Full text · May 1973
The "Family Jewels" (1973)
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61 0 USE PREVIOUS
7 oy EDITIONS
ROUTING
COREE WVTAL iL secer
“AND RECORD SHEET
(Optional)
UBJECT:
pine ee ne
FROM:
Director of Securit
Howard J. Osborn
EXTENSION
DATE
16 May 1973
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS.
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.}
1. Executive Secretary,
CIA Management
Committee
10.
TY.
12.
13.
14,
wa ASAT]
Ko brea
(b)(1)
(b)(3)
(b)(5)
(b)(6)
APPROVED FOR RELEASE
DATE: JUN 2007
00001
ESE
“SECRET CONFIDENTIAL
cere eee ve
Fi ante eae ieee ean tenes
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
CJ UNCLASSIFIED
me peermeeeners
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16 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Secretary,
CIA Management Committee
SUBJECT "Family Jewels"
1. The purpose of this memorandum is to
forward for your personal review summaries of activities
conducted either by or under the sponsorship of the
Office of Security in the past which in my opinion con-
flict with the provisions of the National Security Act
of 1947.
2. These activities cover the period from
March 1959 to date and represent as accurate a record
as is available in our files. Those activities which.
took place prior to the date of my appointment as
Director of Security on 1 July 1964 have been developed
to a certain extent through the recollection of the
senior people in this Office who were involved or who
had knowledge of the activities at the time they
occurred.
3. I have gone back to March 1959 because I
believe that the activities occurring since that time
still have a viable “flap potential" in that many of the
people involved, both Agency and non-Agency are still
alive and through their knowledge of the activity repre-
sent a possible potential threat or embarrassment to the
Agency. I would be glad to provide clarification or an
explanation of any of these activities if desired. You
have my assurance that unless otherwise stated each of
these activities was approved by higher authority--the
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ieee ee
Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence, the Executive Director-
Comptroller, or the Deputy Director for Support.
Director of
Attachments
C0003
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Attachment A
"FAMILY JEWELS"
Johnny Roselli The use of a member of the
Mafia in an attempt to assassinate Fidel Castro.
Project MOCKINGBIRD During the period from 12
March 1963 to 15 June 1963, this Office
installed telephone taps on two Washington-
based newsmen who were suspected of disclosing
classified information obtained from a variety
of governmental and congressional sources.
Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko A KGB defector who from
the period 13 August 1965 to 27 October 1967
was confined in a specially constructed "jail"
at He was literally confined in a
ce rs with nothing but a cot in it
for this period.
Various Surveillance and Support Activities
These are briefly summarized and range from
the surveillance of newsmen to the provision
of specialized support of local police officials
in the Metropolitan area. I believe that each
one is self-explanatory and, therefore, no further
comment is needed here.
Equipment Support to Local Police Attached is a
list provided me by the Director of Logistics
(he will simply report these items in his
report) which we have provided local police in
the Metropolitan D. C. area over the past four
or five years on indefinite loan. During the
period when the Agency's installations in this
area appeared to be a target of dissident elements
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a conscious decision was made by the Agency to
utilize the services of local police to repel
invaders in case of riot or dissension as
opposed to utilization of our GSA guards, who
are not trained in this type of activity. This
equipment has been issued over the years to
local police, principally Fairfax and Arlington
County Police Departments. I do not believe
that this is totally illegal under the provisions
of the National Security Act of 1947, but I am in-
cluding it since I am sure that it would be con-
sidered as such in light of the recent congressional
fuss over our police training activities.
7, Audio Countermeasures Support to the United States
Secret Service
8. Test of Specialized Equipment in Miami Immediately
Prior to the Political Convention There
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SUBJECT: Johnny Roselli
1. In August 1960, Mr. Richard M.. Bissell
approached Colonel Sheffield Edwards to determine if
the Office of Security had assets that may assist in a
sensitive mission requiring gangster-type action. The
mission target was Fidel Castro.
2. Because of its extreme sensitivity, only a
small group was made privy to the project. The DCI was
briefed and gave his approval. Colonel J. C. King,
Chief, WH Division, was briefed, but all details were
deliberately concealed from any of the JMWAVE officials.
Certain TSD and Communications personnel participated
in the initial planning stages, but were not witting of
the purpose of the mission.
3. Robert A. Maheu, a cleared source of the
Office of Security, was contacted, briefed generally on
the project, and requested to ascertain if he could
develop an entree into the gangster elements as the first
step toward accomplishing the desired goal.
4. Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one Johnny
Roselli on several, ocgasions while visiting Las Vegas.
He only knew him casually through clients, but was given
to understand that he was a high-ranking member of the
"syndicate" and controlled all of the ice-making machines
on the Strip. Maheu reasoned that, if Roselli was in
fact a member of the clan, he undoubtedly had connections
leading into the Cuban gambling interests.
5.. Maheu was asked to approach Roselli, who knew
Maheu as a personal relations executive handling domestic
and foreign accounts, and tell him that he had recently
been retained by a client who represented several inter-
national business firms which were suffering heavy financial
losses in Cuba as a result of Castro's action. They were
convinced that Castro's removal was the answer to their
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problem and were willing to pay a price of $150,000
for its successful accomplishment. It was to be made
clear to Roselli that the United States Government was
not, and should not, become aware of this operation.
6. The pitch was made to Roselli on 14
September 1960 at the Hilton Plaza Hotel, New York City.
Mr, James O'Connell, Office of Security, was present
during this meeting and was identified to Roselli as an
employee of Maheu. O'Connell actively served as Roselli's
contact until May 1962 at which time he phased out due
to an overseas assignment. His initial reaction was to
avoid getting involved, but through Maheu's persuasion,
he agreed to introduce him to a friend, Sam Gold, who
knew the "Cuban crowd.'' Roselli made it clear he did
not want any money for his part and believed Sam would
feel the same way. Neither of these individuals were
ever paid out of Agency funds.
7. During the week of 25 September, Maheu was
introduced to Sam who was staying at the Fontainebleau
Hotel, Miami Beach. It was several weeks after his
meeting with Sam and Joe, who was identified to him as
a courier operating between Havana and Miami, that he
saw photographs of both of these individuals in the
Sunday supplemental ''Parade.'' They were identified as
Momo Salvatore.Giancana and Santos Trafficant, respectively.
Both were on the list of the Attorney General's ten most-
wanted men. The former was described as the Chicago
chieftain of the Cosa Nostra :and successor to Al Capone,
and the latter, the Cosa Nostra boss of Cuban operations.
Maheu called this office immediately upon ascertaining
this information.
8. In discussing the possible methods of
accomplishing this mission, Sam suggested that they not
resort to firearms but, if he could be furnished some
type of potent pill, that could be placed in Castro's food
or drink, it would be a much more effective operation.
Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the
person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving
kick-back payments from the gambling interests, who still had
access to Castro, and was in a financial bind.
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9, TSD was requested to produce six pills of
high lethal content.
10. Joe delivered the pills to Orta. After
several weeks of reported attempts, Orta’apparently got
cold feet and asked out of the assignment. He suggested
another candidate who made several attempts without
success.
11. Joe then indicated that Dr. Anthony Verona,
one of the principal officers in the Cuban Exile Junta, had
become disaffected with the apparent ineffectual progress
of the Junta and was willing to handle the mission through
his own resources.
12. He asked, as a prerequisite to the deal, that
he be given $10,000 for organizational expenses and requested
$1,000 worth of communications equipment.
13. Dr. Verona's potential was never fully
exploited, as the project was canceled shortly after the
Bay of Pigs episode. Verona was advised that the offer
was withdrawn, and the pills were retrieved.
14. Of significant interest was an incident
which involved a request levied by Sam upon Maheu.
At the height of the project negotiations,
Sam expressed concern about his girlfriend,
Phyllis McGuire, who he learned was getting
much attention from Dan Rowan while both were
booked at a Las Vegas night club. Sam asked
Maheu to put a bug in Rowan's room to deter-
mine the extent of his intimacy with Miss
McGuire. .The technician involved in the assign-
ment was discovered in the process, arrested,
and taken to the Sheriff's office for questioning.
He called Maheu and informed him that he had
been detained by the police. This call was made
in the presence of the Sheriff's personnel..
Subsequently, the Department of Justice
announced its intention to prosecute Maheu along
seep 00014
AS ONLY
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with the technician. On 7 February 1962,
the Director of Security briefed the Attorney
General, Robert Kennedy, on the circumstances
leading up to Maheu's involvement in the
Wiretap. At our request, prosecution was
dropped.
15. In May 1962, Mr. William Harvey took over
as Case Officer, and it is not known by this office
whether Roselli was used operationally from that point on.
16. It was subsequently learned from the FBI
that Roselli had been convicted on six counts involving
illegal entry into the United States. Our records do not
reflect the date of conviction, but it is believed to
have been sometime during November 1967.
17. On 2 December 1968, Roselli, along with
four other individuals, was convicted of conspiracy to
cheat members of the Friars Club of $400,000 in a rigged
gin rummy game.
18. Mr. Harvey reported to the Office of Security
of his contacts with Roselli during November and December
1967 and January 1968. It was his belief that Johnny
would not seek out the Agency for assistance in the deporta-
tion proceedings unless he actually faced deportation.
Roselli expressed confidence that he would win an appeal.
19. On 17 November 1970, Maheu called James
O'Connell, Roselli's first Case Officer, to advise that
Maheu's attorney, Ed Morgan, had received a call from a
Thomas Waddin, Roselli's lawyer, who stated that all.
avenues of appeal had been exhausted, and his client now
faces deportation. Waddin indicated that, if someone did
not intercede on Roselli's behalf, he would make a complete
expose of his activities with the Agency.
20. On 18 November 1970, Mr. Helms was briefed
on the latest development in this case, and it was decided
that the Agency would not in any way assist Roselli. Maheu
was so advised of the Agency's position, and he was in
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complete agreement with our stand. He further advised
that he was not concerned about any publicity as it
affected him personally should Roselli decide to tell
all.
21. Subsequently, Roselli or someone on his
behalf furnished Jack Anderson details of the operation.
Attached are two Anderson columns dealing with this
matter.
22. The last known residence of Roselli was the
Federal Penitentiary in Seattle, Washington.
Attachments
00016
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PROJECT MOC KINGBIRD
Project Mockingbird, a telephone intercept activity, was conducted
between 12 March 1963 and 15 June 1963, and targeted two Washington-
based newsmen who, at the time, had been publishing news articles
based on, and frequently quoting, classified materials of this Agency
and others, including Top Secret and Special Intelligence.
Telephone intercept connections were installed at the newmen's
office and at each of their homes, for a total of 3. The connections
were established with the assistance of a telephone company official
who responded to a personal request by the Director of Security, Col.
Sheffield Edwards. Col. Edwards' authority for the activity was Mr.
John A. McCone, Director of Central Intelligence. The latter conducted
the activity in coordination with the Attorney General (Mr. Robert Kennedy),
the Secretary of Defense (Mr. Robert McNamara), and the Director of
the Defense. Intelligence Agency (Gen. Joseph Carroll). In addition to
Office of Security personnel directly involved in the intercepts and
research of materials acquired therefrom, only 3. other Agency
officials are on record as witting of the activity: the Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence (General Marshall S. Carter), the Inspector
General (Lyman Kirkpatrick) and the General Counsel. (Mr. Lawrence
Houston).
The intercept activity was particularly productive in identifying con-
tacts of the newsmen, their method of operation and many of their sources
of information. For example, it was determined that during the period they
received data from 13 newsmen, 12 of whom were identified; 12 senators
and 6 members of Congress, all identified; 21 Congressional staff members,
of whom 11 were identified; 16 government employees, including a staff
member of the White House, members of the Vice President's office, an
Assistant Attorney General, and other well-placed individuals. A number
of other sources were partially or tentatively identified, but the short span
of the activity precluded positive identification. It was observed that through
these contacts the newsmen actually received more classified and official
data than they could use, and passed some of the stories to other newsmen
for release, establishing that many "leaks" appearing under other by-lines
were actually from the sources of the target newsmen.
Since the termination of Project Mockingbird, those materials related
to it which were retained, have been maintained under strict security access
of two Office of Security professionals. foe
ON0gL
SECR ONLY
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SUBJECT: Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko
Yuriy Ivanovich Nosenko, an officer of the KGB,
defected to -a representative of this Agency in Geneva,
Switzerland, on 4 February 1964. The responsibility for
his exploitation was assigned to the then SR Division of
the Clandestine Service and he was brought to this country
on 12 February 1964. After initial interrogation by
representatives of the SR Division, he was moved to a safe-
house in Clinton, Maryland, from 4 April 1964 where he
was confined and interrogated until 13 August 1965 when
he was moved to a specially constructed "jail" in a remote
wooded area at The SR Division was convinced
that he was a dispatched agent but even after a long
period of hostile interrogation was unable to prove their
contention and he was confined at in an effort
to convince him to ''confess."
This Office together with the Office of General
Counsel became increasingly concerned with the illegality
of the Agency's position in handling a defector under
these conditions for such a long period of time. Strong
representations were made to the Director (Mr. Helms) by
this Office, the Office of General Counsel, and the
Legislative Liaison Counsel, and on 27 October 1967, the
responsibility for Nosenko's further handling was transferred
to the Office of Security under the direction of the Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence, then Admiral Rufus Taylor.
Nosenko was moved to a comfortable safehouse in
the Washington area and was interviewed under friendly,
sympathetic conditions by his Security Case Officer, Mr.
Bruce Solie, for more than a year. It soon became
apparent that Nosenko was bona fide and he was moved to
more comfortable surroundings with considerable freedom
of independent movement and has continued to cooperate
fully with the Federal Bureau of Investigation and this
Office since that time. He has proven to be the most
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valuable and economical defector this Agency has ever
had and leads which were ignored by the SR Division were
explored and have resulted in the arrest and prosecution
He Currently iS Living
under an alias; secured a divorce from his Russian wife
and remarried an American citizen. He is happy, relaxed,
and appreciative of the treatment accorded him and states
“while I regret my three years of incarceration, I have
no bitterness and now understand how it could happen."
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crane
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SURVEILLANCES
A.
During the periods 1-20 February, 12 April-7 May,
and 9-20 August 1971, a surveillance was conducted of
a former staff employee, and
a cuban national with whom
become professionally and emo-
tionally involved._ Surveillance was predicated upon
information that| had been seeking from
employees information in Information Processing Division
files, and that employees were visiting a photographic
studio operated by| in Fairfax
City, Virginia. In addition to physical surveillance,
one surreptitious entry of the photographic studio was
made, and an attempt to enter the apartment of
was aborted because of a door lock problem.
Pursuant to a request from the CI Staff, approved
by the DCI, surveillances were conducted of
and her associates at various times from May to September
1971,
ad long been a source Of the WH Division and
had given information regarding a plot to assassinate
or kidnap Vice President Agnew and the DCI. Surveil-
lances included coverage of the activities of Miss King
during two visits to the United States, technical cover-
age of debriefings of her by WH Division representatives
in New York City, and surveillance, including mail cover-
age, of several American citizens alleged to be part of
the plot. Although most of the surveillance occurred in
New York City, surveillance of one of the individuals
included extensive coverage of a commune in Detroit.
C. CELOTEX I
At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was con-
ducted of Michael Getler of the Washington Post during
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II.
the periods 6-9 October, 27 October-10 December 1971
and on 3 January 1972. In addition to physical sur-
veillance, an observation post was maintained in the
Statler Hilton Hotel where observation could be main-
tained of the building housing his office. The sur-
veillance was designed to determine Getler's sources
of classified information of interest to the Agency
which had appeared in a number of his columns,
D. CELOTEX ITI
At the direction of the DCI, surveillance was con-
ducted of Jack Anderson and at various times his "leg
men,'' Britt Hume, Leslie Whitten, and Joseph Spear,
from 15 February to 12 April 1972. In addition to the
physical surveillance, an observation post was main-
tained in the Statler Hilton Hotel directly opposite
Anderson's office. The purpose of this surveillance
was to attempt to determine Anderson's sources for
highly classified Agency information appearing in his
syndicated columns.
E. BUTANE
At the direction of the DCI, a surveillance was
conducted on Victor L. Marchetti from 23 March to
20 April 1972. The purpose of this surveillance was
to determine his activities and contacts both with
Agency employees and other individuals in regard to
his proposed book and published magazine articles ex-
posing Agency operations.
POLICE SUPPORT
A. During 1969, 1970, and 1971, on several occasions,
the Intelligence Division of the Metropolitan Police
Department was provided a communications system to
monitor major anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in the
Washington area. This system consisted of a radio
receiver and an Agent at the Intelligence Division
Headquarters and several automobiles from the Washington
Field Office equipped with radio receivers and trans-
mitters and manned by two WFO Agents, as well as a
representative of the Intelligence Division, Metropolitan
Police Department. The benefit to the Agency was. that
the communications over this system were monitored at
the Headquarters Building to provide instant notice of
possible actions by the dissidents against Agency in-
stallations.
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IIl.
B. During the period from 1968 to 1973, several
items of positive audio equipment consisting pri-
marily of clandestine transmitters and touch-tone
dial recorders were loaned to the Metropolitan
Police Department, Fairfax County, Virginia, Police
Department, Montgomery County, Maryland, Police
Department, New York City Police Department, and the
San Francisco, California, Police Department.
GENERAL SUPPORT
A. SRPOINTER
Since 1953, this office has operated a mail inter-
cept program of incoming and outgoing Russian mail
and, at various times, other selective mail at Kennedy
Airport in New York City. This operation included not
only the photographing of envelopes but also surrepti-
tious opening and photographing of selected items of
mail. The bulk of the take involved matters of inter-
nal security interest which was disseminated to the
Federal Bureau of Investigation. This program is now
in a dormant state pénding a decision as to whether
the operation will. be continued or abolished.
B. AELADLE
For several years the Office of Security has pro-
vided support to Anatole Golitsyn, a Russian défector of
interest to the CI Staff.
C. REDFACE I
In July 1970, this office made a surreptitious
entry of an office in Silver Spring, Maryland, occu-
pied by a former defector working under contract for
the Agency. This involved by-passing a contact and
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sonic alarm system, entering a vault, and entering
a safe within the vault. The purpose of the opera-
tion was to determine whether the individual had
any unauthorized classified information in his
possession.
D. BUREAU OF NARCOTICS AND DANGEROUS DRUGS
In January 1971, the Director approved a request
from the Director, Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous
Drugs, to provide covert recruitment and security
clearance support to BNDD. This has been accomplished
through the medium of a proprietary of the Office of.
Security known as land operating as
Support
includes covert recruitment, investigation, polygraph,
medical clearance, and training. It has been divided
into three phases: (1) A CI operation to place indi-
viduals in BNDD field offices to monitor any illegal
activities of other BNDD employees; (2)
and (3)
Recruitment of an individual used as an Agent by BNDD
but actually employed by BNDD, although this fact is
known only to the Director and Chief Inspector, BNDD.
In this case, arrangements were made for all pay and
other employee benefits to come from CIA on a reim-
bursable basis.
RE.
F. MERRIMAC
From February 1967 to November 1971, an
Office of Security proprietary, recruited and nanated
several Agents for the purpose of covertly monitoring
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dissident groups in the Washington area considered
to be potential threats to Agency personnel and
installations. One of these Agents so successfully
penetrated one dissident group that she was turned
over to the FBI for handling. In addition, during
this period, the Office of Security field offices
were tasked with collecting available intelligence
on dissident groups. All such information was in-
cluded in a periodic report distributed to appro-
priate parts of the Agency and to certain outside
Government agencies.
F,
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MATERIAL REQUISITIONED FROM LOGISTICS
BY SECURITY FOR ISSUANCE TO
LOCAL POLICE
ITEM QUANITY
Gas Mask M-9 200
Gas Mask M-17 196
Steel Helmet and Liners 231
Vest and Groin Protector 96
Vest, Flak M-52 34
Vest, Protective 46
Vest, Grenade 105
Execuvest 6
Emergency Flashing Red Light 22
*Searchlight, Tear Gas 36
*Chemical Baton 6 1/2" 36
*Chemical Baton 12" 24
“*Chemical Baton 26" 24
*Mustang 35 Pistol 6
‘*Searchlight with Shoulder Strap 36
*Stun Gun 3
*NOTE: Various quantities and types of replacement chemical
cartridges, loading kits, and batteries were also
ordered for asterisk items.
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SUBJECT: Audio Countermeasures Support to the
United States Secret Service
On 25 July 1968, and at the specific request
of the United States Secret Service, this Office pro-
vided two audio countermeasures technicians to the
United States Secret Service in connection with the
Democratic National Convention held in Chicago, Illinois.
This was not an official detail although both men were
provided with temporary credentials identifying them
as being affiliated with the United States Secret Service.
On 15 August 1968, we detailed the same two men
to the United States Secret Service to cover the
Republican National Convention in Miami, Florida. On
both occasions, the team members were debriefed upon,
their return and it is clear that their activities were
confined exclusively to sweeping the candidates and
potential candidates quarters.
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15 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Howard Osborn
Director of Security
SUBJECT Identification of Activities with
Embarrassment Potential for the Agency
1. In responding on 7 May by memorandum to the DDO's
request for the identification of any incident which might
conceivably have an embarrassment potential for the Agency,
I cited the equipment test which is mentioned in the attached
memo. The test in question was related to the development of
ercrans! were in and out of some four hotels in Miami, with Loot.
radio equipment. This was shortly before the political con-
ventions, and at least one of the hotels was within a block
of the convention hall.
2. Although this completely innocent--although sub-
ject to misconstrual--activity may already have been drawn
to your attention by your own staff,-it has occurred to us
that we should ensure you are awaré of it, given the involve-
ment of a Security officer,
Chief, meen]
Att:
dated 7 May 73 by
Subj: Equipment
Test, Miami, Fla., Aug 71
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eet oe
7 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT Equipment Test, Miami, Florida,
August 1971
The following details concerning the arrange-
ments for Subject tests were provided by
during a telephone conversation with
the undersigned, 7 May 1973.
|now retired, formerly assigned to
was the| |for the August 1971 Field
Test of the| Security
arrangements tor the test were Nandled on behalf oft
and the visitors by |inm_conjunction with the
ee pacoeie Officer, “wno was
ae-ERE-Eime. [_Thas in daily Contact with
[Miami the course of his officia
duties.
was reluctant to call Jat home
over an Open telephone line to inquire about the specifics
of the arrangements at this point, and suggested
that che security Officer by this time might have
been transterre ack to Headquarters and be available for
a direct query.
The writer called DIV/D Security
Officer, who verified the Tact tnat| indeed is
stationed at Headquarters, with a current assignment to a
located in
iS available via-the following tele-
phone connections:
The aboye details were provided by telephone to
Chief, Division D at 1650 hours this date.
(signed)
Distribution:
Orig File
00037
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Up becasirteo LI. onty [J CONF iA
le ey nee ee ee ee nm eae
stn Semen
SG “ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBECT: {Opticnal)
DATE
Director of Securit
TO: (Om ssignst 2 ar
7O:, (0 ter designation, teem umber, and DATE CrriCEeRr Ss COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIALS to whom. Draw a fine ccross column offer cach comment.)
RECEIVED FORWARDED
Ex. Dir. -Compt.
10.
12,
00038
13.
15.
a 610 “ste ‘seer CO conrivennia, Use ony UNCLASSIFIED
chrom oe thes week: Witames om see wr cee we ee Miesaenuee eee nen etme cme
Page 37 (page 39 of the original)
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director-Comptroller
SUBJECT ROSELLI, John
l. This memorandum is for your information only.
2. Reference is made to our recent conversation regarding
the Agency's participation in political assassinations. Attached
hereto is a memorandum dated 19 November 1970 which was fur-
nished to Mr. Helms setting forth the circumstances of the Subject's
activities on behalf of the Agency. Initially Roselli was unwitting
of Government interest, but as time went on, he suspected that the
U. S. Government was involved and specifically the CIA.
3. Roselli is presently serving a prison sentence for con-
spiracy in a Federal penitentiary in Seattle, Washington and awaits
deportation upon completion of his current sentence.
4, This Agency was aware that Roselli intended to expose
his participation in the plot should we not intervene on his behalf.
The DCI decided to ignore his threats and take a calculated risk as
to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story.
This was subsequently done by Roselli or someone on his behalf fur-
nishing Jack Anderson details of the incident. Attached hereto are
two of Anderson's articles dealing with Roselli. Anderson is also
Editor of the Washington Bureau of the Washington Post, Sunday
supplemental "Parade."
5. Individuals who were aware of this project were: Messrs.
Dulles, Bissell, Colonel J. C. King, Colonel Sheffield Edwards,
00039
Page 38 (page 40 of the original)
William Harvey, and James P. O'Connell. Also included were
Robert A. Maheu and his attorneys Edward P. Morgan and Edward
Bennett Williams.
6, On 26 February 1971 arrangements were made with
Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner Raymond
Farrell to flag any action that may be taken by his organization
regarding deportation proceedings against Roselli. On 26 January
1972 James F. Green, Associate Commissioner for I&NS, advised
that they were deferring any deportation action for another year
and would again call it to our attention upon expiration of the
deferral.
Director of urity
Atts
Page 39 (page 41 of the original)
MEMORANDUM FOR; Executive Director-Con:ptroller
SUBJECT ROSELLI, John
1, This niernorandum is for your information only.
2. Reference is made to our recent conversation regarding
the Agency's participation in political assassinations. Attached
hereto fe a memorandurn dated 19 November 1970 which was fur-
nished to Mr. Helnis setting forth the circumstances of the Subject's
activities on behalf of the Agency. Initially Roselli was unwitting
of Government interest, but as time went on, he suspected that the
U. S. Government was involved and specifically the CIA.
3. Roselli is presently serving a prison sentence for con-
spiracy in a Federal penitentlary in Seattle, Washington and awaits
deportation upon completion of his current sentence.
4, This Agency was aware that Roselli intended to expose
his participation in the plot should we not intervene on his behalf.
The DCI decided to ignore his threate and take a calculated risk as
to the consequences that may occur with the disclosure of his story.
This was subsequently done by Roselli or someone on his behalf fur-
nishing Jack Anderson details of the incident. Attached hereto are
two of Anderson's articles dealing with Roselli. Anderson is also
Editor of the Washington Bureau of the Wa shington Post, Sunday
supplemental Parade,"
5. Individuals who were aware of this project were: Messrs.
Dulles, Bissell, Colonel J. C. King, Colonel Sheffield Edwards,
‘00044
Page 40 (page 42 of the original)
were
William Harvey, and Jarnes P. O'Connell. Also included were
Robert A, Maheu and his attorneys Edward P. Morgan and Edward
Bennett Williams.
6. On.26 February 1971 arrangements were made with
Immigration and Naturalization Service Commissioner Raymond
Farrell to flag any action that may be taken by his organization
regarding deportation proceedings egainst Roselli. On 26 January
1¢72 James F. Green, Associate Commissioner for I& NS, advised
that they were deferring any deportation action for another year
and would again call it to our attention upon expiration of the
deferral, oe
Howard JZ-Jsborn
Director of Security
Atts
00042
Page 41 (page 43 of the original)
tts
00043
Page 42 (page 44 of the original)
SUBJECT ROSFLULI, Johnny
l. This memorandum is for information only.
2. In August 1960, Mr. Richard M, Bissell approached
Colonel Sheffield Edwards to determine if the Office of Security
had assets that may assist in a sensitive miesion requiring
gangster-type action. The mission target was Fidel Castro.
3, Because of its extreme sensitivity, only a small group
was made privy to the project. The DCI was briefed and gave his
approval. Colonel J. C. King, Chief, WH Tivision, was briefed,
but all details were deliberately concealed from any of the
JIMWAVE officials. Certain TSE and Commo personnel partici-
pated in the initial planning stages, but were not witting of the
purpose of the mission.
4. Robert A. Maheu was contacted, briefed generally on
the project, and requested to ascertain if he could develop an
entree into the gangster elements as the first step toward accom-
plishing the desired goal.
5. Mr. Maheu advised that he had met one Johnny Roselli
on several occasions while visiting Las Vegas. He only knew
him casually through clients, but was given to understand that
he was a high-ranking member of the "syndicate" and controlled
all of the ice-making machines on the Strip. Maheu reasoned
that, if Roselli was in fact a member of the clan, he undoubtedly
had connections leading into the Cuban gambling interests.
Page 43 (page 45 of the original)
6. Maheu was asked to approach Roselli, who knew Mahcu
as a personal relations executive handling domestic and foreign
accounts, and tell him that he had recently been retained by a
client who represented several international business firms
which were suffering heavy financial losses in Cuba as a result
of Castro's action. They were convinced that Castro's removal
was the anewer to their problern and were willing to pay a price
of $150, 000 for its successful accomplishment. It was to be made
clear to Roselli that the U. S. Governrnent was not, and should not,
become aware of this operation.
7. The pitch was made to Roselli on 14 September 1960 at
the Hilton Plaza Hotel, New York City. His initial reaction was
to avoid getting involved but, through Maheu's persuasion, he
agreed to introduce him to a friend, Sam Gold, who knew the
"Cuban crowd." Roselli made it clear he did not want any money
for his part and believed Sam would feel the same way. Neither
of these individuals was ever paid out of Agency funds.
8, During the week of 25 September, Maheu was introduced
to Sam who was staying at the Fontainebleau Hotel, Miami Beach.
It was several weeks after his meeting with Sam and Joe, who was
identified to him as a courier operating between Havana and Miami,
that he saw photographs of both of these individuals in the Sunday
supplemental ''Parade,"' They were identified as Momo Salvatore
Giancana and Santos Trafficant, respectively. Both were on the
list of the Attorney General's ten most-wanted men, The former
was described as the Chicago chieftain of the Cosa Nostra and
successor to Al Capone, and the latter, the Cosa Nostra boss of
Cuban operations. Maheu called this office immediately upon as-
certaining this information.
9. In discussing the possible methods of accomplishing this
mission, Sam suggested that they not resort to firearms but, if
he could be furnished some type of potent pill, that could be
placed in Castro's food or drink, it would be a much more effective
operation, Sam indicated that he had a prospective nominee in the
person of Juan Orta, a Cuban official who had been receiving kick-
back payments from the gambling interests, who still had access
to Castro, and was in a financial bind.
00045
Page 44 (page 46 of the original)
10. TSD was requested to produce six pills of high lethal
content,
11. Joe delivered the pills to Crta. After several weeks
of reported attempts, Orta apparently got cold fect and asked out
of the assignment. He suggested another candidate who made
several attempts without success.
12. Joe then indicated that Dr. Anthony Verona, one of the
principal officers in the Cuban Exile Junta, had become disaffected
with the apparent ineffectual progress of the Junta and was willing
to handle the mission through his own resources.
13. He asked, as a prerequisite to the deal, that he be
given $10, 000 for organizational expenses and requested $1, 000
worth of communications equipment.
14. Dr. Verona's potential was never fully exploited, as
the project was canceled shortly after the Bay of Pigs episode.
Verona was advised that the offer was withdrawn, and the pills
were retrieved.
15. Of significant interest was an incident which involved
a request levied by Sam upon Maheu.
At the height of the project negotiations, Sam
expressed concern about his girlfriend, Phyllis McGuire,
who he learned was getting much attention from Dan
Rowan while both were booked at a Las Vegas night club.
Sam asked Maheu to put a bug in Rowan's room to deter-
mine the extent of his intimacy with Miss McGuire. The
technician involved in the assignment was discovered in
the process, arrested, and taken to the Sheriff's office
for questioning. He called Maheu and informed him that
he had been detained by the police. This call was made
in the presence of the Sheriff's personnel.
Subsequently, the Department of Justice an-
nounced its intention to prosecute Maheu along with
the technician. On 7 February 1962, the Director of
00046
Page 45 (page 47 of the original)
Security briefed the Attorney General, Robert
Kennedy, on the circumstances leading up to
Maheu's involvement inthe wiretap. At our re-
quest, prosecution was Cropped.
16. In May 1962, Mr. William Harvey took over as Case
Officer, and it is not known by this Office whether Roselli was
used operationally from that point on.
17. It was subsequently learned from the FBI that Roselli
had been convicted on six counts involving illegal entry into the
United States. Our records do not reflect the date of conviction,
but it is believed to have been sometime during November 1967.
18. On 2 December 1968, Roselli, along with four other
individuals, was convicted of conspiracy to cheat members of the
Friars Club of $400,000 in a rigged gin gummy game.
19. Mr. Harvey reported to the Office of Security of his
contacts with Roselli during November and December 1967 and
January 1968. It was his belief that Johnny would not seek out
the Agency for assistance in the deportation proceedings unless
he actually faced deportation. Roselli expressed confidence that
he would win an appeal,
20. On 17 November 1970, Maheu called James O'Connell,
Roselli's first Case Officer, to advise that Maheu's attorney, Fd
Morgan, had received a call from a Thomas Waddin, Roselli's
lawyer, who stated that allavenues of appeal had been exhausted,
and his client now faces deportation. Waddin indicated that, if
someone did not intercede on Roselli's behalf, he would make
a complete expose of his activities with the Agency.
21. On 18 November 1970, you were briefed on the latest
development in this case, and it was decided that the Agency
would not in any way assist Roselli, Maheu was so advised of
the Agency's position, and he was in complete agreement with
our stand, He further advised that he was not concerned about
Page 46 (page 48 of the original)
-any publicity as it affected him personally should Roselli decide
to tell all. He stated he would advise us promptly of any develop-
ments that he may become aware of in this matter.
Howard J, Osborn
Director of Security
00048
Page 47 (page 51 of the original)
oncuassiries OM CONT TIAL (CL seco
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT; (Optional)
FROM: Ko O EXTENSION NO.
Howard J. Osborn! SN.
Director of Secur Date
Has. 17 December 1973
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE
building) OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number eoch comment to show from whom
INITIALS to whom. Drew o line across column after each comment.)
RECEIVED FORWARDED wa
IG Staff Ss
Attn:
IE. 24 Hos A
Kp wT Lite Gadd
Veo? lay fi
Y_DNee
4,
5.
ike
7.
8.
9.
10.
V1,
12.
13.
15.
sz 610 “totiche’* [SECRET CONFIDENTIAL Use onty. (]_UNCLASSIFIED
ahead wa eee ate oe ee cet da eel Beet lame cae temeecatmeeamt ne
Page 48 (page 52 of the original)
17 December 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SURJECT: Recent Activities of the Watergate Special
Prosecution Staff
1. Early in the evening of 10 December 1973, I received
a telephone call from
who informed the that he, in turn, had received a call from
eromonten Pore veparment ene Division, Washington
Metropolitan POLI
2. It seems that lhad just spent an hour in
conversation at his home wi oh
in the Washington Metropolitan Police Department who had report
to him on his interview that afternoon with a Mr. Martin and a Mr.
rowitz, prosecutors of the Watergate Special Prosecution Staff.
had been subpoenaed for his appearance and he indicated
to that the two prosecutors were principally concerned
with two matters:
a. What type of training had the Agency given
members of the Washington Metropolitan Police
Department? how long were the courses? and
how often were they given?
b. What support did the Agency provide to the
Washington Metropolitan Police Department during
demonstrations occurring in the Washington area
in late 1969 and early 19707
3. ae. that he had been shown a long list of
names and asked if any of them had been involved either with the
training given the Washington Metropolitan Police Department or the
support to the Washington Metropolitan Police Department during the
demonstrations. could remember only three names on the
list. They were:
00052
Page 49 (page 53 of the original)
“ce: IG Staff Attn:
4, The three individuals named by alti in fact
participate in both the training and support during the demonstrations.
They are only three among others of ny| special
Support group who were involved in these activities. O£ extrene
sensitivity is the fact that these same individuals were engaged in
other highly sensitive activities which could cause the Agency severe
embarrassment if they were surfaced today in the current "Watergate
climate."
S. I briefed the Director personally on this development
and he indicated that if the training and demonstrations surfaced that
he would simply acknowledge that this had occurred but as he had
assured members of Congress, we would not engage in this type of
activity in the future. He agreed with my suggestion that we have the
Legislative Counsel brief Congressman Nedzi and Senator Stennis on
this since they have already been briefed on all activities of this
nature undertaken by the Agency in the past. I briefed Mr. Join
Warner, Acting General Counsel, and agreed with him that we would
make no effort to brief members of my until
and if they are subpoenaed. Mr. Warner or members of his Staff will
then caution them to only answer questions asked and not volunteer
additional information. I am making a copy of this memorandum available
to| |of the Inspector General's Staff at the suggestion
of the Inspector General, who I also briefed on this development.
of ate
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security
00053
Page 50 (page 54 of the original)
hd, Cl SSShrieo LJ DHL
ROUTING AND RECORO SHEE
SUBJECT: (Optional)
pe tee ee rae ree ti
FROM: feat EATENSION NO.
Howard J. Osborn 440 orem nmmmanens ercnnees cana
oe memes 8B OMAY 1973
OTE
Director of Security
cuiiding} OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIALS to whom. Draw a tine ocross column ofter each comment.)
RECEIVED FORWARDED wo
YO: (Officer designation, room number, ond
Executive Secretary,. Lhe ZY
“CIA Management Com. 5 jo>-:
curity.
_Hdgs
15.
sfoaf™
(DATE)
00054
FORM USE PREVIOUS
3-42 61 0 EDITIONS
(47)
REPLACES FORM 10-101
FORM NO. MAY BE USED.
1 AUG 54 10] wHECH
Page 51 (page 55 of the original)
NAL
UNCLASSIFIED aL “EY cont TIAL
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEE
SUBJECT; (Optional)
FROM: GaIENSION NO.
Howard J.. Osborn if oO. TE one 25 MAY 1973
Director of Security
TO: (Offices designation, foam number, and
ouilding)
DATE
RECEIVED FORWAROED
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment ta show from whom:
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1. an
Executive Secretary,
“CIA. Management Com
ebe
Del
*'D/Security’
00055
FORM
B10" “ttn S-SEERT mM CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
NSF ONY
unctassiFiep
Page 52 (page 56 of the original)
MiEMORANDUM FOR: Etxecutive Secretary,
CIA Management Committee
SUBJECT Project TWO-FOLD
This memorandum sets forth recommendation for your
approval in paragraph 5.
2. For the past several years, this office has been support-
ing the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) by spot-
ting, assessing, and recruiting personnel to form an internal
security unit whose primary mission is the detection of corruption
within the BNDD. Subsequent to the recruitment and training stage,
the individuals selected are turned over to the Chief Inspector of
BNDD for operational guidance and handling in their various dom-
estic assignments.
3. Recently, this Agency has extended this activity by
supporting BNDD in the covert acquisition of individuals who are
hired as Staff Agents utilized under nonofficial cover and directed
against the principal international drug traffickers. These indi-
viduals are true employees of the BNDD and, although all admin-
istrative details relative to their employment are handled within
the Agency, they are unaware of any Agency involvement.
4. Itis felt at this time that a reaffirmation of our support
to BNDD in Project TWO-FOLD is necessary and desirable.
5. Therefore, itis recommended that approval be granted
for the continuation of Project TWO-FOLD as originally approved
by the Director of Central Intelligence on 12 February 1971.
Page 53 (page 57 of the original)
SUBJECT: Project TWO-FOLD
APPROVED:
DISAPPROVED:
Distribution:
Orig. Return to OS
1-I1G
Per Mr. Colby's recommendation and
DCI concurrence, terminate paragraph
2 activity and continue paragraph 3 only
as the activity pertains to foreign assign-
ments to collect narcotics intelligence
abroad. Copy furnished IG.
00057
Page 54 (page 58 of the original)
prion conetegn ornare rw tem
SUBJECT:
“FROM:
(Optional)
“ROUTING AND BE
ExTcte SION.
DATE
ll May 1973
building)
(Officer designation, room number, and
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
RECEIVED FORWARDED
to whom.
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
Draw o line ocross column after each comment.)
10.
VW.
12,
13.
14,
15.
00058
for.
540:
ust PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
ET CONFIDENTIAL
INTERNAL
USE ONLY
UNCLASSIFIED
Page 55 (page 59 of the original)
_ibMay 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: ‘General: Office of Security Survey
interest.
Glerical and secretarial employees of tha Agency.
1. At the Director's instruction, and with the concurrence
of the then DD/P, the Office of Security developed informants in noe
RID to report on the activities of RID employees on whom security mo
questions had arisen. This program, which included upwards of a
dozen informants at its peak, has declined to its present level of
three, only one of whom is reporting regularly on matters of current
Che
2. ‘The principal object of Security's interest through this
informant is a fermale who was employed in RID for a number of years
until she resigned in 1969. Her resignation coincided with the initiation
of a security review on her by the Office of Security, but Security does
not know whether the employeg was aware of this. security review at.
the time of her resignation... oe oe ER eS
-3, Security's interest in this employee was occasioned by
reports that she had developed an increasingly intimate acquaintance
with a Cuban national. Reporting by one informant, who was also.
being developed by the Cuban, suggested that the Cuban might have.
an intelligence interest in the female,. The same informant also sub-
sequently reported that the Cuban had numerous other contacts among
‘those requiring ‘pas sport photos. Recently, she and the Cuban sought:
to employ Security's informant in this business on part-time basis.
Subsequen
1A ture from the Agency,’
‘employee entered into a common-law marital relationship with the?
Cuban and joined him as partner in a photographic business. In thi
capacity she solicited business among CIA employees, especially ae
ee t-to her depax
Page 56 (page 60 of the original)
5, Information on the background of the Cuban is fairly extensive,
but it is inconclusive. He is known to have been a member of anti-
Castro organizations in this country. There are also reports that
his mother was imprisoned in Cuba at one time. There are other
episodes in his life that suggest intelligence involvement on his part
with some hostile service, but this is not yet definitely established.
6. The Office of Security has had at times a second informant
in this case. His reporting has tended to confirm reporting by the
principal informant,
8. The Office of Security has been running this operation for
over two years, in an effort to obtain conclusive proof of its intelli-
gence nature. CI Staff has been kept informed.. The FBI, which
was informed of the case at an early stage, has declined to take re-
sponsibility for it, on grounds that it concerns CIA's internal security.
As a result, the Office ofSecurity has been inhibited in the actions
it can take against the Cuban suspect. On the other hand, Security
has not taken any action against Agency employees for fear of com-
promising the operation.
9. It would appear to me that the Office of Security has dallied
with this case long enough. Apparently unable through positive measures
to resolve doubts about the case, O/S has followed the course of watch-
ful waiting, hoping the Cuban would take precipitakt action himself that
would give us the evidence we seek. In the meantime, our knowledge
of the relationship between the Cuban and the several other current
Agency employees with whom he is known to have contact continues
00060
Page 57 (page 61 of the original)
The possibility that the employee in SB Division may be passing
information on CIA's Soviet operations is too great to warrant further
delay: in moving against her.
00061
Page 58 (page 62 of the original)
femorandum to: The Inspector Gensral
Subject: Office of Security Survey Office of Security Support to 3BNDD
1. In December 1970 Robert Ingersoll, head of the Bureau of Nar-
cotics and Dangerous Drugs, asked Mr. Helms if the Agency could give
him some assistance in shoring up the internal integrity of the 5NDD.
According to Ingersoll, the old Federal Bureau of Narcotics had been
heavily infiltrated by dishcnest and corrupt elements, who were believed
to have ties with the narcotics smuggling industry. Ingersoll wanted us
to halp him recruit sone thoroughly reliable people who could be used,
not only as special agents in his various offices around the country,
but also to serve as informants on the other BNDD employees in these
offices.
Page 59 (page 63 of the original)
JOLawrence
Page 60 (page 64 of the original)
COs. SENTIAL SECRET
T] URCLASSIFiED
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM: EXTENSION NO.
Howard J. Osborn
Director of Security CATE
9 May 1973
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE
building) OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number eoch comment to show from whom
INITIALS to whom. Draw a fine ocross column after each comment.)
RECEIVED FORWARDED
Deputy Director for
Management §& Services
10.
12.
13.
14,
00064
Keon, UNCLASSIFIED
ane cab tea he atl ge ae Piet SM an abt ate
sean 610 “toreng’s SECRET CONFIDENTIAL
Page 61 (page 65 of the original)
9 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management §& Services
SUBJECT Press Allegations re Use of Agency
Polygraph
1. This memorandum is for your information only
and confirms a report I made to you by telephone earlier
today.
2. On 22 July 1971, an article was carried on
American proposals relative to the SALT talks in The New
York Times over the by-line of William Beecher. It was
devastatingly accurate and contained direct quotes from
a Presidential advisory memorandum the White House had
sent to Mr. Gerard Smith, Director, Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency, a few days earlier. The President
was alleged to be furious with this unauthorized dis-
closure of classified information and directed a. sweeping
investigation within the United States Government to
determine the source of the disclosure. Investigation
was conducted under the directaon of Mr. Egil Krogh and
Mr. David Young, Staff Assistan€# to Mr. John Ehrlichman,
Counsel to the President for Domestic Affairs.
3. On the basis of investigations conducted by
State Security and Defense officials, four individuals--
one individual in the Department of Defense and three
individuals in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency--
were tabbed as leading suspects. Mr. Egil Krogh contacted
me on 26 July 1971 and requested that we arrange to polygraph
the three suspects in the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
and volunteered the information that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation would be asked to polygraph the one suspect
in the Department of Defense.
AL USE ONLY
00065
Page 62 (page 66 of the original)
— aad
Ook brted
4. I informed Mr. Krogh that from time to time
in matters involving the national security the Agency had
detailed to Mr. G. Marvin Gentile, Director of State
Security, a polygraph operator and a polygraph machine for
his use in polygraphing State Department employees who
were recipients of allegations concerning their loyalty.
I emphasized that this procedure had the Director's
approval and that State clearly understood that the examin-
ation was their total responsibility. I further informed
him that this was the only way we could undertake to enter-
tain his request and that even then it would require the
specific approval of the Director. Mr. Krogh asked me to
obtain such approval and work out such arrangements with
Mr. Gentile.
S. Later that same day, Mr. Krogh called Mr. Gentile
and inquired as to whether the arrangements had been made.
Mr. Gentile indicated they had and suggested that the same
polygraph operator be used to examine the Defense suspect.
Mr. Krogh informed Mr. Gentile that he considered this an
excellent idea and that he. would instruct Defense officials
to make their man available to Mr. Gentile for a polygraph
examination.
6. The four individuals were
|The polygraph
examinations resulted in clearing the four men and the
results of the examinations were forwarded over my signature
to Mr. Gentile on 29 July 1971. A copy of my covering
memorandum is attached.
7. Mr. Murrey Marder, a staff writer for The
Washington Post, in an article dated 3 September 1971,
stated that a State Department spokesman had acknowledged
at a news briefing that agents of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation had polygraphed State Department employees
suspected of leaking information on the SALT talks in
July. Mr. John Edgar Hoover, then Director of the Federal
00066
Page 63 (page 67 of the original)
ar rareyer wen ee — can
elo lng ALY
Bureau of Investigation, denied this allegation in a
letter to The Washington Post and said that the polygraph
examinations had been conducted by another agency. Specu-
lation centered around the Agency, but after a day or so,
press speculation in this regard died away.
8. Mr. Marder apparently has never been satisfied
and has been pressing Mr. Charles Bray, State Department
spokesman, for confirmation of Agency involvement. Mr.
Bray learned today that Mr. Marder plans to use a press
conference to be held at 2:00 p.m. this afternoon to press
this point further. Mr. Bray has been given guidance by
Mr. Gentile to avoid confirmation but if this is impossible
he will indicate the examinations were conducted by State
Department Security officials utilizing an operator and
a machine detailed to the Department for this purpose. I
do not know whether or not the fact that the government-wide
investigation was directed by Mr. Egil Krogh is known to
Mr. Marder but I suspect that it is and that this is the
reason why the matter has been raised again. Mr. David
Young was instrumental in pushing my office to conduct an
internal Agency investigation of this disclosure and the
White House was satisfied that no Agency employee was
the source.
Director
Attachment
Page 64 (page 68 of the original)
00068
preerey
Page 65 (page 69 of the original)
moet
la fed wpe ame
Pon
! ty AP)
aed
Roly
eos
1.
a) y
h otf
qo a) we
hel
Alay 14 roy
Q rf oka
wes
ond
ord
ded fot
Loni
a. Set
q) ay
a arc)
min
veel
ry wel fri
moe
ES) teh
ai at oay
eet ry
00069
comme
Page 66 (page 70 of the original)
5 June 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
SUBJECT Items in John Clarke Memorandum
to the Director of Central Intelligence,
dated 9 May 1973
1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not
previously been reported. The first: Use of CIA funds
and facilities to [for FBI and pro-
vision of technical equipments by NSA for use
against a|
2. Ina follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised
that involved here was the use of funds appropriatedfor CIA
being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of
There was also
Agency help given in| Further, other
CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with
some assistance, was working on
Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem
here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought
the only source of additional information on this subject was
Mr. of the DDO/CI Staff.
3. The second item: Use of CIA funds to help
State Department defer Presidential representational expenses
of President Lyndon B. Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."
4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested
by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would
not agree to this amount. The Director did supply funds in
those instances where some operational activity was involved or
could be inferred, i.e.,
Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency
Page 67 (page 71 of the original)
funds used. He felt that only Colonel White could supply
additional details. He said Senator Russell and Repre-
sentative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity but
asked not to be briefed in detail.
INSpecror
Attachment
00071
Page 68 (page 72 of the original)
9 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT Per your instructions
1. Ihave no recollection of specific contacts with the
Ellsberg case, Watergate, or Young. Dick Helms’ instructions
at the time regarding discussion of Hunt's previous employment
should be a matter of record.
2. Other activities of the Agency which could at some point
raise public questions should they be exposed and on which Bill
Colby is fully conversant are:
Clactivity of Dick Ober, DD/O.
and investments and
accumulation of Government capital.
Use of CIA funds and facilities to acquire U.S.
real estate for FBI and provision of technical
equipments by NSA| for use against
Use of CIA funds to help State Department defer 4
Presidential representational expenses of L. B. J. of
trip to SEA.
M. Clarke
000728
_EVES CnC
Page 69 (page 73 of the original)
5 June 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
SUBIECT Items in John Clarke Memorandum
to the Director of Central Intelligence,
dated 9 May 1973
1. Two items in the attached memorandum had not
previously been reported. The first: Use of CIA funds
and facilities to acquire U.S. real estate for FBI and pro-
vision of technical equipments by NSA for use
against a
2. Ina follow-up meeting with Mr. Clarke, he advised
that involved here was the use of funds appropriatedfor CIA
being given to the FBI in cashiers checks for the purpose of
here was also
“Agency help given in| Further, other
CIA monies in cashiers checks were given to NSA who, with
some assistance, was working on
Mr. Clarke said he thought the only problem
here was in the use of funds, not in the operation. He thought
the only source of additional information on this subject was
Mr. bf the DDO/CI Staff.
3. The second item: Use of CIA funds to help
State Department defer Presidential representational expenses
of President Lyndon Johnson's trip to Southeast Asia."
4. Mr. Clarke said the total amount of money requested
by State Department was $3,000,000 but that the Director would
not agree to this amount, The Director did supply funds in
those instances where some operational activity was involved or
could be inferred, i.e.,
Mr. Clarke was not sure of the amount of Agency
Page 70 (page 74 of the original)
funds used, He felt that only Colonel White could supply
additional details. He said Senator Russell and Repre-
sentative Mahon were advised of this Agency activity but
asked not to he briefed in detail.
Inspector
Attachmea t
000'74
Page 71 (page 75 of the original)
meer ate
ic! wats oq) ERR AL LER
wlan ey ED USE Ol LY CON isc! AL
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional]
FROM: TE ESTENSION NO, — eT
Director of Finance en
1212 Key Building PATE
7_ May 1973
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and DATE
building) OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number cach comment to show from whom
RECEIVED FORWARDED INITIALS to whom. Draw a fine across column affer each comment.)
Deputy Director for
Management §& Services
aT ftteadquarters|—-—-~;~
3.
4 Director of Central] Intelligence
Headquarters
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
12.
13.
14,
FORM USE PREVIOUS INTERNAL
ae a0 comers” [SSE RET. oa CONFIDENTIAL Oo USE ONLY oa UNCLASSIFIED
Page 72 (page 76 of the original)
No text on this page (blank, image only, or unreadable).
Page 73 (page 77 of the original)
MEMORANDUM FOR:
0% MAY 1973
Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director for Management and Services
VIA
FROM Director of Finance
SUBJECT Special Other Government Agency Activities
1. colonel White, Executive Director-
2.
3, Detailees The Agency has reimbursable and non-
reimbursable agreements with the White House, Department of
Justice, Defense Agencies, etc., based on signed memoranda
between the Director of Personnel and the various Agencies.
4. Project TWOFOLD Reimbursement from Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agents by
a domestic Agency Security proprietary.
5.
Page 74 (page 78 of the original)
SUBJECT: Special Other Government Agency Activities
6. Payment to White House Reimbursement to White
House as approved by Executive Director-Comptroller for
$33,655.68 representing cost of postage, stationery and
addressing of replies to letters and telegrams received
by the White House as a result of the President's speech
on Cambodia in May 1970.
00078
SECRET EVES ORLY
Page 75 (page 79 of the original)
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intellisence
07 MAY 3873
VIA Deputy Director for Manageaent and services
FRO Director of Finances
SULILCT 3 Special Other Government Agoncy Activities
Colonel White, Executive Biscoctor-
Dia we en oe & nn oe
2.
‘3. Detailees The Agency has reimbursable and non-
ree, ry arth
reimbursadic acreenents with the waite House, Department of
Justice, Sefense Agencies, etc., based on Sigued me::oranda
between the Director of Personnel and the various agencies.
4. Project THOFOLD Reimbursement fron Bureau of’.
Narcotics and Danzerous vrugs for training of BNDD ayents by
& donestic Agency Security proprietary,
Fa merce oe eae ae are se ee me we ee oe oe
Page 76 (page 80 of the original)
apps ey
oun
eorgarn,
SUBJECT: Special Other Government Agency Activities
6. Payment to White House Reimbursement to White
House as approved by Executive Director-Comptroller for
$33,655.68 representing cost of postage, stationery and
addressing of replies to letters and telegrams received
by the White House as a result of the President's speech
on Cambodia in May 1970.
(signed) Thomas B. Yale
Thomas B. Yale
Director of Finance
SEEN EYES-22 00080
Page 77 (page 81 of the original)
07 MAY 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
VIA > Deputy Director for Managerent and Services
FROM > Director of Finance
SUBJECT Spscial Other Government Agency Activitics
Colonel White, Executive Director-
53. Detailees The Agency has reimbursable and non-
reimbursable agreements with the White House, Departinent of
Justice, Defense Agencies, etc., based dn signed memoranda
between the Director of* Personnel and the various Agencies,
4. Project TWOFOLD Reimbursement from Bureau of
Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs for training of BNDD agents by
4 domestic Agency Security proprietary.
5.
ES ON y 00081
Page 78 (page 82 of the original)
SUBJECT: Special Other Government Agency Activities
6. Payment to White House Reimbursencnt to White
House as approved by Executive Director-Conptroller for
$33,655.68 representing cost of postage, stationery and
addressing of replies to letters and telegrams received
by the White liouse as a result of the President's speech
on Cambodia in May 1970.
(signed) Thomas B. Yale
Thowas B. Yale
Director of Finance
00082
Page 79 (page 83 of the original)
er tee agierette
UNCLASSIFIED Ooowy CONFIT NTIAL SECLET
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM: EXTENSION NO.
Deputy Director of Finance
1212 Key Building [pee
24 May 1973.
TO: (Officer designotion, room number, and DATE
building) OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED FORWARDED INITIALS to whom. Drow a line across column after each comment.)
1.
|Headquarters
2. Attached are pertinent
documents and papers relating
3.
to Para 6 of the Director of
4. Finance's memo to the DCI
dated 7 May 1973, Subject:
5.
"Special Other Government
é. Agency Activities"
8 Warren D. Magnussoy
9. Atts
i 10.
12.
13.
14,
peerae eel “Ol USE ONLY.” oO UNCLASSIFIED
Had. ods tne HAM oh estos lac eee iieals wee hee a4 Sag
Page 80 (page 84 of the original)
Mr, Magnusson's phone conversation with Mr. John Brown at approximately 10:20
on 26 May 19°70:
B; Guess we're back together again:
M: Got more problems?
B: Yes, don't know how much Watts told you.
M: I didn't talk to Watts. Think he called Colonel White.
B: Let me explain background. As a result of the Caibodia speech, we're
getting relatively inundated with correspondence and normally all of
this is sent to the Department of State for answering. What we're
doing we're continuing to send all cons correspondence to State.
However, the President made determination he'd like to answer support
over his signature here and we asked the Department of State to
support us on this effort. They're in a position where they can provide
only limited support at this time. They're committed for $10,000 which
would probably handle in the area of maybe 60,000 responses.
M: How many responses altogether counting pros and cons?
B: The cons are quite a large group that they're handling themselves also.
M: Are they going to be handling pros too?
Bs OO See They're doing cons, On pros they can pick up only
10,000 worth. We estimate it will be around_$8,000 per 50,000 and it
looks like at present time we've got over 100,000 responses in and it
could go upwards of 150,000 or greater, looks like we'll need a minimum
of another $10,000, probably in area of $15,000, additional. This covers
cost of printing, postage and addressing.
M: Just printing, postage and addressing? Not any overtime for any salaries
or anything like that?
B: No, the posting of the things we'll do ourselves by hand. No problem.
We're talking about physical costs of job cost of stamps, cost of
envelopes and cards, and cost of having them addressed by outside firm.
We'll handle putting stamp on, inserting, and sealing and mailing. Only
talking about cost associated with three aspects of the operation.
M: Postage, addressing and printing.
B: Yes, reason I asked NSA to see if they could arrange depending on
how volume goes probably another $10,000 to $15,000.
M: These are just pros? State is handling all cons themselves?
(continued)
VEO 0084
Page 81 (page 85 of the original)
Messrs. Magnusson and Brown (continued Page 2)
Yes, this is just portion of pros we're talking about. My understanding
get in touch with you to work out mechanics of how we would handle the
-billing to make sure it's straight and we do it properly so it fits in
with your accounting system.
This is only portion of pros. cate doing some too?
They're contributing $10,000 to the pros as well as doing all the cons,
They're picking up quite a load as a result of this. One hell of a lot
of response coming in on this.
Bound to be. Tell you, John, let me give you a call back later today
if I may. Have to take a look about where I would fit this stuff in.
Are you going to be in this afternoon?
I'll be around. If I'm not in my office I'll get back to you as soon
as IT come back.
I'll give you a call then,
Can't be real definite not sure how we're going to peak out. Not
sure what backlog is. I'11 check into that so when we talk this
afternoon I can be little more definite. Probably run into that area,
I think,
Okay, I'll get back in touch with you.
Okay, thank you, Warren.
End of Conversation
Page 82 (page 86 of the original)
Mr. Magnusson's phone conversation with Col. White at 15:40 on 26 May 1970:
talked with John Brown today and it seems like as you mentioned
as a result of Cambodia, inquiries going into White House. The State
Department is doing all the work on the cons there are pros and cons.
The State Department is going to answer all the cons and the President has
determined that he wants to answer personally all the pros. However, the
State has agreed to pick up some of those too in the amount of $10,000.
That. will cover maybe 60,000 of the answers. They estimate there's going
to be from 100,000 to 150,000 answers that will have to be put out by
the White House. Estimate it's going to cost about $8,000 per 50,000,
Think it might go to 150,000. $10,000 to $15,000 additional which the
White House will have to pay for. The charges are only going to be for
printing, postage and addressing by an outside firm. No salaries for
overtime or anything like that. They're going to lick the stamps in the
White House, paste the stamps on and insert the message into the envelopes.
John Brown said he had requested NSC to see if they could arrange,
presumably with us, I guess, for another $10,000 to $15,000 depending on
volume. He was talking as more or less foregone conclusion we would do
it. I made no commitment. Told him I'd look into it.
How would we do this?
We would do it by asking them to pay amount and then send over 1080
to us with bill for the postage, bill for the addressing of the envelopes
and bill for the printing accompanying this and we would just send check
back. They would send short memorandum with it certifying these are the
charges.
I think we want to know what we spend our money for but I don't think we
want the public records to: show that we paid for it.
What we can do, Sir I can ask them to send over a 1080 with certifica-
tion that these are the charges for classified services per our conversation,
and if you're willing to take that we can certainly do it that way.
Will this be an outside firm? Couldn't we just pay the firm? What would
.be better? I'm not sure.
I think a short memo just saying attached 1080 is for charges previously
agreed to between this Agency and themselves and that's all and then we
send them check for that. Otherwise, there's always chance that an outside
firm might realize it was us paying for it.
I guess it's the best way to do it. I'd like to have in our records
nobody else has access to exactly what it was for all about it;
their records, which are audited by the General Accounting Office, as
little as possible.
(continued)
00086
Page 83 (page 87 of the original)
Mr. Magnusson and Col. White (continued Page 2)
Think I can talk to them and arrange that so he just sends unclassified
1080.
Go ahead and do it. I'll have to sign off on it, I suppose. You go
ahead and arrange it in way that will give us full record, As far as
any records of their's are concerned, I would prefer to have minimum.
I can write memo and John Brown can refer to this and our phone conversa-
tion in a memo accompanying the 1080.
Okay, go ahead and do it. Put limit on it. When they talked to me they
said $10,000.
He said $10,000 to $15,000 because they're just pouring in. Might run
above $10,000.
Approximately $10,000 but in no case will it exceed $15,000 something
like that. Okay.
All right, Sir.
Thank you, Warren.
End of Conversation
TON, AN RR
00087
Page 84 (page 88 of the original)
Mr. Magnusson's phone conversation with Mr. John Brown at approximately 17:00
on 26 May 1970:
Think we can go ahead and do this. Have to be careful as to way this
is documented that's the only thing. Would like to suggest that I
write memo for the record kind of co-sign it agreeing to emount
and so forth and the way we do this. Memo would have in it what it's
for and then you would send us a 1080 for this, referencing this memo
and our conversation.
B: You're thinking in terms of reimbursing us again? Wouldn't it be
better for us to have direct charge to you?
M: No, because of public record. In order to have all the things in our
hands, It wouldn't look good for us to pay the bills direct for this
sort of thing.
B: It would not?
M: No, if you people pay the bills
B: (interrupting) Even to pay a large postage fee? Bulk of expense will
be postage.
M: But we have to document wnat it's for if you people can just pay it,
‘then we'll give you money for it.
B: What would our memo say?
M: Say attached is 1080 referencing memo dated such and such.
B: ‘What does the memo say that we're making reference to?
M: I'll write that up and bring over to you.
B: What, basically, are we going to say it's about?
M: Have $10,000 with limit of $15,000 and would be for printing of these
things and so on.
B: Just wondering if you have direct billing it seems to me that serves
purpose of memorandum. A
M: The direct billing from, let's say, the printer, the addressograph
company or something like that, to us might raise questions outside
and I think powers that be don't want to have fact that we're paying
for this sort of thing anyplace where it can be dug up. Easiest and
cleanest way to do this is you people go ahead and pay and we'll
reimburse you immediately.
B: Do we have to have this memo?
(continued) ee 00088
mu. ML ek
Page 85 (page 89 of the original)
Messrs. Magnusson and Brown (continued Page 2)
M: I'd keep in my safe here.
B: Wouldn't it be adequate to send 1080?
M: Don't forget, you people keep copies of 1080's you have to by
law. 1080 would have to cite what billing is for because of that,
then that would open up to GAO or somebody else as to who's paying
for this sort of thing.
B: We have to cite what it's for?
M: Let's say it's "XYZ Printing Company" and you pay bill. This looks
like you're paying it. You send us 1080 which says nothing and we
give you money for this. We ourselves have to have on our records
what we're paying for for our own euditors which doesn't get outside
of our Agency.
B: It's for your internal auditors? It would not get outside? Okay,
that sounds all right.
M: I'll draw the memo up and bring it over there and you can see it.
B: That sounds good, Warren,
M: Would next Monday be all right with that memo?
B: Yes, we'll go ahead and order.
M: You can get going and so on.
B: Don't know what final cost is going to be. Hate to restrict ourselves,
We figure total cost is going to be around $25,000. Got over 100,000
already that are just pro. 200,000 that haven't been analyzed yet.
Of 200,000 they estimate possibly upwards of 50,000 or 60,000 could
pertain to Cambodia. Of the backlog of 200,000, 60,000 could be of
type that will be answered in this mailing. Our best estimate would
be it may run over,
M: I've got instructions, John, to indicate in memo that it's for
approximately $10,000 but not to exceed $15,000. If and when it
exceeds $15,000, we'll start over again and I'll inquire further as
to whether we can cover the other okay?
B: Okay.
M: Open to negotiation if it runs higher.
(continued)
00089
Page 86 (page 90 of the original)
Messrs. Magnusson and Brown (continued Page 3)
B: ft may run higher. If 60,000 letters come out being pro, will take
us to $26,000 or somewhere in that vicinity.
M: Then I'd have to go back and inquire to see if powers that be will
cover the other part. I think it's best to wait ‘til that happens.
B: Oxay, good enough.
M: What time Monday?
B: Why don't you give us call here Monday? My secretary will line it up.
M: Okay.
B: Thank you, Warren,
End of Conversation
00090
wreath
Page 87 (page 91 of the original)
wae AL iNt er LCT Tore fvtowlavwe
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505
8 JUN 1979
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Reimbursement to the White House for Certain
Printing, Postage and Addressing Expenses
1. Reference is made to the telephone conversation between
Mr. John Brown, Staff Secretary, White House, and the undersigned
concerning the accounting and the reimbursement procedure for
White House expenditures in connection with the printing, postage
and addressing of replies to certain mail addressed to the President.
2. It was estimated and agreed that these expenditures would
amount to approximately $10,000, but not exceed $15,000, and the
request for reimbursement to this Agency would be based upon receipt
of a memorandum categorizing the expenses and certifying to their
validity. The memorandum will also transmit a Standard Form 1081
and copies of the vendors’ invoices where applicable.
3. Upon receipt of the above memorandum, Standard Form 1081
and copies of vendors' invoices, a U. S. Government Treasury check
will be drawn and forwarded to the White House.
WARREN D. NAGNUSSON
Deputy Director for Liaison and Planning
Office of Finance
CONCUR:
(em Brown
000914
Page 88 (page 92 of the original)
MeMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Reimbursement to the White House for Certain Printing,
Postage and Addressing Expenses
1. On 18 August 1970, the undersigned received a telephone call
from Mr. John Brown (145-2167) advising that the mailing had been
heavier than anticipated (increased to 250,000 pieces) and that the
dollar requirement for subject purpose had increased from $15,000 to
$25,000.
2. I apologetically advised Mr. Brown that since our records
showed that prior approval was limited to $15,000 I would have to
advise and confirm with my superiors that the increase to $25,000
was acceptable, as I was sure it was.
3. In the absence of Col. White (on leave), Mr. Bush immediately
contacted Mr. Clarke, who was not in his office. On 19 August,
Mr. Clarke telephonica pproved the increased level and Mr. Brown
was duly informed.
Chief,
00092
Page 89 (page 93 of the original)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
September 10, 1970
Dear Mr. Magnusson:
Pursuant to your telephone call to Mr. John Brown regarding the
breakdown of costs in connection with the mailing of the Acknowledgement
Cards concerning The President's Speech on The Situation in Soutneast
Asia, the following costs were incurred:
Computer Marketing Industries, Inc. $ 12,746.15
Acknowledgement Cards 3,185.07
Envelopes 1,051.20
Total $ 16,982.42
Sincerely yours,
Carson M. Howell
Administrative Officer
Mr. Warren D. Magnusson
Deputy Director for Liaison and Planning
ffice of Finance
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.
00093
Page 90 (page 94 of the original)
15 SEP iS
EOL ED
Cais
Lae
ae ayes a aa ea ompypeee tes om yyt wn. “4. yr.
Le. Atbached hereto Le cieonneboy fu free uhe Wiese oe.
for mailing expenses.
2. It is requested ths “Lan voucher be ofivinistertvively
coproved and seetified as to the availubillvy of Ducde om returncd v9
fot te ee a apm pete
wiles orface Lor poymenv.
Memo from Ma. Howell
aid LO Sent 1370
fF 1081 (orig and 2)
oF (15 Sept 70)
00094
Page 91 (page 95 of the original)
£5 SEP 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Planning, Programming and Budgeting
SUBJECT Reimbursement to the White House for Certain
Printing, Postage and Addressing Expenses
“emorandum for the Record, dated 24 August 1970,
same subject
REFERENCE
1. Attached hereto is accounting submitted from the White House
for mailing expenses.
2. It is requested that the original voucher be administratively
approved and certified as to the availability of funds and returned to
this office for payment.
WARREN D. MAGNUSSON
Deputy Director for Liaison and /Planning: '¢
oo Office of Finance
Attachments
Memo from Mr. Howell
dtd 10 Sept 1970 OK
SF 1081 (orig and 2)
war 7°
00095
Page 92 (page 96 of the original)
soap 5 yeti ort ORE UT
Big) dE oe 1uKa uC AU $e} ye iULE No...
tts] -104- CUD pcan, pens nae forint ee ts te ernie
st 104-10 Ui Wy Ro eAVIALS aint CRebit$
Ba NO. ee ee oe
fies billed)
Ru, Na.
(Hating oSieo)
To 200 PAID BY
TO SDUTSTIE Oncor once bilied) (D. 0. syinbol)
You are authorized to effect tho withdrawals and credits indicated below.
300 300
COTS OUTST OTC errr ALi Ce) (D, 0, syinbol)
fashington, C,
(Address)
CATHORAW FROM f payYTO= —CisC
DEPARTMENT Derantwenr Executive Office of the Presi:
Bouneav BUREAU The Wnite liouse Office
11-01-8001
AppREas Aponeas Washington, D. C. 20506
Purnav Sums any Bureau SUMMARY —
Rarerence APPROPRIATION OR Funp SYMBOL AMOUNT REFERENCE APPROPRIATION OR FUND SYMBOL AMOUNT
1100110.001
Tota.
$16,982,
Totat
Details of charges or reference to attached supporting documents
CIMA
For the printing of Acknowledgne
and place on magnetic tape ana the preparation of heat transfer labels and af
to envelopes, in connection with the acknowledging of mail conc
speech on the Situation in Southeast Asia.
nt Cards, Envelopes, and to Keypuncn names & aadr
Cixi
erning the Preside
For use of office billed: For. use of billing office:
I certify funds are available.
FAN “MOR CG
Tyy
IFICATE OF OFFICE BILLED
certify that the items listed herein are correct and proper for p
vment froin the appropriation(s) designated.
oro
(Date)
(Autborized ad ministrative
janeed
or certifying ofticert
C/D No.
00096
dat
Paid by check No.
vr GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961-60782!
Page 93 (page 97 of the original)
rears
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00097
Page 94 (page 98 of the original)
her. John
The White House Offi
ene
rown
staff Secretary
Washington, D. C. 26500
Dear Mr. Drown:
t-Enclosed is U. S. Treasury Check No. in the amount
of $16,982.42 which represents reimbursement of Burcau Schedule
No.
copy enclos ea. fT his schedule was forwarded to this
Office by Mr. Carson M. Howell Adininistrative Officer, on
10 September 1970.
Yours very truly,
YARREN D, MAL_luSSON
Deputy Director for Liaison and Planning
Office of Finance
Wut: re eae ane Se
Tome! Dest Abe ee
Rewer Ama
Enclosures Abend Act Cras Oo ( a Cat,
ad) eeectie Mui. Boren ae
OF 1 Oct. 70) ae ey pei ee Le
ee vv awe SOA 7
ne an aed Peers te.
XE Pra Ow! ee ALiates ba, Oe eto
eet 4X. ad A on
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oO phy cere
00098 toe renee: Goo e ij
Page 95 (page 99 of the original)
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
December 7, 1970
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: WARREN MAGNUSON
We have finally received the cost breakdown for acknowledging
the mail in connection with the President's speech on the situation
in Southeast Asia, By copy of this memorandum I am requesting
our administrative office to forward that portion of the bill applicable
to you.
If there are any problems in handling this, please let me know,
Thank you,
FOL.
JOHN R. BROWN III
ce: Carson Howell
00099
Page 96 (page 100 of the original)
Keypunch names, place on magnetic tape
prepare and affix to envelopes heat
transfer labels, and furnish printout. $7,410.35
Print acknowledgment Cards 2,244.27
Print Envelopes 728,00
Postage 6,290.64
$16,673.26
Page 97 (page 101 of the original)
tatty be
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Planning, Frogramming and Budgeting
SUBJECT Reimoursement to the Wnite House for Certain
Printing, Postage and Addressing Expenses
ROFERENCE Memorandum for the Record, dated 24 August 1970,
same suoject
1. Attached hereto is the second accounting, in the amount of
$16,673.26, submitted from the White House for mailing expenses.
Check for the first accounting in the emount of $16,982.42 was
forwarded to the White House on 2 October 1970.
2. It is requested that the original voucher be administratively
approved and certified as to the availability of funds and returned to
this office for payment.
x GNC
Deputy Director for Liaison and Planning
Office of Finance
Attachments OR.
SF 1081 (orig & 2 w/att)
Memo from the White House
dated 7 Dec 1970
Memo to D/PPB, transmitting
lst accounting, dated 15 Sept 70 ) Lb one
Copy of 1st 1081 a
Memo from the White House
dated 10 Sept 70
Memo for the Record dated 24 Aug 70
001014
Page 98 (page 102 of the original)
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(Bhiag ofiee)
AOD
To — lhe PAID BY
(Disbursing oticer—odice bilied) (D. QO. ayiubol)
You are suthorized to effect the withdrawals and credits indicated below.
300
(Disbursing oficcr—lilhng office (D. 0. symbol)
vasuington, D.C.
(Address)
WiTHORAW FROM ee
DrranTMenT DerawTMENT Executive Ofice of the ?resis
B ! Bune nie hs 4 oal move
CREAD BuKeao ane White flouse Grliece
Li-OL-O0301
Anpnreas Aopress washington, 20599
Sia SES ee
Doreav SUMMARY Runzav Susaary
REFERENCE AFPROPRIATION OR FunD Sy MBOL AMOUNT 74, REFERENCE APPROTRLATION OF'FuND STuDOL “AWOURT
1i10110,001 wilh 65.26
rt OY 5620
TotaL Tota Le yO bo
Details of charges or reference to attached supporting documents
Por the printing of Acknowledgement Cerds, Envelopes and Postage for mailing,
and to Keypunch names, place on magnetic tave, prepare and afiix to envel:nes
heat transfer labels, and furnish printout, in connection with the acknowlediiin,
of mail concerning the President's Second speech on the Situation in Souineast ‘sis
See attached list for breakdoim of Costs.
For use of office billed: For use of billing office:
o<ctify funds are _aveiladlia,
— an HOR CODE
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICE BILLED
I certify that the items listed herein are correct and proper for payment from the appropriation(s) designated.
rad om 147
(Date) ying allicers
Paid by check No. C/D No. dated 001
% U. S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 1961-607821
Page 99 (page 103 of the original)
NGEMORAINDUM POR: eaery'
cea ra
bot check in the mracunt of Gie,o
drawn payabie tot
wes
Loat Sten Te: < an
nurey of tne United states,
+ Ce dew ase made, an re ri
3, AIL documentation ccuces twaneacticn is bel. x mei?
alintta fa eh Ao sane etes pyres
this office for security veascens and is avaliable to the Agency ats torn
4, Please forward the cucck ior
appropriate oicial.
YARN RAD, MAGS
Deputy Director for Liaison tua ss
00103
Page 100 (page 104 of the original)
in)
ie)
Dear Mr. Brown:
Enclosed is U. S ‘Treasury Check No.
t,
yi wes
in the
amount of $16,673.26 which represents reimbursement
Schedule No.
Enclosures
copy enclosed,
Yours very truly,
of Bureau
ffice of Finiunce
Director for Liaison and Pl -nning
00104
hone
Page 101 (page 105 of the original)
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services
SUBJECT > Special Report
1. This memorandum is in response to a request to
provide information on situations or associations that
might appear to be irregular on the surface.
2. Details to the White House and Government Agencies
Background: For many years the Central Intelligence Agency has
detailed employees to the immediate office of the White House
per se and to components associated intimately with the immediate
office of the President such as the Council on International
Economic Policy and the President's Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board. We have furnished secretaries, clerical
employees and certain professional employees on a reimbursable
and non-reimbursable basis. At the present time, we have no
clericals or professionals assigned to the immediate White
House office, but we do have one young man detailed to their
Communications Section. There are detailees to PFIAB and CIEP.
I might point out that we had detailed to the White House as
late as the fall of 1970 couriers, telephone operators, a
laborer assigned to the grounds and a graphics man who designed
invitations for State dinners. By October of 1970, more funds
were apparently available to run the White House and most of
our detailees were hired as bona fide White House employees.
CIA is not the only Agency furnishing the White House with
detailees. ‘Levies have been made by this Administration and
others on Defense and State and other Government entities
whose employees have Top Secret clearances.
Professional officers have been and are at the present
time assigned t the National Security Council and we have seven
clericals on detail to NSC on a reimbursable basis.
In addition to the above, we have technical specialists
detailed to NSA, an instructor at the National War College and
security officers detailed to the Department of State to
__CONBENTIAL
00105
Page 102 (page 106 of the original)
protect foreign visitors. Recently, was detailed
to the Secretary of the Treasury along witn rour other Agency
employees. We have even, in rare instances, detailed our
people to Congressional Staffs for short periods of time.
3. Details to the White House and Government Agencies
Discussion: Details to NSC, the White House, NSA and the
National War College are probably quite defensible. On the other
hand, there may be those who would question Agency employees
currently working at the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs
and Mr. Peter Peterson having an Agency employee as his
secretary when he was the Secretary of Commerce (she also made
a trip with him to Moscow). She is still with him in his
present assignment but we expect that she will report to NSC for
a new detail sometime this month. served for
over ten years as Director of the Office of Public Safety for
AID. This information has been kept ''close to the vest" during
that entire period of time. He has been approved for disability
retirement and is presently on sick leave and will retire
automatically at the expiration of this leave.
Each detail of an Agency employee to the White House or
other Government agency has been carefully considered and
approval at a higher level obtained when professionals were
involved.
4. Project TWOFOLD: I believe the support we are
providing to Project TWOFOLD is an activity that should be
reported under your guidélines. Since this is an extremely
sensitive Project and the Office of Security is reporting on
it, I will not repeat the details in my memorandum.
5. Individuals Engaged in Domestic Activities: In a more
general sense, Contract Personnel Division prepares and executes
contracts with individuals engaged by the Agency to carry out
domestic activities. We also process Staff Agents who are
domestically assigned. None of these assignments are decided
in OP. I really have no way of knowing with any degree of
certainty what the specific duties of these individuals will be.
6.
00106
Page 103 (page 107 of the original)
8. Hunt Requests a Lockpicker: This is a record of
External Employment Assistance Branch's action on a request
from Howard Hunt for a lockpicker who might be retiring or
resigning from the Agency.
Sometime in the spring of 1972, Frank O'Malley of EEAB
received a call from Howard Hunt who asked Frank if he had a
retiree or resignee who was accomplished at picking locks.
Mr. O'Malley sent him a resume on Thomas Amato who retired
31 July 1971. Mr. O'Malley did not document his EEAB record
to show the date of this exchange, but who
also works in EEAB) opines that it occurred sometime between
March and May 1972.
All of the above information was reported to the Office
of Security on 4 October 1972 following the FBI's contact with
the Agency regarding Howard Hunt.
9. Resume Sent to McCord: nA contract
employee who retired in September I97I, was a Client of the
External Employment Assistance Branch in his search for a job
after retirement. One of the leads given to Was
James McCord's security business. EEAB sent resume to
McCord, but was not hired.
In mid-summer 1972, telephoned EEAB from
Chicago. (He had a job there witn tne Halifax Security Co.,
a lead provided by EEAB, but until this telephone call he had
00107
Page 104 (page 108 of the original)
not notified EEAB that he had the job and had moved from
the D.C. area.) He said he had been. visited by a Special
Agent of the FBI who told [_____ithat his resume had been
found among McCord's papers. Te Agent wanted to know if
had any connection with McCord. Lee eee pained
Jow the resume got to McCord. After the Agent Jeft hin,
[oe rere po tephoned EEAB. jof OP and of
were notified immediately.
Harry 8. Fisner
Director of Personnel
Page 105 (page 109 of the original)
Be gegen
AL 1 Con yt
(esas
SR en tem RPT Neel gt Reem Rem meme ek cen te nee eet merce
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
Director of Logistics
oTCT
Sensitive Activities Perfoined by the Office of Logistics
"ROUTING A AND RECORD SHEET
EXTENSION NO.
DATE
4 MAY 1 1973
TO: (Officer designation, toom number, and
building}
2551
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
to whom.
RECEIVED FORWARDED
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
Draw a line across column offer each comment.)
1.
Deputy Director for Manage-
ment_and Services
2.
Director of Central
Intelligence
10.
It.
12,
13.
14.
15.
zi; EYES ONLY
00109.
SECRET
ete tt nba ee RAM ee ame
conripenrian C1] Ue ety
rare aed eee cenharn, Lala Bk Aeeade Bt edit da Se
SEs arty ana Rec same
oO UNCLASSIFIED
fai Shel te aa Mae ae! nel tll te sentient
Page 106 (page 110 of the original)
14 WAY 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH Deputy Director for Management and Services
SUBJECT > Sensitive Activities Performed by the
Office of Logistics
1. This memorandum contains information for the Director
of Central Intelligence.
2. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given
by the Deputy Director for Management and Services on 7 May
that Office Directors report on activities, either under their
cognizance or otherwise known to them, the nature of which
could possibly need explanation or justification when viewed
within the statutory responsibility and authority of the
Director of Central Intelligence. The responsibilities of the
Office of Logistics (OL) are such that in all matters herein
reported, except two, the actions undertaken were at the re-
quest of another Agency component. We have prepared a brief
description of each action involved and then have included the
name of the sponsoring component. The substantive reason for
the requests for action by:this Office will have to be deter-
mined by inquiry to the designated sponsoring component.
3. Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the
initiative of this Office are as follows:
00110
EYES ONLY
SEGRET
Page 107 (page 111 of the original)
PV oO Atipy
“TTL UNL
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics
ma V4 wee! V7
LILO
SECRET 00414
Page 108 (page 112 of the original)
whe
ee meee
oa ook We aa
LITO LV —
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics
‘the DD/O, we will not honor any requisition for surveil-
lance equipment unless it has been approved by the CI
Staff of the DD/O.
4, Within the.area of contractual responsibilities, the
following items are pertinent:
a. In February 1971, Colonel L. K. White, the then
Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to attend a
meeting in his office, also attended by Mr. William Colby.
Colonel White explained that the Technical Services
Division (TSD) had been requested to provide assistance
to the FBI for a sensitive project designated [tour
rently designated| |Colonel White di is-
close the purpose Of the assistance being provided by TSD
but did instruct me to assist TSD on purely contractual
matters. Since the Office of Logistics has no information
concerning the mission or purpose of project| sub-
stantive questions concerning the subject shou
addressed to TSD. Other procurement actions accomplished
for the FBI are reported below. Specific mention is made,
however, ofl rybeoause of the dollar magnitude, ap-
proximately million, .and the complex technical equip-
ment that has been involved in the undertaking.
b. The Procurement Division, OL, currently has two
requisitions in hand from TSD which would involve reim-
bursable sales to the FBI. One such requisition in the
-amount of $36,900 is for two Westinghouse television
cameras. The second requisition in the amount of $11,200
is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by
Bausch and Lomb. No action is being taken on either of
these requirements pending further instructions which
will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management
and Services.
c. Over the years, this Agency has often supported
other Government agencies from a contractual or materiel
standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved
request, supported by a transfer of funds, the Agency
would either enter into "accommodation procurements" for
the requesting agency or support the requesting agency by
the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are
legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This
Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or pro-
vide a service for, another Government agency when such
ryro
EYES-ONLY
00114
Page 109 (page 113 of the original)
EYES" VV
Lilo UPtre
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics
action would be more economical and eliminate the need for
one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities
readily available from another. A typical example of this
procedure is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the
Defense Intelligence Agency element located at NPIC. In
connection with the current reporting requirement, however,
I have had our records researched for the past 2 years and
Attachment 1 reflects those transactions which appear to be
relevant to the subject of this memorandum,
d. In connection with the disclosures during the sum-
mer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not properly
safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook.
two acts. I directed the Security Officer from our West
Coast Procurement Office at the Moffet Naval Air Station
in California to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy
himself that classified material furnished them by the
Agency was both properly safeguarded and accounted for.
His report was affirmative. On 23 August 1971, the senior
Security Officer assigned to this Office forwarded a
letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming
the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified
information furnished them by the Agency. Of residual
interest in this matter, there is summarized the contents
of a memorandum of 2 July 1971 to the Executive Director-
Comptroller from the DD/T which is in our possession.
This memorandum reports that PBIS regularly
disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation
but that instructions had been issued to cease
distribution of classified reports. While no
‘other direct dissemination went to Rand, other
USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing
"many't copies of DD/I products to Rand as au-
thorized under USIB regulations. The memoran-
dum also states that Rand personnel had
requested searches and document retrieval from
the CRS facility.
5S. In connection with action taken for the Office of
Security, there are three relevant items:
a. The Printing Services Division, OL, was requested
by the Office of Security to print a book written by
Harry J. Murphy, Office of Security. The book was pre-
pared by Mr. Murphy under a Brookings Institution Federal
CECRET 00113
Page 110 (page 114 of the original)
LTid Wiel
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics
Executive Fellowship. The book is entitled "Where's
What Sources of Information for Federal Investigators."
It is a full treatise on the existence of sources of in-
formation that may be useful to an investigator. The
book's first printing of 300 copies was made in June 1967.
Due to demand, a second printing of 600 copies was made
in September 1968. The title page of the book gives
attribution to Mr. Murphy, Office of Security, Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Brookings Institution Federal
Executive Fellowship. The book is classified Confidential,
and it is our understanding that the distribution was made
to appropriate agencies of the Federal Government. A copy
of Mr. Murphy's book can be made available for review if
desired.
Sometime in 1972, a representative of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) requested
that the Agency give consideration to our publishing, at
LEAA expense, an unclassified version of this volume. It
was the intent of LEAA to make broad-scale distribution
to Police Departments throughout the country. The Director
of Security and I consulted on this matter and jointly
determined that the LEAA request should not be honored be-
cause the Agency should not put itself in the position of
publishing law enforcement material for general and un-
classified purposes, and it would be an abuse of our print-
ing facilities.
b. On 5 January 1971, the Director of Security re-
quested that I approve his leasing up to eleven motor
vehicles for use in connection with a special support
operation which would last approximately 3 months. The
Director of Security informed me, in his requesting memo-
_vrandum of 5 January 1971, that ''This support activity has
been undertaken at the specific instruction of the Director
and has his personal approval." The request was approved.
c. From 1968 to date, the Office of Security has
requisitioned from this Office a considerable amount of
materiel which we understand was to be given or loaned by
them to local Police Departments. In certain cases some
of this materiel was issued from Agency stocks and, in
other cases, direct procurement of the materiel was made
by funds furnished by the Office of Security. A complete
listing of such materiel is found in Attachment 2.
Page 111 (page 115 of the original)
Fyre Oey
Lit GQ Wisatt
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics
b. This Office is aware, although it had no cognizance
nor responsibility, that an apartment was rented in Miami
Beach, Florida, during the period of the Democratic National
Convention, 10-14 July 1972, and the Republican National
Convention, 21-24 August 1972. The apartment was used as
a meeting place
in liaison with members of the Secret Service and rendering
EYES—SLY
Page 112 (page 116 of the original)
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics
‘assistance in connection with the political conventions
that were being held. WH Division is the cognizant
operating component on this matter.
7. The above recitation of facts represents, to the best
of my knowledge and memory, those matters which appear to be
relevant to subject tasking given by the Director.
John F. Blake
Director of Logistics
2 Atts
00116
Page 113 (page 117 of the original)
OO1LT
Page 114 (page 118 of the original)
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SUTATOIIIY
Soro ste
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ZL/ST/0T eons todeue asl daa eee Cooue
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‘TL/8T/TT ‘szo.zenzyoy s1ep1039y asi
ZL/LT/9 S10S asl eLlowe)
ZL/9T/TT $}eS asl erlo3owe)
721/£7/s euoydeteal, SO StazAjeuy
auoydeTaL. siezATeuy ZL/82/$ SO
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721/¢2/¢ euoydete, LozAzteuy so
722/9T/S ‘sioqzytumsuery, as. otpey uodveg
ZL/EZ7/E 50 suoydetey LezdkpTeuy
ysoenbay a9TF5O Wort
BuTZseNnbsy JO 92"qQ
00118
Page 115 (page 119 of the original)
onl wee
OnE
T 8ZL ALYSaLOZ
JITALIS
UOTIEZTTEINIEN
20T T o0z‘¢ uotiyRIstwuy pue
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SUOTIEDITUNWWOD)
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Z ose‘ AINSCOLY
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TL/9Z/L asi ‘royitmsuery OTpey uodeeg
Tetoeds 724/82/9 asl ‘yur eInuzog
¢4/0T/T ‘yur asl Tetoeds ernutog
TedT1IDETY
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00119
Page 116 (page 120 of the original)
00120
Page 117 (page 121 of the original)
MATERIAL REQUISITIONED FROM LOGISTICS
BY SECURITY FOR ISSUANCE TO
LOCAL POLICE
ITEM
Gas Mask M-9
Gas Mask M-17
Steel Helmet and Liners
Vest and Groin Protector
Vest, Flak M-52
Vest, Protective
Vest, Grenade
Execuvest
Emergency Flashing Red Light
*Searchlight, Tear Gas
*Chemical Baton 6 1/2"
*Chemical Baton 12"
*Chemical Baton 26"
‘Mustang 35 Pistol
*Searchlight with Shoulder Strap
*Stun Gun
QUANITY
200
196
231
105
*NOTE: Various quantities and types of replacement chemical
cartridges, loading kits, and batteries were also
ordered for asterisk items.
EVE
00122
Page 118 (page 122 of the original)
14 HAY 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
TUROUGH BReputy Director for Management and Services
SUBJECT > Sensitive Activities Ferformed by the
Office of Losistics
1. This renorandum contains informetion for the Director
of Central Intellisenca,
A gpl
2. This memorandum is submitted pursuant to advice given
by the Neputy Director for Management and Services on 7 May
that Office Directors report on activitics, either under their
cognizance or otherwise known to them, the nature of which
could possibly need explanation or justification when viewed
within the statutory responsibility and authority of the
Director of Central Intelligence. ‘he responsibilities of the
Office of Logistics (OL) are such that in all matters herein
reported, except two, the actions undertaken were at the re-
quest of another Agency component. We have prepared a hrief
description of each action involved and then have included the
name of the sponsoring component. The substantive reason for
the requests for action by this Office will have to be deter-
mined by inquiry fo the designated sponsoring component,
Facts pertaining to both actions undertaken at the
initiative of this Office are as follows:
00122
EYES Q
Page 119 (page 123 of the original)
Logistics
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
ONLY
SFC 00123
Page 120 (page 124 of the original)
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics
the DD/O, we will not honor any requisition for surveil-
lance equipment unless it has been ‘approved by the CI
Staff of the pNn/O,
4, Within the area of contractual responsibilities, the
following items are pertinent:
a. In February 1971, Colonel L. K. White, the then
Executive Director-Comptroller, called me to attend a
meeting in his office, also attended by Mr. William Colby.
Colonel White explained that the Technical Services
Division (TSD) had been reguested to provide assistance
to the FBI for a sensitive project designated (cur-
rently designated Colonel White did no is-
close the purpose 6 assistance being provided by TSD
but did instruct me to assist TSD on purely contractual
matters. Since the Office of Logistics has no information
concerning the mission or purpose of eee korg sub-
stantive questions concerning the subject shou e
addressed to TSD. Other procurement actions accomplished
for the FBI are reported below. Specific mention is made,
however, of [because of the dollar magnitude, ap-
proximately $1 million, and the complex technical equip-
ment that has been involved in the undertaking.
b. The Procurement Division, OL, currently has two
requisitions in hand -from TSD which would involve reim-
bursable sales to the FBI. One such requisition in the
amount of $36,900 is for two Westinghouse television
cameras, The second requisition in the amount of $11,200
is for two wide-angle surveillance probes manufactured by
Bausch and Lomb. No action is being taken on either of
these requirements pending further instructions which
will be sought from the Deputy Director for Management
and Services.
c. Over the years, this Agency has often supported
other Government agencies from a contractual or materiel
standpoint. Upon the submission of an officially approved
request, supported by a transfer of funds, the Agency
would either enter into “accommodation procurements" for
the requesting agency or support the requesting agency by
the issuance of materiel from stock. Such actions are
legally accomplished under the Economy Act of 1925. This
Act authorizes one agency to support the needs of, or pro-
vide a service for, another Government agency when such
ES ONLY
mi 00124
SECT
Page 121 (page 125 of the original)
ete oe
EYE.
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics mo
action would be more economical and eliminate the need for
one agency of the Government to duplicate facilities
readily available from another. A typical example of this
procedure is purchasing photointerpretation gear for the
Defense Intelligence Agency clement located at NPIC. In
connection with the current reporting requirement, however,
I have had our records researched for the past 2 years and
Attachment 1 reflects those transactions which appear to be
relevant to the subject of this memorandum.
d. In connection with the disclosures during the sum-
mer of 1971 that the Rand Corporation was not properly
safeguarding classified documents, this Office undertook
two acts. I directed the Security Officer from our West
Coast Procurement Office at the Moffet Naval Air Station
in California to visit the Rand Corporation and satisfy
himself that classified material furnished them by the
Agency was both properly safeguarded and accounted for.
His report was affirmative. On 23 August 1971, the senior
Security Officer assigned to this Gffice forwarded a
letter to the Rand Corporation stressing and reaffirming
the procedures Rand must follow in safeguarding classified
information furnished them by the Agency. Of residual
interest in this matter, there is summarized the contents
of a memorandum of 2 July 1971 to the Executive Director-
Comptroller from the DD/I which is in our possession.
This memorandum reports that FRIS regularly
disseminated reports to the Rand Corporation
but that instructions had been issued to cease
distribution of classified reports. While no
other direct dissemination went to Rand, other
USIB agencies, primarily USAF, were passing
‘many"' copies of DD/I products to Rand as au-
thorized under USIB regulations. The memoran-
dum also states that Rand personnel had
requested searches and document retrieval from
the CRS facility.
5. In connection with action taken for the Office of
Security, there are three relevant items:
a. The Printing Services Division, OL, was requested
by the Office of Security to print a book written by
Harry J. Murphy, Office of Security. The book was pre-
pared by Mr. Murphy under a Brookings Institution Federal
ONLY cots
Page 122 (page 126 of the original)
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics
Executive Fellowship. The book is entitled "Where's
“What Sources of Information for Federal Investigators,"
It is a full treatise on the existence of sources of in-
formation that may be useful to an investigator. The
book's first printing of 300 copies was made in June 1967.
Due to demand, a second printing of 600 copies was made
in September 1968. The title page,of the book gives
attribution to Mr. Murphy, Office of Security, Central
Intelligence Agency, and the Brookings Institution Federal
Executive Fellowship. The book is classified Confidential,
and it is our understanding that the distribution was made
‘to appropriate agencies of the Federal Government. A copy
of Mr. Murphy's book can be made available for review if
desired.
Sometime in 1972, a representative of the Law
Enforcement Assistance Administration (LEAA) requested
that the Agency give consideration to our publishing, at
LEAA expense, an unclassified version of this volume. It
was the intent of LEAA to make broad-scale distribution
to Police Departments throughout the country. The Director
of Security and I consulted on this matter and jointly
determined that the LEAA request should-not be honored be-
cause the Agency should-not put itself in the position of
publishing law enforcement material for seneral.and un-
Classified purposes, and it would be an abuse of our print-
ing facilities.
b. On 5S January 1971, the Director of Security re-
quested that I approve his leasing up to eleven motor
vehicles for use in connection with a special support
operation which would last approximately 3 months. The
Director of Security informed me, in his requesting memo-
randum of 5 January 1971, that: “This support activity has
been undertaken at the specific instruction of the Director
and has his personal approval." The request was approved.
c. From 1968 to date, the Office of Security has
requisitioned from this Office a considerable amount of
materiel which we understand was to be given or loaned by
them to local Police Departments. In certain cases some
of this materiel was issued from Agency stocks and, in
other cases, direct procurement of the materiel was made
by funds furnished by the Office of Security. <A complete
listing of such materiel is found in Attachment 2,
ONLY
was AT
00126
Page 123 (page 127 of the original)
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Logistics
b. This Office is aware, although it had no cognizance
nor responsibility, that an apartment was rented in Miami
Beach, Florida, during the period of the Democratic National
Convention, 10-14 July 1972, and the Republican National
Convention, 21-24 August 1972. The apartment was used as
a meeting place
in liaison With SReMbers—oT Tne -SeCret_service-ane—rencersmg——
00127
Page 124 (page 128 of the original)
SUBJECT: Sensitive Activities Performed by the Office of
Lowistics co
EI assistance in connection with the political conventions
that were being held. Wil Division is the cognizant
operating component on this matter.
7. The above recitation of facts represents, to the best
of my knowledge and memory, those matters which appear to be
relevant to subject tasking given by the Director.
JOnn Fe. pBpldaRE
Director of Logistics
2 Atts
ONLY Done
SECRETS
Page 125 (page 129 of the original)
ain
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wo,
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00129
Page 126 (page 130 of the original)
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00130
Page 127 (page 131 of the original)
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TUTATID9Y
001314
Page 128 (page 132 of the original)
No text on this page (blank, image only, or unreadable).
Page 129 (page 133 of the original)
MATERIAL REQUISITIONED FROM LOGISTICS
BY SECURITY FOR ISSUANCE TO
LOCAL POLICE
Gas Mask M-9
Gas Mask M-17
Steel Helmet and Liners
Vest and Groin Protector
Vest, Flak M-52
Vest, Protective
Vest, Grenade
Execuvest
Emergency Flashing Red Light
*Searchlight; Tear Gas
*Chemical Baton 6 1/2"
*Chemical Baton 12"
*Chemical Baton 26"
*Mustang 35 Pistol
*Searchlight with Shoulder Strap
*Stun Gun
QUANITY
200
196
231
105
*NOTE: Various quantities and types of replacement chemical
cartridges, loading kits, and batteries were also
ordered for asterisk items.
Page 130 (page 134 of the original)
AER ore ee
UMSLASS ied LI ose 'oth CCK. SERTIAL
pteetemeiememnemmeet we mee
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optcral)
FROM: “EXTENSION NO,
OJCS
D/OJCS, Hq. DATE
11 WY 1873
TO: [Officer designation, room number, and DATE
building) OFFICER'S COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIALS fo whom, Drow a line across column after eoch comment.)
RECEIVED FORWARDED
Hq.
2.
3. “BCI
Cevbow Py rouwver|
7. he VoL mud clesk
Co dSen) iy wore twe
ve chet OK CICS
9. Stns cp WKtte
10.
Ps ttre 19-43
12,
13.
14,
15. 00134
son O10 “toiten’* SECRET CONFIDENTIAL: [J Use Ay )sCUNCLASSIFIED
AN ete small ee eb ek em
Page 131 (page 135 of the original)
Srna, Jo 7X
1 1 MAY 19
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Central Intelligence Agency
THROUGH Deputy Director for Management and Services
SUBJECT Activities which might be considered sensitive
issues.
I have listed below computer processing projects which the Office of
Joint Computer Support has participated in or is aware of and which
might be considered sensitive issues.
Most Sensitive Projects
OJCS Project Officer Nature OJCS
Project Organization, & of Reason for
Identification Telephone P roject Listing
HYDRA Richard Ober A special pro- Type of
CI Staff ject initiated data being
by DCI collected.
SANCA Machine Type of
OS index to data in
security files index.
Information Type of
ORD storage & re- data in
trieval of drug files.
related data
(ORD's project
OFTEN)
Sensitive Projects
Computer file Type of
of drug data. data in
file.
001435
Page 132 (page 136 of the original)
Sensitive Projects (Continued)
OJCS Project Officer Nature
Project Organization, & of
Identification Telephone Project
Statistical
TSD analysis of
psychological
data.
DOTS
OJCS
Reason for
Listing
Source of
data. Con-
tractors are
involved
with project.
Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern
SPYDER
DMVREC
Data on
radio frequen-
cies used for
support of In-
Place Monitor-
ing System, a
Nature of
data. Tech-
niques of
system dis-
cussed with
FBI,
system to identify
unauthorized
transmitters.
File of auto-
mobile license
numbers.
File of Agency
applicants who
were not
hired.
Nature of
data.
Nature of
data.
Page 133 (page 137 of the original)
Sensitivity Unknown, but Possibly a Matter for Concern (Continued)
OJCS Project Officer Nature OJCS
Project Organization, & of Reason for
Identification Telephone Project Listing
Association
with the
named
organization,
JOHN D, IAMS
Director of Joint Computer Support
Page 134 (page 138 of the original)
RO OUTING
Se Re ee game Sami ete teem TTI neath EA aes cman ee LUE AS
Con et tak
D Recor {2D SHEET
SECT
eee eee Oe
SUBJECT: 1Oztoxal)
“TROM:
Director of Communications
Hars.
EXTENSION NO.
PAE 10 May: 1973
TO; (Officer designation, room number, and DATE
building)
RECEIVED FORWARDED
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number eoch comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line ocross column after each comment.)
1. DDMES
Hars.
Ref SC The
attached is in further
2.
response to your request.
10.
MW.
12.
13.
14,
15.
00138
Seen 610 “elie OO SECRET
ae — Lae aah Feat Ra ae eed ee
CONFIDENTIAL
min ciel mmm ee rm 18 aren Santi,
O INTERNAL
USE “ONLY UNCLASSIFIED
Page 135 (page 139 of the original)
“DOCUMENT DESCRIPTION
REGISTRY
source: __OC
DATE OF DOCUMENT: _8 May 1973
COPY NUMBER (S):
NUMBER OF PAGES: WO pocumENT No:
NUMBER OF ATTACHMENTS: _one
CONTROL NUMBER: SC
DATE DOCUMENT RECEIVED:
LOGGED BY:
FROM: Special Programs Division, OC DATE: 10 May 73
OFFICE NAME SIGNATURE DATE
D/co Mr. Jack J, Keith
Approval REMARKS
[7] Action Ne Fw had Pee. Geta peat
CJ] comment 7 Mey to ‘deat be Opera ges
CJ Concurrences
C Information
Direct Reply
Cj Preparation of Reply
Recommendation
a Signature
Return
dispatch
Fite
Page 136 (page 140 of the original)
OESEGRET™
8 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Summary, Special Programs Division (SPD),
Office of Communications, Operational
Contacts with Other U.S. Government Agencies
1. Prior to 1969 the OC COMINT intercept unit,
which was then in Miami, had relatively frequent contact
with the Miami bureaus of the FBI and FCC, Miami Police
and the Miami Beach Police. The staff provided support
to these activities in monitoring, identification and
DF of specific illegal agent transmissions conducted by
foreign nationals and American citizens in the greater
Miami area. Arrangements for this support were made
through the DDO's
2. In late September 1972, NSA, through Division D/
DDO, requested that the Special Programs Division initiate
a hearability survey of certain HF long-distance commercial
telephone circuits between the U.S. and South America.
The circuits carried:drug related long-distance calls of
interest to the BNDD and other U.S. agencies. Because of
the availability of personnel and technical capabilities,
we tee
where the circuits could be satistactorily inter-
cepted. On 15 January 1973, formal NSA tasking of the
intercept was instituted. On 30 January 1973, all coverage
was terminated by Division D because of possible legal
complications.
-3. The Chief and Deputy Chief, SPD and SPD/Special
Blectronic Operations Branch have been engaged in informal
technical liaison with operating components of the FBI
for a number of years. Initial contacts and arrangements
for support of. specific activities have been made by the
Division D/DDO. Support has been provided in the form of
DOWNG 0 SECRET
UPON L OF ATTACHMENT
OPS
hana
Page 137 (page 141 of the original)
8 May 1973
exchanges of technical information on techniques, technical
assistance and training, and the loan of Agency equipment.
In the past several ye s been rendered to
sensitive FBI projects and Support.
has been and is presen g given to FBI projects
ied =e These projects are described in the attached
sealed envelope.
4. An operational test of an HF /DF
system was conducted ni DO and
OC-SPD pers in the early part of the summer of 1972.
A location in Miami Beach, Florida was selected for the
tests because of similarity to the actual target site and
environment in Saigon. Receiving antennas were placed on
the roof of the hotel being used as the receiving/DF site.
A hotel employee asked why the materiel was placed on the
roof. A team member in effect told him that the group
was an advance security segment for the Democratic National:
Convention. No further questions were asked; the tests.
were completed and the equipment was returned to the
Washington area. Lo
Chier, special Programs Division, OC
Att.
TOP-SrRET
00141
Page 138 (page 142 of the original)
9 May 1973
Top_-SECTET
Page 139 (page 143 of the original)
9 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
SUBJECT: Organizational Dealings with Activities Inside the
United States
1. This MFR records organizational dealings with activities
inside the United States known to this office.
2. In September 1972, requested secure communi-
cations in the Miami Area wi ocal offices of BNDD and Customs,
[The communications link was never instailed
ladvised in April 1973 that there were plans
underway in Miami to combine various Federal agencies anti-
drug efforts under a new Justice Department Division, and at
this time it was not known where the new anti-drug office would
be located.
3. During the Democratic and Republican conventions,
oT eupperted requirements levied by the Secret
ervice concerning name traces and other intelligence infor-
mation relating to subversive influences which might affect
those conventions. rovided some technical advice and
procedural assistance in establishing a useful means of com-
municating between the two correspondents. WHD should be able
to provide a detailed resume of activities supported in this
matter.
“Thomas E. O'Donnel?
‘Chief, Americas Staff, OC
DOTS
Page 140 (page 144 of the original)
ee whe ite es
aS ene wee ee eee DS Snes
NED etre >
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
fro[ NAME AND A DDRESS pate initiacs
p FO} a Ef IN UTIALS
1) Mr. William E. Colby G/\ VAAN
ae ae te ert one canes fe. a.
ett GD
ACTION & DIRECT REPLY PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL DISPATCH “it RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT FILE RETURK
CORCURRERCE INFORBATION SIGHATURE
Remarks: Lose em
Bill: Ne
The attached memorandum identifies
the funds referred to in Chuck Briggs!
notes of 13 and 20 January 1972,
FOLO HERE TO RETURN TO SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO. DATE
Inspector General 30 May 7B
I MPEP paedwloeto
TAIN DOSE Pee VINE See? ee i
FORM KO. 237 Use previous editions (40)
"Since: these note seare on a toally- separate ‘sensitive subject,
pls pull them from this file WEC (Note to C/MPS)
Page 141 (page 145 of the original)
ce tant
MEMORANDUM FOR: Inspector General
29 May 1973
SUBJECT :Mr.Colby's Request to Inspector General to
Determine Subject Referred to by Two Notes
ina PP/B Memo to DD/M&S
REFERENCE D/PPB Memo to DD/M&S dated 23 May 1973,
Subject: Watergate Principals Direct or
Indirect Involvement
enn trees pen Sua
00145
Page 142 (page 146 of the original)
CR ce ni. rete ore Teenie oe EO Reet oeee eeee
SENDER. WILL CHECK CLASSIF. TION TOP AND BOTTOM
tncvasstrizp CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
TO NAME AND ADDRESS DATE INITIALS
1 IG ae Oa LY SETS Oe > [3 ‘72
6.
ACTION DIRECT NEPLY. PREPARE REPLY
APPROVAL DISPATCH RECOMMENDATION
COMMENT FILE RETURN
CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGHATURE
Remarks:
MNwede. awaken xv eg ured
128%
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO SENOER
FROM: NAME, AOORESS ANO PHONE NO. DATE
W. E. Colby 23 May 73
[UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
se (40)
F tir 937 Use previous editions
Page 143 (page 147 of the original)
pant meee ae ant ete
oe 23 MAY i373
(DATE)
ee pee ee
FORM NO. lol REPLACES FORM 10-101 47)
1 AUG S4 WHICH MAY BE USED.
ments ar anges rey ee
Page 144 (page 148 of the original)
OFFICIAL ROUTING SLIP
To] NAME AND ADORESS pate iniriacs
Wet cr
Colby x23} I
ACTION pikect aerly pRepaRe REPLY
APPROVAL bisPetcH RECOM HERDATION
COMMENT FILE RETUAN
CONCURRENCE INFORMATION SIGHATURE
Remarks:
See Szcm2 sLeee el nolss
“Your Copy cmb, Vo ne
hh GIG3 telah Cy WOKS
Dcl- Ap prve2 Bye pr. tece
at iweXig
(at Og Phew
Ciba
have ate) da ely ore 38 oF Yhis
FOLD HERE TO RETURN TO. SENDER
FROM: NAME, ADDRESS AND PHONE NO.
DATE
Charles A. Briggs, D/PPB 5/23/73
UNCLASSIFIED CONFIDENTIAL SECRET
FORM NO. 237 Use previous editions (40)
we po eee
cae et tl Fe
Page 145 (page 149 of the original)
Ereceulive Begitry
T3224
23 May 1973
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Management and Services
SUBJECT: Watergate Principals Direct or Indirect
Involvement
1. This memorandum responds to the Director's request for
a report of any involvement in any capucity since January 1969
with Messrs. Hunt, McCord, Liddy, Young, or Krogh.
2. I have had none with Hunt, Liddy or Young.
3. My McCord contact was indirect and occurred sometime
during the late 1960's when I wes Director, Office of Computer
Services. opposed plans for Technical Division, Office of
Security (under Mr. McCord) to acquire a separate computer for
its In-Place Monitoring System. bt DD/S&T (then ORD)
was the computer individual wormmpg-wnm-iD and, I think, would
have details.
4. The Krogh contact also was indirect and involved his
request, first through OMB, that CIA fund foreign travel on behalf
of the Cabinet Coinmittee on International Narcetics Control. Indi-
vidual phone discussions are noted_in the attsched, The Agency
focal points were| Jand I understand
as forwarded relevant documentation. Copies of
memoranda from Messrs. Krogh, and Colby are attached
also.
5. I held a staff meeting yesterday to pass the request to
all OPPB employees. One officer who was attending a funeral will
not be available until tomorrow,
O\DBE\CWE BE Aen: ag20(S3WIAL2)
I] D\BDB EAC? OVJA LIS fs/ Charles A. Briggs
T- Mo ED Coppa
Oz FGGr.62266
DIeiwipayou:
Charles A. Briggs
Director of Planning,
Programming, and Budgeting
Attachment O 0149
As stated
Page 146 (page 150 of the original)
‘4 Feb 72
7 Feb 72
7 Feb 72
12(7) May 72
23 Jun 72
6 Jul 72
2 Aug 72
1 Nov 72
Attachment
23 May 1973
Call from Jim Taylor, OMB re "Bud® Krogh and his deputy,
Waliex Minnick, of the Domestic Council who plan foreign
travel in connection with their narcotics interests. Jim was
alerting us to their intention, to ask us for funds for the
travel.
Follow-up from Taylor: Plan 3-5 trips fer 3 individuals--
all in FY 72. Cost prebably SI0K. Minnick ready te make
first trip. is plugged in. ExDir said OK re Tehran
visit.
See attached memo from Egil Krogh, Jr. to Bill Colby and
follow-on memos from (21 Jul 72) and Colby
(2 Aug 72).
John Hurley, OMB called, menticning possible Krogh/
Minnick attendance at a Latin American (Station Chief?)
conference on narcotics. He also said Jeff Shepherd,
White House, was laying on a Wes with for
himself, Shepherd and Mark Alger, OMB to Eurcpe.
commented on Krogh/} finnick interest
in getting CA: activities, including large-scale PM,
on narcotics front. __[pushing small-scale PP.
called, Notes say only: "Minnick-Hurley film.
We will send.,*®
called re Colby letter (attached). Said-travel
orders ready; need money this PM (No record in my
notes as to who wus traveling when, but have faint
recollection of its being to Mexico City).
and contacted by
R slated? call. Again notes are cryptic:
GAO-Grace Survey BNDD problens/
nrexico,*
00150
pad
Page 147 (page 422 of the original)
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D,C, 20308
OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR
9..May 1973
Lie
MEMORANDUM FOR ALL CIA EMPLOYEES
1. Recent press reports outline in detail certain alleged CIA
activities with respect to Mr. Howard Hunt and other parties. The
presently known facts behind these stories are those stated in the
attached draft of a statement I will be making to the Senate Committee
on Appropriations on 9 May. As can be seen, the Agency provided
limited assistance in response to a request by senior officials. The
Agency has cooperated with and made available to the appropriate law
enforcement bodies information about these activities and will con-
tinue to do so.
2. All CIA employees should understand my attitude on this
type of issue. I shall do everything in my power to confine CIA
activities to those which fall within a strict interpretation of its
legislative charter. I take this position because I am determined
that the law shall be respected and because this is the best way to
foster the legitimate and necessary contributions we in CIA can make
to the national security of the United States.
3. I am taking several actions to implement this objective:
I have ordered all the senior operating officials of this
Agency to report to me immediately on any activities now
going on, or that have gone on in the past, which might
be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this
Agency.
I hereby direct every person presently employed by
CIA to report to me on any such activities of which he
has knowledge. I invite all ex-employees to do the same.
Anyone who has such information should call my secretary
(extension 6363) and say that he wishes to talk to me
about “activities outside CIA's charter."
——nonnntestRAPHe—iurepuas USE ONLY
00418
Page 148 (page 423 of the original)
‘4. To ensure that Agency activities are proper in the future,
I hereby promulgate the following standing order for all CIA employees:
Any CIA employee who believes that he has received
instructions which in any way appear inconsistent
with the CIA legislative charter shall inform the
Director of Central Intelligence immediately...
dames R. Schlesinger
Director
BOMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL LSE ONLY
690 44180