Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update (1985)

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OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON, 20301-2000 POLICY 21 October 1985 MEMORANDIM FOR ADMINISTRATOR DEFENSE TECHNICAL INFORMATION CENTER ATTN; MR, RICH MATTHEWS, DTIC-FDA SUBJECT: Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update September 1985 This is to confirm our earlier telephone discussion regarding the subject. In entering the subject white paper into your system, it is requested that you apply Distribution Statement A, “Approved for public release; distribution 1s unlimited.” Further, you may stww the Office of the Secretary of Defense as the originator. "David E. Whitman Asaistant for Information Security

Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western Technology: An Update In recent years, the United States Government has learned of a massive, well- organized campaign by the Soviet Union to acquire Western technology illegally and legally for its weipons and military equipment projects. Each year Moscov receives thousands ci pieces of Western equipment and many tens of thousands of unclassified, classifed,.and proprietary documents as part of this campaign. Virtually every Soviet military research project-—well over 4,000 each year in the late 1970s and over 5,000 in the early 1980s—benefits from these technical documents and hardware. The assimilation of Western technology is so broad that the United States and other Western nations are thus subsidizing the Soviet military buildup. Western products and technology secrets are being systematically acquired by intricately organized, highly effective collection programs specifically targeted to improve Soviet military weapon systems. The Soviet intelligence services —the KGB, the GRU, and their surrogates among the East European services-—and Soviet trade and scientific organizations are actively involved in obtaining this technology. Targets include defense contracters, manufacturers, foreign trading firms, academic institutions, and electronic data bases. Only recently has the full extent of illegal Soviet technology collection efforts become known. The purpose of this paper is to reveal detail the structure of these Soviet programs. and to give examples of Soviet requirements and successes. Understand- ing the Soviet effort is a critical first step in protecting Western technology and preventing it from being turned against the West. “original contains color plates: 412 DTIC roproducte ys ons Ww be in ehitee black and

ch A Se Ne “ee Ne Me pat ate was we Ge ee te ee Me ee Me ta ee ee et Contents Page Introduction Overview of Two Soviet Programs oe 2 The VPK Program: Raising the Technical Levels of Weapons 4 and Manufacturing Equipment Successes and Benefits OG VPK Collectorsand Sources tsti<‘<i<‘i<—<i<i<CS;téi‘i‘«‘zmY The KGB ce ce nates ae TheGRU> nT Selected Sources Be 17 US Defense Contractors. Commercial Data Bases WY Scientific Conferences 419 Ministry of Foreign Trade 20 Overt and Academic-Related Collectors The Trade Diversion Program: Building and Expanding Industries 2g Computers and Microelectronics CO 24 Participants i in the Second Program Le Use of Diverters-for-Hire oe 26 Other Diversion Methods BO 37 Prospects for Stemming Losses oe 28 Annex Several Hundred Fxamples of Soviet Military Equipment and 31 Weapons Benefiting Frorn Western Technology and Products tb. Figures I. Key Organizations Involved in Managing Military Research 3 and Manufacturing and the Acquisition of Western Technology 2. Examples of VPK Requirements, Mid-1970s—Early 1980s hi) f 3. Rank Ordering of Soviet Industries by VPK 7 Requirements Fulfilled, by Rubles Saved. and by Hardware Received. 1976-80 4 Technical and Time Benefits to Thousands of Soviet Military 1 Researen Proyects From Western Technology

5. Ruble Savings From Only a Part of Soviet Western Technology: Acquisitions 6. Rank Ordering of Industries by Soviet Military Research Projects Benefiting From Western Technology, Early 1980s 7. Soviet Military Requirements Satisfied by Principal Collection Agencies in the Overall VPK Program, Late 1970s and Early 1980s 8. ‘Most Significant Acquisiti-ns Satisfied by Principal Collection Agencies, Late 1970s and Early 1980s 9. Selected US Universities Ideutified by the Soviets as Sources of Needed Applicd Technology 10. Soviet Needs for Applied Science and Technology From BR. Selected US Universities Compared With Number of Visiting Se, Soviet Bloc Scientists, Early 198us we 11. Soviet Acquisitions of More Than 2.500 Pieces of Western ‘Microelectronics Manufacturing Equipment, Early 1970s- Early 1980s Tables Se ee ee eee ee ee Summary of Results of the VPK Program. Laie 1970s and Early 1980s Selected Worldwide Soviet Acquisitions, Military Applications, and Collectors of Western Documents, Military Hardware, and Dual-Use Products 3. Rank Ordering of Top 100 US Defense Contractors of 1983 Compared With Their Rank Ordering by Aporoximate Frequency of Soviet Identification for Needed Technology, Selectec Periods i in Late 1970s aad Early 1980s 4 Selected Successful Soviet Bloc Fspionage Operations Against US and Other Western Defense Contractor Targets 8, Examples of Dual-Use Equipment and Technology Likely To Be Targeted by the Soviets aad

Soviet Acquisition of Mititarily Significant Western Technology: An Update Introduction Overcoming considerable technological inferiority over the past several decades, the Soviets have built the largest 'nilitary industrial manufacturing base in the world and a massive research establishment to complement it. Their objective is to achieve military- technical capabilities that are at least equal, if not superior, to those of the West. Their resource commitment is enormous by any mea- sure: it has enabled them in recent years to narrow the Western lead in nearly all key technological areas, particularly microelectronics. In materials, explosive, and sensor technologies applicable to, deployed tacti- cal forces such as tanks, artillery. and antitank and surface-to-air missiles the Soviets’ technology level is roughly equal to or slightly better than that of the West. They are the world’s !caders in a few significant fields. such as chemical warfare and in some areas of laser research for future “star wars” applications. Nevertheless, in spite of tne several viecades of mas- sive investment in indigenous research and develop- ment. the prospects are small that the Scviets can reduce their dependence on a large variety of Western products and technology in this decade and the next without allowing the technological gap to widen. The main reasons for this continuing need are endemic to the'Soviet system: the lack of adequate incentives. inflexible bureaucratic structures. excessive secrecy, and insularity from the West. Even if there were some major Soviet economic or managerial reforms, no real lessening of the Soviet dependence on Western inno- vation is anticipated as long as the USSR perceives the’ need for military-technological parity with the West. or the need for superiority. The impact of this dezcdence could be even more imporigni in ine 1996 ina ti is ivday. The USSR has been compelied to follow Western direction in echnological change. and thus far it has been able to do this satisfactorily because of a mature technologi- cal base. The nex’ decade is less certain for the Soviets, however, because of new technological leader- ship that the West has supplied them. Their depen- dence is essentially for innovation-—where they will continue to look to the West—not for maintaining adequacy, which they have achieved in nearly all important military technologies. But today's adequa- cy will be tomorrow's obsolescence if technology fails to keep pace. In May 1982 the US Congress was given a report identifying a massive and global Soviet program to acquire Western militarily significant technology." That report described ihe Soviets’ successes in supple- menting their military research and manufacturing capabilities and in narrowing the technology gap with the West, thereby eroding the technological superior- ity on wiich US and Allied security depends. The identification of this Soviet program led the West to undertake greater efforts in counterintelligence and export control. Since then, it has become even more evident that the magnitude of the Soviets’ collection effort and their ability to assimilate collected equip- ment and technology are far greater than was previ- ously believed. This update of the 1982 report defines the scope of the Soviet effort. It outlines how the Soviets go about acquiring Western technology and identifies examples of specific technologies they seck. It highlights details and statistics of Soviet successes--much more detail than could be revealed previously. This information was obtained directly by the United States and Allied countries. Understanding the Soviet effort is critical in designing ways to protect Western technology from being acquired and used against Western security interests. Soviet Acquisition of Western Technology, April 1982 Exhibit No. Hearings Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investiga- tions of the Committee on Governmental 4 fairs, United States Senate, Ninety-Seventh Congress, Secund Session. 4. 6, E1, and 12 May 1682. Western technologs (hardware. documents. and know-how) in- cludes that of Japan as well as other Free Warld countries. re aioe ee, Sri Sil iat Sila ee tle Oi)

Soviet Motivations A basic question is why do Soviet weapon designers and Soviet manufacturers need to copy design con- cepts embodied in Western equipment and associated documents? In general, Soviet weapons have histori- cally reflected a commitment to functional designs that can be easily manufactured in labor-intensive Sactories and readily maintained in the field with a nunimiamt of technical skill. There has always been a struggle between Soviet design simplicity and techni- cal complexity. Soviet weapon designers have not had to face the competitive pressures that drive Western designers to press the state of the art. Building on a mature research sector and on lessons learned from past performances of weapons in battle, the Soviets are placing more of a premium on techni- cally complex systems. Western system and equip- ment characteristics increasingly are used as yard- sticks against which Soviet technical capabilities are judged. Every major civilian or military project is compared with the best Western technology before it is approved for development. Once in development, Soviet standards mandate the comparison of the quality and technical level of hardware, at different design Stages, with foreign counterparts. With their access: to many details of Western weapons and dual-use equipment designs and concepts Soviet designers are, in effect, con-peting with Western de- signers. That competition, supported and encouraged by the Soviet leadership, is probably pressuring the military research establishment to pay increasing attention to technically complex systems. Counter- vailing pressures for desion siniplicity are being ap- plied by the. manufacturing sector, which is less responsive in adapting to technological change. All of these‘forces indicate. continuing Soviet programs to acguire Western military and dual-use hardware and technical data. Overview of Two Soviet Programs Since 1982 it has become clearer that the Soviets have two programs to acquire Western hardware and documents: ¢ First, Moscow has a program to raise the technical levels of weapons and military equipment as well as to improve the technica! levels of manufacturing processes. This program is managed by the most powerful organization in defense production-—the Military Industrial Commission (VPK) of the Pre- sidium of the Council of Ministers (figure 1). Main- ly, although not exclusively, through intelligence channels, the VPK seeks one-of-a-kind military and dual-use hardware, blueprints, product samples, and test equipment to improve the technical levels and performance of Soviet weapons, military equipment, and defense manufacturing equipment and reduce any dependency on advanced Western products. This is done in large part by exploiting and adapting design concepts’ embodied in acquired equipment and associated documents. Second, the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Soviet intelligence services administer a trade diversion program to acquire relatively large numbers of dual- use manufacturing and test equipment for direct use in production tines. This program secks export controlled microelectronics, computer, communica- tions, machining, robotics, d.agnostic, and other equipment to increase the throughput of weapon- producing industries. These two programs, which apparently are adminis- tered separately, are the hub of the Soviet effort. The VPK program is principally, but not exclusively, an industrial security and counterintelligence concern for the West. It involves espionage by hostile intelli- gence officers. overt collection by Bloc officials. ac- quisition by scientific exchange program participants, and illegal trade-related activity. The trade diversion

Figure 1 Key Organizations Involved in Managing Military Rese:,ch and Manufacturing and the Acquisition of Western Technology Cc M otary policy. research. manufactunng. and the principal reyuesters of Western technology C3 Collectors of Western technology Politburo Central Committee Council of Ministers Ministry of Defense Military Industrial Commission ( VPK) Committee for State Security (KGB) State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) ne wwnened Ministry of Foreign Trade Aviation Industry Machine Building Defense Indusiry General Machine Building Communications Equipment Industry Radio Industry Medium Machine Building Shipbuilding Industry Electronics Industry Chemical Industry: Electrical Equipment Industry Petrateum Refining and Petrochemical Industry The Military Industrial Commission (VPK) coordinates the devel- opment of ali Soviet weapons as well as the Soviet national-level program to acquire Western technology. The VPK is the most powertul organization in the defense-research establishment, com- prising the top executives of the key defense manufacturing minis- tries (industries). Requests for Western documents and one-of-a- kind hardware from military equipment designers in each of the 12 industries shown above are called requirements (see figure 2). To satisfy these requirements, the VWPK controis a national od Le papeeeenenn General Staff Key defense East European Other defense Chef Intelhgence manufacturing intelligence services Academy of Sciences manufacturing Directorate (GRU) ministries mun.stries State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES) fund, amounting to some half a billion rubles each year (roughly $1.4 citlion in 1980 purchase power equivalents). Once approved by the VPK.. requirements are selectively levied among the KGB, the GRU. and at least four other national-level collection agencies, as well as surrogates among.the East European intelligence services. The State Committee for Science and Technology (GRNT) acts as a collector and as the central processor for the national-level program. It:also monitors the absorption and assimilation of Western technology by the defense industries.

preeram principally involves export control and inter- national compliance issues. Characteristics of these programs overlap, further complicating the design of adequate countermeasures: Both programs sometimes seck the same products. Soviet industrial ministries request technology and equipment through both programs. ¢ The collection channels overlap and in some cases the same Soviet individuals (intelligence officers and others) are involved in each program. The VPK Program: Raising the Technical Levels of Weapons and Manufacturing Equipment The VPK includes the top executives of most of the key Soviet defense manufacturing ministries shown in figure 1. Full VPK membership is given to the Ministers of Aviation, Machine Building (projectiles and explosives), Defense Industry (armor and electro- optics), General Machine Building (strategic missiles and space), Communications Equipment, Radio (ra- dars and large-scale computers), Medium Machine Building (nuclear weapons and high-energy lasers), Shipbuilding. and Electronics. It is 2 small but power- ful group, responsible for centrally overseeing the research, development, and productic.n of all Soviet weapon systems. It coordinates developments between its chief customer, the Ministry of Defense, and the key suppliers, the defense-industrial ministries. As the expediter for weapons development projects, it is the principal Soviet military instrument for eliminating or circumventing the inefficiencies characteristic of the Soviet economic svsteni. As part of its responsibility to enforce schedules aad ly ensure that.technical and performance specifica-_ tions are met. the VPK translates requests for’ West- -ern hardware and documents, principally by the de- sign bureaus of 12 industries (figure 1). into lists of collection requirements. In the late 1970s alone about one-half billion rubles (roughly $1.4 billion in 1980 purchase power equivalents) each year was reserved ‘for purchases of one-of-a-kind Western hardware and documents. Three examples of specific requirements from the VPK lists are shown in figure 2. The first deals with the IBM 370 computer, used by the Soviets as the model for production of their own version, “Ryad,” which is a copy of the IBM 370 arcnitecture and functions. The second deals with a cruise missile computer. The VPK apparently assigned it a high priority because of major efforts under way at that time to develop long-range strategic cruise missiles, which require large-capacity digital memories for onboard navigation. The Soviets historically have had reliability and other problems in developing such computers. The third example is a US Fairchild Instrument Corporation/Xincom semiconductor memory tester: It is a good example of the one-of-a- kind dual-use product requested and acquired through the VPK program. Design concepts embodied in the hardware and associated docunientation of the tester were copied to develop a Soviet counterpart. The _original tester also could be used to help copy cr reverse-engineer Western integrated circuits. Requirements for documents alone can command amounts as considerable as hardware; examples in- clude over 50,000 rubles (roughly $140,000 in 1980 purchase power equivalents) for documents on the US shuttle orbiter contro! system and over 50.090 rubles for high-energy laser developments. Over 200,900 rubles ($560,000) was approved for acquiring selected research documents on US antimissile defense concepts. Each year the VPK publishes a report based on the evaluation of the individual ministries. It includes aggregate statistics on numbers of technical docu- ments and samples (hardware) obtained, gross ruble savings, and the numbers and priority of requirements satisfied. This report is sent to the Chairman of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers and to the Central Committee of the Communist Party. Copies also are sent to headquarters elements of the collec- tion organizations.

Figure 2 Example; of VPK Requirements, Mid 1970s Early 1980s Mid 19705 Requesier Creyponsib for sroducing mainframe computers) me Ministry or the Radio In stry Desied technulegy mo 2. Technical documentation on IBM 370 computer models 145, 153, 168 and operating system daia, not earlier than (974. information about ad new IBM projects. Organization ch itgen wits Heaton ve we ae one 3, KGB Grigin or locaton of ievhnology sos see me 4 US: Documem: from the IBM firm. Late 1970s hunt requinsaent. Pronts code AT adicates teehnology seeded for Minisities of Aviation. ications Equip and Electronics poomnval soluuens of a problem in producing 4 turure cape systern Industries, A-l, Most Critical Desind technology 2. Electronic components and programing devices for cruise missile an digital cornputer memory. Samples and dc desired. Mwoumem tands allo.ated for coliection of thi oer 3 $70.000 mbiss Orgameation crarged with collection — 4 G9 Early 19806 Cade Ba indicates sud tantai cedcution time and expenuere % od Ministry of the Electronics Indust:v. B-f SU preductort of Kew wecpany Re Devwred chao ar 2. Xincom monitoring and metering equipment for static and fuacuonat «esting of semicunductor memory units. Sample ss and docamenis desired. Mawnan Funes reg cd for cotlection of th src 3. 4,500,000 rabies nopimathgence ona aonon also charged wuts Sty tedlecdon 4 Minwuy-of Fotcisn Trade, KGB The nid-1972< VPK requirement shown aove targets FRM equip- (sample) and associated documentation requested for copying as a ment for Sowet ovhtars research acd devticament rhe Sovists well as for volume purchases for direst use in production lines. This coned the architec ture af the IBM 36° and 370 soxieny to develep tester was in fact acquired, and design concepts weve copied. saving their Ryad series cf computers. The late 19705 cvequiremert is a several hundred man-vears of Soviet developmental effort. sl very high priovity for three reasons: iv is Wentificd as most Soviet requirement data als: include the firms and sometimes entica!” ai is needed to solve problems sup: ocducing a future the names of persons who have the desired hardware cnd.docu- é weapon sysieit ard three ministries wouk! beesftc iechnically, ments Some 3,000 to 5.000 new, amended. and reanproved require- econonica'ly. nag jointly from its acquisnion The earl: 1980s ments {or hardware, documents, or both are now issued by the a requirement, for a Fairchild/Xinem semicoadictar memory test Soviets each year. a system. iS o perfect example of the one-of-a-irind duai-nse product

Table 1 Summary of Results of he VPK Program, Late 1970s and Early 1980s An average of over 5,000 Soviet military equipment and wee pon system research projecis per year in the early 1980s benefited from Western hardware and technical documents. Over half of these projects were in the electronics and the armor and electro- optics industries. Innovation, new concepts. new directions, higher vechnical levels of research, accelerated development of more advanced weapons, and the avoidance of major pitfalls are some of the key bencfits io Sovie: military scientific research projects. In the early 19803 more than 3,500 requirements were levied each year for specific Western hardware. documents, or both, with roughly orne-:hird satisfied each year; the other two-thirds ‘still targeted. Some half a billion rubles are maint? ined each year for potential collections against these requirements (roughly $1.4 billion in 1980 purchase power equivalents). During the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976-80), over 3,500 require- ments were fully satisfied worldwide---roughly 60 to 70 percent of these being fulfilled by the Soviet intelligence services (the KGB and the GRL) and surrogates among the East European intelli- gence services, Requirements fully satisfied during the ith: Five- Year Plan. will exceed 5,000. Jf the 3,500 satisfied requiremen:s approximately 5 to 10 percent were judged by the Soviets as the most significant to military research projects. The Soviet intelligence services and surrogates. among the East European services fulfilled about 90 percent of these most significant requirements cach year. About half of all VPK requirements fulfilled in the :Oth Five- Year Plan (1976-80) and thus far in the 1] tth Five-Year Plan (1981-85) were for two industries: electronics and communica- tions equipment. About 60 percent of that portion of document and hardware acquisitions considered to be the mosi sigaificant to the Soviets was of LS origin, although not necessarily collected in the United States. About 70 percent of the documents and hardware acquired in the 10th and so far in the 11th Five-Year Plans, which were judged by the Soviets to be the most significant to their military, research projects, probably were export controlled, embargoed., classified. or under some control by Western governments. About 50 percent of the 6,000 to 10,000 pieces of hardware acquired annually and 20 perceat of the 100.000 documents acquired annually are used by the Soviets in transferring Western technology into their military research projects. ¢ In the late 1970s aboui 700 embargoed cual-use manu‘acturing, diagnostic instrumentation, and other dual-use proqucts were acquired each year for copying.embodied designs, reverse- engineering, and probably for selected direct use a: key equip- _ment in Soviet military production lines. ¢ From !976 to 1980 the greatest savings in research project costs, almost one-half billion rubles (the 1980 dollar cost of equivalent research activity would be $800 million), were realized by two ministries—the Ministry of the Defense Industry (armor and electro-optics) and the Ministry of the Aviation Industry. The Soviet manpower equivalence of these savings alone translates roughly into over 100.000 man-years of sc entific research. These savings, however, may be biased. The ruble figures probabiy reflect operating cosis-~ salaries, bonuses, and sometimes savings in elimination of, for example: test range activity. but not capital costs. Although Soviet managers generally tend to inflate savings to enhance their role, the savings estimated in the VPK program appear to be conservative. Successes and Benefits The VPK program is a Soviet success story (table 1}. Over 3,500 specific collection requirements for hard- ware and documents were satisfied for the 12 indus: 7: al ministries for just the 10th Five-Year Plan (1976- 801. About 50 percent of more than 30,000 picces of Western one-of-a-kind military and dual-use hard- ware and about 20 percent of over 400,000 technical documents collected worldwide in response to these requirements were used to improve the technical + performance of very large numbers of Soviet military equipment and weapon systems. The benefits and distribution by industry of the fulfilled requirements are shown in figure 3. According to the Soviets, about one-third of the VPK requirements are totally or partially fulfilled annually. strougly suggesting that Western industrial security, counterintelligence. export controls. and other efforts do have an effect. But each year the number of VPK requirements grows by about 15 percent. This is a strong indication that the expanding Soviet military industrial program continues to rely on Western technical solutions and advances. [t also indicates increased collection success and user expectation.

Figure 3 Rank Ordering of Soviet Industzies by VPK Requirements Fulfilled. by Rubles Saved, and by. Hardware Received, 1976-80 Number of requirements for Western documents. hardware. or both Rank by requirements fulfilled 0 Rank by hardware received/ rubles saved ‘B00 1,000 Electronics Communications Aviation Radar and computers Chemical Sh:pbuilding + Nucleas induyay and lasers Armor and electro-optics 10/1 Electrical equipment 5/42 Projectile add explosive a Missile ang speve 4 12/6 Petroleu.n an. About 50 percent of the VPK requirements that were fulfilled during the JOth Five-Year Plan for Western hardware and docu- ments were satisfied on behalt oi two defense industries—-electron- ics and cor munications. These are key areas where the Soviets’ need for militarily significant technology and the West's need for better controls:‘are greatest. The four industries receiving the most Western military hardware and dual-use procucts were electronics (over 6,000 pieces of equipment, a large percentage involving microelectronics), chem- ical (almost 4,000 pieces), petroleum/petrochemicals (over 1,500), and communication: (over 1,500), ranked in that order. The top four industries saving the most rubles in research project development costs in terms of manpower and other re- sources were the armor and electro-optics industry (almost 20 percent of the 1.4 billion rubles saved in research project costs) and the aviation, communications, and electronics industries. These four industries consistently appear to be the Soviet lead-rs in requesting, absorbing, and generally getting the most use out of Western" hardware and documerts. In some cases, such.as in the armor area, the Soviets are using Western technology not to catch up, but to enhance a capability that already is equal to or better than that of the West.

Five Years-Gained in Developing the Next Generation of Fire-Control Radars for Soviet Fighter Aircraft The Soviets estimated that by using documentation on the US F-18 fighter their aviation and radar industries saved some five years of development time and 3% million rubles (the 1980 dollar cost of equiva- lent research activity would be $55 million) in project manpower and other developmental costs. The man- power portion of these savings probably represents over a thousand man-years of scientific research effor: and one of the most successful individual exploitations ever of Western technology. 1» documentation on the F-18 fire-control radar ser,ed as the technical basis for new lookdown/shoot- down engagement radars for the latest generation of Soviet fighters. US methods of component design, fast-Fourier-transform algorithms. te: ain mapping functions, and real-time resolution-enhancement techniques were cited as key elements incorporated into the Seviet counterpart. Moreover, F-18 and F-14 documentation served as the in:petus for two long-term research projects to _design from scratch a new radar-guided air-to-air missile system. The documentation also was instru- mental in formulating concrete specifications to de- velop new Soviet airborne radar countermeasures equipment against the F-18 and F-14. Significant acquisitions of Western technology in- clude documents on fire-contrcl radars for the F-14. F-15, and F-18 and documents on US ballistic missile defense concepts (table 2). In terms of broad defense programs, Soviet strategic missiles, air defens tacti- cal forces, and weapons manufacturing capabilities have benefited the most from the VPK program. The annex has several hundred examples of specific Soviet weapons and military equipment benefiting from Western technology. Western technology collected each year in the late 1970s and early 1980s aided Soviet military industries principally. in four ways. Ranked by priority, the VPK program: ¢ Redirected Soviet technical approaches in about a hundred projects each year for ongoing weapon systems and key sailitary equipment, or resulted in the improvement of the weapons manufacturing processes. Initiated several hundred new short-term and long- term research projects each year on techn‘~a! topics that had not been under consideration. Raised the technical levels of several thousand developmental projects each year involving military equipment, manufacturing, or design procedures. Eliminated or shortened phases of more than a thousand military research projects each year. This contributed to a substantial reduction— in a-number of cases, two to three years—in time needed 10 produce more technically advanced weapons and military equipment. The benefits vary from project to project. Western technology has assisted the Soviets in reducing their weapon acquisition cycle by up to two years for research projects in an advanced status. Acquisition of Western documents, for example, helped the Soviets cut by two years the time spent on researching a new generation of fuzes for munitions with a large kill radius and for self-aiming aviation cluster munitions. For projects in an earlier stage of research, the cycle can be reduced as much as five years. This considera- bly shrinks overall research time, reduces the amount of resources devoted to weapon system research, and allows diversi: of those resources to other Soviet military resea -h projects. A wide range of Soviet data demonstrates that bene- fits to military rescarch projects have increased signif-: icantly trom the fate 1970s to the early 1980s (figure 4) and have applied iv thousands of research projects in all key defense industries. Measured in rubles, the

Table 2 Selected Worldwide Soviet Acquisitions, Military Applications, and Collectors of Western Documents, Military Hardware, ‘and Dual-Use Products Western Technology Acquired Strategic Missiles Documents on Cruise Missiles Using Radar Terrain Maps Documents on Heat Shielding Material for Reentry Vehicles Documents on Ballistic Missile Defense Concepts Air Defense F-14, F-15, F-18 Documents on Fire-Control Radars US Phoenix Missile Documents Infrared Radiom:ter Fiber-Optics Systems Air-to-Air Missile Documents General Purpose Naval And Antisubmarine Warfare Aircraft Carrier Steam Catapult Design Documents US MK 48 Torpedo Documents Gamma Radiation Radiometer Acoustic Spectrum Analyzer Powerful Accustical Vibrator Space and Antisatellite Weapsiis Documents on Systems and Heat Shielding of the US Space Shuttle Transit Naval Navigation Hardware VS NAVSTAR Navigation System Documents High-Energy Chemical Laser Documents Systen 101 Processing Fc,uipment Tactical Forces International Radar Conference Documents Ground Support Equipment for US TOW Anti- tank Guided Missile US Copperhead Laser-Cuided Artillery Documents Laser-Guided Missile Documents Infrared Imaging Subsystem Designs Millimeter Radar Documents Pressure Measuring Instruments and Documents Soviet Application/Improvement Cruise Missile Guidance Ballistic Missile Warheads Future Ballistic Missile Defense Four Soviet Fighter Aircraft Semiactive Air-to-Air Missile Reduced Infrared Signature Aircraft Aircraft and Missile Onboard Communication Systems New Air-to-Air Missile Aircraft Launching System for New Aircraft Carrier Antisubmarine Torpedo Nuclear Submarine Wake-Detecticn Trailing System Submarine Quieting Submarine and Ship Sonars Reusable Space System First-Generation Space-Based Naval Radionavigation System Digital Signal Processing for Counterpart Satellite System Space-Based Laser Weapon Digital Processing and Video for Space-Based Recon wissance: Missile, Bomb, and Remotely Piloted Vehicle Command Guidance Synthetic Aperture Radar for Aircraft Detection Countermeasure System New Laser-Guided Artillery Shell Portable Antiaircraft System Fire-Control System of Future Tank Antitank Missile Advanced Modeling for New Artillery Projectiles Collector KGB, GRU KGB, GRU KGB, GRU KGB, GRU KGB KGB GRU GRU GRU GRU, GRU GRU GKNT, GKES, Academy of Sciences KGB GRU Others KGB Others GRU GRU GRU KGB KGB GRU KGB. GRU

Table 2 Selected Worldwide Soviet Acquisitions, Military Applications, and Collectors of Western Documents, Military Hardware, and Dual-Use Products (continued) Western Technology Acquired Mezufacturing and Technology Kevlar 49 Fiber Documents for Missiles Complete Set of Manufacturing Equipment for Printed Circuit Boards DTS. 70 Printed Circuit Board Testing System Fivcrglass Manufacturing Technology Computer Disk Memory Systems Bubble Memory Technology Technical Documents on Tests of Cold-Rolled Steel High-Accuracy Three-Dimension Coordinate Soviet Applicstion/Improvement Improved Missile Development Copied for 11 Production Assembly Lines for Strategic Missile, Armor and Electro-Optics, and Radar Industries Miltary Microelectrume Production System High-Pressure Airtanks for Submarines Military Ryad Series Disk Drives Jactical iviszre Onboard Memories Improved Structurai Protection of Warships Copied for Several Industries Collector KGB, GRU Ministry of Foreign Trade KGB KGB. GRL. Ministry of Foreign’ Trade KGB Others "KGB Ministry of Foreign Trade. “teasuring Machine GKNT. GKES, Academy of Sciences savings doubled between 1976 And 1980 (figure and still are expanding inthe Eth Five-Year Plan. The statistics on benefits also point to a massive diffusion of Western technology into Soviet military equipment and weapens. Figure 6 shows how the more than $.000 military research projects benefiting in the early 1980s were distributed by industry. Accerding to these rough indicators. the electronics. armor and electro-optics, and aviation industries are benefiting the most from Wesiern technology. Overall, the acouisition of Western technology per- mits the Soviets to field more sophisticated, versatile, and effective weapons. The basic time for fielding these advanced Soviet weapons, though. remains about the same. It also provides new military capabili- ties and allows additional resources to be used for the development of additional advanced weapons con- cepts. The acquisitions also serve to lighten somewhat the burden of continuing growth in Soviet research and defense spending. Soviet copying and reverse-engineering of Western military and dual-use equipment are major character- istics of the VPK program. Indeed, the majority of VPK reqitirements for “technology” appéars to be for hardware only. In the late 1970s alone! the Soviets acquired about 700 embargoed one-of-a-kind dual-use products each year principally in the area of manufac- turing, inspection, instrumentation and test equip- ment, including key microelectronics production and test equipment. These products were used for making Soviet counterparts or possibly were for use as key manufacturing or test equipment that completed pro- cess lines. Examples included computer-controlled integrated circuit testers, aircraft engine vibration control systems, and narrow-band analyzers for sub- marine quieting. These practices indicate Soviet deficiencies are in the design. testing, and integration of technologically advanced military systems. not in basic research and applied science. They fall short in the engineering of a

Figure 4 Technical and Time Benefits to Thousands of Soviet Military Research Projects From Western Technology Percent Late 1970s Total sover 4.000 Projects whose technical approaches Were redirected New research Proyects whose research Mages were ehminatéd or shortened Proyects started Projects whove' technical Ava 63 kevels were ransed SS The benefits to the Soviet military research estabiishment from acquisitions of Western technology are far greater than previously believed. Virtually every Soviet long- and short-term research project for military systems--well over 4,000 in the late 1970s and well over 5,000 in the early 1980s—is benefiting from the docu- ments and hardware of at least a dozen Western countries. (S figure 6 for'a breakout of how these projects were distributed by industry.) Percent Early 1980s Total over 5,000 Projects in the VPK program are divided into the four major categories shown above. Projects with redirected technical ap- proaches and new projects represent the most significant benefits through adoption of innovations and new directions for military systems. Major pitfalls are thus avoided. Projects whase technical levels were raised and those whose stages were eliminated or shortered represent improvements in the military state of the art of the Soviet Union and an acceleration in the time when more advanced subsystems are ready for new and future v.eapons. device, technologically advanced by Wesi-rn stan- dards. into a useful piece of militartly applicable hardware producible in large quantities. The profile of the VPK program {as well as the trade diversion program) can be used to better define militarily critical technologies as well as better ways to counter Western losses. Both appear principally aimed at acquiring products and technical data. Both show that protecting duel-use products is just as important as protecting the related design know-how. Equipment sules divorced from the transfer of know- how do have long-term significance for the Soviets. The evidence indicates that equipment transfers. both large batch acquisitions and individual samples used for copying embodied design concepts and for reverse- engineering. generally outstrip acquisitions of “tech- nology” in.quantity and are of more immediate ve !ie to the Soviets. VPK Collectors and Sources Analysis of reliable data indicates that in the VPK program the Soviet Bloc intelligence services (the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB), the Chie: Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Sta¥ (GRU), and their surrogates among the East Europe an intelligence services) are the collectors me st often tasked and the most successful.

Figure 5 Ruble Savings From Only a Part of Soviet Western Technology Acquisitions Mitison ruattes Atdoot 14 Rithon rubies in savings on selected proyects during the Hath Five-Year Plan Sut Joe 1976 7k 1y KO. The above savings generally are conservative estimates uy the Soviets resulting from the elimination of stages of military research and design projects, the -*duction in time to carry them out, and the adoption of new technical approaches. The savings are not cumulative. That is, a 20-million-ruble annual saving from the acquisition of US and other Western fiberglass plastics production technology used in manufacturing high-pressure air tanks for submarines was counted for one year only, the year of acquisition. Roughly 400 million rubles ($640 million) were saved in 1980 for only a portion of the Western technology acquired. Most of these savings were in long-term military research projects for weapons of the late 1980s and early 1990s. They therefore were most likely given in te.ms of manpower savings. By this measure several tens of thousands of Soviet man-years of scientific research 2ffort were saved in 1940 During the late 1970s and early 1980s the Soviet intelligence services acquired. through their own ef- forts and those of the surrogate East Europeans. about 60 to 70 percent of ail materials collected in the overall VWPK program each year (figure 7). More important. these intenigence services were involved in collecting worldwide about 90 percent of the informa- tion judged by Mascow as most significant and used Microelectronics Reverse-Engineering Soviet collectors have easily acquired many types of Western integrated circuits (IC:) for reverse engineer- ing. Indeed, most Soviet ICs can be traced toa Western original. One of the best examples is their KRS80I1K80A microprocessor, which is a modified version of the Intel Corporation 8080A 8-bit micro- processor used'in many US juilitary systems. In this case, the Soviets even copied the equivalent US part number to avoid confusion (note the KR5S 80 1K 80A versus the US 080A). Furthermore, the evidence clearly shows that Soviet ICs known as LOGIKA-2 and series 133/155 were directly copied from the Texas Instruments 5400/7400 family. These ICs have been us-d in Soviet strategic and tactical military systems since the mid-1970s to provide t..portant qualitative im- provements. The more advanced Western fabrication equipment acquired by the Soviets in recent years has been used to produce copies of sophisticated Western ICs for their latest generation of weapons. If the Soviets succeed in acquiring the next generation of materials, equipment, and parts, their military capa- bilities will continue to improve in the area that is the major strength of the West—quality.. The USSR's practice of reverse-engineering, however, may soon run into problems. As US and Japanese ICs become more complex, reverse-engineerinz will re-— quire: tracking hundreds of thousands of connec- tions; (b) understanding how they all fir together; and (c) mastering the complex processing steps used in production. Thus, vopying such circuits will require not only much more sophisticated Western equipment but also much more time to duplicate each circuit, causing their overall microelectronics gap with the West to widen.

Figure 6 ae Rank Ordering of Industries vy Soviet Military Research Projects Benefiting From Western Technology, Early 1980s Average searls percent of all research projects that benefited Note scale change Electrons if 4 Arnot and clectro-opties Aviation if Missiles and space Projectiles and explosives Communications i Chemicals Radar and computers nin EER Projects whose techarcal levels — were raised Electrical equipment Ed Projects whose research stages wery clin. insied or shortened Shipbuilding Gass: Projects whose techaiwal approaches ot i were redirected plus new research projects srurted > Nuclear industrs a and jasers i Petroleum and petrochemicals an The assimilation of Western technology into Soviet industries The general distribution points out the rather bru fect that” conducting military research is considerable. The greatest: benefi- Western documents and hardware have just on raising tue tectinical ciaries were the electronics and armor and electro-optics industries. levels of Soviet military research. This is particularly true for the a which accounted for over 50 percent tequaling thousands? of afl top three industries, where advanced technology and innovative military research projects benefiting from Western technology in design convepts play a significant role in weapon developments. the early 1980s.

eras ete wee te “gta ees ele “eae sere ee) wean figure 7 Soviet Military Requirements Satisfied by Principa! Collection Agencies in the Overall VPK Program. Late 1970s and Early 1980s Porcent of requirments tally: satsitied oy te w an et) Ba) GRI — KGB ORNT GES Auadsins ef Sciences Mioginy or ceed Foreign Teade Ones The distribution shows that the KGB and the GRU tand their surrogates among the East European intelligence services} were the main collectors in the overall VPK program. They were in. sIved in satisfving roughly 60 to 70 percent of all YPK requirements completely fulfilled during the late 1970s and eariy 1980s. (Per- centages do not add to 100 because several agencies contributed to fulfilling some of the same requirements.) Although not evident fron, the above data, both the KGB and the GRU signifcantiy increased their efforts in the early 1980s Yearly average in date 1970s 4 Bre Years average in cathy [as because the average number of requisements fulfilled so far in the early 1980s 1th Five-Year Plan) increased about $0 percent over the late 1970s The State Committee for Science and Technology (GKNT) an? associated collectors surprisingly were the third main collecting entity, satisfying a relatively large percertage. Figure & shows, however, that they were crecited with satisfying about ‘percent of a selected subset of acquisitions, those judged by the Soviets to be the most significant to their military research proiects. in many hundreds of military research projects (figure 8). Both the KGB and the GRU levy-some of the VPK requirements on surrogates among the East European counterpart services. The KGB probably owes a high- er percentage of its collection to these Fast European civilian intelligence services than does the GRU to its East European counterparts. All use human assets worldwide. Coordination with the East Furopean. services is con- ducted through the liaison functions at both KGB and GRU headquarters as well as through KGB and GRU advisers in the various Warsaw Pact intelligence services. Since the mid-to-late 1970s the surrogates

alk ied eo. cin Bn 7 eee al Oe Be te ine Figure 8 Agencies. Late 1970s and Early 1980s Most Significant Acquisitions Satisfied by Principal Collection Pho ROB id GRY were omvelsed in collecting thea peccenh at the aMfitans devclopment proyects Gate EY 7s arab carly Lusis Average soars percent of agquisitens judged by the Sevens tobe she Wooster acqapitiens judged by the Sesteis te he the most bengtianat te thee nest saya bk ane Ie do w Bin) Hate 127s gow! me KGB Barly 1¥sos GRU Other 7ET] Single agency acquisitions Minstn of — svt KGB and GRE Foreign Trade wee KGB and GRE with others Nonmntellizence service involvement GKRNT GRES 7 Academe of Sgences in contrast to figure 7, which shows results for the overall VPK gence service involvement” and nonintelligence ‘single agency prog fam, this figure shows the main collection agencies for a acquisitions’) indicates the West has a counterintelligence and selected subset of acquisitions—those judged by che Soviets to be industrial security challenge. the, most significant to their military research projects for the About 60 percent of the acquisitions were of US otigin (but tot periods indicated. The Soviet intelligence services and surrogates necessarily acquired in the Lnited States). The several hundred are the key collectors in the VPK program. Their approximate 90- acquisitions for each period in the statistics above are a small subset percent association with the most significant acquisitions (100 of those acquisitions shown in the statistics for the overall VPK percent less the percentages from the categories labeled “nonintelli- program. ste ta. ot aie) wets

among these services have played a major role in the overall VPK collection program, often in return for Soviet economic concessions to their countries. Fhe intelligence services of East Germany, Poland, and Hungary are among the most successful in acquiring Western classified data and expert controlled products. During the late 1970s and early 1980s the GRU probably fulfilled two to 10 times as many VPK requirements as the KGB for the important defense- industrial minisiries of: ¢ Communications Equipment Industry (defense and satellite communications systems}—10 times. Machine Building (projectiles and explosives}—five times. General Machine Building (strategic missiles and space vehicles} --five times. Medium Machine Building (nuclear industry and lasers}--- two times. Radio Industry (radars and large-scale comput- ers}-—-two times. The GRU probably is more successful because of its overall scientific orientation, its bolder operational style. its increased collection oppertunities that reflect a wider variety of technology-related. cover positions overseas, and its clearer understanding of collection objectives. The KGB. The First Chief Directorate (foreign intelli- gence) of the KGB conducts science and technology collection operations through tts headquarters compo- nent known as Directorate T. Directorate T probably has approximately 1,000 officers, with nearly 300 on foreign assignment. Fhe officers on foreign assign. nent are organized into components known as L.ine _X.and most of them are scientific specialists by both academic and professional training. The largest KGB ‘complements are probably in Bonn, Cologne, London, New York. Yokyo, and Vienna. (Paris was one of the Jargest until mass expulsions in 1983.) Line X officers abroad typically occupy such cover positions as science attaches in a Soviet embassy or equivalent positions in the con.mercial or economic sections of Soviet missions or an international organi- zation, Other preferred cover positions for these offi- cers are as officials in various Soviet trade missions or as members of scientific or other academic exchanges. Such positions provide easy access to the types of information targeted by the VPK or to foreign person- nel who could provide such access Cover as an “accentance engineer’ at a company with a Soviet contract is also a preferred way to acquire proprietary secrets. The GRU. The Chief Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet General Staff has emphasized the collection of military scientific data since the earliest days of Soviet military intelligence. Unlike the KGB, the GRU has no headquarters component specifically charged with managing scientific collections: rather. this function is part of the overall responsibilities of four geographic operational directorates. GRU head- quarters does, however, have a scientific infc mation analytical directorate that supports scientific collec- tion efforts. The GRU does not have a separate cadre of career scientific specialists in the field; instead, most GRU officers have technical backgrounds and education as well as years in a military specialization. Approxi- mately 1.500 GRU officers serve outside the USSR. For all of them, scientific collection is an integral part of their responsibilities and a high priority. The GRU probably has a higher percentage than the KGB of officers with cover. positions that provide more access to Western scientific targets and more methods of transporting export controlled products and technical data to the Soviet Union. Some of these positions similar to those of the KGB's scientific specialists are in scientific or commercia! sections of Soviet missions or international organizations and various foreign trade offices. In addition. the GRU officers often have positions in Aeroflot (the Soviet airline) and Morflot (the Soviet merchant marine). All Soviet military attaches are GRU officers. of course. The GRU, however. does not seem to use cover Positions in academic and technical exchanges to the same extent as does the KGB. cam fe ato, te

Selected Sources. US Defense Contractors. Moscow views US and Allied defense contractors with their proprietary and government security controls as difficult targets. Ac- cordingly. the KGB, the GRU, and their surrogates among the East Europeans are the collectors primari- ‘ly tasked to operate against them. Of the top 100 US defense contractors for 1983, nine of the 10 most frequently cited by the Soviets as sources of needed technology were in the aerospace industry (table 3), The next group most frequently identified was the chemical and petrochemicals industries. Although the Soviet Bloc intelligence services are the primary collectors of scientific and technological in- formation in the VPK program, it is estimated that about 90 percent of the roughly 100.000 documents acquired each year. worldwide are unclassified. About 10 to 20 percent of these unclassified documents are either under proprietary corporate, export, or other government controls. The Soviet intelligence services and their surrogates among the East European ser- vices probably provide Moscow with about 10,000 technology-transfer-related classified documents each year from the West. Analysis and operational obser- vations indicate that only a small percentage of these are collected through Soviet intelligence service oper- ations in the United Stares. Analysis of hostile intelligence activities indicate that in recent years the surrogates among the East Europe- an intelligence services possibly have been more suc- cessful than Soviet intelligence against priority de- fense technologies in the United States. East European services have had considerable success not only in the United States. but elsewhere because: They are generally perceived as a lesser threat than the Soviets. They often may not be perceived as onerating ina surrogate role. ¢ In some countries. including the United Siates, they operate under less severe travel restrictions. Some, especially the Czechoslovaks and the East Germans, probably find it easier to operate in the West European cultural and commercial clirnate. Recent examples of Soviet Bloc espionage operations against US and other Western defense contractor targets are presented in table 4. As a result of various coproduction arrangements and contract bidding among foreign firms, the availability of much US defense contractor technology overseas in US subsidiaries and in other firms has increased. This enables Soviet Bloc intelligence tc seek priority US technologies in many countries around the world. Commercial Data Bases. Unclassified technical docu- ments from all countries—including engineering ana- lyses and research results-—ate targeted by Soviet intelligence and other collectors because of their value to Soviet engineers secking creative designs and alter- native engineering approaches. For example, from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, NASA documents and NASA-funded contractor studies provided the Soviets with their most important source of unclassified mate- rial in the aerospace area. Soviet interests in NASA activities focused on virtually all aspects of the space shuttle. Documents acquired dealt with airframe de- signs (including computer programs on design analy- sis), materials, flight computer systems, and propul- sion systems. This information allowed Soviet military industries to save years of scientific research and testing time as well as millions of rubles as they developed their own very similar space shuttle vehicle. The individual abs‘racts or references in government and commercial data bases are unclassified, but some of the information, taken in the aggregate. may reveal sensitive information concerning US strategic capa- bilities and vulnerabilities. Numerous unclassified US Department of Defense and contractor documents are soughi by the Soviets from the Commerce Depart- ment’s National Technical Information Service. Doc- uments dealing with design, evaluation, and testing of US weapon systems—the Sidewinder air-to-air mis- sile. tie F-15, the Redeye shoulder-fired antiaircraft missile, the B-S2, and others-—-are in the data base. The public and private document clearinghouses— established to efficiently index and disseminate the results of government and government-sponsored mili- tary-related technical research—are a fertile ground for KGB, GRU, and other collectors. In receni years. the growing use of electronic data bases has provided the Soviets with an even more efficient means of identifying and procuring such unclassified technical information needed by Soviet designers.

Table 3 Rank Ordering of Top 100 US Defense Contractors of 1983 Compared With Their Rank Ordering by Approximate Frequency of Soviet Identification for Needed Technology, Selected Periods in Late 1970s and Early 1980s Dollar Value Rank 39. Company General Dynamics McDonnell Douglas Rockwell International General Electric Boeing Lockheed United Technologies (Pratt & Whitney) Tenneco Hughes Aircraft Raytheon Grumman Martin Marietta Litton Industries Westinghouse Electric IBM LTV FMC TRW Sperry Honeywell Ford Motor (Ford Aerospace} General Motors EXXON Northrop Allied (Bendix) Maersk Line Ltd AVCO GTE Textron Singer Texas Instruments Huzhes Helicopters General Tire & Rubber (Aerojet) ITT Standard Oil of California Teledyne Motor Oil Hellas Soviet Identification Rank Dollar Value Rank 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47, 48. Company Soberbio Pan American World Airways Harris Todd Shipyard Eaton Goodyear Tire & Rubber (Goodyear Acrospace) Guam Oi] & Refining Atlantic Richfield (ARCO) Sanders Assoc. Waterman Marine Signal Co. (Garrett) Roya! Dutch Shell Group Motorola North American Philips (Magnavox) E Systems Hercules Morrison Knudsen Mobili Ogden Morton Thiokol Gould Congoleum Caterpillar Tractor Emerson Electric Control Data Standard Oil of Indiana Coastal Penn Central Aerespace Fairchild Industries HBH (Hughes Air/ Bendix /Holmes) MIT Burroughs Pacific Resources Johns Hopkins University Oshkosh Truck Gulf Oil Ashland Oil Soviet Identification Rank 32, 4 An ellipsis indicates that no targeting for specific technology or hardware was noied during the sampling period to rank these companies: this is not a complete indication that there was no hostile turgeting of those companies. Other companies not among the top 190 are known to have been identified by the Soviets for needed technology.

Table 3 (continued) Dollar Company Soviet Value Identification Rank Rank 79. Rolls Royce Ltd. 30 80. Du Pont 10 81. Williams International 32 82.' Reynolds Industry 25 83. Duchossois Thrall Group (Chamberlain) 29 84. NI Industry (Norris) 85. Sam Whan 86. Computer Science 87. Xerox 88. Brunswick 30 89. Hewlett Packard 27 Dollar Company Soviet Value Identification Rank Rank 90. Gulf States Oil & Refining dB 91. SAI 92. Sunstrand 93. Kaman 94, Kuwait Petroleum 95. Harsco nee 96. Lear Siegler Oo 30 97, Varian Associates 29 98. Soutnern Union wee 99. Cubic 32 100. Digital Equipment 29 In the VPK program: the Soviets issue general guidance to vollec- tors to acquire selected information on, for example, a system (the US Space Shuttle) or a subsystem/technology (electro-optical guidance techniques of the US Maverick or TOW missiles). They follow up this guidance with specific “requirements” and allocate funds for particular pieces of hardware (MK 46 torpedo: more than 1,250,000 rubles (more than $3.5 million), or a U-2 aircraft radio: more than 50,000 rubles), or a document (K-250K-D gyroscope: more than 20,000 rubles), or a dual-use product (excimer la:er: more than 20,000 rubles). The government agencies, companies, or One solution appears to be to thoroughly screen all candidate data base entries and keep sensitive govern- ment information out of the public data bases or limit its availability to US and Allied defense contractors. Unfortunately, this may also inhibit the United States’ own national research effort by restricting the ready availability of such information. Scientific Conferences. Collection of information from professional and academic conferences on applied science and technology has also contributed to the success of the Soviet program. At least 35 conferences worldwide were identinied in the VPK program as potential sources of specific data in the late 1970s to assist in solving military researcl problems. These included conferences on materials. missiles. engines, lasers. computers, marine technology, space. micro- electronics. chemical engineering. radars. armaments, contractors that have such information or products are specified. The rank ordering in this table is representative of the number of times a company was specifically identified as a source of needed information and hardware during a selected period. Duplicate numbers beginning with Soviet rank 15 indicate ties in the number of tin es identified. The data available give a rough indication of large Soviet ongeing needs for innovation in specific aerospace design concepts and hardwar: as well as for chemical technology and manufacturing equipment. and optical communications. The Soviets judged some of the data acquired from these conferences to be among the most significant contributing to their military projects. Conferences in the late 1970s and early 1980s (and Soviet evaluation of the data) ranked in order of significance were the: International Radar Conference (improved circuit designs for synthetic aperture satellite radars and aircraft over-the-horizon radars}—Collector: GRU. ¢ Conference on Integrated Optics (assisted in identi- fying ways to produce a qualitatively new Soviet category of integrated optical devices for fiber- optics communications}—Collector: KGB.

Table 4 Selected Successful Soviet Bloc Espionage Operations Against US and Other Western Defense Contractor Targets US citizen. Radar specialist, Hughes Air: craft Company. Worked on advanced US radar systems, experimenial radar sys- tems, and air-to-air and surface-to-air South African naval officer who had at- tended the British Royal Navy College and served at the Embassy in London. Later was a scientific research staff US citizen. Electronics engineer. Through his girlfriend/wife he had access to Ballis- “tic Missile Defense Advanced Technology Center contracts at Systems Control Inc., West German. Head of the Planning Agent Hostile ‘Dates Access Service| Operated William Bell SB Poland 1978-81 missiles. Pierre Bourdiol KGB 1973-83 French engineer. Dieter Gerhardt GRU 1964-33 Officer. James Harper SB Poland 1971-81 California. Manfred Rotsch KGB 1967-84 Department of the aviation firm Messerschmitt-Bolkow-Blohm (MBB). Impact Saved the Soviets several tens of millions of rubles in research efforts: advanced Soviet technology by about five years by permitting them to implement proven de- Pe sign concepts. Currently undergoing trial. Passed information on various antiaircra‘t missiles. Provided dozens of documents on potential US ballistic missile defense programs, ICBM basing modes, and related technol- ogy. Afforded Soviets a unique look at potential US future systems concepts. Passed information on the “Tornado” air- craf* nroduced by the European Panavia consortium. ¢ Conference of the Aerospace and Electronic Sys- tems Society of IEEE (helped technical solutions to existing problems and improved the characteristics of a low-altitude target detection radar}—Collector: KGB. Internationa! Conference on Radar (assisted devel- opment of signal processing for passive jamming suppression methods and for radars to detect distant aircraft targets}-—Collector: GRU. International Conference on Nontraditional Energy Transformation Systems (refined directions of re- search on space-based nuclear reactors}—Collector: KGB. oS Conference on Millimetric and Submillimetric Equipment tassisted in design solutions for millime- ter wave prox nity fuzes}—Collector: KGB. Symposium on Solar Energy Conversion (increased efficiency and decreased costs jor electron beam deposition of coatings on solar components for space vehicles}—Collector: GRU. According to Soviet estimates, the information ob- tained by the KGB and GRU from these conferences alone, particularly the first three, produced savings of millions of rubles in long-range military research projects-——savings roughly equivalent to 100 man- years of effort. The fact that numerous professional and scientific conferences are specifically identified as valuable sources in advance by the VPK indicates their exploitation is not fortuitous, but carefully plannea. Ministry of Foreign Trade. The Soviet Ministry of Foreign Trade administers and operates hundreds of foreign trade organizations and firms around the world. This global presence and the ministry's official duties related to technology and transportation make it a practical cover organization for hundreds of KG3 and GRU officers involved in technology acquisition efforts. These officers conduct overt and covert collec- tion operations and channel the results through their respective intelligence organizations for accountabil- ity in the VPK system.

In addition to providing cover for intelligence officers, the Ministry of Foreign Trade is also a major inde- pendent collector in the VPK program and attempts tc pursue most of its assigned VPK requirements on an overt basis. During the late 1970s and early 1980s. it helped fulfill about 15 perce’ of all fully satisfied VPK requirements (figure 7). More important, it fulfilled 9 ~ercent of those satisfied requiremeits identified as “most critical.” Also during that period its role was specialized, focusing largely on the acqui-. sition of microelectronics manufacturing equipment and communications dual-use products. In view of this, it is not surprising that throughout the 10th and thus far in the 11th Five-Year Plans the Ministry of Foreign Trade was assigned to collect the 'argest percentage of samples (a yearly average of approxi- mately 30 percent) as cpposed to documents. The ministry also has a major role in the illegal trade activities discussed later in this report. Overt and Academic- Related Collectors. The Soviet Academy of Sciences .is another collector in the VPK program. So too are the State Committee for Science and. Technology (GKNT) and the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations (GKES. Although these organizations are involved principally in overt collection of information for nondefense industries, they also are involved in worldwide overt collection of information and technical data in response to specific VPK tasking for military research projects. Some- times they are tasked jointly with the KGB and other collectors to satisfy these requirements. These three collection agencies, especially the Acade- my of Sciences and the GKNT, operate in the West in a milieu of scientific, academic, and business confer- ences. They and others help send approximately 2,000 Soviet Bloc citizens to the United States each year in a nontourist status. A portion of those visiting proba- bly respord to high-priority VPK requirements. Addi- tionally, many Soviet scientific personnel have been co-opted to some degree by the Soviet intelligence services to provide assistance to VPK and other collection activities. ‘During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Soviet scientif- ic collection directives identified numerous universi- ties worldwi jc that had needed information. Perhaps as a vote of confidence in US academic research, the number of US academic centers targeted has in- creased from about 20 to over 60 during this period. The universities cited as sources for both applied military-related technology and for civilian scientific data include some of the finest in the United States (figtires 9 and 10). The majority of information sought at universities for the VPK program was-applied technology and engineering, and not fundamental or basic research. Carnegie-Mellon, Cincinnati, Kentucky, Massachu- setts Institute of Technology (MIT), Michigan, and Wisconsin were among those universities (as well as defense contractors) identified in the VPK program as sources for information on new high-strength, high- temperature alloys, such as titanium, on lightweight structural alloys, and on powder metal processing. California Institute of Technology, Harvard, and MIT were targeted for techniques, methodologies, and results for evaluation of strategic concepts on space, aviation. and missile systems. California Insti- tute of Technology and MIT were also cited as sources for transonic, supersonic, and hypersonic aerodynamic research, as were the Polytechnic Insti- tute of New York (Brooklyn), Princeton, and Stan- ford. Kansas, MIT, Ohio State, and Penn State were identified for data relating to electrohydraulic control systems applicable to aircraft. helicopters, and the Soviet version of the US Space Shuttle. Researci. applicable to future high-energy laser and partic]~ beam weapons was sought from M.T, Denver, and Princeton. As illustrated in figure 7, the three overt and academ- ic-related collectors rank third in the overall VPK program, satisfying about 20 percent of those require- ‘ments that were completely fulfilled by all collectors. On the other hand, figure 8 shows that while their overall contribution to Soviet military research collec- tion is large in volume they accountee for about 5 percent of the technology judged most significant by ‘the Soviets during the late 1970s and early 1980s. Acquisitions included information on developing and manufacturing composite materials for missiles and space systems: automated control designs for highly

Figure 9 Selected US Universities Identified by the Sovicts as Sources of Needed Applied Technology Boston Area eo Brardeis & Harvard aMIT Various Periods During the: __Aamsselaer, 1970s Wisconpin acornelt Mass “A 49805 svestern Menger) high aleg a 1970s and 1984s A. Chicago ae Penn State, 4 Prin iHinois hia” Carregie- Tech Purdue — State Melon Pena} Dayton, Pittsburgh S Janis. //New York City Area OT Hlinois 2% A Hepkimg/ Columbia a — Indiana inci WVa a 4 NY Lg oe 4 Cincinnati Polytechnic tnst Brooklyn Kentucky Oregon ashington Area i 4 American Minnesota’ GWU A Maryland Wyoming tee’ Stanford Utah Nebraska, State MBerkeley Goloradog are Acolorado A Denver Kansas aT nh A Duke® ane Tenn ukee use qucso Vanderbilt Carolina Arizona Gemson Alabama qhawan rer boyotas oo Florida, Miami, Over the past decade or so about 40 percent of the US universities shown above were identiried in the VPK program as sources of applied science and technology princinally for Soviet military aerospace developments. The State Committee for Science and Technology also issues requirements against US universities, out principally fur fundamental research for both Soviet military- and civilian-related science developments. Known Soviet collectors at US and other Western universities include those from the intelligence services, scientists within the Academy of Sciences, and scientists from the State Committee for Science and Technology who come to study in the United States. Many of these collectors are also involved in spotting and assessing US scientists for potential recruitment as agents.

Figure 10 Soviet Needs for Applied Science and Technology From Selected US Universities Compared With Number of Visiting Soviet Bloc Scientists, Early 1980s Number ot different Soviet needs or number of Soviet Bloc vistiors Fatal number of visit applications (early 1980s) 0 10 20 30 Massachusetts Institute 374 we of Fochnology Pee coe fe Carnegie: MeHon 62 University Harvard niversity 2 Vanerity of Michigan 112 pf Pee CL Sowet high-priority military research needs California Tnstiqute &e3 Pomaridy civitien scenufic needs ob fechnofogs i Known visits bs Soviet Blog saientists ! C273. Actual sisity by Soviet Blo scientists with backgrounds related to Soviet needs for Information for high-poorty mulitary eresearch projects Princeton U niversits The above US universities. as well as Stanford. California at the number of VPK-identified military research needs and the Berkeley. Cornell. and the Hlinois Institute of Technology. were number of visiting Soviet Bloc scientists with backgrounds related identified vy the Soviets more often than others during the early to those ‘echnical areas There is, however, Jittle data indicating 1980s as sources of technology needed for high-priority military that specific scientists were tasked to acquire information for Soviet and civilian research projects. There is a rough correlation between — military research projects.

accurate coordinate-measuring machines for quality control of weapon components and subassemblies: information on automatic control systems for optimiz- ing rolling mills; acoustical data for developing low- frequency sonars for submarines: and information on aerial photography, magnetic recording systems, and lasers. The Trade Diversion Program: Building and Expanding Industries Numerous sources and data indicate the existence of a program separate and administratively different from the VPK program, but comparable to it in scope. This second program is characterized not by requirements for one-of-a-kind equipment, but by illegal and legal acquisitions of relatively large numbers of dual-use products for Soviet military programs. These products are requested by the defense industries for direct use in manufacturing lines to increase the throughput or output of plants or for designing future equipment. Often inanufacturing cells, complete production lines, or even entire plants are sought from the West. Much of this equipment and technology falls into the areas of computers, microelectronics, numerically con- trolled machine toois, robotics, and matcrial fabrication. This second Soviet program is probably less struc- tured than that of the VPK, but just as rigidly monitored because of the large amounts of hard currency necessary. This is the Soviet program that appears to be largely responsible for orchestrating and managing most of the worldwide trade diversions, particularly in the areas of computers and microelectronics. Computers and Microelectronics Major Soviét diversion efferts are targeted at micro- electronics fabrication equipment and computers; nearly half of detected trade diversions fall into these categories. Using unscrupulous Western traders who employ license falsifications. deceptive equipment de- scriptions, dummy firms, false end users for illegal purchases, and smuggling. as well as assistance from intelligence operations, the USSR has acquired at a minimum several thousand pieces of major microelec- tronics fabrication equipment during the last 10 years (figure 11). The equipment acquired through these efforis is iargeiy responsible for the significant ad- vances the Soviet microelectronics industry has made thus far, advances that have reduccd the overall Western lead in microelectronics from 10 to 12 years in the mid-1970s to four to six years today. Western microelectronics manufacturing equipment has been applied throughout the entire production process-— from materials preparation to the final testing appara- tus needed for sophisticated production lines. In fact, total design and fabrication lines may have been acquired from single diversion operations. Volume purchases, legal and illegal, characterize the second Soviet program. Examples of microelectronic products that the Soviets illegally acquired from the United States, Japan, and other countries in one year during the early 1970s include 30 sophisticated crys- tal pullers, 99 diffusion furnaces, three integrated circuit (IC) testers; and 10 mask aligners. The next year they diverted 24 crystal pullers, 64 diffusion furnaces, three photorepeaters, three pattern genera- tors, three epitaxial reactors, and an IC tester. Such purchases have been used directly in assembly lines for military production. Jn the future, large quantities of test equipment for sophisticated very-large-scale integrated (VLSI) circuits will be a major target. Volume purchases of materials are also part of the second program. Before 1980, the Soviets purchased hundreds of tons of electronics-grade silicon (not under export controls at that time). This is the raw material needed for integrated circuits for both mili- tary and civilian uses. The silicon originated primarily from the United States, West Germany, and Japan. After the sale of electronics-grade silicon to the USSR was restricted. Soviet acquisitions continued through worldwide diversions. Future acquisitions of silicon very likely will begin to concentrate on the very high-quality silicon produced in the United States, West Germany, and Japan for use in producing VLSI circuits. 24.

Figure 11 Soviet Acquisitions of More Than 2,500 Pieces of Western Microelectronics Manufacturing Equipment, Early 1970s Early 1980s Number of major pieces of dual-use equipment Manufacturing areas Matenal preparation Oxidation. tithography, and etching Doping Packaging ‘Testing Over the past few years.the Soviets have virtually completed their entire building construction program for manufacturing military microelectronics components. To equip many of these buildings with advanced production equipment, they acquired. more than 2,500 pieces of major Western controlled and uncontrolled micro- electronics fabrication equipment covering the entire spectrum of manufacturing operations. They acquired this equipment from the United States, Japan, and Europe, and diverted it through many parts of the world: Years of illegal acquisitions of large numbers of dual-use products through worldwide trade diversions have enabled the Soviets to narrow the microelectronics technological gap with the West from 10 to 12 years a decade ago to about four to six years today. Integrated cizcuits intended for direct use in Soviet systems are usually acquired from the United States and Japan by trading companies in various parts of the world. and then shipped in huge numbers to Soviet and East European destinations. As many as 100 million circuits may be shipped in this manner every year. In direct monetary value, volume acquisitions through illegal trade probably far exceed those of the VPK- directed effort. The Soviets have diverted thousands of different items of high technology in the past two decades, totaling perhaps billions of dollars in hard- ware value alone. Most of these illegal acquisitions have been facilitated of conducted autonomously by unscrupulous traders. The manufacturers of high- technology production equipment have rarely been knowingly involved in diversions; indeed, they have often been. victims. The Soviets have arranged most diversions through Eurcpe, but their use of Asia as a diversion route is growing. Over 300 firms in more than 30 countries have been identified as engaged in diversions. Many more companies probably exist—some involved in only a few operations and quitting or disbanding before becoming well known or vulnerable. Participants in the Second Program The Soviet intelligence services and the Ministry of Foreign Trade are involved in various ways with most of this illegal trade, some of which is conducted through ostensibly norma! trade channels. The Minis- try of Foreign Trade and industrial ministries operate ‘a large network of foreign trade organizations, com- mercial offices, joint companies, and foreign procure- ment offices whose staffs know the hardware markets

and act as ready contacts for technology traders and diverters who may volunteer their services to the Soviets. They are also quite adept at spotting opportu- nities for diversions and obtaining controlled Western products. These functions are performed by legitimate Soviet trade officials, intelligence officers under trad> cover, and trade officials working directly for intelli- gence officers. Many of the 141 Soviets expelled from 25 countries during 1983 were assigned in some ‘capacity with the. Ministry of Foreign Trade. The Soviet illegal trade program appears to be admin- ist*ted and managed in the trade ministry's Main Engincering and Technical Administration (GITU). Although it is a component of the ministry, GITU is staffed and managed largely by intelligence officers, organized into separate KGB and GRU groups by their respective headquarters. Its subordinate Depart- ment for Technicei: Cooperation with Foreign Coun- tries is similarly staffed and managed. GITU report- eGiy exercises some supervision over all technical Soviet foreign trade organizations and all technical joint trading companies. The GITU staff has grown from about 12 in 1970 to about 70 in 1983. Its subordinate Department for Technical Cooperation with Forcign Countries num: bers over a hundred. The intelligence officers assigned to GITU, and to the Ministry of Foreign Trade in general. blend into a number of roles in carrying out their assignments. Soviet intelligence service person- nel (as well as their East European surrogates) are in embassy commercial sections, trade missions, consul- ates, commercial organizations, and joint stock com- panies in the West. Moreover, intelligence officers have been identified as employees of foreign trade organizations in the Soviet Union and their offices ‘elsewhere in the world. Although GITL is largeiy a Soviet intelligence service domain (with the GRU probably filling most cover positions), that does not mean that all trade diversion operations are conceived of and supervised un a daily basis by intelligence officers. Some evidence indicates that the GRU is involved with more trade diversion operations than the KGB, but it is unknown if this is by design or rather a practical manifestation of the high proportion of foreign-trade-related GRU cover positions. Legitimate Soviet trade officers in Warsaw Pact countries are also involved in trade diversions, and not merely as intelligence co-optees. Use of Diverters-for-Hire One of the most effective and secure trade diversion methods used by the Soviets is the contract or broker diverter. Contractor diverters work for set or negotiat- ed fees; broker diverters receive a commission, usually a percentage of the equipment purchase price. Both are individual traders or businessmen with some affiliation to high-technology manufacturing or trade circles. They are very knowledgeable of high-technol- ogy markets and product availability and either vol- unteer their services to the Soviets or are spotted by Soviet assets in the West or in the USSR: Some have global expertise and connections; some specialize in operations in a few countries or a few technology product lines. In some cases, the Soviets have used diverters with known track records of trading almost exclusively, or in high volume, with the East Europeans. Whether a volunteer or selected by the Soviets, a potential contract or broker diverter is generally screened to determine the scope and depth of his contacts, range of trade abilities, and access to perti- nent high-.echnology markets and manufacturers. In some cases such an assessment may be a rigorous one, in others perhaps only superficial. A most important quality, however, is the ability to deliver goods as scheduled, for close to the agreed pr’ :es, without complications or risks to the Soviet Customer. Although many Soviet intelligence officers are in- volved with negotiating and contracting with di- verters, this procedure is not a classic intelligence operation and is analagous to an intelligence “recruit- ment” in timing only. The diverter does not accept intelligence discipline as would an “agent.” Indeed it makes little or no difference to diverters if they are dealing with intelligettce principals as opposed to trade officials. save for the need to avoid the suspi- cions of espionage. Additionally, most diverters proba- bly do not enter into a permanent relationship with

their Soviet principals, but rather into one that is only for the duration of one or a series of formal or informa! contracts for specific products or services. Although there are dissimilarities among contract or troker diversion operations, there are some character- istics that seem consistent: © The Soviets incur minimal, if any, risk or legal liability. Many, if not most, contracts are scheduled, briefed, signed, or verbally agreed to in Moscow or -another convenient denied area or are obscured by the conduct of legitimate overt business. Little or no contact is maintained with the diverter. This seems especially true of diverters operating on beha!f of a Soviet intelligence service. ¢ For the most part, the diverter has autonomy in oper tional decisions, iacluding arranging front or- gani.ations, product availability, purchase, ship- ping. storage, and delivery. At times diverters also perform initial professional setup, testing,.and ser- vicing of equipment. In so doing they rely exclusive- ly on professional-overt and covert colleagues. e Fees are negotiable. The Soviets will pay lucrative, but not outrageous prices, Fees can also be raised during the course of the diversion if more costs or risks are entailed by the diverter. ¢ Payment is generally through letter of credit depos- ited by the Soviets to the diverter’s bank account. The use of contract or broker trade diverter opera- tions by the Soviets minimizes, if not obviates, the risk to their intelligence residences and trade officials while simultaneously assuring the application of pro- fessional business and trade diversion know-how to the technology acquisition task. Because of the low Soviet profile in these operations, more vigorous law and trade control enforcement may be more effective in stemming contract diversion than counterintelli- gence responses, although both efforts clearly have an important role. Contract Trade Diverter: Richard Mueller Richard Mueller, a West German citizen, is wanted in that country and in the United States for many cases involving illegal exports of COCOM-controlled computers, microelectronics, and other products to the USSR. His involvement with illegal technology acquisition on behalf of the Soviet Bloc dates hack to the early 1970s. By 1978 Mueller's deals were made almost exclusively with Soviet foreign trade officials; some of these officials were intelligence officers under cover. For his network, Mueller uses numerous dum- my and front firms and meets with his Soviet princi- pals in Moscow to mask his activities. At one time he had more than 75 firms operating in Austria, France, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany. Between 1978 and 1983 Mueller delivered to the Soviets advanced computers, peripherals, and micro- electronics manufacturing equipment worth at least several tens of millions of dollars. Perhaps Mueller’s best known operation was his attempted diversion to the USSR in late 1983 of seven large US Digital Equipment Corporation VAX computers and related hardware and software. The VAX series of super minicomputers are valuable to the Soviets because of their computer-aided design (CAD) applications for microelectronics fabrication. This equipment was purchased in the United States for Mueller’s dumm firms in South Africa and West Germany. Much of it was seized by Sweden and West Germany enroute to the Soviet Union. Other Diversion Methods Soviet forc'«n trade officers also attempt to make small Western firms dependent on Soviet legal orders over a period of years. For such firms, whe are not contract or broker trade diverters, the occasional

a7. eas ate ea De rae aera ate te fet ee Rereanag md rae fe > IONS Soviet request for illegal purchases or a support role in a larger illegal trade operation appears difficult if not impossible to refuse. Indeed, some firms may even be drawn into.complicity or support for Soviet diversion operations unwittingly or gradually. It has long been a concern in the West to limit the expansion of Soviet foreign trade organizations abroad because of the opportunities they o fer for this type of diversion activity. Although has become more difficult for the Soviets to conduct this type of activity, Moscow continues to keep these diversion channels open. The Soviets also acquire technology to modernize manufacturing through another mechanism. the so- called acceptarice engineers. They are assigned as quality inspectors on a long-term basis, usually a year or longer, to Western firms engaged in manufacturing items for Soviet end users. These may be intelligence officers or Soviet personnel who are co-opted to steal proprietary production or technical data. They also use this opportunity for agent spotting for immediate or future exploitation Use of acceptance engineers for collection is especially practical in countries with advanced manufacturing technology. Companies in Western Europe and in Japan have been targeted with this approach. Prospects for Stemming Losses ‘The West needs to better organize to protect its military, industrial, commercial, and scientific com- munities, keeping two obiectives clearly in view: over the Soviets in vital design and mi .uf: cturing know-how. Second. it should strictly control key dual-use prod- ucts, including computer-aided design and manu- facturing systems, large volumes of automatic test and inspection equipment. and, most important, the automatic test equipment that can alleviate acute ‘Soviet qualitative deficiencies in the manufacturing of weapons and military equipment. The ultimate goa! should be to deny the Soviets access to Western documents, hardware, and technologies that will accelerate their military programs and si- multaneously cause Western defense efforts and costs First, it must seek to maintain its technolog cal lead to increase. Soviet dependence on the West for tech- nological innovation in military research and develop- ment and in modernizing Soviet prod.'ction industries is broad. It is particularly important in nicroelectron- ics and computers, and extends to key ai.as that include command, control, communications, and in- telligence (C’1), computer-integrated design and man- ufacturing, and materials fabrication (tabie 5). The United States and many other Western govern- ments have begun to better recognize that their military and dual-use equipment and technologies have been improving the performance capabilities and manufacturing standards of Soviet weapons. Several positive steps have already been taken by the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, including selec- tive expansion of the COCOM list to deny the Soviets key items. Although the emphasis has varied among countries, most have’ undertaken individual programs to stem diversions and losses that include some of the following: Increased awareness programs, highlighting the magnitude, tactics, and detriment to Western secu- rity of the Soviet efforts. Improved export control efforts and enhanced law enforcement capabilities. ¢ Countesintelligence programs specifically targeting the technology t:ansfer activities of hostile intelli- gence services and their Soviet co-optees and agents. e Industrial security awareness programs conducted jointly by counterintelligence services, security ser- vices, and corporate security professionals. Soviet Bloc scientific visitor controls designed to screen high security risk visitors and. in the process, strengthen the spirit and integrity of academic exchanges. ¢ Better review of government open publications in the, prepublication or predistribution phases. In general, a more difficult operational environment for Soviet intelligence has resulted worldwide. > The Coordinating Committee (C OCOM) was established in 1949 to serve as the forum for Western efforts to develop a system of strategic export controls. It is composed of the United States, the United Kingdom, Turkey, Portuga!, Norway, the Netherlands. Luxembourg, Japan, Italy, Greece, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Denmark, Canada. and Belgium.

ee Wael eT eae fe ee. ewe wee ET Te Dt Tete EE SET EER SOT TO Table 5 Examples of Duai-Use Equipment and Technology Likely To Be Targeted by the Soviets Advanced Integrated Circuits Gat. ces Mew -— Microprocessors and Peripherals -— Very-Hign-Speed Integrated Circuit (VHSIC) Devices Automatic Integrated Circuit and Printed Circuit Board Testers Chemical Vapor Deposition (CVD) Equipment, Especially Metal- Organic CVD Systems Computer-Aided Design (CAD) Systems Integrated Optics ¢ Jon-Beam and Plasma Etchers ¢ fon-Implantation Equipment ¢ Lithography Equipment, Especially Electron- beam, lon-beam, and X-ray Systems Molecular Beam Epitaxy (MBE) Systems Semiconductors III-V and W-VI Compounds Heteroepitaxial Materials Specialized Crystal Pullers Quality Silicon for Very-Large-Scale Integrated (VLSI) Circuits Computers Array-Transform Processors Artificial Intelligence Systems ¢ Data Display Equipment ¢ High-Density Disk Storage Systems Internal Memories Software Development Systems Stand-Alone Mainframe Computers ¢ Supercomputers © Superminicomputers Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (Cl): Cl Software e Computer Networking Systems © Telecommunications —- Fiber-Optics Transmission Systems — Digital Switching Systems — High-Speed Modems — Satellite Comraunications Systems — Terminal Displays Computer-Integrated Desiga and Manufacturing e Computer-Aided Design Software, Methods, and Equipment Computer-Aided Manufacturing (CAM) Software Computer Numerical Controls for Metalworking Machines ¢ Coordinate Measuring Machines Finite Element Analysis ¢ Flex:ole Manufacturing Systems (FMS) ¢ Plant Control Software ¢ Robotics Material Fabrication — Metals and Alloys ¢ Composites ~— High-Strength Fibers and Filaments — Carbon-Carbon Manufacturing Ceramics e Materials Processing — High Temperature Resistant Coatings — Isostatic Presses — Lasers for Su:face Conditioning and Material Processing — Material Joining and Bonding Equipment —- Nondestructive Test and Evaluation Equipment Precision Shapers and Formers Vacuum Furnaces, Including Those for Single Crystal Growth The worldwide diffusion of advanced products and high technology. however. clearly has increased Soviet collection opportunities. To take advantage of this, the Soviets can be expected to intensify operational acqui- sition efforts by: Expanding their use of contract divert. ona global basis. Increasing their dependence on surrogates among the East European intelligence services: increasing use of client states such as Libya. Vietnam. and North Korea. ‘Increasing their exploitation of any vulnerable US and Western defense weapon system coproduction arrangements in Allied countries. Relying more on third-country espionage operations targeting US personnel and technology (mostly han- dling covert assets in areas outside the United States). Exploiting Third World trade entities dealing with US high technolcgy (the Soviets contend that corpo- rations, officials, and security services in those couniies can be easily victimized).

Ser rt ver 7 sah ieerenere iced OE Ea EN Ra all RNAi in, te alas ia al Sal Nal Tal al Da Ne aD BE ee ee Attempting broader online access to US and other Western data base systems directly from the Soviet Union. For effective countermeasures to keep pace with the evolving Soviet acquisition programs, in particular the highly effective operations of the KGB, the GRU, tueir surrogates among the East Europeans as well as unscrupulous traders, the West should accurately anticipate Soviet tactics. Western countries should continue to improve and modify their responses. In. particular, the West needs tc improve and refine its knowledge of Soviet military-technical needs and factor this knowledge into meaningful and practical, multilateral export control lists. Most impertant, how- ever, must be increased multinational coordination of Western prograins—for example, a systematic pro- gram among the Western customs services aimed at preventing the illegal export and diversion of militari-: ly significant equipment in the face of wnat clearly will te a geographically expanding Soviet acquisition threat. Much can be done to stem losses because much is known about Soviet efforts; it is not an insurmount- able problem. But the Soviets’ appetite for Western technology will continue to be voracious. They will continue to exloit any weaknesses in Western export controls. as well as policy differences among the COCOM countries, to acquire the technologies need- oo ed by their military programs for the late 1980s and beyond. This effort is more difficult and costly for them than at any time tn the past. The stakes are high and the Soviets know it: they will devote whatever resources and manpower are required to fulfill their most critical military collection requirements. The West can do no less if it is to succeed in protecting itself as well as frustrating their efforts. Al! in the West-— govéernme its and private industries-~ will need to participate. [REDACTED]

Aviation Projectiles and Explosives Armor and Electro-Optics Annex Severai Hundred Examples of Soviet Military Equipment and Weapons Benefiting From Western Technology and Products There are hundreds of examples of Soviet military equipment and weapons of the 1980s and 1990s that have benefited or will benefit from the technologies and products of at least a dozen different Western countries. New and advanced technical directions will be incorporated into some of the weapon systems, subsystems, and equipment in each industrial area given below. The equipment in many projects will have their technical levels raised or project completion dates shortened principally because of the copying of design concepts embodied in Western technical documents, one-of-a-kind military hardware, and dual-use products. Four New Fighter Aircraft New Tactical Fighter of the 1990s_ A Supersonic Aircraft Ground Attack Aircraft Airborne Command Post Reduced-Infrared-Signature Aircraft Four Transport Aircraft 100-mm and 152-mm High-Explosive Shells 203-mm Artillery Shell Sabot Design for Armor-Piercing Tank Round Armor-Piercing Tungsten Penetrator Shell 23-mm Gun Aviation Cluster Bomb Remote Mining Shell Delivered by Artillery, Rockets, and Aircraft Large Caliber Artillery Shell Casing Small Caliber Ammunitions Space-Based Photoreconnaissance System Infrared Space Reconnaissance System Space-Based Missile Launch Detection System Space-Based Infrared Image Processor Synthetic Aperture Radar for Space Reconnaissance Reusable Space Shuttle Air-to-Air Missile (US Phoenix- Like) Fire-Control System for Three Fighters Gas Turbine Engine Ramjet Engine Noise-Detonated Fuze Microclectronic Radio Fuze Miilimeter- Wave Proximity Fuze High-Efficiency Proximity Fuze for Mass Munitions Antisubmarine Torpedo Antisubmarine Missile Munitions Testing Equipment Thermal Decoy Target Protective Blast Structure Solid Propellant Unmanned Target Plane Equipment T-55 Tank T-64 Tank T-64A Tank T-64B Tank T-72 Tank T-80 Tank 125-mm Tank Gun Industrial Gas Laser

Missiles and Space Communications Radars and Computers Aerial Frame Camera High-Altitude Aerial Camera Coordinate Measuring Machine Portable Antiaircraft Missile System Advanced Night Vision Device Small-Arms Night Sight Holographic Fire-Control System Laser-Guided Artillery Shell Laser Gyro Optical Computer for Tactical Ballistic Missile Diamond Turning Device for Mirrors for Future Laser Weapons A New ICBM A New SLBM Maneuvering Reentry Vehicle (MaP V) Strategic Cruise Missile Reusable Space System (Shuttle) Navigation Satellites Manned Space-Based Orbital Station Reentry Vehicle Aircraft-to-Submarine Communica- tions System High-Altitude Video Reconnaissance System Video Processor for Space Reconnaissance Reconnaissance Radio Receiver Strategic Aircraft and Cruise Missile Communication System Fiber-Optics Communications System Electronic Countermeasure Station Signals Intelligence Equiprnent ABM Radar System Design Space-Based Oceanographic Radar Three-Dimensiona! Phased-Array Radar Over-the-Horizon Radar Shortwave-Band Aircraft Radar High-Capacity Computer Laser Rangefinder Antitank Missile Countermeasure Against US Antitank Guided Missile Automatic Gun Barrel New Artillery Gun Barrel Sniper Rifle and Machinegun High-Strength Gun Barrel from Electroslag Steel Automated Rolling Mil! for Military Production Carbon-Carbon Nosecone for Reentry Vehicle Missile Motor Case Material (Based on .DuPont Kevlar 49) Surface-to-Air Missile Missile Fuel Tank Cryptographic System Telemetry System Narrow-Band Signal Analyzer Cryptographic System Scrambler ‘Magnetic Recorder Fiber-Optical Cable Microcomputer for Communications Programmable Oscilloscope Digital Processor Printed Circuit Board Production Equipment for Communications Correctable Aerial Bomb Remotely Piloted Vehicle Electronic Page Teleprinter Disk Drives for Ryad Computer Computer Software BESM-6 Computer Magnetic-Bubble Computer for Onboard Missile Computer Matrix Processor

Nuclear and High-Energy Lasers Shipbuilding Electrorics and Microelectronics Nuclear Weapons Safety System Space-Based Nuclear Reactor Nuclear Reactors Naval Nuclear Reactor Water-Cooled Pewer Reactor Process for Reactor-Grade Zirconium High-Sensitivity Mass Spectrometer for Uranium Enrichment Isotope Separation Process New Aircraft Carrier Catapults for High-Performance Airplanes New Submarine Submarine Quieting Equipment and Techniques Antisubmarine Torpedo Telecontrolled Torpedo Torpedo Missile Laser Submarine Wake-Detection’ System Radioactive Submarine Wake- Detection System Hydrophone for Aircraft- to- Submarine Communications Photolithography System Photomask Equipment Microelectronics Tester (Fairchild Corporation SENTRY-7 Design) LSI IC Circuit Mask Fabricator Microelectronics for Onboard Weapon Systems Large-Scale Integrated Circuit Tester Microprocessor (Metorola MC 10800 Series Design) 16-Bit Microcomputer Computers (Digital Equipment Corporation PDP Series Design) Micro- and Mini-computers for Military Purposes (AM 2900, LSI-11M, PDP 11/70 and REDAC Designs and Hardware) Memories for Onboard Radar Fire Control Systems Computer Memories New Semiconductor Thyristor for Military Equipment Naval Gun Space-Based Microprocessor for a Detector Radiation Detector Airborne Military High-Power Carbon Dioxide (CO,) and Carbon Monoxide (CO) Laser Weapon High-Power Gas Dynamic Laser Space-Based High- Energy Chemical Laser Weapon Magnetometer Surface Warship Warship-Based Multitarget Radar Fire-Control System Sonar System for Nuclear Submarine Sonar for Surface Ship Sonar for Ships and Helicopters Sonobuoy Radiowave Underwater Communica- tion System for Diver-Scouts Ship Demagnetizer Gyrohorizoncompass for Naval Ships Charge Coupled Devices Traveling Wave Tube for Military Satellite Communications Space-Based Laser Communication System High-Power Microwave Tube for Onboard Radar Against Low- Flying Targets Laser Communication, Detection, and Ranging System (Hughes Aircraft Company 3800 Design) Infrared TV System MIG Aircraft Centimeter Waveband Radar with Onboard Digital Processing Compact Analog-Digital Converter Quartz Resonator Crystal Grower Power Gencrator: Communication and Telemetry System Microwave Generator

Chemicals Electrical Equipment Petroleum and Petrochemicals Hybrid Ramjet Engine for Cruise Missile Solid Rocket Propellant for Strategic Missile Polyethylene Production System Color Aerial Photographic Film Photographic Film for Air and Space Reconnaissance Photographic Film for Space Recon- naissance (Kodak 3414 Film) Antistatic Photoreconnaissance Film Low-Density Polyethylene Photoresist System for Microelectronic Photolithography Space-Based Turbogenerator Tank-Mounted Infrared System Sodium-Sulfur Battery for Missiles, Space, Tanks, and Submarines Electric Step-Motors for Aviation Weapon Systems New Fuel for Strategic Cruise Missiles New Jet Engine Fuel Polyurethane Binders for Solid Rocket Fuels INew Zeolite Catalyst for Motor Fuel: Synthetic Motor Oil for Tanks in Arctic Areas (Mobil Oil Company) Synthetic Lubricant for Aercspace Equipment Radiation-Resistant Additives to: Lubricants for Snace New Lubricant-Coolant for Motor Vehicles Polyamide Composite Materials for Aircraft and Tank Industries Carbon Fiber Production for Aerospace Applications Radiation Hardening Paint for Radio- electronic Equipment Bonding Material for Spacecraft lon-Exchange Resins Laser Systems for Remote Chemical/ Biological Reconnaissance Fillers for Deep Sea Vehicles New Gas Mask Power Sources for Missile Installations Space-Based Solar Power Cells Spacecraft Temperature Control System Ship Electrical Supply System Batteries for Naval Ships Rubberized Fabric Inflated Seal for Supersonic Military Aircraft Industrial Rubber for Aerospace and Armored Vehicles Industrial Rubber Seals High- and Low-Temperature Fluoroelastomer for Aerospace and Armored Vehicles Improved Protective Gear for Astronauts and Pilots Radar-Absorbing Camouflage Coating