man brigade, after
an amphibious landing, against Castro's combined military
forces, which the highest-level U.S. intelligence (USIB reports
entitled "The Military Buildup in Cuba", dated 30 Novenber 1960
and 9 February 1961, respectively) estimated as follows: The
Revolutionary Army 32,000 men; the militia 200,000 men;
employing more than 30 to 40 thousand tons of Bloc-furnished
arms and heavy materiel of the value of $30,000,000.
28. It is difficult to umderstand how the decision to
proceed with the invasion could have been justified in the
latter stages of the operation. Under the Trinidad plan
(Annex C), access to the Escambray Mountains for possible
guerrilla existence might have constituted some justification
for the enormous risks involved. This justification did not
apply to the Zapata area which was poor guerrilla terrain and
offered little possibility for the break-out of a surrounded
invasion force. The lack of contingency planning for either
survival or rescue of the brigade has never been satisfactorily
explained.
29. The argument has been made that the Agency's theory of
an uprising to be set off by a successful invasion and the
maintenance of the battalion for a period of a week or so has
not been disproved. It was not put to the test, this argument
goes, because the cancelled D-Day air strikes were essential
Page 64 (page 64 of the original)
to the invasion's success. Such an argument fails in the face
of Castro's demonstrated power to arrest tens of thousands of
suspected persons immediately after the D-Day-minus-2 air strikes
and the effectiveness of the Castro security forces in arresting
agents a8 demonstrated by unimpeachable intelligence received.
Views of Joint Chiefs
30. Agency participants in the project have sought to
defend the invasion plan by citing the approval given to the
plan by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). To this argumxt,
members of the JCS have replied, in the course of another
inquiry, (1) that the final plan was presented to them only
orally, which prevented normal staffings (2) that they regarded
the operation as being solely CIA's, with the military called
on to furnish various types of support and the chie? interest
of the JCS being to see to it that every kind of support
requested was furnished; (3) that they went on the assumption
that full air support would be furnished and control of the
air secured and on the Agency's assurances that a great number
of insurgents would immediately join forces with the invasion
forces; and (4) that, in the event the battle went against them,
the brigade would at once "go guerrilla" and take to the hills.
31. The Agency committed at least four extremely serious
mistakes in planning:
a. Failure to subject the project, especially in its
latter frenzied stages, to a cold and objective appraisal
Page 65 (page 65 of the original)
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by the best operating talent available, particularly by
those not involved in the operation, such as the Chief of
Operations and the chiefs of the Senior Staffs. Had this
been done, the two following mistakes (b and c below)
might have been avoided.
b. Failure to advise the President, at an appropriate
time, that success had become dubious and to recommend that
the operation be therefore cancelled and that the problem
of unseating Castro be’ restudied.
ce. Failure to recognize that the project had become
overt and that the military effort had become too large to
be handled by the Agency alone.
d. Failure to reduce successive project plans to
formal papers and to leave copies of them with the:
President and his advisors and to request specific written
approval and confirmation thereof.-
32. Timely and objective scrutiny of the operation in the
months before the invasion, including study of all available
intelligence, would have demonstrated to Agency officials that
the clandestine paramilitary operations had almost totally
failed, that there was no controlled and responsive underground
movement ready to rally to the invasion force and that Castro's
ability both to fight back and to roll up the internal opposition
must be very considerably upgraded.
Page 66 (page 66 of the original)
33. It would also have raised the question of why the United
States should contemplate pitting 1 3500 soldiers, however well
trained and armed, against an enemy vastly superior in number and
armament on a terrain which offered nothing but vague hope of
significant local support. It might also have suggested that the
Agency's responsibility in the operation should be drastically
revised and would certainly have revealed that there was no real
plan for the post-invasion period, whether for success or
failure.
Existence of Warnings
34. The latest United States Intelligence Board, Office of
National Estimates, and Office of Current Intelligence studies
on Cubaavailable at that time provided clear warning that a
calm reappraisal was necessary.
35. But the atmosphere was not conducive to it. The chief
of the project and his subordinates had been subjected to such
gruelling pressures of haste and overwork for so long that their
impetus and drive would have been difficult to curb for such &
purpose. The strike preparations, under the powerful influence
of the project's paramilitary chief, to which there was no
effective counterbalance, had gained such momentum that the
operation had surged far ahead of policy. The Cuban volunteers
were getting seriously restive and threatening to get out of
hand before they could be committed. The Guatemalan Government
Se ee eh ee Ee eee ee ee OF
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was urging the Agency to take away its Cubans. The rainy season
was hard upon the Caribbean. The reappraisal never happened,
though these very factors which helped prevent it should have
warned the Agency of its necessity.
36. These adverse factors were compounded and exacerbated
by policy restrictions that kept coming one upon another through-
out a period of weeks and right up until the point of no return.
These caused successive planning changes and piled up more
confusion. Rapidly accumulating stresses, in our opinion,
caused the Agency operators to lose sight of the fact that the
margin of error was swiftly narrowing and had even vanished
before the force was committed. At some point in this degenerative
cycle they should have gone to the President and said frankly:
"Here are the facts. ‘The operation should be halted. We request
further instructions."
Consequences of Cancellation
37. Cancellation would have been embarrassing. ‘The brigade
could not have been held any longer in a ready status, probably
could not have been held at all. Its members would have spread
their disappointment far and wide. Because of multiple security
leaks in this huge operation, the world already knew about the
preparations, and the Government's and the Agency's embarrassment
would have been public.
Page 68 (page 68 of the original)
38. However, cancellation would have averted failure, which
brought even more embarrassment, carried death and misery to
hundreds, destroyed millions of dollars’ worth of U.S. property,
and seriously damaged U.S. prestige.
39. The other possible outcome the one the project
strove to achieve was a successful brigade lodgment, housing
the Revolutionary Council but isolated from the rest of Cuba by
swamps and Castro's forces. Arms were held in readiness for
30,000 Cubans who were expected to make their way unarmed
through the Castro army and wade the swamps to rally to the
liberators. Except for this, we are unaware of any planning
by the Agency or by the U.S. Government for this success.
4O. It is beyond the scope of this report to suggest what
U.S. action might have been taken to consolidate victory, but
we can confidently assert that the Agency had no intelligence
evidence that Cubans in significant numbers could or would join
the invaders or that there was any kind of an effective and
cohesive resistance movement under anybody's control, let alone
the Agency's, that could have furnished internal leadership
for an uprising in support of the invasion. The consequences of
a successful lodgment, unless overtly supported by U.S. armed
forces, were dubious.
Page 69 (page 69 of the original)
g Pathars
aetna Ey
The Choice
hi. The choice was between retreat without honor and a
gamble between ignominious defeat and dubious victory. The
Agency chose to gamble, at rapidly decreasing odds.
42. The project had lost its covert nature by Novenber
1960. As it continued to grow, operational security became
more and more diluted. For more than three months before
the invasion the American press was reporting, often with
some accuracy, on the recruiting and training of Cubans.
Such massive preparations could only be laid te the U.S.
The Agency's name was freely linked with these activities.
Plausible denial was a pathetic illusion.
43. Insistence on adhering to the formalities imposed by
non-attributability which no longer existed produced absurd-
ities and created obstacles and delays. For example, the use
of obsolete and inadequate B-26 aircraft instead of the more
efficient A-5s originally requested, was a concession to non-
attributability which hampered the operation severely. A
certain type of surgical tent requested for the landing beach
was not supplied because it could be traced to the U.S. A
certain modern rifle was not supplied, for the same reason,
although several thousand of them had recently been declared
surplus. In the end, as could have been foreseen, everything
was traced to the U.S.
Page 70 (page 70 of the original)
Lr eee ae oo
4k. U.S. policy called for a covert operation and assigned
it to the agency chartered to handle such things. When the
project became blown to every newspaper reader the Agency should
have informed higher authority that it was no longer operating
within its charter. Had national policy then called for continu-
ation of the overt effort under a joint national task force,
vastly greater man-power resources would have been available for
the invasion and the Agency could have performed an effective
supporting role. The costly delays experienced by the Agency
in negotiating for support from the armed services would have
been avoided.
Piecemeal Policy
45. In the hectic weeks before the strike, policy was being
formed piecemeal and the imposition of successive restrictions
was contracting the margin of error. The last of these restric-
tive decisions came from the President when the brigade was
already in small boats moving toward the Cuban shore. Had it
come a few hours earlier the invasion might have been averted
and loss of life and prestige avoided.
46. If formal papers outlining the final strike plan in
detail and emphasizing the vital necessity of the D-Day air
strikes had been prepared and left with the President and his
advisors, including the Joint Chiefs, with a request for
written confirmation that the plan had received full
Page 71 (page 71 of the original)
seme fens
comprehension and approval, the culminating incident which
preceded the loss of the Cuban brigade might never have
happened.
47. We are informed that this took place as follows: On
the evening of 16 April the President instructed the Secretary
of State that the D-Day strikes setfor the following morning
should be cancelled, unless there were overriding considera-
tions to advise him of. The Secretary then informed the
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, the Director being
absent from Washington, and the Deputy Director (Plans) of
this decision, offering to let them call the President at
Glen Ora if they wished. They preferred not to do so, and
the Secretary concluded from this that they did not believe
the strikes to be vital to success.
A Civilian Decision
48. Earlier that evening the project chief and his para-
military chief had emphatically warned the DD/P to insist
that cancellation of the strikes would produce disaster. Thus
the DD/P, a civilian without military experience, and the DDCI,
an Air Force general, did not follow the advice of the project's
paramilitary chief, a specialist in amphibious operations. And
the President made this vital, last-minute decision without
direct contact with the military chiefs of the invasion
operation.
Page 72 (page 72 of the original)
4g. The President may never have been clearly advised of
the need for command of the air in an amphibious operation like
this one. The DD/P was aware that at least two of the President's
military advisors, both members of the Joint Chiefs did not
understand this principle. This might well have served to warn
the DD/P that the President needed to be impressed most strongly
with this principle, by means of a formal written communication,
and also have alerted him to the advisability of accepting the
Secretary's invitation to call the President directly.
20. If the project's paramilitary chief, as leader of the
overt military effort, had accompanied the DDCI and the DD/P to
the meeting with the Secretary he might have brought strong
persuasion to bear on the decision.
51. This fateful incident, in our opinion, resulted in
part from failure to circulate formal planning papers together
with requests for specific confirmation.
Shifts in Scope
D2. The general vagueness of policy and direction permitted
a continual shifting of the scope and scale of the project, that
is, the type of operational planning commonly referred to as
“playing it by ear," and this in turn led to various kinds of
difficulties about people, money, supplies and bases.
93. A staffing guide prepared in May 1960 listed a total
of 235 personnel required for the foreseeable future (107 being
Page 73 (page 73 of the original)
sleet
ees nL
on board). By September, the strength had been built up to
228. In October another staffing guide listed a total of 363
positions. By the end of the project 588 people were work-
ing in WH/4. There were 160 people in the Miami area alone.
54. The original plan contemplated 200 to 300 Cubans as
a contingency force. By mid-July, a force of 500 was being
considered. In early November, the plan was to use 1,500 men,
and there was talk of as many as 3,000. In early December, a
brigade of 750 was agreed upon. Its strength was built up to
664 by the end of January. By 17 March the ground forces in
training numbered 973. By 28 March equipment for 1,600 men
had been ordered, and the actual brigade strength on 6 April
was 1,390. Such changes made it very difficult for the
supporting components, particularly the Office of Logistics
and Development Projects Division, who were not given much
lead time.
d9+ The original estimate for the project anticipated
expenditures to the total of $4,400,000 during the two fiscal
years, 1960 and 1961. On 24 March 1960, $900,000 was released
for the balance of Fiscal Year 1960. This amount was expended
within a month and an additional million dollars released to
carry the project to the end of June.
56. In August, a budget was presented for Fiscal Year 1961
which amounted to $13,000,000. By December, $11,300,000 had
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Pm Sre eee Dime
been obligated and an additional $28 200,000 was requested and
authorized. In May 1961, an additional $5,000,000 was requested
to meet obligations incurred. The total amount of money for
this project for Fiscal Years 1960/61, instead of $4,400,000, was
more than $46,000,000.
57. When the project started, it was not realized that bases
would be needed at Useppa Island, Key West, Miami, and Opa-locka,
Florida; New Orleans, Puerto Rico, Panama, Guatemala, and
Nicaragua, as well as innumerable safe houses and other facilities.
Consequently the project suffered, because many of these facili-
ties were not ready when needed. The WH Division launched into
a large paramilitary project without the bases, the boats, the
experienced paramilitary personnel, or a complete and sufficient
plan, and never really caught up.
fe Lek ot ee be ee SOL ee ee oe ete a oe
Page 75 (page 75 of the original)
G. THE MIAMI OPERATING BASE
1. ‘The confused relationships between WH/4 headquarters
and the forward operating base in the Miami area were a signifi-
cant factor in the over-all performance of the project mission.
The base was activated in late April 1960 and was put in Miami
mainly because it was the chief center of Cuban refugees in the
United States.
2. From the beginning, the DD/P and his associates took
firm stand against allowing this base to become more than a_
small support organization, and until September 1960 the base
did little except carry on liaison with the Cuban exile organi-
zations and U.S. law enforcement agencies. For example, there
was only one paramilitary officer at the base during this period.
3. The DD/P's Chief of Operations wrote in June 1960:
"T recognize your need for some operational personnel in the Miami
area to service and conduct certain actiyities there. I am firmly
opposed, however, to the growth of an organization which would
represent a second headquarters or intermediate echelon there."
At this same time, the DD/P's Assistant for Covert Action empha-
sized that the function of the forwara operating base should be
one of coordination, with command remaining in Headquarters.
4, In August the DD/P wrote that he was worried about
Miami and wanted to be sure that “we are not duplicating there
any functions that are being performed in Headquarters. For
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owen
instance, I am not quite clear what are the duties of the PM
types there since this component is neither a headquarters nor
a training installation nor even a forward command post.” And
in another memo in November, he again urged that WH/4 be
especially careful to avoid any duplication of effort between
Miami and Headquarters.
Duplication of Effort
5. By this time there was plenty of duplication. Head-
quarters and the Miami Base had become engaged in many parellel
or overlapping operations and were even competing with each
other. Both components were handling all kinds of agents and in
Some cases the same ones. The only activity that Miemi did not
get into was air operations, but even here it necessarily had ea
role in many of the clendestine air drops.
6. There was a general feeling at Headquarters that the
forward base existed solely for support and that Headquarters
was in the best position to handle operations because it had
ready access to policy guidance and fast radio commmications
to and from all elements. This view ignored the fact that much
of the commmication with Cuba was only by secret writing and
couriers; that Miami was the main source of information, poli-
ticians, agents and soldiers for the project; that it was the
logical location for infiltration and exfiltration; that the
base, through the maintenance of effective liaison, had the
Page 77 (page 77 of the original)
complete cooperation of the local FBI, the Border Patrol, Inmi-
gration, Coast Guard, FCC, Customs, Navy, and police officials.
Except for the Director of Central Intelligence, who
visited the base, top Agency officials concerned with the project
did not have first-hand knowledge of what was being done and
what could be done at Miami. The limitations they placed on
base activities had serious consequences. For example, when
the resistance organizers being trained in Guatemala were ready
to go into Cuba in September, the maritime capability to in-
filtrate them did not yet exist. By the time the base had built
up some capabilities in various lines, valuable months had been
lost.
The Miami View
8. On the other hand, there was a general feeling at the
base that it should be a “station”, conducting operations just
as Havana was able to do (up to the date when diplomatic rela-
tions were broken off), with Headquarters providing support,
guidance and policy. This view failed to realize that a station
with several hundred people would have been very difficult to
conceal, that it would have cost a million dollars to move
everyone to Miami, and that Headquarters would have gotten into
the operations anyhow, due to the easy access to Miami from
Washington, especially by telephone.
9. The letter of instructions to the base chief, dated
6 October 1960, was pretty vague. It stated that he would have
ee ete ee ee
Page 78 (page 78 of the original)
Nee eee ame SES ae ae
authority over all project personnel and responsibility for the
supervision of any project activities conducted through the
Miami area from other areas. It authorized him to use personnel,
materiel, facilities and funds for the accomplishment of the
over-all Agency mission. He was made responsible to the chief
of the project.
10. The first intelligence (FT) case officer reported to
the base in September 1960 and proceeded to acquire, train and
direct agents. At the time of the invasion, the Miami Base had
31 FI agents in Cuba, all of whom were reporting and all of whom
had been recruited by the base.
The CI Section
ll. The counterintelligence (CI) section began to function
in mid-July 1960. By the time of the strike, this section had
39 carefully selected, highly educated Cubans trained as case
officers to form a future Cuban Intelligence Services also, 100
selected Cubans trained as future CI officials and civil
government officials; also, a reserve of 100 older non-political
individuals trained as a reserve intelligence corps.
12. The paramilitary (PM) section was opened in late June
1960 with one officer. His job was to conduct liaison with the
Cuban leaders in order to obtain recruits for the Guatemala
camps. A second PM officer reported in August, and at this time
there was a beginning of an attempt to infiltrate arms,
Page 79 (page 79 of the original)
oie feet
ae SAC SO ee
amminition and personnel into Cuba clandestinely by boat.
(These were the "PM types" whose duties had mystified the DD/P.)
There were also two maritime "types" who were training the crew
of a borrowed small boat for clandestine trips.
13. By 15 November 39 people had been assigned to the Miami
base in addition to 44 people from the Agency's Office of Com-
munications. In addition to support elements, there were
sections for propaganda, FI, CI, political action, and PM.
14, By 15 April 1961, the base and its sub-base had 160
persons assigned, as follows:
2 Political Action
7 Propaganda
25 Support
14 Security
68 Communications
3 Miscellaneous
15. While the Havana Station was still operating, Miami Base
was in close touch with it by courier and secure commmications.
When Havana Station was closed, Miami expected to take over the
stay-behind assets, such as they were. However, Headquarters
took over their control. Miami concentrated on the training and
infiltration of agents.
PM Support Role
16. In PM activities, control was tightly held by Head-
quarters, and the PM section of the base was limited pretty mich
Page 80 (page 80 of the original)
to providing support in recruiting soldiers and running small
boat operations. This tight control meant that the PM officers
at the base looked to Headquarters for guidance rather than to
the chief of base. The PM and other sections had their own
channels to Headquarters, and this led to uncontrolled action
and considerable confusion. PM officers in Key West, @ sub-
base of Miami, also sometimes communicated directly with Head-
quarters.
17. There are alleged to have been cases in which a Head-
quarters decision was conveyed to the Mami Base by three
persons simteneously, each over the telephone. The result
of this was that the base had an enormously high phone bill and
the base chief often was not informed of events until after
they were over, if at all.
18. The Miami case officers retained their agents as long
as the agents were reporting by secret writing. Once the
agents reported by radio, they were taken over by Headquarters.
This was resented by the Miami case officers, who felt that
they were in the best position to know the agents, having
recruited and trained them.
19. Case officers in Headquarters, on the other hand,
felt that Miami case officers tried to steal their agents when
they passed through the Miami area. One agent who visited
Headquarters received promises of money and support which went
Page 81 (page 81 of the original)
far beyond what the case officer in Miami had offered. The base
was not informed of these promises until the agent mentioned
them. For the next several months, this particular agent was
unmanageable and would not even meet with the Miami case officer.
This was naturally viewed as Headquarters meddling.
Examples of Confusion
20. Case officers in Miami also felt that they were unduly
handicapped in that Headquarters was not only competing with
them but also reviewing their actions, which was something like
playing a game with the umpire on the other team. It is doubt-
ful that a reviewing component can maintain objectivity when it
is also competing with the component whose activities it is re-
viewing.
21. Numerous examples could be cited to illustrate the
confusion that existed. The divided control over maritime opera-
tions is discussed elsewhere in this paper. There was an ex-
pensive fiasco over some special lubricating o11 additive in-
tended for sabotage use in Cuba. The organizational arrangement
made necessary hundreds of telephone calls and cables which
otherwise would not have been sent, and the areas for uncertainty
and misunderstanding were still considerable. For example, a
Miami cable of 15 February referred to an agent message and
asked, "Does Headquarters intend to answer and arrange this
operation?"
Page 82 (page 82 of the original)
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22. The general situation also led to an extraordinary
number of temporary-duty trips back and forth between Washington
and Miami. These were not only expensive but added a great many
problems in the way of support and security.
23. In December 1960 the base chief pointed out to Head-
quarters that the base needed "clarification and specification
of the requirements it is expected to fulfill and tasks that
it is expected to perform, together with the investment of
sufficient authority and discretion for the operational action
which may be involved." In March 1961 he pointed out that "the
base would welcome more precise requirements for its agents
than had been received up to that time in the interests of
making efficient use of them."
24, In May 1961 he wrote a memorandum on control of denied
area operations which pointed out that future operations should
either be controlled from Headquarters or from a forward operating
base, but that the divided control which had existed during the
project had resulted in parallel, sometimes duplicative and
conflicting efforts and in operational relationships which were
competitive, without purpose, and sometimes counter-productive.
25. The inspectors agree that this divided effort
represented an ineffective and uneconomical use of time, money,
and materiel, and less than maximum utilization of Agency employees,
plus unexploited, delayed or poorly coordinated use of Cuban agents
and assets.
Page 83 (page 83 of the original)
H. INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
1. The WH/4 Branch had not only the responsibility for the
Cuban project but also the normal area duties of a geographical
unit in the Clandestine Services. Besides being considered a
task force with the mission of overturning the Castro government,
it also had the Headquarters desk responsibility for Cuba, in-
cluding support of Havana Station and Santiago Base until the
break in diplomatic relations.
2. This arrengement required WH/4's intelligence (FT)
section to collect intelligence on Cuba not only for the task
force, with its special requirements, but also for the entire
U.S. intelligence commnity, with its diverse and long-range
needs.
3. The section was plagued with personnel shortages from
the start, but as long as the U.S. Embassy in Havana remained
open, thus assuring communications, it received and processed a
good yield of intelligence from Cuba, chiefly on political,
economic, and Communist Party matters. Late in 1960 the section
was directed to place emphasis on military information, but it
found that its agents in Cuba lacked access to high-level mili-
tary sources.
4, he FI section transmitted copies of all the reports
it processed to the paramilitary section as well as to the rest
of its regular intelligence customers.
Page 84 (page 84 of the original)
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Or Sr ons
The Net in Havana
5. The section devoted considerable effort to supporting
Havana Station in preparing its agents for stay-behind roles in
the event of a break in diplomatic relations. When the embassy
finally closed on 3 January 1961 the station had a single net
for positive intelligence. It comprised some 27 persons, 15 of
whom were reporting agents and the rest radio operators, cutouts
and couriers. The principal agents and one of the radio opere
ators were U.S. citizens and thus had doubtful status after the
break in relations.
6. In September 1960 as the military invasion concept was
beginning to gain ascendancy in project planning, the chief of
the project created a G-2 unit. But instead of placing this
unit directly wder himself as a project-wide unit. and making
its chief a member of his immediate staff, he put it in the
paramilitary section under the aggressive Marine Corps colonel
who became the paramilitary unit chief at about that time.
7. As chief of this low-echelon intelligence unit, whose
analyses were to have important influence on an action vitally
affecting national security and prestige, wH/} brought in an
officer of undoubted ability but of limited experience in para-
military and FI operations. It was a grave error to place this
G-2 unit in such a subordinate position in the project, and
this error produced the serious consequences described below.
ae AF ome ee
Page 85 (page 85 of the original)
saehengs
ee ene AE EE wae oar oa
Function of G-2 Unit
8. The paramilitary G-2 unit consisted of four officers
and several secretaries. Its principal function was to prepare
intelligence annexes to the successive invasion plans. Its
sources of information included, in addition to the FI section's
reports, photographic intelligence, cartographic intelligence,
Special Intelligence, armed services reports, and messages
received from the paramilitary section's own agents in Cuba.
Reports from the armed services were procured rapidly through
direct informal lieison rather than through the usual slower
channels.
9- In various ways the functioning of the regular FI
section, which was directly under the project chief, was ad-
versely affected by the paramilitary G-2 unit.
10. The PM unit absorbed the available pérsonnel. The
chief of the FI section was not invited to attend WH/4 staff
meetings, and for security reasons, he never had access to
WH/4's war room. During the final weeks the FI section was
not permitted to examine the PM section's incoming operational
cables for possible positive intelligence content. The FI
section chief did not have a clearance for photographic intelli-
gence.
Lack of Liaison
ll. There was no close liaison between the two sections,
and this resulted in some duplication in preparation of reports
Page 86 (page 86 of the original)
SPO Pea
requested by the DD/P, because neither section would learn of
the requests made of the other. Until the end of 1960 the two
sections were housed in different buildings.
12. The most serious consequence of the third-echelon
position of the G-2 unit was that it concentrated in the hands
of the unit chief the dual function of receiving all the infor-
mation available from Government-wide sources, including that
from the agentsof his own paramilitary section, and of inter-
preting all these data for the purpose of supplying intelligence
support to the various. invasion plans.
13. Interpretation of intelligence affecting the strike
force aspect of the operation was thus entrusted to officers
who were so deeply engaged in preparations for the invasion that
their judgments could not have been expected to be altogether
objective. This circumstance undoubtedly had a strong influence
on the process by which WH/4 arrived at the conclusion that the
landing of the strike force could and would trigger an uprising
among the Cuban populace. This conclusion, in turn, became an
essential element in the decision to proceed with the operation,
as it took the place of the original concept, no longer
maintainable, that the invasion was to be undertaken in support
of existing and effective guerrilla forces.
1h. Irrespective of the validity of that conclusion, it is
clear that the interpretative analysis should have been made not
Page 87 (page 87 of the original)
Pen sete
Seerktrrnnieeelinnclsectiomdiantiaos
by the persons who were working day and night to prepare
the invasion but by an objective and disinterested senior
interpretation specialist from the Agency's FI Staff or from
its Office of Current intelligence.
Intelligence Support Vacuum
15. Another serious error in the field of intelligence
support was that Miami Base received almost no intelligence
support from the Headquarters G-2 section. This may be
attributed to the facts that the paramilitary chief was almost
completely preoccupied with the strike force preparations and
that his subordinate G-2 was not given project-wide responsi-
bilities and to the rigid security restrictions under which
the paramilitary section was expected to operate, as well as
to the general confusion in the organizational position of the
Miami Base.
16. This serious support vacuum at Miami was compounded
because the base, in spite of its large size and the fact
that it was deeply engaged in its own operations in Cuba, had
no intelligence support section. There was no single officer
or unit charged with responsibility for interpreting the
considerable amount of intelligence derived directly from base
sources and from Special Intelligence.
17. Furthermore no photographic intelligence was available
to Miami Base, which had no officer with a clearance entitling
Page 88 (page 88 of the original)
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him to receive it. There was substantially no intelligence
support covering the Cuban beach areas or the political
situation inside Cuba. There was no analysis or interpretation
of Special Intelligence, and there was no mechanism to call
critical material to anyone's attention.
18. The result of this highly defective state of affairs
was that individual Miami case officers were forced to rely
upon their own interpretation of the separate intelligence
reports, instead of having this material interpreted for them
by specialists. They were not given a number of other items
of operational intelligence which were in existence in the
G-2 unit of the paramilitary section at Headquarters.
Page 89 (page 89 of the original)
I. THE POLITICAL FRONT AND THE RELATION OF CUBANS TO THE PROJECT
1. The Cuban opposition front, as conceived by the Agency
in consultation with the State Department, was to have the
following characteristics:
a. Full restoration of the 1940 Cuban constitution.
b. Return to the basic principles of the revolution,
as enunciated in the 1958 Caracas Declaration.
c. Pro-Western and strongly anti-Communist orientation.
d. Political complexion ranging from a little to the
right of center to somewhat left of center.
e. Ability to muster the broadest possible support
from the Cuban population.
2. The functions of such a front organization were conceived
a. A cover for covert action against the Castro
regime.
b. A catalyst and a rallying point for anti-Castro
groups variously reported to number 178, 184, or 211.
ic. A possible nucleus for a provisional government of
Cuba following Castro's downfall.
3. The terms of reference thus excluded followers of the
former dictator, Fulgencio Batista. They also excluded extreme
leftists.
Page 90 (page 90 of the original)
4, Exclusion of the Batistianos and other ultra-conservatives
caused one kind of problem. Many of the exiles had been Batista
followers. Many of them were rich and had assets Buch as boats
and followers, which could be used. Some had military experience.
Some of them had American friends who were influential enough to
urge their claims to consideration upon the White House.
The Leftist Fringe
5. ‘Exclusion of the far-left fringe caused another kind
.of problem. It was hard to tell how far left some persons were.
And some of. those whose political acceptability was questionable
nevertheless claimed such substantial following inside Cuba that
it was difficult to ignore them.
In forming the Frente Revolucionario Democratico (FRD)
the Agency focussed its attention principally on personalities
and groups who had either participated in Castro's government
or supported his revolution but had become disillusioned and
gone into opposition.
7. In early 1959 the Havana Station was already assessing
a wide variety of anti-Castro personalities with whom it was
in contact. In mid-1959 a station agent was exploring the
possibility of covert support to the Montecristi Movement of
Justo Asencio Carrillo Hernandez.
8. In the mid-1950s the Montecristi group had been active
against Batista, who exiled Carrillo. He returned after the
Page 91 (page 91 of the original)
cee ee ee ee
revolution to take an important banking post but found Castro's
Communist tendencies intolerable and went into opposition again.
His group is described as liberal and progressive but rejecting
any accommodation with Communism.
The Organizing Committee
9. Carrillo was one of several Cuban figures whom the
Agency induced to defect in late 1959 or the early months of
1960. Others were Manuel Francisco Artime Buesa, Jose Ignacio
Rasco Bermudez,. end-Manuel Antonio Varona Loredo. Tt: was these
four who, after long negotiations, formed the organizing. com-
mittee of the FRD in May 1960.
10. Artime, who is still under 30, joined Castro's moyement
as an anti-Batista student. Under instructions from -the Catholic
Church he organized a group of 4,000 Catholic Action students
to gain the farmers' help against Batista. The view has been
expressed that he was the Jesuits’ penetration of the 26 July
Movement. Castro gave him a high post in National Agrarian
Reform Institute (INRA) from which he resigned after ten
months to form the Movement to Recover the Revolution (MRR),
composed in part of his former Catholic Action followers. This
exile opposition group provided a large proportion of the recruits
for the strike force.
ll. Rasco, a college and university classmate of Castro's,
is a lawyer and history professor, described as a nice young
Page 92 (page 92 of the original)
intellectual without much talent for action. In the fall of
1959 he became the first president of the Christian Democratic
Movement (MDC), an anti-Commmist Catholic group which Castro
drove underground in April 1960 at which time Rasco fled the
country.
12. Varona's career in government and in opposition
politics goes back to the 1920s. During the regime of
President Prio Socarras he held several important posts,
including that of prime minister, and was responsible ‘for
anti-Communist policies and measures. He collaborated with
Castro until the Commmist pattern of the new regime became
evident, coming to the U.S. in April 1960. Before leaving
Havana he had presented-a plan for Castro's overthrow, in-
cluding a unified opposition and U.S. aid for developing
propaganda and military capabilities.
The Political Spectrum
13. Varona was representative of the older opposition
parties (Autentico and Ortodoxo) which had survived both
Batista and Castro and which were roughly in the middle of
the political spectrum. Artime's group also occupied a
centrist position, but its membership was drawn from the
younger generation on Cubans. Carrillo and Rasco appeared
to be a little left and a little right of center, respectively.
Page 93 (page 93 of the original)
14. Thus the original group of organizers represented a
fairly broad range of political views. They were joined in
June 1960 by Aureliano Sanchez Arango who claimed leadership
of the AAA group, the initials possibly representing Asociacion
de Amigos de Aureliano. Both Sanchez Arango and Varona claimed
to have considerable following in the Cuban labor field. Sanchez
Arango and his followers appeared to have some general knowledge
of the use of clandestine techniques.
15. These five associated themselves in issuing a manifesto
at Mexico City on 22 June 1960. This document called upon Cubans,
other Latin Americans and the world at large to help the FRD over-
throw Castro's dictatorship. The FRD pledged itself to establish
a representative democratic government with full civil liberties
under the 1940 Cuban constitution. It pledged free general
elections within 18 months of establishment of a provisional
government. It proposed to ban the Communist party and institute
program of social and economic progress for all classes of Cubans.
16. Varona's maturity and experience led to his selection
as coordinator, in effect, general manager, of the FRD. This
immediately precipitated the resignation of. Sanchez Arango and
in turn led to the beginning of a problem in establishing and
maintaining FRD unity which the project never fully solved.
Page 94 (page 94 of the original)
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@ Change in Policy
17. The FRD had originally been conceived as the channel
through which all of the project's aid to the Cuban cause would
Ylow. However, Sanchez Arango's walkout threatened a loss of
assets and capabilities which-the project wanted. to preserve.
‘The result was expressed.as follows in a briefing prepared by
WH/4 for CINCLANT in November 1960:
"In October we made a change in operational poliey.
Heretofore we had kept our efforts centered on: the. FRD;
however we will now consider requests for parantlitery
aid from any anti-Castro (ana non-Betista) group, inside
or outside Cuba, which can show it has a capability for
paramilitary action against the Castro regime. MWe feel
@ that the combination of our controlled paramilitary
action under the FRD segis and the lesser-controlled
operations of other Cuban revolutionaries will bring
about a considerable acceleration of active anti-Castro
expressions within Cuba. We will, in any event, have
the lever of support as a mechanism for influencing
the ultimate emergence of one individual or group as
the primary figure in the anti-Castro commnity."
18. Because of the gregariousness of Cuban exiles, the
project was unable to prevent this change in policy from
becoming known to the FRD executive committee. When the
pate Onn
Page 95 (page 95 of the original)
ee cae
Bender Group, now generally understood by Cubans and many
others to represent the CIA, began responding to requests
from and giving support to defectors from the FRD and to
groups which the FRD considered politically unacceptable,
the organization which was supposed to be a world-wide
symbol of Cuban freedom and which was being groomed as the
nucleus of the next government of Cuba naturally felt that
its prestige had been undermined.
-Diffusion of Effort
19. This complicated relations between project case
officers and the FRD leaders. It also appears to have
resulted in some diffusion of effort in the attempts at
clandestine infiltration of arms and paramilitary leaders
into Cuba. It seriously hampered progress toward FRD unity,
sharpened internal FRD antagonisms, and contributed to the
decline in strike force recruiting efforts.
20. The composite political complexion of the FRD
shifted a little to the right in August 1960 with the join-
ing of Ricardo Rafael Sardinia, who headed an organization
called the Movimiento Institucional Democratico (MID).
21. A source of friction between the FRD and its project
sponsors was the effort to induce it to set up its headquarters
outside the U.S. The Cuban leaders were finally persuaded by
financial leverage to move to Mexico City where the Mexican
Page 96 (page 96 of the original)
Government had agreed to be hospitable. Housing and office space.
were arranged for the executive committee members and their
families and for a project case officer and his secretary. i [REDACTED]
[REDACTED] Mexico City was reactivated for support
duties, such [REDACTED] 0U0UUUtst—<“i‘sSsSCSY and the moye was
made.
22. However, the Mexican Government appears not to have
kept its word, and the Cubans were subjected to surveillance
end other heressnent. Within a few weeks it became evident
that the situation was intolerable, and everybody moved pack
to Miami Which is where the Cubans wanted to be in the first
place.
The Bender Group
23. The man responsible for laying the groundwork of the
FRD, arranging a long series of meetings among the Cubans,
and persuading them to merge their differences and: issue a
joint manifesto, was the chief of the project's political
section. He was known to the Cubans and inevitably to the
press as “Frank Bender". The Bender Group, for reasons of
plausible denial, purported to be composed of U.S. business-
men who wanted to help overthrow Castro. The Cubans do not
seem to have cared whether this was true or not, but the guise
irritated them because they wanted to be in direct touch with
the U.S. Government at the highest level possible.
Page 97 (page 97 of the original)
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2h, Bender's linguistic accomplishments did not include
Spanish and this may have diluted his effectiveness in dealing
with Cubans.
25, After the FRD was launched the handling of purely
FRD affairs in Mexico City and later in Miami was turned over
to a case officer with fluent Spanish and long experience ‘in
Latin American affairs.
26. However, Bender continued to be identified.with the
project... The FRD leaders’ antagonism toward the Bender Group
‘was sharpened when, at the time of the change in operational
policy noted above, wWH/& assigned Bender the responsibility
of dealing with Cuban individuals and groups outside of the
FRD framework.
The Rubio Padilla Group
27. One of the outside groups the project continued to
work with was the Action Movement for Recovery. (MAR), headed.
by Juan Rubio Padilla. Use of this conservative group of rich
landlords was strongly advocated by William D. Pawley, an influ-
ential Miemi businessman. A paper prepared by wH/k for the
Director of Central Intelligence's use in briefing Senator
Kennedy in July 1960 stated MAR's claims to a widespread
resistance organization needing only arms and ammmition and
orders to go into action and called the MAR relationship a
most encouraging development.
ete ee ee oan se et ene lee ee ee we ee ee
Page 98 (page 98 of the original)
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28. However, Rubio was too conservative for the FRD's
taste, and the MAR was never incorporated into the FRD.
29. An organization which resisted incorporation in the
FRD until March 1961 and which meanwhile had a stormy relation-
ship with the Bender Group was the Movimiento Revolucionario del
Pueblo (MRP), headed by Manuel Antonio Ray Rivero. Ray had been
Castro's minister of public works until he lost his job toa
Communist. He arrived in this country in November 1960 and
agreed to accept assistance from the Bender Group but wished
to maintain his freedom of choice. The project's unilateral use
of Ray resulted in some successful maritime operations
30. Bender's efforts to get Ray to join the FRD produced
strained relations, but in December Ray agreed to accept military
aid through ‘the FRD.. Ray's program appeared to be identical with
Castro's but without Communism and without hostility. to the United
States. Ray became less intransigent as time went on and in
February and March 1961 was participating in talks with Bender
and Varona on the formation of the Revolutionary Council which
he ultimately joined. There seems to be no substance to alle-
gations in the press that Ray was ignored. In fact, his unsub-
stantiated claims to wide underground resources are said to have
been received uncritically by some project personnel.
Page 99 (page 99 of the original)
an mann ae — ES aoe
Contact with Batistianos
31. Another allegation which gained some currency was that
the project was supporting and otherwise using former associates
and supporters of Batista. At one point WH/4 did have contact
with one ex-Batista, leader, Sanchez Mosquerra, and gave some
support to his group, but this effort was soon called off. There
were also attempts by Batistianos to penetrate the project's
military effort, but these were resisted. The FRD‘s own intelli-
gence section was active in attempting to screen out Batistianos.
The strike force contained some members of the former ‘Cuban
Constitutional Army, which existed under Batista, but these were
recruited as soldiers not as politicians.
32. The brigade officers seem to have been clean of the
Batista taint. However, the FRD, for whom they were supposedly
fighting, justly complained that it. had had no hand in their
selection.
33. Jose Miro Cardona, a distinguished lawyer who turned
to politics late in his career, was the first Cuban prime minister
after the Castro revolution, was later ambassador to Spain, and
was ambassador-designate to the United States when he broke with
Castro, took asylum in the Argentine Embassy, and was eventually
granted safe conduct to this country (in October 1960) where he
became the FRD's secretary-general for public relations.
Page 100 (page 100 of the original)
Din daeeenmbenlee ee esp bniiiome
34. Under the guidance of Bender he became a strong force
for unity in the FRD during its most difficult period, the virtual
political interregnum before the inauguration of President Kennedy.
Miro was influential in bringing Ray into the Revolutionary. Council
which was formed on 20 March with Miro as chairman.
Visit to Training Camp
35. Miro, with other Council members, visited the strike
force in Guatemala on 29 March in a much-needed effort. to spur
troop morale. There had been far too Little contact between the
FRD and the soldiers being trained in its name. Artime, Yarona,
end Antonio Jaime Maceo Mackle had been there in February in an
attempt to calm mitinous spirits. The last previous visit had
been made in the fall of 1960 by Col. Eduardo Martin Elena,
head of the FRD'’s military staff and a former constitutional
Army officer. Martin Elena antagonized the trainees 7 and. with
the beginning of straight military training under a U.S. Arny
officer, who had no interest in Cuban politics, a ban was placed
on visits to the camp by Cuban politicians.
36. This was probably a mistake and an unreasonable inter-
ference in the Cubans' management of their own affairs. Con-
trolled contact between the FRD and the troops could have done
much to improve the morale and motivation of the troops and make
the training job easier. There was nobody in the Guatemala camp
who could answer the political questions of the trainees, who
Page 101 (page 101 of the original)
kA eneee— ae
were all volunteers and deserved to know what kind of a future
they were preparing to fight for. Furthermore, the FRD needed
a chance to develop the loyalty of the troops who were presumably
to install and protect its leaders on Cuban soil as members of
a provisional government.
37.. This was one example of a high-handed attitude toward
Cubans that became more and more evident as the project progressed.
Cubans were the basic ingredient for a successful operation and,
although the aim of having the exiles direct activities was
probably idealistic and unattainable, nevertheless ‘the Agency
should have been able to organize them for maximm participation
and to handle them properly to get the job done.
An American Operation
38. But with the Americans running the military. effort,
running .Radio Swan, and doing unilateral recruiting, the operation
became purely an American one in the exile Cuban mind, and in the
public mind as well. In by-passing the Cubans the Agency was
weakening its own cover.
39. The official attitude which produced this situation
is reflected in the project's progress reports. In November a
report noted that the Agency had “plenty of flexibility to choose’
the Cuban group we would eventually sanction as a provisional
government." A January report indicated that the Agency, rather
than the Cubans, was making the plans and decisions: “We have
Page 102 (page 102 of the original)
charted five different lists of proposed assignments for any future
provisional government of Cuba end are compiling biographic data
on those Cubans who might be utilized by us in forming a future
Cuban government.”
4O. The crowning incident which publicly demonstrated the
insignificant role of the Cuban leaders and the contempt in‘which
they were held occurred at the time of the invasion. Isolated
in a Miami safe house, “voluntarily” but under ‘strong ‘persuasion,
the Revolutionary Council members awaited ‘the outcome of a military
operation which they had not planned end. knew little bout ~while
Agency-written bulletins were issued to the world in their name.
41. They. had not been puppets in the early days of the
project. Some of the Cubans had drawn up detailed operational
plans for resistance in areas of Cuba that. they knew intimately;
others provided coyer ‘and support. .One wealthy exile :eyen vol-
untarily went through the assessment routine at Useppa Island
along with the young trainees. They had reason to feel that the
project was in the nature of a joint venture, at least.
The Military Emphasis
4O, But when the project began to shift from. a clandestine
operation to a military operation, Cuban advice and participa-
tion no longer seemed necessary. Cubans who up to about
November 1960 had been close to some of the plans and opera-
tions were cut out. To the military officers on loan to the
Page 103 (page 103 of the original)
_o@. eat wee
Ne ee ean aan me eal
project, the problem was a military one, and their attitude
was “to hell with the Revolutionary Council and the political
side."
43. The paramilitary and the political action sections of
WH/4 were not in effective touch with each other; in effect,
they. treated their tasks as unrelated, and this was reflected
in the field. The diminished relationships with the Cuban
leaders were a measure of the extent to which people in the
project became carried away. by a military operation.
4k, The effective utilization of Cubans and. cooperation
with them ‘was also hampered to some extent because many of the
project officers had never been to Cuba, did not speak Spanish,
and made judgments of the Cubans on very. lim knowledge. (A
notable exception was the propaganda section, which was well
qualified in this respect.) They considered. the Cubans un-
trustworthy and difficult to work with. Members of the Revo-
lutionary Council have been described to the inspectors as
“idiots” and members of the brigade as "yellow-bellied."
4S. However, many staff employees in the project realized
that the Cubans would have to be dealt with realistically and
allowances made for their differences and weaknesses. In some
instances, case officers achieved quite remarkable rapport
with the Cubans they were handling. These officers were ones
Page 104 (page 104 of the original)
_@ Pri tee asceee wees
ieee
who had had considerable experience in dealing with foreign
nationais in various parts of the world, and the results showed
it.
Dealing with Cubans
46. Some military officers on loan to the project were less
successful in dealing with Cubans. They simply gave military
orders to these foreign nationals and expected to be obeyed.
h7. Some of the contract employees Buch as ships’ officers,
‘treated the Cubans like dirt. This led to revolts, mutinies,
aud other troubles. Some very able Cubans withdrew from the
project because of the way they were treated.
48. The inspecting team has received a definite impression
that this operation took on a life of its own, that a number of
the people inyolved became so wrapped up in the operation as
such that they lost sight of ultimate goals.
49, There is a substantial question whether any operation
can be truly successful when the attitudes toward the other
people are so unfavorable. There does not seem to be much
excuse for not being able to work with Cubans. If this
nationality is so difficult, how can the Agency possibly succeed
with the natives of Black Africa or Southeast Asia?
50. The Agency, and for that matter, the American nation
is not likely to win many people away from Communism if the
Americans treat other nationals with condescension or contempt,
Page 105 (page 105 of the original)
ae eae ed
ignore the contributions and the knowledge which they can bring
to bear, and generally treat them as incompetent children whom
the Americans are going to rescue for reasons of their own.
Fe eee nae re rr tae OES
Page 106 (page 106 of the original)
ba ns ar aes ee
J. CLANDESTINE PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS AIR
1. The first attempt at a clandestine air drop over Cuba
took place on 28 September 1960. (By coincidence this was the
same night as the first maritime. operation. ) A 100-man arms
pack was dropped for an agent rated as having considerable: poten-
tial as a resistance leader. The crew missed the drop zone by
seven miles and dropped the weapons on a dam. Castro forces
scooped them up, ringed the area, caught the agent and later
shot him. The airplane got lost on the way back to Guatemala
and landed in Mexico. It is still there.
2. This operation might have indidated an unpromising future
for air drops. In fact, its failure was influential in persuading
the chiefs of the project of the futility of trying to build up an
internal resistance organization by clandestine means, and within
the next few weeks the operational emphasis was beginning its
fateful swing toward the overt strike-force concept. To this
extent the portent of failure was heeded, but it did not suffice
either to halt the air drops or to ensure arrangements for their
success. The attempts went on and on with results that were
mostly ludicrous or tragic or both.
3. On 26 December 1960, Headquarters received word that a
Cuban agent, who had been given Agency training in this country,
wanted an air drop of not more than 1,500 pounds of demolition
and sabotage materiel and weapons. He clearly specified the
Page 107 (page 107 of the original)
Se air ae oe anc
layout and the location of the drop zone, and also the amounts
and kinds of materiel desired. wH/4 cabled this requirement to
the air base in Guatemala, where all the flights originated.
However, the Development Projects Division (DPD) then cabled
Guatemala that arms and ammmition would be dropped with food to
make a maximum load, also 200 pounds of leaflets for a drop
elsewhere. This cable was not coordinated with wH/k, which sent
a message to the agent the following day stating that a cargo
drop would take place as requested and that the weight would be
1,500 pounds.
Rice and Beans
4. A drop was made on 31 December. The 15-man reception
team received, not only 1,500 pounds of miteriel which was dif-
ferent from the original request because the specific items could
not be packed in waterproof containers in time, ‘but also 800
pounds of beans, 800 pounds of rice and 166 pounds of lard.
5. This was the only drop to this Cuban ugent. He was so
vexed with the drop that he came out of Cuba specifically to make
a complaint and to cancel a succeeding drop which had been planned.
He stated that he would not accept another drop, no matter what
the cargo was. He pointed qut that the Agency had endangered his
-gafety by dropping cargo which he had not asked for, did not
need, and could not handle. Furthermore, the aircraft had stayed
in the vicinity too long, had flown with its lending lights on,
had circled around and made numerous U-turns and even dropped
Page 108 (page 108 of the original)
LRT
propaganda leaflets on his property. He decided the Agency lacked
the professional competence to make clandestine air drops.
6. This operation was recorded as "successful" by the Agency
because cargo was actually delivered to the people it was meant for.
There were four such “successes” in all, out of 30 missions flown
up to 21 April 1961. (The Fiscal Year 1961 budget called for 105
air drops.) The first of these took place on 30 December after
numerous attempts beginning in mid-October. There were 13 unsuc-
cessful attempts during January and February. “The third success
took place on 3 March, when three agents were dropped (previous
attempts to drop them had been made on 7 February and 27 February).
The fourth successful drop was on 29 March.
The Successful Drops
7. Except for the rice-and-beans drop, the successful drops
were all to an agent who had been trained in air reception pro-
cedures by staff personnel at Headquarters.
8. The three cargo drops known to be successful were all
made in the Pinar del Rio Province. In other words, practically
all the supplies went to one small area of western Cuba. Small
amounts are thought to have been received in Camaguey and Oriente,
but none in Matanzas or Havana. Ten missions were flown into the
Escambray at the request of an agent who had no training in air
reception. Twice the cargo was not dropped because the drop zone
was not located, and once the plane turned back because of bad
Page 109 (page 109 of the original)
ep pened
weather. On the seven occasions cargo was Gropped, it was either
totally or in large part recovered by the Castro forces. Three
times cargo was dropped blind, three times in the wrong Place,
and once on the drop zone when the reception committee was not
9. In all, about 151,000 pounds of arms, ammmition and
equipment were transported by air. Not more than 69,000 pounds
of this was actually dropped; the rest was returned to base. of
this 69,000 pounds, at least 46,000 pounds were captured: by
Castro forces, who recovered all or a large part of ten drops 3
compared with our agents, who recovered three. In other words
out of 75 tons which were air-lifted, paramilitary agents
actually got about twelve (about enough to arm 300 men, figuring
7,500 pounds to a hundred-man pack).
10. Except for the one team, there were no clandestine
personnel drops made or even attempted during the entire project.
Lack of Procedure
ll. The agents on the ground did not have a standard
procedure for air reception (most of them had not been trained).
The locations of drop zones were variously and insufficiently
described by coordinates, sketches, or azimuths. In two opera-
tions the requesting agents did not even have maps of their areas.
In one of these WH/\ headquarters, DPD and Miami Base each arrived
at a different set of coordinates from the reference points given.
101
Page 110 (page 110 of the original)
eee ane em ae
In another case the coordinates given for a drop zone were in the
ocean. Reception parties proposed to mark the drop zone with
various bizarre and impractical patterns, such as: two red lights
and one white light about 15 feet apart moving clockwise; an arrow
50 meters long with lights at two-meter intervals; lights in the
form of a straight line with a sign in the middle lit up with
Christmas lights (on this one, the crew at one point mistakenly
identified cars on a road as the drop-zone signal); two crosses
pide by side; a triangle of three lights with a fourth light in
the center. In some areas there were so many small lights in the
vicinity that no pattern could be located. For one drop the agents
made four proposals in rapid succession: no lights, a nine-man
eross, & line of five bonfires, a 60-meter line of colored flash-
lights.
12. The standard light patterns taught by paramilitary instruc-
tors and generally accepted as best, were (a) an "L" of lights;
(bo) a "IT" of 5 lights; and (c) cross of 6 lights. All lights
should be 15 to 25 yards apart, with one light different from the
others.
13. The Cuban air crews must share the blame for the failures,
as must their trainers. Policy did not allow American observers
to go along on the missions to correct the errors. Pilot disci-
pline was lacking and instructions were not followed in numerous
instances.
102
BOS
Page 111 (page 111 of the original)
oor cao an na aoe ad
14. For example, one air crew, under specific orders to abort
the mission if the drop zone was missed on the initial rum and not
to search for it or circle around, made four passes four miles
away, according to the ground report (which added, "Pilots drunk
or crazy.").
15. Another crew commander, under orders not to drop unless
the T pattern was positively identified, elected to drop without
seeing the T because he had a "positive feeling" that he was over
the drop zone. Another aircraft remained in the drop zone area
41 minutes before dropping cargo.
Headquarters Direction
16. The Headquarters direction of these air drops left much
to be desired. DPD, which controlled the crews and planes, never
had a representative physically assigned to WH/4, and the two
activities were operating in a divided command situation on the
basis of mutual cooperation rather than generally accepted manage-
ment practice and military command principles.
17. Daily consultation proved impossible although there was
a@ requirement of it. There was trouble on cover stories, on
funding, on security, and on cables, among other things. It was
difficult to determine where the responsibilities of one
component ended and those of the other began.
18. The WH/4 paramilitary chief recommended that the DPD unit
be assigned to the chief of the task force for integration within
103
Page 112 (page 112 of the original)
arlene emergence
his staff. But no action was ever taken, and the situation remained
as described for the duration of the project.
19. WH/4 and DPD did not even agree on doctrine and tech-
niques. In addition, all flight plans had to be personally reviewed
and approved by the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI)
and by the 5412 Special Group. The requests for.air drops came
from Cuba by radio, secret writing or telephone to Miami and then
were forwarded to WH/k headquarters, which then put in an opera-
tional request to DPD, which in turn directed the Guatemala air
base to mount the flight after approval had been given by DDCI.
DPD could and did release its own cables, without coordination.
20. This cumbersome system was complicated even more by the
searcity of agent radio operators inside Cuba. Some of the arrange-
ments had to be made by secret writing, which was not only slow but
contributed to misunderstanding. Necessary last-minute changes of
plan by the reception groups or air crews could not be communicated
to each other.
Example of Confusion
21. The drop finally accomplished on 30 December is an out-
standing example of the confusion that prevailed,
22. WH/4 informed Havana that the drop would be made from
400 feet. DPD told the Guatemala Tese that the drop would be at
1,000 feet. Guatemala, on the other hand, felt that 600 feet
would be best. WH/4 informed the agents that the aircraft definitely
10h
Page 113 (page 113 of the original)
BPO
would make only one pass over the drop zone. But DPD authorized
one 360° turn in order to make the drop good if the drop zone was
not located on the initial run. (Actually, the crew made three
passes.) This drop then failed (on 5 December) because the recep-
tion group understood that the plane would make only one pass, and
turned off the lights when the plane came back for a second try.
There was also confusion over the time of the drop and the number
of bundles. The difficulties in arriving at an understanding among
all parties concerned were so great that this operation, first
planned for 22 October, was re-scheduled for 13 November, rum on
5 Decenber without dropping, then scheduled for 19 December. ‘Then
this had to be changed to 25 December and finally to 30 December.
23. For another operation WH/4 told Guatemala that the cargo
should weigh 6,000 pounds, but DPD told Guatemala it could not be
more than 4,000 or 5,000 pounds. The DPD message was not coordinated
with WH/4, as Guatemala then pointed out.
24, Some of the techniques used by DPD were highly question-
able. In one instance DPD told Guatemala that in the event the
drop-zone lights were not seen by the crew the pilot should never-
theless drop his cargo on the drop zone as determined by dead reckon-
ing. As it turned out, the reception group had dispersed after an
encounter with a Cuban army patrol and was unable to be at the drop
zone. The Castro forces then picked up at least half of the bundles
dropped.
Page 114 (page 114 of the original)
o-Ps eee
Supplies for Castro
25. In another case 1,600 pounds of food and mteriel were
dropped blind (in the dark of the moon) on each of four hilltops
to a group which was known to be in such a precarious position
thet it was not able to stay in place long enough to lay out a
drop zone. Again, the Castro‘forces got most of the load.
26. In. still another, DPD told Guatemala that turns were
allowed if the plane was not Lined up on the initial run over the
drop zone. .The agents reported that the plane passed over twice
without dropping and that this alerted the Cestro amy to attack
the resistance group and to disperse it.
27. Once two planes were sent over the drop zone half an
hour apart and allowed to make two passes each. Not surprisingly,
.200 militia searched the area the next day and seized the cargo.
The drop altitude for another operation was set at 4,000 feet. The
pilot reported he had hit the drop zone from 3,500 feet, even though
unable to recognize the marker, but there is evidence that the enemy
got at least half the drop.
28. One aircraft received heavy fire and was damaged. Its
crew thus learned the hard way that dropping leaflets first had
helped to alert the area and recommended that in the future the
cargo be dropped first. Miami Base pointed out to Headquarters
that it was a mistake to drop heavy weapons before a group had a
known capability of using them or had specifically requested them.
106
rns ev ae
Page 115 (page 115 of the original)
29. For a long time the results of the drops, as reported
by the ground elements, were not forwarded to the air crews Who
got no critiques but continued to report successes when in fact
they were missing the drop zone by many kilometers.
Handling an Emergency
30. The handling of an emergency also left something to be
desired. One of the planes had to land in Jamaica. The commander's
phone call to an emergency. number ‘in Guatemala produced the reply,
“Never heard of you." ‘first heard of
Orne eee ern
this landing tron [REDACTED] who had assumed (wrongly) that
[REDACTED] =< been advised by Headquarters.
31. In January 1961 Division D of the Agency's FI Staff made
@ study which raised pertinent questions about the air drops. The
project's paramilitary staff made a study in March and concluded
that the Cuban crews did not have ‘sufficient experience or super-
vised training in clandestine paramilitary air operations to meet
the project objectives and that they were too undisciplined to
obey instructions or to make correct reports. This study recom-
mended that contract American aircraft commanders be used but it
did not receive the approval of the paramilitary chief and went
no further.
32. DPD also made an analysis in March and recommended cer-
tain overdue corrective action such as obtaining agent reports of
drop results for prompt dispatch to the air base in Guatemala
107
Page 116 (page 116 of the original)
Ne ee aaa
critiques for each mission regarding compliance with instructions,
elimination of blind drops, and better identification of drop zones.
DPD cablea Guatemala on 7 March that an analysis of the mission
results to date would be forwarded shortly to be used as @ basis
for refinement of tactics and improvement of coordination with the
reception teams. And at the end of March a check pilot was included
for the first time in a mission crew. He noted discrepancies in
pilot procedure and crew coordination.
Tardy Corrective Action
33. These corrective actions came too late. The seeming
inability to support resistance elements augmented_the growing
reliance being placed on the idea of an amphibious strike force
to accomplish the objective; then, as the strike idea took over
more and more, interest in clandestine drops decreased among
officers in charge of the project. On or about 28 March a policy
decision was made that there would be no more clandestine drops
until after the amphibious assault. Inasmuch as the WH/k case
officers handling these drops were not informed as to the strike
plan or the date, this posed 4 problem for them because 19 drops
to specific drop zones were requested between 22 March and 19 April,
and it was necessary to stall off the requests with such messages 4S!
"Don't give up hope. We'll drop as‘ soon as we ean."
"Regret unable mount BERTA. Definitely planning support your
operation. Beg you understand our problems."
Page 117 (page 117 of the original)
be ae par aan YS on ae sae ae
But the agents had their own problems during this time:
"Unjust to delay operation so much. .This is not a game."
“How long will I have to wait for the drop. The lives of
peasants and students depend on you."
"Dear Allies: Arms urgent. We made a commitment. We have
complied. You have not. If you have decided to abandon us
answer."
"We are risking hundreds of peasant families. If you cannot
supply us we will have to. .demobilize. Your responsibility.
‘We thought you were sincere."
"All groups demoralized. They consider themselves deceived
because of failure of shipment of arms and money according
to promise."
Perhaps the situation was best summed up by this agent message:
"Impossible to fight... .Either the drops increase or we
die. .Men without arms or equipment. God help us."
34. The Inspector General reluctantly concludes that the
agent who was showered with rice and beans was entirely correct
in his finding that the Agency showed no professional competence
in its attempts at clandestine air drops into Cuba. Furthermore
these attempts in their over-all effect probably hurt the resis-
tance more than they helped.
Page 118 (page 118 of the original)
Seen sane ame —aie_ ae mae a
K. CLANDESTINE PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS MARITIME
1. WH/% Branch had two separate maritime problems. It
needed to transport men and supplies clandestinely to the coast
of Cuba by small boats, and it needed ships to transport and
support an amphibious landing of a military force more or less
overtly. This section of the report will be mostly concerned
with small boat operations.
2. The WH Division had no assets in beings there was no a
Agency element comparable to DPD to call on; and for obscure
reasons the Navy.was not. asked ‘to provide the help it might
have. .WH/4 had to start with nothings there seemed to be very
little maritime know-how within the Agency.
.3. The original operational plan called for building up
a substantial resistence organization, which could be done
only if supplies and people were delivered to the right places.
During the critical period March-December 1960, WH/4 had one
boat, the "Metusa Time", a 54-foot pleasure cruiser which was
lent to the Agency by a friend. Two maritime operations
officers, more or less under deep cover, labored from March to
October to outfit this boat and train its crew.
4, The boat went on its first mission on 28 September,
offloading 300 pounds of cargo and picking up two exfiltrees.
By January it had made five additional trips and transported
about five tons, but only one infiltree. It had another
successful operation in March 1961 and another in April.
coerce. LLO nee an gEGED.
Page 119 (page 119 of the original)
on “aera ome ae ae Se
[REDACTED] Boats
In November and December there were six other successful
small boat operations conducted with boats owned by various Cubans.
The arrangements were made by individual case officers at Mianf
(there being no maritime section) and mainly in response to
requests by the owners. No memoranda of understanding were made
end the agreements as to supporting, equipping, and funding
these Cuban boats were exceedingly loose thus causing many
problems later.
6. <A Cuban would say, "Give me a tank of gas and a machine
gun, and you cam use our boat and we will help run it." After
the operation he was likely to come back and say that the boat
needed all sorts of equipment which had been damaged by the
operation, and many claims vere built up in this way.
Although more than twenty of these boats were ‘offered
to case officers, mast of them were too small and too limited
in range to be of much use. Furthermore, the bad weather
which lasted from December into March made small boat operations
impossible at a time when they were badly needed. In January
1961 there was not a single successful operation.
Boats
8. By December the need for some QE boats was
becoming obvious. The "Sea Gull" (see below) was picked up by
Headquarters about this time. Jt turned out to be a complete
JIL
5 he oe: ge ti set ae eigk -Ze PRIS Ry, wt tenon te os
Page 120 (page 120 of the original)
"lemon"; one of the most experienced employees in small boats
spent most of his time from December to June trying to get it
to run, and it never did participate in an infiltration or
exfiltration operation. Also, about December a 75-foot yacht,
the "Wasp", SD. %It had a 17-knot speed and a 600-mile
range and ran its first successful mission on 15 February.
9. About February the "Tejana" also became operational.
This was a 110-foot yacht which became available through a
Cuban contact of @ case officer. The arrangements mde by
the case officer with the Cuban owner were so vague that
payment of bills incurred was a continuing problem. However,
the "Tejana", in four operations in March, infiltrated 19,000
pounds, as compared with 12,700 pounds which had been infil.
trated from September up to February by all available boats.
10. The statistics compiled by WH/k and by Miami Base
on the small boat operations are somewhat confused and
inconsistent. However, the general picture is clear. The
small boat operations succeeded in getting about 76 people
into Cuba clandestinely. Most of these were taken in during
March. Up to the middle of February only ten had been
successfully infiltrated by this means, the first being in
mid-November.
ll. In the matter of arms, ammmition and other supplies
to the resistance, the boat operations were not an outstanding
Page 121 (page 121 of the original)
success. From September to.the time of the strike about 70,000
pounds were successfully infiltrated. This was about three times
as mich as was put in by air drops. The total amount of supplies
put into Cuba by air and boat operations amounted to about 93,000
pounds (463 tons); this would be about enough to equip 1,250 men.
Limited Area
12. There was one successful boat operation in Septembers
two in October; three in November; six in December, none in
January} six in February; thirteen in March; and two-in April.
Up to February only six and a half tons were sent in.
13. One should not get the idea that these supplies were
wiiformly distributed throughout Cuba. Most of them were
placed in one small area, the north coast of Cuba close to
Havana. The small boats did not have the range to go farther.
14. In almost all cases the supplies were transferred to
a Cuban boat or an offshore key rather than deposited on the
shores of Cuba itself. In the fall, boat operations were
restricted by policy to offshore rendezvoug. By January Miami
had begum to plan beach landing operations as a means of
overcoming the wnreliability of Cuban-based boats. At this
time Miami Base did not even have aerial photos of the north
coast of Cuba.
15. Of the 33 missions rated as successful only 27 could
be considered entirely so since the cargo on the other operations
Page 122 (page 122 of the original)
was later recovered by the Castro government or the success
was only partial. The reception committees did not seem to
have had much training in maritime reception procedures.
16. In sum, a small amount of materiel was put into the
Havana area in the period September-December by some ill-suited
small boats. Then by using the "Wasp" and the "Tejana" a
substantially larger amount of supplies was put in during
February and March as well as some people, but to a limited
area only. At this point the "Berbara J" and the "Blagar"
(former LCIs) were used because of their longer range and
larger size; however, for various reasons they were also
unsuccessful in placing anything on the south coast except
at the westernmost part,
Lack of a Plan
17. Officers who worked on these operations reported
that there was no effective project plan for using small boats
to deliver men and equipment tocforces inside Cuba who were
best suited to use them to build up a powerful underground
movement against Castro. According to these officers, WH/4
did not plan small boat operations; the case officers simply
responded to requests by individual Cubans and groups. One
officer remarked that the Cubans were running the operations.
18. Of all the attempts mde to land men and supplies in
Cuba clandestinely by water some of the most notable were made
Page 123 (page 123 of the original)
Phe
ebm ROT
by the "Barbara J", a surplus LCI which the Agency bought in
October 1960. It was intended that this craft would serve as
@ mother ship for small boat operations and also provide a
long-range lift capability.
19. After a shakedown voyage in December, featured by a
mutiny, the ship was scheduled for clandestine maritime infil-
‘tration of three paramilitary teams into Cuba. Tnitially there
was some confusion as to who was running the operation since
Miami had’been handling small boat operations and had made the
rendezvous plans for this one, but Headquarters had responsibility
for the "Barbara J". WH/4 then sent the chief of its maritime
section to Miami to coordinate, to brief the captain, and to
dispatch the boat on its mission on 16 January.
20. The “Barbara J" put into Vieques Island on 31 January
1961 after having been‘ unsuccessful in putting anybody ashore
in Cuba. The crew's morale continued to deteriorate. Some
refused to take direct orders, attempts to discipline the men
were ineffective, the engineers refused to stand watch, and all
of the crew wanted to return to Miami and resign. Also, nine
of the ten agents did not wish to stay on the ship for another
mission.
A Sit-down Strike
21. On 4 February the "Barbara J" sailed from Vieques for
a rendezvous on the south coast of Cuba, 2h crew members having
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yn OS ae ray
been left on a Vieques beach, where they staged a sit-down and
@ hunger strike. On 9 February the "Barbara J" reported that
the contact had not shown up at the rendezvous point.
22. After trying again on 10 February, the captain of the
"Barbara J" cabled: "Take a message to Garcia: The reluctent
heroes in fishing boat again conspicuous by their absence."
On 11 February he sent another odd cable: "Last message to
Garcia: Your fishing boat still manifesting extreme shyness.
Suggest next operation send in varsity." On 13 February he
sent: "Cruised without making contact. ‘Picked up small target
on radar, tracked it down, and scared hell out of some fisher-
men who wanted no part of us."
23. The case officer and the team leaders had a different
story. They stated that when the "Barbara J". arrived at the
rendezvous point it was approached by & amall boat that came
at the right time and gave the correct signals, but that as
the boat came alongside the captain of the "Barbara J" ordered
two floodlights turned on the boat which apparently scared it
away. On 18 February the reception party sent a message that
their boat had been at the right place at the right time and
that a patrol boat had showed up. The “Barbara J" arrived at
[REDACTED] on 1) February without having received arrival
instructions. On 15 February Miami sent a message saying that
it was setting up facilities at Key West to receive the
116
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Page 125 (page 125 of the original)
Lo ee can
“Barbara J". Upon landing in Key West the ten paramilitary
agents, having been on this trip for a month after spending
two months in a safe house, were ready to resign and it took
a considerable amount of persuasion to get them to stay with
the program. They were then sent to New Orleans for holding.
Earning a Citation
oh. Several officers who were associated with the captain
of the "Barbara J", a contract employee acquired from Military
Sea Transportation Service ( Metts), have testified to his
drinking on duty, his bullying of Cubans, and his disregard
for security. Drew Pearson wrote about the drunken American
LCI skipper who scared away Cuban underground leaders with his
ship's floodlights, and who threatened to abandon a sabotage
team. On 21 March the project's paramilitary chief relieved
the captain of his command and requested that he be terminated.
However, the captain was retained on duty and eventually
received full pay and a bonus for a six-month contract period
in the amount of $14,698.
25. WH/4 Branch initiated action to get the captain
commended by his parent service for outstanding performance.
In July 1961 he was cited "for completing an assignment involving
extreme hazards in an outstanding manner, and displaying excep-
tional skill and courage" and given the Navy Superior Civilian
Page 126 (page 126 of the original)
ataeen egy
Service Award the highest honorary civilian award within
the authority of the MSTS commander.
26. The branch had never taken action either to clear
him or to convict him of serious charges, and the high
commendation he received casts doubt not only on the validity
of other WH/4 recommendations for merit citations but also
on the quality of personnel management in the project.
Peculiar Organization
27. The organization for controlling clandestine maritime
operations was peculiar. The forward operating base in Miami
“had the responsibility for small boat operations but could not
run any without Headquarters approval. It was seldom that
Headquarters had any query or refused to give approval.
28. But -the Miami Base did not have the equipment and
experience that were needed. For a long time the docking
facilities were inadequate. The desirability of having a
base at Key West was recognized as early as November 1960, but
this base was not established until mid-February. It was
insufficiently staffed and had a great many cover, security and
administrative problems on which it received little assistance.
At first it was under the direction of the Miami paramilitary
section; eventually it was placed under the chief of the Miami
Base.
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Page 127 (page 127 of the original)
hae canes aa ae
29. The small staff at Key West not only supported small
boat operations; it also had to take whatever action was
necessary when disabled black flights came in to the local Naval ?
air station since DPD had no representative in the area. Each
unsuccessful maritime operation doubled the work. Boats coming
back to a safe haven loaded with arms and explosives, usually
crewed by Cubans and sometimes disabled in various ways, had to
be unloaded again by whoever was available among paramilitary
case officers and security and support people. A few staff
employees worked almost around the clock for a month loading
and unloading cargo without benefit of even a forklift. Many
tons were so handied.
30. It is clear that there was no over-all policy in regard
to the small boats. There was no clear directive as to whether
to acquire short-range, speedy boats or long-range, slower boats;
whether to use fishing craft and crews or special-purpose boats
built specifically for our use. There was no policy on the use
of a mother craft. There was no control over the amount of
money spent on these small boats and their outfitting.
The Maritime Unit
31. WH/4 Headquarters had a staff employee whose job was
small boat coordinator. This meant, in effect, checking
proposed operations with the intelligence section, extending
approvals and keeping records. WH/4 also had a separate maritime
119
Page 128 (page 128 of the original)
unit which handled the technical side of the small boats,
approved funds for them, and arranged for personnel for then,
but had nothing to do with their operations.
32. This maritime unit also had the responsibility for
acquiring and fitting out the larger ships such as the
"Barbara J", the "Blagar", the three LCUs and the ships used
in the strike. This unit also had the responsibility for
training underwater demolition teams, directing raiding
operations, and overseeing the Vieques Base.
33. The. lack of equipment, the shortage of experienced
personnel, the press of time and the problems of coordination
are shown by the experience which the maritime unit had with
the acquisition and outfitting of the L0Is and the LCUs. The
press of time hardly allowed for advertising for specific
types of craft or soliciting competitive bids. The two IIs
(the "Barbara J" and the "Blagar") were purchased from a
private corporation in Miami for $70,000. About $253,000 was
then spent in modifying, repairing and outfitting then.
34. This work, which extended over a period of several
months, was directed by officers from Headquarters during
short temporary duty tours in the Miami area. The day-to-day
supervision of the work was under several Navy chief petty
officers (borrowed from the Agency's Office of Training) who
had no contact with Miami Base, no authority to spend money or
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Nee Oe ee ae ee ee ae
give orders, and no channel to procure parts and equipment.
The technical and training abilities of these Navy chiefs were
grossly misused by the project; much of their time was spent
at stevedore or deckhand labor.
Training on LCUs
SE, hes 100s
were bought directly from the Navy in September 1960 at
$125,000 each. Supposedly in operating condition, these
craft had been stripped and were in such bad shape that they
could hardly be moved from the dock. The dozen or 60 Agency
employees who went to Little Creek to get them into operational
condition were so busy with repairs that there was little time
left for learning how to operate the craft, even though some
members of the group were not familiar with Icus, the engineers
did not all know engineering and the skippers did not all know
navigation. This group got the LCUs to Vieques Island somehow
and proceeded to train the Cuban crews, which, however, were
given no training in night landing and very little in navigation.
36. In all, about $1,400,000 was spent on boats and ships,
and the total cost of the maritime phases of the project was
about $2,679,000. Wages were a considerable item. For example,
ship's masters on contract were budgeted at $2,500 a month, cooks
at $1,000. There seemed to be a general failure at the top to
AE Qin
Page 130 (page 130 of the original)
BPP OR ET
realize how much boats cost to run and to keep in repair. The
arrangement whereby officers in Headquarters tried to control
the expenditures being made in Florida to repair and operate
boats which were urgently needed was highly impractical. The
high cost of boats in this project is well illustrated by the
dismal case of the “Sea Gull".
Case of the "Sea Gull"
37, SAD
It had pre-
viously been used to service offshore oil-drilling rigs and was.
estimated to have a fair market value of $74,500.
38. The request for approval gD was signed
for the chief of the project by a special assistant in the FI
section (acting for the acting chief!) and approved by the
Deputy Chief of WH Division (acting for Hits chief). It was
ee christened the "Sea Gull" and transported
to Miami, where it broke down 500 yards from the pier on its
first trial run. On 6 January 1961 it was estimated that
repairs and modifications would cost $10,000; by 30 January,
the estimate had grown to $32,000; by 22 February, to
$40,000; and on 24 February, the shipyard doing the work
submitted a bill for $65,000! In all, the "Sea Gull" cost:
Page 131 (page 131 of the original)
See ee eee ee
SD $39, 500
‘Repairs (eventually reduced from $65,000) 58,000
Communications gear, tools, arms, navigation
aids 14,000
$Ti1, 500
39. The "Sea Gull” was not ready to be used until the last
week of March; at this time it was commandeered (along with the
"wasp") by a headquarters unit which was staging a deception
operation in connection with the amphibious strike, over the
strong protests of Miami Base, which never got to use the boat
on an infiltration operation.
ho. The lack of qualified personnel, the confusion of
responsibility, the lack of planning, and the skyrocketing
costs in the maritime activity led to a high-level request Yor
the assignment of a qualified senior Naval officer to the
project. When a captain reported, no one seemed to know vbat
to do with him and, after he briefly visited Miami and Key West
bases, he was assigned to the naval side of the strike planning
at Headquarters. He is reported to have been not entirely
happy with his brief Agency tour. In any event he was another
example of poor handling of people in this project, and he was
not given a chance to solve the problems of maritime operations.
hl. It is apparent that the Agency had very little capability
for maritime operations even of 4 clandestine nature. It lacked
Page 132 (page 132 of the original)
trained personnel, boats, bases, doctrine, and organization.
The employees who worked in this sadly slighted activity were
well aware of this, and morale was not high. As one of them
said, "The lowest kind of operations officer is a paramilitary
operations officer, and the lowest kind of PM officer is a
maritime operations officer."
Page 133 (page 133 of the original)
TR lie
L. CLANDESTINE PARAMILITARY OPERATIONS TRAINING UNDERGROUND
LEADERS
1. Early in the project a carefully selected group of
Cubans was trained for infiltration into Cuba to organize
resistance. The loose management of the project is illus-
trated by the confusion between the headquarters elements
and the training elements over what these men were being
trained for, and by the failure to have their missions, means
of entry, and reception ready for them.
2. The trained Cubans put into Cuba were too few and
too late to do very much, and the strike planners ignored
them. The cost of training and holding these men probably
ran well over a million dollars, yet most. of them were never
used for what they were trained to do, and some were not used
at all.
3. This particular endeavor began in December 1959 when
the WH Division made a decision to pick a small group of Cubans
and train them to train other Cubans for infiltration into Cuba
in small paramilitary. teams to organize resistance forces.
Possible training sites in Panams were surveyed at this time,
but no further action was taken. The basic policy paper
approved by the President in March 1960 included. the above
proposal.
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bea SP ar ne oe
4, In April 1960, the Cuban leader Manuel Artime, who was
in Miami, offered a number of his followers as recruits for
this program. Useppa Island was acquired as an assessment
and holding site, and a preliminary screening of the candidates
for the training program began.
2+ During May and June 1960 complete polygraphs, psycho-
logical and psychiatric tests, and evaluations were cbtained
on 66 individuals. Basic Morse code training was begun at
the island. In June 29 trainees were sent from Useppa Island
to Panama for basic peramilitary, training. -In July 32 trainees
were sent to Guatemala to be trained. as radio operators, and.
Useppa Island was then closed down.
The Training Site
6. A worse training. site could hardly. have been. chosen
than the one in Guatemala, it being almost inaccessible, with
no training facilities and.almost.no living facilities. The
trainees were put to work building the camp, working during
the day and studying at night. This went on for several months.
The number of Americans at the camp was held to a bare
minimm for security reasons. They were represented to be
either tourists or adventurers. ‘The camp commander was also
the chief of training and the project officer for Guatemala.
When he arrived, he had to set up the temporary camp, find an
area for a permanent camp, contract for buildings, supplies,
Page 135 (page 135 of the original)
and equipment; he also had to find sites for a suitable air base
& maritime base, and a prison and contract for these facilities
to be built. He had three assistants: a commnications officer
and two contract employees.
8. The initial group of paramilitary trainees was trans-
ferred to the Guatemala Base from Panama after two months of
training. By 23 August there were 78 paramilitary trainees
3h commmications trainees and nine. staff and contract employees.
ae ‘By. September the training camp had enough facilities
and instructors to begin a four-week basic training course.
The trainees were sorted into seven-man teams according to
their area knowledge and their aptitudes. Sixty were selected
a to go into Cuba (either ‘legally or illegally) and to contact
) resistance groups; 60 were selected for action teams to go in
‘illegally and join the resistance groups that had been contacted
by the first teams; the remainder of the trainees would be formed
into a small conventional strike force. The training base
expected the teams to be ready to go in October and asked Fead-
quarters to provide the infiltration plans.
10. The trainers did not realize that Headquarters had
changed the plan. Already in July the FRD, the exile political
front, had been asked to provide 500 individuals for a para-
military action cadre, and the training base was asked if it
could accommodate this number. Obviously, it could not.
Page 136 (page 136 of the original)
Qa ey pam
Conditions actually got worse. In September the training camp
was plagued by torrential tropical rains, shortages of food
and supplies, plus trouble with agitators and hoodlums among
their recently arrived trainees, who were not being screened
‘and assessed as the first ones had been. The training base
chief got into disfavor with Headquarters apparently because
of his blunt cables asking for assistance. ("My men are going
hungry and barefoot."
Request for Missions
11. In October the infiltration teams that had been
selected from among the trainees worked out detailed opera-
tional plans for themselves, complete with maps, propaganda
handouts, and resistance operations. When the base announced
that about a hundred men were ready to go, Headquarters replied
that it was proposing the illegal infiltration of the teams in
November by boat. (Actually, the only boat the project had at
this time was the 54-foot "Metusa Time".) Headquarters further
cabled that it was engaged in preparing a general plan for the
employment of the infiltration teams but that the details were
not yet ready. The base chief was recalled in October, and
thereafter the training base had a new chief each week for five
weeks. One trainee was put into Cuba legally at the end of
October.
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Page 137 (page 137 of the original)
oa da eee om oe ad
12. In November 1960 (12 months after the original decision
had been made to train Cuban teams for resistance organization)
ten teams were reported ready to go. But they were still awaiting
Headquarters plans for infiltration. In all 178 men (including
23 radio operators) had been trained in security, basic clandestine
tradecraft, intelligence collection end reporting, propaganda and
agitation, subversive activities, resistance organization, recep-
tion operations, explosives and demolitions, guerrilla action,
and similar matters.
13. Headquarters approved the use of 60.of. these men for
the resistance teams 3 all others were ‘scheduled to begin formal,
conventional combat training on 15 November as an element of a
strike force of 1,500 men. This drastic change in over-all
plan was announced to the training base by a cable on 4 November
and led the base to plead for closer coordination in the future
between Headquarters planning and the field training. During
this month six trainees were moved to a Miami safe house where
they stayed for two months, awaiting transportation into Cuba.
Move to Panama
14, In December 1960 Headquarters advised the training
base that it was expecting approval of its operational concept,
which included internal resistance stimulated by teams as well
as the use of a ground and air assault force. It advised the
base that a 750-man brigade (instead of 1,500) was being planned
Page 138 (page 138 of the original)
oie
and that 80 men (instead of 60) were approved for infiltration
teams. During this month the 80 men were moved to Panama where
they were held until somebody could find out what to do with
them. An offer from DPD to give them jump training was turned
down by the project.
15. By January 1961 the morale of the trainees in Panama
had declined considerably. There Was not even an interpreter
available for briefing and debriefing them. Headquarters then
had. 24 of them brought to safe houses in Miami to be made ready
for dispatch. Twelve radio operators were moved from Panama
to the Agency's training base in the United States for further
training.
16. By February 1961 the 32 trainees still in Panama were
described as disillusioned.and at the breaking point. They
were then transferred to a base in New Orleans to be given
additional training in sabotage and air-maritime reception.
February was actually a red-letter month. Six of the radio
operators were infiltrated legally. Om 14 February the first
resistance team was put into Cuba, and two more teams went in
at the end of the month. However, the two teams which had sat
in a Miami safe house from mid-November to mid-January returned
to Miami in bad humor in mid-February after a month on the
"Barbara J" circumnavigating Cuba without being put ashore.
130
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Page 139 (page 139 of the original)
17. <An effective infiltration mechanism never was developed.
Not one of the paramilitary teams was ever delivered by air. On
29 March the project was able to put four agents into Cuba through
Guantanamo Base. It is not clear why this could not have been
done earlier. No infiltration was ever tried by submarine.
Morale Problems
18. On 10 March 1961 (16 months after the original decision
to train resistance teams) the 90 men. who had been trained for
this were distributed. as. follows:
32 infiltrated, including 14. radio operators
5 at sea on a sabotage mission
6.in New Orleans as members of a raider team
-28 in New Orleans still awaiting infiltration
19 detached to Miami for various impending operations.
The morale of the remaining trainees was low and their anger high.
This caused a great many problems in New Orleans. Some of these
men had been held in five different camps over ‘a ten-month period.
On 30 March, about three weeks before the invasion, the remainder
of the group (about 20) were transferred to Miami and turned loose,
being described as a collection of spoiled individuals distinguished
by. bad conduct. At least 30 of the agents who were recruited
between May and September 1960 never got into Cuba at all; among
the 30 were elght who came into the project in the original group
in May 1960 and who were in training almost continuously from that
time up to April 1961.
Page 140 (page 140 of the original)
19. The time spent in training is no measure of the quality
of the training, of course, and there was undoubtedly a great
waste of time. One of the Cubans trained for infiltration into
Cuba wrote that after he arrived in Panama in December 1960:",..
during almost three weeks, the only thingh I did...was cleaning
a small dam and the shoting range. after that we. just din't do
anythingh, just sleep and ate, thats all.". When he arrived in
Florida on 18 January: "There, the same history, sleep, eat, play
card and watch television. ‘The only training I receveid.during >
thet time was on secret writting, wich was very good but nothing
else." The same agent pointed out serious deficiencies in his
weapons training and his final briefing.
20. One of. the instructors in Guatemala in the early months
later claimed that only two instructors knew their business 3. the
others were chosen from the trainee cadre, who had only a back-
ground of two months' training themselves. He included -himself
among the unqualified.
Training Omission
2l. The remoteness of the training site caused additional
difficulties. When brigade training started on 29 November
there were only two compasses for. 405 troops and these belonged
to trainees. Compasses had first been requested on 2 October,
but when they were not received the training in their use had
to be omitted from the program.
ate wee Paine Re eG te oe
Page 141 (page 141 of the original)
22. More serious, there had never been any definition of
training goals, and the base and Headquarters were working at
cross-purposes. The chief of the training pase in Guatemala
never received any letter of instruction.
23. The situation at the New Orleans Base in March 1961
was even more chaotic. The instructors found a training area
which was 90% swamp and filled with poisonous snakes. Demolition
classes had to be conducted along a footpath leading from a
theater to a mess hall, with constant interruptions from
passers-by. Nobody seemed able to define the training that
‘was required. A demolitions instructor was assured on arrival
that the group he had come to train did not need the instruction;
in any case, there were no explosive training materials, no
adequate range, and.no gear to set one up. Another instructor,
sent to New Orleans to train a small raider group, found himself
expected to train, organize and equip a 90-man guerrilia force.
A week later he found himself training a 160-man assault battalion
instead. The training requirement was never spelled out, and the
training equipment never showed up.
2k. Training activity of various sorts was going on contin-
ually; there were requirements for everything from counterintelli-
gence to small boat handling. But there was no full-time chief
of training in the project to oversee requirements, define
responsibilities, set up facilities and provide support.
Page 142 (page 142 of the original)
NOS ee al
Consequently, what training was done, was done without control,
by individual case officers doing the best they could. How
effective this training was cannot be determined. Much of it
took place in Miami, where personnel from the base were instruct-
ing Cubens in intelligence collection, counterintelligence tech-
niques, psychological warfare activities, or paramilitary subjects,
according to need.
25- The training was necessarily conducted in safe houses,
and. required a considerable expenditure of time on the part of
base personnel. Other training was conducted in the Washington
area, usually by case officers. One man was trained in a hotel
room to make a parachute jump (he made one successfully! ). Many
.requests were levied on the Office of Training for instructors
and training materials. But these were uncoordinated and wasteful.
Many of the instructors, when made available, were not used in
their specialties, ending up in such jobs as stevedoring instead.
26. A well thought-out project would have had a training
annex which would have laid specific requirements on the Office
of Training, particularly when the training of hundreds of people
was an integral part of the venture. Instead, the requirements
were met in piecemeal and improvised fashion, under difficult
conditions, and with dubious results.
13h
eee eee reo ne ee ee ee ee ween we eine Oe ce kame lee
Page 143 (page 143 of the original)
M. SECURITY
1. The assault on Cuba is generally acknowledged to have
been a poorly Kept secret. It could hardly have been other-
wise, considering the complexity of the operation and the number
of people involved, both Cuban and American. The inspection
team did not make a detailed study of the security aspects of
the operation but came across many weaknesses in the protection
of information and activities from those who did not “need to
know.”
2. In general the Cubans who were in the operation do
not seem to have had any real understanding of the need to
keep quiet about their activities. Many of them knew mich
more than they needed to Imow, and they were not compartmented
from each other and from Americans to the extent that was neces-
sary. For example, one wealthy Cuban who was close to the
operation was being contacted by at least six different staff
employees.
3. Some agents were being handied by two or three
different case officers at the same time, with confusing results
and lack of control. Many of the agents who were sent into
Cuba had known each other during training; for example, a dozen
radio operators had been trained as a group. If one was arrested,
he would know who the other ones were. One radio operator inside
Cuba was aware of almost every paramilitary operation in Cuba
from the beginning of the project.
Page 144 (page 144 of the original)
Te candi eee a eee ee
4, Agents who were supposedly well trained disregarded
elementary rules of personal security and were arrested because
they needlessly gave away their true identities by visiting
relatives who were under surveillance or by carrying identifying
documents in their pockets.
Hazard in Miami
5. The Miami area represented a particular hazard because
stories and rumors spread rapidly through the large Cuban
community, which included Castro agents. Movements of boats
and people soon became known. One agent, who had been infiltrated
into Cuba by boat, reported later that within three days his
family in Miami knew when and how he had landed, because one of
the crew members of the boat had told many people in Miami about
it. Letters from the training camp, although censored, managed
nevertheless to convey information to the Miami Cubans.
6. The Americans on the project in many cases also failed
to observe strict security discipline. One senior case officer
holding an operational meeting with Cubans in a Miami motel was
overheard by a citizen, who reported to the Federal Bureau of
Investigation.
7. %It has been testified that the security measures at the
training camps in Guatemala and at New Orleans were inadequate.
Furthermore, the training camps had no adequate counterintelligence
capability. Except for an instructor borrowed from the Office of.
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eal: RS AR oo ee
Training for a few weeks, the Agency was unable to provide a
counterintelligence officer to the camps. This lack was serious
because, in order to obtain a great many recruits for the strike
force in a hurry, there was very little screening of the
volunteers, and some who were sent to camp had been inadequately
checked.
Poor Backstopping
8. Instances were noted of poor backstopping of the cover
stories of Agency employees, sketchy briefings on cover, weak
cover stories, and faulty documentation. Much of this can be
ascribed to lack of attention to detail due to the press of
time. Many of the early difficulties in Guatemala stemmed
from the inadvisability of providing supplies and support to
instructors who were posing as "tourists" and "soldiers of
fortune". This pretense eventually had to be dropped because
of its impracticality. A serious weakness showed up in the
poor arrangements for backstopping overflights (for example
the plane that landed in Jamaica).
9. Somewhat curiously, a strict compartmentation was
applied in certain areas of the project which actually denied
information to people who needed it. Those who were engaged
in running agents into Cuba were never allowed into the War
Room or given the plan for the strike.
137
Page 146 (page 146 of the original)
10. For security reasons, the resistance elements inside
Cuba were not advised of the time of the assault, and could
hardly have risen up even if there had been 100,000 of them.
The entire complement of the Miami Base was likewise uninformed
and was unprepared to take action when the strike occurred.
Staff employees at the Miami Base, who could have benefited by
special clearances, did not get them until much too late.
Use of Guatemala
ll. The use of Guatemala for training bases was, in terms
of security, unfortunate. It is obvious now that the training
could have been done more securely in the United States (as for
example, the tank crew training, which got no publicity at all).
The Guatemala camps were not easily hidden and not easily
explained. The air base was located on a well-traveled road
and in view of a railroad where trainloads of Guatemalans
frequently halted on a siding.
12. It is strange that the training of the Cubans was under-
taken in a foreign country, where the trainees were necessarily
exposed to the natives and reporters could pick up information.
Presumably this was done on grounds of security and non-attri-
putability; however, the radio operators who were trained in
Guatemala were later brought to the United States for further
training. The force for the abortive diversionary expedition
was trained in New Orleans rather than being sent outside the
Page 147 (page 147 of the original)
Ne sansaancam ee aT Lams ame ot
country. Other Cubans were trained in both paramilitary and
espionage subjects in the outskirts of Miami and Washington,
and still others were trained on American soil at Vieques
Island. Of all these training locations, only the ones in
Guatemala became known to the world.
13. It is acknowledged that many Cubans and Americans
“observed strict security discipline, that the. security officers
of the project made an outstanding contribution, and that many
arrengements and activities are not open to criticism regarding
their security. Unfortunately, this was not good enough for a
project of this size and importance conducted by professional
intelligence officers.
li. Because of the operation's magnitude, the errors
committed resulted in the exposure of Agency personnel and
modus operandi to many uncontrolled individuals, both foreign
and American.
Page 148 (page 148 of the original)
caren lenciemeschpentine eee ation
N. AMERICANS IN COMBAT
1. During the invasion landing two Agency contract
employees, assigned as operations officers aboard the two
LCIs, went ashore to mark two of the beaches and exchanged
gunfire with Cuban militia. One of these employees had taken
part in a sabotage raid on a Cuban oil refinery a month
earlier. Both of them engaged in rescue operations along
the Cuban shore after the brigade collapsed.
2. In late 1960 the project leaders were becoming doubtful
of the motivation of the Cuban pilots they were training and of
their ability to perform tactical missions successfully. In
January 1961 the Agency requested the Special Group to authorize
the use of American contract pilots. The authorization given
was limited to the hiring of the pilots and reserved for later
decision the question of their uctual use. The Special Group
also granted authority to recruit and bire American seamen to
serve in the invasion fleet.
3- Three American contract pilots with long Agency
experience were made available from another project. A number
of other pilots and air-crew technicians, members or ex-members
of several Air National Guard units, were recruited especially
for the project in early 1961 umder cover of a notional commercial
company.
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kh, Through the first day of fighting, 17 April, only Cuban
air crews were used for combat or drop missions. Of 11 Cuban-
manned B-26s which had gone over the beachhead, only three had
returned to base, and four of the others had been shot down.
That night the available Cuban crews were exhausted and dispirited.
5. On 18 April the hard pressed exile brigade was calling
for air support. Two American fliers volunteered to go, and
several Cuban crews followed their example. The result was 4
highly successful attack against a colum of Castro's forces
moving on Blue Beach. Four American-manned aircraft were in
combat over the beachhead the following day, and two of them
were shot down by Castro's T-33s. Later the same day two
American crews returned for another sortie. Four American fliers
were either killed in combat or executed by Castro forces after
being shot down.
6. In addition to these actions, an American-manned PBY
patrolled the waters south of Cuba for a total of 57 hours
during five days on air-sea rescue and communications relay
duty.
7. The American pilots lost in combat were aware of United
States Government sponsorship and probably also of Agency interest,
but had been instructed not to inform their families of this. In
spite of wide press coverage of the invasion failure, the story of
the American pilots has never gotten into print, although its
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sensational nature still makes this a possibility. In dealing
with the surviving families it has been necessary to conceal
connection with the United States Government. This effort has
been complicated by the fact that the original cover story was
changed and a second notional company substituted.
8. The resolution in @ secure manner of the legal and
moral claims arising from these four deaths has been costly,
complicated and fraught with risk of disclosure of the
Government's role. These problems were aggravated by the
inclusion in the employment contracts of certain unnecessarily
complicated insurance clauses and by the project's failure to
prepare in advance an effective plan for dealing with the
eventual legal and security problems.
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Pan Dein
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Certain basic conclusions have been drawn from this survey
of the Cuban operation:
1. The Central Intelligence Agency, after starting to
build up the resistance and guerrilla forces inside Cuba,
drastically converted the project into what rapidly became
an overt military operation. The Agency failed to recognize
that when the project advanced beyond the stage of plausible
denial it was going beyond the area of Agency responsibility
as well as Agency capability.
2. The Agency became so wrapped up in the military
operation that it failed to appraise the chances of success
realistically. Furthermore, it failed to keep the national
policy-makers adequately and realistically informed of the
conditions considered essential for success, and it did not
press sufficiently for prompt policy decisions in a fast
moving situation.
3. As the project grew, the Agency reduced the exiled
leaders to the status of puppets, thereby losing the
advantages of their active participation.
kh. The Agency failed to build up and supply a resistance
organization under rather favorable conditions. Air and boat
operations showed up poorly.
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5. The Agency failed to collect adequate information
on the strengths of the Castro regime and the extent of
the opposition to it; and it failed to evaluate the
available information correctly.
6. The project was badly organized. Command lines
and management controls were ineffective and unclear.
Senior Staffs of the Agency were not utilized; air support
stayed independent of the project; the role of the large
forward base was not clear.
7. ‘he project was not staffed throughout #ith
top-quality people, and a number of people were not used
to the best advantage.
8. The Agency entered the project without adequate
assets in the way of boats, bases, training facilities,
agent nets, Spanish-speakers, and similar essential
ingredients of a successful operation. Had these been
already in being, much time and effort would have been
saved.
9. Agency policies and operational plans were never
clearly delineated, with the exception of the plan for the
brigade landing; but even this provided no disaster plan,
no unconventional warfare annex, and only extremely vague
plans for action following a successful landing. In
general, Agency plans and policies did not precede the
alin
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various operations in the project but were drawn up in
response to operational needs as they arose. Consequently,
the scope of the operation itself and of the support
required was constantly shifting.
There were some good things in this project. Much of the
support provided was outstanding (for example, logistics and
communications). A number of individuals did superior jobs.
Many people at all grade levels gave their time and effort
without stint, working almost unlimited hours over long periods,
under difficult and frustrating conditions, without regard to
personal considerations. But this was not enough.
it is assumed that the Agency, because of its experience
in this Cuban operation, will never again engage in an operation
that is essentially an overt military effort. But before it
takes on another major covert political operation it will have
to improve its organization and management drastically. It
must find a way to set up an actual task force, if necessary,
and be able to staff it with the best people. It must govern
its operation with clearly defined policies and carefully
drawn plans, engaging in full coordination with the Departments
of State and Defense as appropriate.
Previous surveys and other papers written by the Inspector
General have called attention to many of these problems and
deficiencies, and have suggested solutions. For example, in
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Sa par ao ee
June 1958 a recommendation was made, in a survey of the Far East
Division, that a high-level Agency study be made of the extent
to which the Agency should be engaged in paramilitary operations,
"if any"; and that it include an evaluation of the capabilities
of other government departments to assume primary responsibility
in this field.
In January 1959 the Inspector General pointed out in a
memorandum to the Deputy Director (Plans) that: "A basic
problem in the PM field is the delineation of responsibility
between the Agency and the military services. In our view, the
Clandestine Services tends to assume responsibilities beyond
its capabilities and does not give sufficient consideration to
the ability of other Departments of the Government to conduct
or participate in these operations."
A 1955 survey of the then Psychological and Paramilitary
Operations Staff warned against the by-passing of this staff
by the operating divisions, who were dealing directly with the
Deputy Director (Plans) and the Director of Central Intelligence
instead. In March 1961 the survey of the Covert Action Staff
again warned against ignoring the staff and failing to utilize
its services.
The July 1959 survey of the Deputy Director (Plans)
organization again stressed the importance of the functional
staffs, particularly in relation to the conduct of complex
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ian eoGiienle aon
Operations, and advocated the use of a task force for covert
operations having major international significance.
"These operations", the survey stated, "may be aimed at
the overthrow of a hostile regime and may require extensive
paramilitary operations, and clandestine logistics and
air support of substantial magnitude. Such operations must
be coordinated with national policy on a continuing basis,
and may require constant high-level liaison with the State
Department and the White House. To be successful, major covert
operations of this nature require the effective mobilization of
all the resources of the DD/P, and are clearly beyond the
capabilities of any one area division."
The same survey added that the Caribbean task force Located
in the WH Division was planning at a great rate, but accomplishing
little because it was too low-level to act decisively or to obtain
effective policy guidance from other departments of the Government 3
it did not even inspire confidence among many senior DD/P officers.
Such task forces within a single division "represent a woefully
inadequate response to a problem of major national significance.
Command of such a task force must be a full-time Job, and the task
force commander must be of sufficient stature to deal directly
with the Under Secretary of State or with other senior officials
of the government as the need arises."
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fenienfinenentnigeenedee
The same survey also discussed the management problem in
the pp/P area at length, and made a number of recommendations
which are on record. Among other things, it pointed out the
confusion as to ‘the relationship and ‘functions of the three
top officers.
The study of the Cuban operation shows that these criticisms
and many others discussed in previous Inspector General surveys
are still valid and worthy of review. But the Cuban operation,
in addition to demonstrating old weaknesses again, also showed
Agency weaknesses not clearly discerned before.
The Inspector General, as a result of his study of the
Cuban operation, makes the following recommendations regarding
future Agency involvement in covert operations which have major
international significance and which may profoundly affect the
course of world events:
1. Such an operation should be carried out by 4
earefully selected task force, under the command of a
senior official of stature on a full-time basis, and
organizationally outside the DD/P structure but drawing
upon all the resources of the Clandestine Services.
2, The Agency should request that such projects
should be transferred to the Department of Defense when
they show signs of becoming overt or beyond Agency
capabilities.
Page 157 (page 157 of the original)
3. The Agency should establish a procedure under which
the Board of National Estimates or other body similarly
divorced from clandestine operations would be required to
evaluate all plans for such major covert operations, drawing
on all available intelligence and estimating the chances of
success from an intelligence point of view.
The Agency should establish a high-level board of
senior officers from its operational and support components,
plus officers detailed from the Pentagon and the Department
of State, to make cold, hard appraisals at recurring intervals
of the chances of success of major covert projects from an
operational point of view.
5. A mechanism should be established for communicating
these intelligence and operational appraisals to the makers
of national policy.
6. In return, a mechanism should be established to
communicate to the Agency the national policy bearing on
such projects, and the Agency should not undertake action
until clearly defined policy has been received.
7. The Agency should improve its system for the guided
collection of information essential to the planning and
carrying out of such projects.
8. The Agency should take immediate steps to eliminate
the deficiencies in its clandestine air and maritime operations.
149
Page 158 (page 158 of the original)
9. The Agency should take steps to improve its
employees' competence in foreign languages, knowledge
of foreign areas, and capability in dealing with foreign
people, when such skills are necessary.
10. The Agency should devise a more orderly system for
the assignment of employees within the pp/P area than that
currently in use.