CORONA: the CIA's 1995 documentary history of its first spy satellite

CIA War Records Series Editor in Chief McDonald Documents Mary S. Selected Estimates the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, editor ( 1992) the Soviet Union, Scott A. Koch, editor (1993) The CIA under Harry Truman, Michael S. Warner, editor (1994)

Kevin C. Editor History Staff Center for the Study of Intelligence Central Intelligence Agency Washington, 1995

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Contents Foreword Preface xi ... Part I: History of CORONA Program 1 x111 1. Kenneth E. Greer, “Corona,” Studies in Intelligence, Supplement, 17 (Spring 1973): l-37. Part II: The Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance 3 41 43 2. Director of Central Intelligence Directive, Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance (COMOR), 9 August 1960 45 3. Col. James E. Mahon, JCS to COMOR, ‘Urgent Requirements for CORONA and ARGON,” 18 August 1960 49 4. James Q. Reber, “List of Highest Priority Targets, USSR,” 18 August 1960 59 5. James Reber, Memorandum of Agreement, “Procedures for the Handling of T-KH Materials,” 22 August 1960 James Q. Reber, Memorandum for Brig. Gen. Andrew J. Goodpaster, 63 “Categories of Billets Planned for Certification,” 26 August 1960 75 7. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Memorandum for the Secretary of State, et al., 26 August 1960 8. James Reber, Memorandum for US Intelligence Board Members, 77 “TALENT-KEYHOLE Certification Plans,” 27 August 1960 9. James Reber, “Minutes of COMOR Meeting,” 13 September 1960 79 83 James Q. Reber, Memorandum for US Intelligence Board, “Proposed Expansion of Billets for the Exploitation and Use of Materials and Information,” 14 September 1960 87 James Q. Reber, Memorandum for US Intelligence Board, “Amendment to ‘Proposed Expansion of Billets for the Exploitation and Use of TALENT-KEYHOLE Materials and Information,“’ 14 October 1960 93 12. Allen W. Memorandum for Brig. Andrew J. Goodpaster, “Proposed Additional Billets for the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security System,” October 1960 vii

Part III: NPIC Products and Other 97 101 13. Office of Research and Reports, “Visual-TALENT Coverage of the USSR in Relation to Soviet ICBM Deployment, January June 1960,” 11 July 1960 Joint Mission Coverage Index, “Mission 9009, 115 18 August 1960,” September 1960 15. National Intelligence Estimate, -61, “Strength and 127 Deployment of Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missile Forces,” 21 September 1961 157 16. Photographic Intelligence Report, “Uranium Ore Rumania,” December 196 1 Concentration Plant, 169 Photographic Intelligence Report, “Regional Nuclear 17. Weapons Storage Site Near Berdichev, USSR,” May 1963 Photographic Intelligence Report, “Search for Uranium 18. 175 Mining in the Vicinity of A-Ko-Su, China,” August 1963 185 Photographic Intelligence Report, “Suspect CW Agent 19. Production Plants, Dzerzhinsk, USSR, Changes Since 1962,” August 1963 191 Photographic Intelligence Report, “Chronological 20. Development of the Rapustin and Tyuratam Test Centers, USSR, 1957-l 943,” November 1963 2 Photographic Intelligence Report, “Probable Solid 197 Propellants Testing Facilities and Associated Explosives Plants in the USSR,” December 1963 215 22. Photographic Intelligence Report, “Comparison of Possible AMM-Associated Facilities at Moscow and Sary-Shagan, USSR, August and September 1963,” May 1964 23. Special National Intelligence Estimate 13-4-64, “The Chances of an 237 Imminent Communist Chinese Nuclear Explosion,” 26 August 1964 Technical Publication, Photographic Evaluation Report, 247 24. “Mission 1012-1, 17-20 October 1012-2, 21-23 October 1964,” 1965 Photographic Intelligence Report, “Severodvirisk Naval 253 25. Base and S 402, Severodvinsk, USSR,” November 1964 261 26. Photographic Interpretation Report, Mission 17-22 June 1967,” June 1967 289 27. Photographic Interpretation Report, Mission June 1967, Middle East Edition,” June 1967 307 28. Photographic Interpretation Report, Mission 17-22 June 1967, South China and North Vietnam Edition,” June 1967

Part IV: Nonmilitary Uses for Satellite Imagery 29. Report No. 9, KH-4B System Capability, “Appraisal of Geologic Value for Mineral Resources Exploration,” March 197 315 317 - Appendix Executive Order 1295 1, Release of Imagery Acquired by Space-Based National Intelligence Reconnaissance Systems, 22 February 1995 ix 359

CORONA: America’s First Satellite Program Foreword Since the CORONA satellite made its first successful flight in August 1960, the Intelligence Community’s overhead reconnaissance programs have been among the nation’s most closely guarded secrets. The end of the Cold War, however, has at last made it possible to declassify both information and imagery from the first American satellite systems of the 1960s. To do this, President William Clinton in February of this year ordered the declassification within 18 months of historical intelligence imagery from the early satellite systems known as the CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD. Because the President’s Executive Order 1295 1 (see appendix) envisions scientific and environmental uses for this satellite imagery, the declassified photographs will be transferred to the National Archives with a copy sent to the US Geological Survey. Vice President Albert Gore, who first urged the Intelligence Community to open up its early imagery for environmental studies, unveiled the first CORONA photographs for the American press and public at CIA Headquarters on 24 February 1995. To mark this new initiative, CIA’s Center for the Study of Intelligence and the Space Policy Institute at George Washington University are cosponsoring a conference, “Piercing the Curtain: CORONA and the Revolution in On the occasion of this Intelligence,” in Washington on 23-24 May conference, the CIA History Staff is publishing this collection of newly declassified documents and imagery from the CORONA program. This is the fourth volume in the CIA Cold War Records Series, which began in 1992 when Director of Central Intelligence Robert Gates launched CIA’s Openness Policy and reorganized the Center for the Study of Intelligence to include both the History Staff and a new Historical Review Group to declassify historically important CIA records. The editor of this new volume, Dr. Kevin C. Ruffner, has an A.B. from the College of William and Mary and an M.A. in history from the University of Virginia. He joined the CIA History Staff in 199 1, soon after he received his Ph.D. in American Studies from George Washington University. The documents and imagery in this volume were reviewed and declassified with unusual dispatch by a special working group of declassification officers from the National Reconnaissance Office, the Central Imagery Office, CIA’s Directorate of Science and Technology, and its National Photographic Interpretation Center. The group’s prompt work is especially notable since Xi

many documents required consultation with the US Air Force, National Security Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Energy, Department of State, and CIA’s Collection Requirements and Evaluation Staff. This volume’s appearance just three months after President Clinton’s declassification order is yet another tribute to the skill and speed that the History Staff of the Center for the Study of Intelligence has come to expect from the Design Center and Publications Center in the Directorate of Directorate of Administration’s Printing and Intelligence, and Photography Group. Kenneth McDonald Editor in Chief xii

CORONA: Preface First Satellite Program The CORONA reconnaissance satellites revolutionized the collection of intelligence in the This was a time when it was still extraordinarily difficult to gather information by any other means from “denied areas” including the Soviet Union, Communist China, and their allies. The need for intelligence about Soviet strategic weapon systems and bases dramatically increased after May 1960, when the Soviets shot down an American U-2 aircraft and captured its CIA pilot, Francis Gary Powers. Within a few months, however, on 18 August the United States launched its first successful reconnaissance satellite, which in one mission provided more photographic coverage of the Soviet Union than all previous U-2 missions. On 19 August the recovery of Mission 9009 with a camera marked the beginning of the CORONA reconnaissance satellite program’s long and valuable service. The story of this program’s success is one of the most remarkable in the annals of American science and intelligence. The US Government did not acknowledge that it used satellite systems and imagery for intelligence purposes until 1978. Although President Jimmy Carter then announced that the United States used satellites to verify arms control treaties, it has only been the past few years that officials have talked openly about these systems and their intelligence uses. CORONA, the program name for a series of satellites with increasingly more accurate cameras, provided coverage of the Soviet Union, China, and other areas from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. From its start in the late 1950s until its retirement in 1972, CORONA (in its several versions) both proved valuable in itself and set the stage for the satellite programs that followed it. Fur the first time US policymakers had encompassing coverage of the Soviet Union and China that was both timely and accurate. Since the 1960s a significant percentage of finished intelligence-intelligence reports sent to policymakers- h a s been largely derived from reconnaissance satellites. Satellite imagery is used for a variety of analytical purposes from assessing military strength to estimating the size of grain production. Far and away its greatest utility, however, has been to monitor the deployment of Soviet strategic forces and to verify compliance with arms control agreements.

While orbiting the earth, CORONA concentrated principally on photographing the USSR and China. One intelligence community study summarized CORONA’s efforts over the Soviet Union: CORONA’s initial major accomplishment was imaging all Soviet medium-range, intermediate-range, and intercontinental ballistic missile launching complexes. CORONA also identified the Plesetsk Missile Test Range, north of Moscow. Repetitive coverage of centers like Plesetsk provided information as to what missiles were being developed, tested, and/or deployed. Also, the unequivocal fact of observation gave the United States freedom from concern over many areas and locations which had been suspect in the past. Severodvinsk, the main Soviet construction site for ballistic-missile-carrying submarines was first seen by CORONA. Now it was possible to monitor the launching of each new class of submarines and follow it through deployment to operational bases. Similarly, one could observe Soviet construction and deployment of the ocean-going surface fleet. Coverage of aircraft factories and provided an inventory of bomber and fighter forces. Great strides were also made in compiling an improved Soviet ground order of battle. It was CORONA imagery which uncovered Soviet antiballistic missile activity. Construction of the GALOSH sites around Moscow and the site near Leningrad, together with construction of sites around Tallinn for the Soviet surface-to-air known as the SA-5, were first observed in CORONA imagery. HEN HOUSE, DOG HOUSE, and the Soviet Union’s first phased-array associated with the Soviet ABM program-were also identified in imagery. CORONA “take” was also used to locate Soviet SA-1 and SA-2 installations; later its imagery was used to find SA-3 and SA-5 batteries. The precise Location of these defenses provided Strategic Air Command planners with the information needed to determine good entry and egress routes for US strategic bombers. CORONA imagery was also adapted extensively to serve the needs of the Army Map Service and its successor, the Defense Mapping Agency (DMA). Enhanced by improvements in system attitude control and ephemeris data plus the addition of a stellar-index camera, CORONA eventually became almost the sole source of military mapping data. Some explanation of the terms used in the CORONA program may be helpful. The imagery acquired from the satellites and cameras that composed the CORONA program had a specific security system called KEYHOLE. This added the codeword KEYHOLE, for satellite collection, to the codeword TALENT, which was originally used for imagery collected by aircraft. The first four versions of CORONA were designated through KH-4 (KH denoted KEYHOLE); KH-4 went through three versions. The camera in KH-l-public cover name DISCOVERER-had a nominal ground resolution of 40 feet. (Ground resolution is the ground size equivalent of the xiv

smallest visibie imagery and its associated space.) By 1963 improvements to the original CORONA had produced the KH-2 and KH-3, with cameras that achieved resolutions of 10 feet, The first mission was launched in 1962 and brought a major breakthrough in technology by using the MURAL camera to provide stereoscopic imagery. This meant that two cameras photographed each target from different angles, which allowed imagery analysts to look at KH-4 stereoscopic photos as three-dimensional. In the KH-4, the workhorse of the CORONA system, three camera models with different resolutions were the principal difference between the versions, KH-4, and By 1967, the J-3 camera of KH-4B had entered service with a resolution of 5 feet. This final version of CORONA continued overflights until 1972. Two other systems, separate but closely allied with CORONA, also operor ARGON, performed ated during this time with less success. The mapping services for the Army in a few missions in the early 1960s with mediocre results. The same disappointing performance afflicted the LANYARD system, or KH-6, which was both begun and abandoned in 1963. The following outlines the CORONA versions from 1959 to 1972: Camera KH-1 KH-2 Prime) KH-3 (C Triple Prime) Units Launched Time Period 10 1959-60 10 6 1961-62 KH-4 M (Mural) 26 KH-4A J (J-l) 52 1964-69 KH-4B J-3 17 1967-72 This volume of newly declassified documents and photos is organized in four parts. Part presents the first history of the CORONA program, an article published in 1973 in a classified special supplement to CIA’s professional quarterly, Studies in Intelligence. Part 2 provides a brief look at how the interdepartmental Committee on Overhead Reconnaissance, formed in 1960 to coordinate satellite collection, implemented the new system. Part 3 includes a number of National Photographic Interpretation Center and other

CIA reports on the analysis of CORONA imagery, while Part 4 concludes with an example of a nonmilitary use of satellite imagery. In each part, a brief introduction is followed by the relevant documents in chronological order. CORONA was the United States’ response to a growing need in the 1960s for detailed photographic coverage of countries behind the Iron Curtain. The introduction of newer-and still classified-satellite systems after 1964 further improved the program’s utility and performance. The sheer volume of documents and imagery associated with CORONA-its imagery alone is estimated at over 2 million linear shelf feet-made it both important and difficult to select representative samples for this volume. In the spring of 1992, Robert Gates, then Director of Central Intelligence formed the Environmental Task Force to determine how the Intelligence Community could use its technology to assist scientists in studying the environment. Spurred by then Senator Albert Gore, the CIA also formed Classification Review Task Force to examine the declassification of a satellite imagery collected by obsolete, broad-area-search satellite systems. Both the Environmental Task Force and the Classification Review Task Force determined that imagery produced from through systems offered unusual information for scientists, scholars, and historians. The declassification of this imagery, both panels concluded, presented no threat to national security. DCI R. James Woolsey approved the recommendations of the two task forces and on 22 February 1995, President William Clinton signed an Executive order directing the declassification of more than 800,000 early satellite images. These images, collected by the CORONA, ARGON, and LANYARD systems, provide extensive coverage of the earth’s surface. This book of documents is but the first installment of information on America’s first satellite system. In the years ahead the American public can look forward to a wealth of declassified reports and imagery from the CORONA program.

Part History of the CORONA Program After the CORONA program drew to a close in 1972, the CIA published a survey account of the program in a special Spring 1973 supplement to its classified professional journal, Studies in Intelligence. Kenneth E. Greer’s article focuses on the program’s early years, its uncertainties and frustrations. CIA manager, Richard M. Bissell, Jr., commented after the second mission-DISCOVERER I-failed in 1959: It was a most heartbreaking business. If an airplane goes on a test flight and something malfunctions, and it gets back, the pilot can tell you about the malfunction, or you can look it over find out. But in the case of a recce [reconnaissance] satellite, you fire the damn thing off and you’ve got some telemetry and you never get it back. There is no pilot, of course, and you’ve got no hardware, you never see it again. So you have to infer from telemetry what went wrong. Then you make a fix, and if it fails again you know you’ve inferred wrong. In the case of CORONA it went on and on. In its first years CORONA encountered considerable difficulties, which did not immediately diminish even after the first successful mission in August 1960. Indeed, of the first 30 missions from 1960 through 1962, only 12 were considered productive. The description of the recovery of Mission 1005 in South America illustrates some of the problems that the intelligence community confronted and overcame in developing and employing CORONA. The Studies article also highlights CORONA’s considerable achievements. When The New York Times on 12 August 1960 reported the safe return of DISCOVERER XIII and its triumphant procession from the Pacific Ocean to President Eisenhower at the White House, the paper immediately recognized that this startling reentry signaled a new era: The technological feat marks an important step toward the development of reconnaissance satellites that will be able to spy from space. The same ejection and recovery techniques eventually will be used for returning photographs taken by reconnaissance satellites. Indirectly the technique will also contribute to the eventual return of manned spacecraft. Within a week, Air Force Capt. Harold E. Mitchell and his crew conducted the the first aerial recovery when DISCOVERER XIV (or Mission first satellite with film, returned to earth on 19 August 1960. Six days later, ‘Quoted in Leonard Mosley, A Biography of Eleanor, Allen, and John Foster and Their Family Network (New York: The Dial Press/James Wade, 432. 1

President Eisenhower and Director of Central Intelligence Allen inspected the mission’s photographs. In films “good to very good,” the camera had photographed 1 million square miles of the Soviet Union and East European countries. From this imagery 64 Soviet airfields and 26 new surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites were identified. That the first satellite sion could produce such stunned knowledgeable observers from imagery analysts to the President.

1. Kenneth E. Greer, “Corona,” in Intelligence, Supplement, 17 (Spring 1973): 1-37. The first photographic satellite CORONA Kenneth E. Greer When the U-2 began operating in the summer of 1956, it was expected to have a relatively short operational life in overflying the Soviet Union-perhaps no more not so much on the likelihood than a year or two. That expectation was that the Soviets develop the means of shooting it down, as on their ability to develop a radar surveillance network capable of tracking the U-2 reliably. diplomatic protests With accurate tracking data in hand, the Soviets could with enough supporting evidence to generate political pressures to discontinue the overflights. As it turned out, the United States had underestimated the Soviet radars, which promptly acquired and continuously tracked the very first a formal protest within days U-2 flight over Soviet territory. The Soviets of the incident, and a standdown was ordered. For nearly four years, the U-2 ranged over much of the world, but only sporadically over the Soviet Union. Soviet radar was so effective that each flight risked another protest, and another standdown. some means had to be found to accelerate the initial operational capability for a less vulnerable successor to the U-2. Fortunately, by the time Francis Gary Powers was shot community, down near Sverdlovsk on May 1960 (fortunate for the that is-not for Powers), an alternative means of carrying out photographic was approaching operational readiness. reconnaissance over the Soviet On 19 August 1960, just 110 days after the downing of the last U-2 overflight air catch was made near Hawaii of a of the Soviet Union, the first capsule of exposed film ejected from a photographic satellite that had completed seven passes over denied territory and 17 orbits of the earth. The feat was the culmination of four years of intensive and often frustrating effort to build, launch, orbit, and recover an intelligence product from a carrying satellite. At about the time the U-2 first began overflying the Soviet Union in the U.S. Air Force was embarking on the development of a strategic reconorbiting satellites in a variety of collection naissance weapons system configurations. The program, which was designated had its origins in 1946 when a requirement was placed on the RAND Corporation for a study of the technical feasibility of orbiting artificial satellites. The first real breakreported through had come in 1953 when the USAF Scientific Advisory Staff that it was feasible to produce relatively small and light-weight to the program thermonuclear warheads. As a result of that report, the ATLAS was accorded the highest priority in the Air Force. • 3

Corona Since the propulsion to a satellite in orbit is of the same general order of magnitude as that required to launch an the achievement of of made it possible to begin thinking seriously of an launching orbital satellites. Accordingly, Operational Requirement was levied in 1955 with the stated objective of providing continuous surveillance of pre-selected areas of the world to determine the status of a potential enemy’s war-making capacity. The Air Research and Development Command, which had inherited the RAND study program in assigned the satellite project to its Ballistic Missile Division. The development plan for was approved in July and the program got under way in October with the awarding of a contract to the Lockheed Aircraft Corporation for the development and testing of the system under the program The planning for contemplated a family of separate systems and subsystems employing satellites for collection of and infrared intelligence, The program, which was scheduled to extend beyond 1965, was divided into three phases. Phase I, the test series, was to begin in November Phase . II, the ATLAS-boosted test series, was scheduled to begin in June with the objective of completing the transition from testing phase to the operational phase and of proving the capability of the ATLAS booster to launch heavy loads into space. Phase III, the series, was to begin in and was to consist of three progressively more sophisticated systems: the Pioneer version (photographic and the Advanced version (photographic and lance version (photographic, and infrared). was expected that control of would be transferred to the Strategic Air Command with the initiation of Phase III. It was an ambitious and complex program was pioneering in technical fields about which little was known. Not surprisingly, it had become apparent by the end of that the program was running behind schedule, It also in trouble from the standpoint of security. The U-2 program was carried out in secret from 1956 until May 1960. Its existence was no secret to the Soviets, chose to let it remain a secret to the general public (and of course, but than publicize it and thereby admit to most of the official community} that they lacked the means of defending their air space against the high-flying was undertaken as a classified project, but its very size and the U-2 existence of the number of people involved made it impossible to conceal program for The press soon began speculating on the nature of the program, correctly identifying it as involving military reconnaissance satellites, and referring to it as BIG and SPY IN THE SKY. The publicity was was begun in a period when of concern, because the development of the international political climate was hostile to any form of overflight reconnaissance. ‘It was against this background that the President’s Board of Consultants on Foreign Intelligence Activities submitted its semi-annual report to the President on 24 October The Board noted in its report that it was aware of two 4

reconnaissance systems that were under consideration. One was a study then in progress in the Central Agency concerning the feasibility of a manned reconnaissance aircraft designed for greatly increased performance and reduced radar cross-section; other was WS-117L. However, there appeared little prospect that either of these could produce operational systems earlier than mid-1959. The Board emphasized the need for an interim photo reconnaissance system and recommended that an review be made of new developments in advanced reconnaissance systems to ensure that they were given adequate consideration and received proper in the light of thenexisting and future intelligence requirements. The Executive Secretary of the Security on October notified the Secretary of Defense and the Director of Central Intelligence that the President had asked for a joint report from them on the status of the advanced systems. Secretary. responded on behalf of and Mr. on 5 December with a that, because of the sensitivity of the subject, details on the new systems be furnished through oral briefings. As a consequence, there are no official records in CIA’s Project CORONA files bearing dates between 5 December 1957 and 21 1953, but it is clear that major decisions were made and that important actions were underthe photographic subtaken during the period. In brief, it was decided offering the prospect of early success would be sepasystem of rated from designated Project CORONA, and placed under a joint CIA-Air Force management t- a n approach that had been so successful in covertly developing and operating the U-2 The nucleus of such a team was then constituted as the Development Projects Staff under the direction of Richard who was Special Assistant to the for and Development. was designated as the senior CIA representative on the new venture, and his Air Force counterpart was Brigadier General Osmond Ridand, who, as Colonel had served first deputy in the early days of the Development Projects Staff and later became Vice Commander of the Air Force Ballistic Division. that he first learned of the new program and of the role intended for him it “in an odd and way” from Dr. Edwin Land. Dr. Land had been deeply invoked in the planning and development of the U-2 as a member of the Technological Capabilities Panel of the Office of Defense Mobilization. He continued an active interest in overhead reconnaissance and later headed the Land which was formed in May 1958 to advise on the development of the aircraft planned as the successor to the U-2. also that his early instructions were extremely vague: that the that it was to be placed under subsystem was to be split off from separate covert management, and that the pattern established for the development of the W-2 was to be followed. One of the instructions, however, was firm and precise: none of the funds for the new program were to come from monies authorized for already approved Air Force programs. This restriction, although seemingly at first glance, later led to disagreement over its interpretation. CORONA mangement expected that the boosters already approved L 5

(Continued) Corona for the THOR test series of would simply be diverted to the CORONA program; this proved not to be so. As a consequence, CIA had to go back to the President with an admission that the original project had understated the estimated cost and with a request for more money. Roughly concurrent with the to place one of the subsystems under covert management, the Department of Defense realigned its structure for the management of space activities. The Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) was established on February 1958 and was granted authority over space projects. The splitting off of CORONA from WS-117L all was accomplished by a directive from ARPA on February assigning program to the Air Force and ordering that responsibility for the the proposed interim reconnaissance system employing THOR boost be dropped. the THOR-boosted interim reconThe ARPA directive ostensibly naissance satellite was followed by of the notifications would normally accompany the cancellation of a military program. The word was passed officially the Air Force, and formal contract cancellations were sent out to the prospective suppliers. There was much when the cancellations went out: contractors were furious over the suddenness of the action; Air Force personnel were at the abandonment of the photographic subsystem that seemed to have the best chance of early success. After the cancellation, very limited numbers of individuals in the Air Force and in the participating companies were cleared for Project CORONA and were informed of the procedures to be followed in the reactivation of the cancelled program. and had worked out the arrangements for the they then began technical problems associated with the design configuration they had inherited from The subsystem in point the use of the THOR as the first stage booster and, as a second stage, Lockheed’s modification of a rocket engine had been developed by Aircraft for take-off assist and auxiliary power applications in the B-58 HUSTLER bomber. It was referred to as the HUSTLER engine during the development phase of WS-117L but soon came to be known as the AGENA-the name it bears today. One of the very early CORONA plans called for spin stabilization of the payload, with the camera scanning as the payload rotated. The contractors working on this subsystem design were Lockheed on the space vehicle, and Fairchild on the camera. The camera was to have a focal length of six inches, without image motion compensation. Ground resolution was expected to be poor with After 6

(Continued) this short focal Iength, particularly if combined the readout techniques envisaged by Several important design decisions were implemented in this organizational period of CORONA. Recognizing the need for resolution to meet the intelligence objectives, it was concluded that physical film recovery offered the most promising approach for a usable photographic return in interim time period. This resulted in the addition to the design of a recovery pod or capsule with General Electric selected as the recovery vehicle contractor. In retrospect, the decision on film recovery prove to be one of the most important made in U.S. reconnaissance activities, that photo reconnaissance systems developed up to the current time have relied physical recovery of film. Another major decision for the new CORONA Program came in late March 1958, following a three-day conference in San among representatives of CIA, Air Force Ballistic Missile Division, Lockheed, General Electric, and Fairchild. The discussion revealed that, while work was going forward, design was far from complete. The Lockheed representative reported that they had investigated the of building a satellite vehicle shaped a football, a cigar, or a sphere. They bad finally decided, for the original drawings at least, on a football-shaped pod slightly at each end to correct the center of gravity. There was discussion of the need for immediate contractual arrangements with the various suppliers. Bissell remarked that he was “faced with the problem at present of being broke” and would need estimates from the as soon as possible in order to obtain the necessary financing to get the program under way. The suppliers agreed to furnish the required estimates by the following week. The project quickly began taking formal shape that meeting. Within a span of about three weeks, approval of the program and of its financing was obtained, and the design of the payload configuration evolved into a concept quite different from the spin-stabilized pod- It was at this point in late March April that major complications bad arisen in the technical design and of the Fairchild camera. Interest shifted to a competitive design submitted by Itek Corporation, a spin-off of Boston University. Itek proposed a longer focal length camera scanning within an earth-center stabilized pod. The Itek design was based on the principle of the Boston University Hyac camera. recalls that he decided in favor of the Itek design, but only after much agonizing evaluation. decision was a difficult one to make because it involved moving from a proven method of space vehicle stabilization to one that was technically more difficult to accomplish. It did, however, standardize stabilization being pursued on the development, on the and which has been a part of subsequent photo reconnaissance systems. first project proposal, which was completed on 9 April 1958, requested approval for concurrent development of both the Fairchild and the systems, with the Fairchild configuration becoming operational first and the configuration being developed as a follow-on system. Within two days, however, had made the final decision abandon the Fairchild spin-stabilized configuration entirely. He rewrote the project taking note of the earlier

Corona configuration and his reasons for favoring the Itek approach (principally the better resolution attainable, the lower overall cost, and the greater potential for growth The proposal was rewritten a second time, retaining the Itek configuration but raising the cost estimate from to Of the total estimated cost,-represented ‘a rather arbitrary allowance” for 12 each THOR boosters and Lockheed second stage vehicles, and was to be financed by ARPA through the Air Force. The remaining- was for by CIA of the pods containing the reconnaissance film cassettes. The final project proposal was forwarded to Brigadier General Andrew the President’s Staff Secretary, on 16 April after having been reviewed by Mr. Roy Johnson and Admiral John Clark of ARPA; Mr. Richard Homer, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Research and Development; Brigadier General Osmond Vice Commander, Air Force Ballistic Missile Division; and Dr. James Special Assistant to President for Science and Technology. The proposal was approved, although not in writing. The only original record of the President’s approval reportedly was in the form of a back of an envelope by General C. P. the handwritten note on Deputy Director of Central Although it may have been the original intent, that CORONA would be administered in a manner essentially the same as that of the U-2 program, it actually began and evolved quite differently, It was a joint CIA-ARPA-Air Force effort, much as the U-2 was a joint CIA-Air Force effort, but it the direction that characterized the W-2 program. The project proposal described the anticipated administrative arrangements, but it short of clarifying delineation of authorities. It noted CORONA was being out under the authority of ARPA and CIA the support and participation of the Air Force. CIA’s role was further explained in terms of participating in supervision of the technical development, especially as the actual The work statement prepared for Lockheed, the prime contractor, on 25 noted merely direction of the program was the responsibility of several agencies of the Government. The imprecise statements of who was to do what in connection with CORONA allowed for a range of interpretation, The vague assignments of responsibilities caused no appreciable difficulties in the early years of CORONA when the joint concern was primarily one of producing as promised, but they later ( 1963) became a source of severe friction between CIA and the Air Force over responsibility for conducting the program. Bissell, the recognized leader of the early CORONA program, gave this description of how the early program was managed: and The program was started in a marvelously informal manner. I worked out the division of between two organizations as we went along. Decisions were made jointly. There were so few people involved and their relations were so close that decisions could be and were made quickly and cleanly. We did not have the problem of having to make

(Continued) 1 Corona compromises or of endless delays awaiting agreement. After we got fully organized and the contracts had been let, we began a system of management as we had done with the U-2 Ritland through monthly suppliers’ and sat at the end of the table, and I acted as chairman. The group included two or three people from each of the suppliers. We heard reports of progress and ventilated problems-especially those involving interfaces among contractors. The program was handled in an extraordinarily manner between the Air Force and CIA. Almost all of the people involved on the Government side were more interested in getting the job control. done than in claiming credit or The schedule of the program, as it had been presented to the CORONA group at its meeting in San in late March called for a beginning about the first of 1958 and extending for a period of weeks. It was anticipated that the equipment would be assembled, tested, and the first vehicle launched during that period, which meant that the fabrication of the individual components would have had to completed by 1 July By the time Bissell submitted his project proposal some three weeks later, it had become apparent that the tentative scheduling was unrealistic. noted in his project proposal that it was not yet possible to establish a firm schedule of delivery dates, but that it appeared probable that the first firing than June 1959. could be attempted no It is pertinent to note here that there was no expectation in that CORONA would be operating over a decade later. The CORONA program got under way initially as an interim, short-term, high-risk development to meet the intelligence community’s requirements for area search photographic reconnaissance pending successful development of other, more sophisticated systems planned for The original CORONA proposal anticipated the acquisition of vehicles, noting that at a later date it might be desirable to consider whether the program should be extended-with or without further technological improvement Raving settled on the desired configuration and having received Presidential approval of the program and its financing, the CORONA management team moved forward with contractual arrangements. The team of contractors for CORONA differed from the team on the WS-117L subsystem a consequence of selecting earth-center stabilized approach. brought in as one of the major subcontractors to (General Electric being the other). However, to soften the financial blow to Fairchild, Itek was made responsible for the design and development of the camera subsystem Fairchild producing the camera under subcontract to Itek. This contractor team continued throughout the CORONA program, although later in the program, the relationship was changed to that of associate contractors. The contractor relationships on the CORONA program were as friendly and cooperative as any could have been set up, and team dedication to the success of the program is one of the primary reasons for the success the program enjoyed. The final contractors were selected on April 1958 and a work statement was issued Lockheed on that date. The contractors began systems design on April 9

Corona and completed them and submitted them for first review on May. The designs by mid-1958, the program was well down the road-on the contractors’ side-toward meeting the goal of a first launch no later than mid-1959. The Government side, however, was running into difficulties. The first problem was money, the second was cover, and the two were inextricably intertwined. estimate for program had assumed that the R boosters would be absorbed by the Air Force by diverting them from the subsystem. That assumption proved to be incorrect. An additional- had to he found to pay for the 12 Further, it had been decided that an additional four launch vehicles would orbit, and recovery procedures and an be required for testing of additional three would be required for biomedical launches in support of the CORONA cover stat-y. ARPA not see its way to making Defense Department funds available merely for testing or for cover support when there were other space programs with pressing needs for money. Consequently, CORONA management had to go back to the President for approval of a revised estimate. By August it had also become apparent to the project’s managers that the original, but as yet unannounced, cover story conceived for the future CORONA launchings (an experimental program within the first phase of was becoming increasingly untenable. had by then become the subject of fairly widespread public speculation identifying it as a military reconnaissance program. It was feared that linking CORONA to in any way would inevitably place the reconnaissance label CORONA, and-given the hostility of the international political climate to overflight there was the that the policy of government might cancel the program if it should be so identified. Some other story would have to be contrived dissociate CORONA from and at the same time account that for multiple launchings of stabilized vehicles in low orbits and with payloads being recovered from orbit. It was decided, therefore, to separate the WS-117L photo reconnaissance program into two distinct and ostensibly unrelated series: one identified as 10

1. (Continued) DISCOVERER (CORONA -THOR boost) and the other as SENTRY known as - ATLAS boost). A press release announcing the initiation of the DISCOVERER series was issued on 3 December 1958 identifying the initial launchings as tests of the vehicle itself and later Iaunchings as explorations of environmental conditions in space. specimens, including live animals, were to be carried into space and their recovery from orbit attempted. The new CORONA cover concept, from which the press release stemmed, called for a of five biomedical vehicles, and three of the five were committed to the schedule under launchings four, and seven. The first two were to mice and the third a primate. The two uncommitted vehicles in in event of failure of the heavier primate vehicle. were to be In support of the cover plan, ARPA was to develop two payload packages designed specifically to study navigation of space vehicles and to obtain data useful in the development of an early warning system (the planned It might be noted here that only one of the animal-carrying missions was attempted (as DISCOVthree ERER III), and it was a ARPA did develop the radiometric payload packages, and they were launched as DISCOVERERs XIX and in late and early 1961. The photo reconnaissance mission of CORONA necessitated a near-polar orbit, by launching either to the north or to the south. There are few otherwise suitable areas in the continental United States where this can be done without danger that debris from au early in-flight failure could fall into populated areas. Cooke Air Force Base* near Catifomia’s Point met the requirement for downrange safety, because the trajectory of a southward launch from there would be over the Santa Barbara channel and the Pacific Ocean beyond. Cooke was a natural choice, because it was the of the first Air Force operational missile training base and housed the Strategic Missile Squadron (THOR). Two additional factors favored this as the launch area: the manufacturing ties and skilled personnel required were in the vicinity, and a southward would permit recovery in the Hawaii area by initiating the ejection/ recovery sequence as the passed over the Alaskan tracking facility. Unlike the U-2 flights, Iaunchings of satellites from U.S. soil could not be concealed from the public. Even a booster as small as the THOR that is, in comparison with present-day space boosters) launches with a thunderous roar that can be heard for miles; the space vehicle transmits telemetry that can be intercepted; and the vehicle can be detected in orbit by radar track. The fact of a launch could not concealed, but maintenance of the cover story for the DISCOVERER series required that the launchings of the uniquely configured photographic payloads be closed to observation by unwitting personnel. Vandenberg was excellent as a launch site from many standpoints, but it had one feature that posed a severe handicap to screening the actual from unwanted observation: the heavily traveled Southern Pacific railroad passes through it. The early launches from Vandenberg had to was renamed Vandenberg AFB in October 13

1. (Continued) be timed for early afternoon, * and the Southern Pacific schedule broke this period into a series of launch windows, some of which were no more than a few minutes between trains. Throughout its existence, the CORONA program at Vandenberg was plagued by having to time the launches to occur during one of the intervals behveen passing trams. The planned recovery sequence involved a series of maneuvers, each of which had to be executed to near-perfection or recovery would fail. Immediately after so that the injection into orbit, the AGENA vehicle was yawed 180 recovery vehicle faced to the rear. This maneuver minim&d the control gas which would be required for re-entry orientation at the end of the mission, and protected the heat shield from molecular heating, a subject of considerable when these concerns had diminished, concern at that time. (Later in the J-3 the vehicle would be flown forward until re-entry.) re-entry was to take place, the ACENA would then be pitched down through 60 degrees to position would be the satellite recovery vehicle (SRV) for retro-firing. Then the separated from the AGENA and be spin-stabilized by firing the spin rockets to maintain it in the attitude given it by the AGENA. Next the retro-rocket would be fired, slowing down the SRV into a descent trajectory. Then the spin of the SRV would be slowed by firing the de-spin rockets. Next would come the separation of the retro-rocket thrust cone followed by the heat shield and the parachute cover. The drogue (or deceleration) chute would then deploy, and into the recovery finally the main chute would open to lower the capsule area. The primary recovery technique involved flying an airplane across the top of the descending parachute, catching the chute or its shrouds in a trapeze-like hook suspended beneath the airplane and then winching the recovery vehicle aboard. C-119 Aircraft were initially used with C-130 aircraft replacing them later in the program. The recovery vehicle was designed to float long enough, if the air catch failed, for a water recovery by helicopter launched from a surface ship. While the vehicle was still in the construction stage, tests of the air recovery Test Squadron-with disheartening technique were conducted by the results. Of 74 drops using personnel-type chutes, only 49 were recovered. one type of operational drop chute, only four were recovered out of I5 dropped, aircraft passes were required for the hook-up. Eleven and an average of drops with another type of operational chute resulted in five recoveries and an average of two aircraft passes for the snatch. Part of the difficulty lay in weak chutes and rigging, and in crew inexperience. The most serious problem, however, was the fast drop rate of the chutes. Parachutes that were available to support the planned weight of the recovery vehicle had a sink rate of about 33 feet per a sink rate approaching feet per second SO second. What was required that the aircraft would have time to make three or four passes if necessary for hook-up, Fortunately, by the time space hardware was ready for launching, early limited film to for a mission 17 orbits, seven of which would cross denied territory, Requirements for daylight recovery and for daylight passage over denied areas with acceptable sun angles dictated the afternoon launch time.

Corona 13

a parachute had developed with a sink rate slow enough to offer a reasonable chance of air recovery. The launch facilities at Vandenberg were complete, and the remote were tracking and control facilities which had been developed for ready for the first flight test of a THOR-AGENA combination in January 1959. however, the attempt The count-down was started for a launch on the aborted at launch minus minutes. When power was applied to test the AGENA hydraulic system, certain events took that were supposed to occur flight but not while the vehicle was still sitting on the launch pad. The explosive connecting the AGENA to the THOR detonated, and the rockets* fired. the attaching it to the THOR and did not The AGENA settled to the ground, but appreciable damage was done. A program review conference was held in Palo Alto two days after the launch failure to examine the possible causes of the abort and to assess its impact on the CORONA launch schedule. Fortunately, the problem was quickly identified and easily corrected, and it was that the system was ready for test launches at the rate of about one per month.. At the review General surfaced a new problem having to do with the stability of the nose cone during re-entry. The cone was designed for a film load of Pounds, but the first missions would to carry only 20 pounds. GE reported that about three pounds of ballast would have to be in forward end of the cone to restore stability. The program officers to add an instrument package as ballast, either for diagnostic purposes or for support of the story, thus converting what could have been dead weight into net plus for the test program. The test plan contemplated arriving at full operational capability at a relatively early date through testing of the major components of the beginning with the THOR-AGENA combination alone, then adding the nose to test the sequence, and finally installing a camera for a full CORONA systems test just how much confidence the project planners had in the imminence of now be discovered; however, it must soon have begun if the confidence factor was very high at the to wane. in February and extending through June 1960 an even cameras, and dozen launches were attempted, with eight of the vehicles of them were failures; no film capsules were recovered from orbit. Of eight camera-carrying vehicles, four failed to achieve orbit, three experienced camera film failures, and eighth was not recovered because of a malfunction of the re-entry body spin rockets. These summaries of the initial launch attempts the nature and dimensions of the problems for which solutions had to be found. ••UlIage rockets are propellant rockets attached to the These prior to ignition of the AGENA engine after the THOR to that the liquid propellants are against the bottom of the tanks so that proper Row into the pumps occur. 14

1. (Continued) 15

(Continued) DISCOVERER I was not assigned a number in the DISThe on-pad failure of 21 on February 1959 with a COVERER series. DISCOVERER I was light engineering payload as a test of performance. No recovery was planned. For a time was uncertainty as to what had happened to it because no radio signals were received. At the time, it was believed to have obtained orbit with speculation that the protective nose cone over the antennas was ejected just before the AGENA fired and that the AGENA then rammed into the nose cone, damaging the antennas. Today, most people believe the somewhere near the South Pole. DISCOVERER The second vehicle was launched on April 1959. Orbit was announced about two hours later, along a statement the capsule carried a lightweight biomedical payload ( as indeed it did The Air Force reported on 15 April that plans to recover the capsule near Hawaii had been abandoned and that the might descend somewhere in the Arctic. The announcement slightly understated the known facts. The capsule had ejected on the 17th orbit as planned, but a timing malfunction (actually a human programming error) had caused the ejection sequence to be initiated too early. The capsule was down, probably somewhere in the of the Spitsbergen Islands north of In fact, there were later reports that the falling capsule had actually seen by residents. The Air Force announced on the 16th that the Norwegian government had authorized a search for the which would begin the day. Planes scoured the area, and helicopters joined the DISCOVERER Much publicity attended the launching of DISCOVERER some of it planned and some uplanned (and unwanted). This was first (and only ) DISCOVERER flight to carry animals: four live black mice. Black mice were chosen in order to ascertain the possible hair-bleaching effects of cosmic rays. The mice were members of the C-57 strain, a particularly rugged breed. They had been “trained,” with other mice, at the Air Force’s Field Laboratory at Holloman They were seven to ten weeks old and 16

(Continued) weighed slightly over an ounce apiece. A three-day food was provided, of a special formula containing peanuts, gelatin, orange and water. Each mouse was placed in a small individual about twice its size, and each had a minuscule radio strapped to its back to monitor the effects of the space trip on heart action, respiration, and muscular activity. The lift-off on 3 June was uneventful, but, of injecting approximately horizontally into orbit, the AGENA apparently fired downward, driving the vehicle into the Pacific Ocean and killing the mice. Looking back on the mission, the attempt to orbit the mice seems to have been jinxed from the very beginning. Just before the first try at launch, telemetry indicated a lack of mouse activity. It was thought at first that the little fellows were merely asleep, so a technician sent up in a cherry-picker to arouse them. He banged on the side of the but to no avail. When the was opened, the vehicle and tried mice were found to be dead. The cages had been sprayed with to cover rough edges; the mice had found it tastier than their formula; and that was that. The second try at launch several days later, with a back-up mouse “crew,” was a near-abort when the capsule life cell humidity sensor suddenly indicated percent relative humidity. The panic button was pushed, troubleshooters were sent up to They found that when the vehicle was in a vertical position the humidity sensor was directly beneath the cages, and it did not distinguish between plain water and tine. The wetness dried out after a while, all was forgiven, and the vehicle was launched-unhappily into the permanent percent moisture environment of the Pacific Ocean. the timing of the launch was unfortunate. monkeys, Able and flight in a JUPITER nose cone on May in Baker, had survived a connection with another, unrelated test program. However, Able died during minor surgery on 3 June to remove an electrode that had been implanted under his skin. (This was the date of the DISCOVERER III launch.) The British protest to the U.S. Ambassador, Society Against Cruel Sports made a and the press raised quite a stink about the fatal mice flight--comparing it unfavorably the Russians’ successful launching of the dog, Laika, in SPUTNIK II back in November 1957, and demanding that orbit and recovery procedures be perfected before attempting further launches of mice or monkeys. N-VIII DISCOVERER IV on 25 June 1959 was the first to carry a camera and thus the first true CORONA test, but the payload did not go into orbit. DISCOVERER again with a camera, attained orbit but the temperature inside the spacecraft abnormally low and the camera failed on the fit orbit. The recovery

(Continued) Corona capsule was ejected at the proper time, but never showed up; early in 1960 it was discovered in a high near-polar orbit with an apogee of 1,058 miles. Failure of the spin rocket had caused the retro-rocket to accelerate rather than de-boost the package, DISCOVERER VI went into orbit six days later, but the camera failed on the second revolution, and the retro-rocket failed on the recovery attempt. DISCOVERER VII on 7 November did not go into orbit. DISCOVERER VIII on 20 November went into an eccentric with an apogee of 913 miles, and the camera failed again. The recovery vehicle was ejected but the parachute failed to open. It had become plain by the of 1959 that something (or, to be more precise, many things) had to be done to correct the multiple failures that were plaguing the CORONA system. Eight THOR-AGENA combinations and five cameras had been expended with nothing to show for the effort except accumulated knowledge of the system’s weaknesses. The project technicians knew what was going wrong, but not always why. Through DISCOVERER VIII, the system had experienced these major failures: One misfired on the launch pad. Three to achieve orbit. went into highly orbits. One capsule ejected prematurely. Two cameras operated briefly and then failed. One camera failed entirely. One experienced a retro-rocket malfunction. One had very low spacecraft temperature. A panel of consultants reviewed the various failures and their probable causes and concluded that what was needed most was “‘qualification, requalification, and multiple testing of component parts” before assembling them and sending them aloft. This called for more money. Accordingly, submitted a project January 1960 asking approval of nearlyamendment to the DDCI on additional to cover the costs of the testing program. He apologized to General for submitting a request for funds to pay for work that was already under way: “Although such a sequence is regrettable, there has been *One of these early launches tested system for the tell-tale payload doors inquisitive eyes near the launch The scheme was to them with paper, fastened over two lengths of piano wire with balls at the front end. The air flow at launch to strip away the paper. The idea would use the pingpong balls and wire as was tested on the side of a sports car simulating launch velocity as nearly possible on the Freeway late one evening. The test proved that the worked, and that patrolmen could overhaul a vehicle going only m.p.h. Unfortunately, the malfunctioned on the next actual launch, and there was no consensus for another test round with the Freeway police.

Corona confusion in this program as to what the amount of the overruns would this has made it difficult to obtain approvals in an orderly fashion in of the fall of major problems remained to be solved in achieving orbit, in camera functioning, and in recovering the film capsule. were the more serious of specific failures that were occupying the of the technicians: The AGENA vehicle was designed for use with both the THOR and the ATLAS boosters. The ascent technique used by the AGENA vehicle was essentially the same in both combinations, but there were significant differences in the method of employing the booster. In the CORONA program, in order to conserve weight, THOR booster followed a programmed trajectory using only its autopilot Also, the THOR thrust was not cut off by command at a predetermined velocity (as in the ATLAS); instead, its fuel burned to near-exhaustion. This relatively inaccurate boosting profile, coupled with the low altitude of CORONA orbits, required great precision in the orbital injection. At a typical injection of miles, an angular error of plus or minus 1.1 degrees or a velocity deficit of as little as feet per second would result in failure to complete the first orbit. This had happened repeatedly. Lasting relief from this problem lay some distance in the future: a more powerful ACENA was being developed, and the weight of instrumentation for measuring in-flight performance on the early flights would be reduced on later operational missions. The term remedy lay in a drastic weight-reduction program. This was carried out in part (literally, it is said) by attacking surplus metal with tin snips files. The system was designed to operate without pressurization (again to conserve weight), and the acetate base film being used was tearing or breaking the high vacuum existing in space and causing the camera to jam. A solution for this problem was found in substituting polyester for acetate base film. The importance to the reconnaissance programs of this achievement by Eastman Kodak in film technology cannot be overemphasized. It ranks on a level with the development of the film recovery capsule itself. The first orbital flight in which the camera was operated with polyester film was DISCOVERER XI (Mission 9008) in April 1960. Although recovery was not successful, one of the major space reconnaissance problems had been solved. The equipment was built to work best at an even and predetermined temperature. To save weight, only passive thermal control was provided. The spacecraft’s internal temperature had varied on the flights thus far, and it was much lower than desired on one flight. An interim solution for this problem was found in varying the painting of the vehicle skin. The spin and de-spin rockets used to stabilize the recovery vehicle during re-entry had a tendency to explode rather than merely to fire. Several had blown up in ground tests. A was found in substituting cold gas spin and de-spin rockets.

Corona to persist for that of placing the recovery vehicle into that would terminate in the zone. This required the SRV from at precisely right time, and it by firing to the correct and at was very margin for this one-second in ejection timing could shift the recovery point five miles; velocity vector error of more than ten degrees would cause capsule to miss the recovery zone completely. of the months, One might ask why the CORONA program officers persisted in the face of such adversity. The answer lay in the overwhelming intelligence needs of the period. The initial planning of CORONA began at a time when we did not know how many BEAR and BISON aircraft the Soviets had, whether they were introducing a new and far more advanced long range bomber than the BISON, skipped the build-up of a manned bomber force in or whether they had of missiles. There had been major changes in intelligence estimates of Soviet and of the scope of Soviet missile program on the nuclear of the results of the relatively small number of U-2 missions approved for the However, by the great ‘missile gap” controversy was very summer of ranges of miles, proving much in the fore. The Soviets had tested had a capability of building and operating them. What was not known where they deploying them operationally, and in what numbers. In the preparation of the National Intelligence Estimate on guided missiles in the fall of the various intelligence agencies held widely diverse views on Soviet strength, Nineteen Sixty ushered in an election year in which missile gap had become grave issue, and the President scheddcd to meet leaders that spring without--l appeared--the benefit of hard with had improved our knowledge of the Soviet Union, intelligence data. coverage and the to the critical questions, but it could not and it increasingly an intelligence asset than a political ty. only a matter of time until one was shot It was judged to coming to an as an almost certain DISCOVERERS IX-Xl? A standdown was in effect in CORONA from November 1959 until Febfor intensive R&D efforts to identify and eliminate the ruary 1960 to causes of failure. On 4 February, DISCOVERER IX was launched and failed to orbit. The first of from CORONA vehicle occurred with the launching of DISCOVERER on February 1960, but in manner such that no one boasted of it. The THOR booster rocket began to fishtail not long after it left the pad and destroyed by range safety officer seconds 20

1. (Continued) through quarter of of film to permit carrying of additional for testing vehicle DISCOVERER was launched on 15 April 1960 carrying 16 pounds of film. A reasonably good was achieved miles at npogec and 109.5 at perigee), and the camera operated satisfactorily.** All of the was exposed and into capsule. the problem of the spin rockets, which had been observed in ground tests, during recovery sequence, and the payload was lost. Another standdown- - a major one-was imposed following the failure of DISCOVERER XI. As of mid-April 1960, there had been launches and one abort on of the orbit, but no capsules had DISCOVERER SII was planned as diagnostic flight-without payload-heavily to determine precisely why recovery of had failed previously. vehicle was launched 29 1960, but failed to orbit. DISCOVERER Success The nest flight, on August was launched of the no-orbit DISCOVERER XII diagnostic flight, without camera and film. The was and successfully inserted into orbit. The recovery ejected the orbit, and and were that the capsule down well away from planned impact nominal was miles south of Honolulu C-119 C-130 circled awaiting the capsule’s descent. The splash-down about 330 miles northwest of Hawaii. airplanes were backed up by surface ships miles and deployed in a recovery zone with north-south axis of some axis miles either of cxpectccl impact point. Although beyond the range of the airborne recovery aircraft, the COI’ERER XIII descended near enough to the staked-out to permit the capsule sank an attempt at water recovery. A ship reached the scene *This was one of the few launch failures for the remarkable team which prepared Vandenberg Base. The CORONA launches provided the THOR boosters exciting moments for the Douglas crew, however. of the crew were from the V-2 who on V-2 days ignite rocket engines with kerosene-soaked At Vandenberg AFB they did not to resort to this tactic, but they were required on numerous occasions to return to launch minus 15 seconds to unfreeze with the touch of members of the blockhouse would marvel Daredevils” would race their vehicles the entire way from the pad to blockhouse, arriving just ignition would in begin. mission, the first mission on which camera operated successfully because of the change from base to 21

(Continued) Corona and fished it out of the ocean. Much of the credit for the was attributed to the inauguration (on the unsuccessful DISCOVERER launch) of the spin and de-spin system. For the first time ever, man had orbited an object in space and recovered it. This American space *‘first” beat the Russians by just nine days. The Soviets bad tried to recover SPUTNIK IV the previous May but when the recovery capsule ejected into a higher orbit. They did succeed in de-orbiting and recovering SPUTNIK V carrying the dogs, and on 20 August 1960. Arrangements were made for extensive publicity concerning this in recovering an object from orbit-in large measure to the cover story of DISCOVERER/CORONA as being an space series. News photos were released of the lift-off from Vandenberg, of the floating in the ocean, ‘and of the recovery ship Haiti President Eisenhower the capsule and the flag it had carried to the press, and it later placed on exhibit in the Smithsonian Institution for public viewing. In anticipation of the first recovery being a reconnaissance mission, a plan had been developed under which the capsule would he switched in transit through Since DISCOVERER was a diagnostic flight, the project office was spared the necessity of executing a clandestine switch of prior to shipment to Washington, and the President and Smithsonian received the actual hardware from the first recovery. We have all watched televisiou coverage of the U.S. man-in-space programs with the recovery of astronauts and capsules after splashdown in the ocean. A helicopter flies from the recovery ship to the floating capsule and drops swimmers to attach a line to the capsule. After the astronauts are removed, the helicopter hoists the capsule from the water and carries it to the recovery ship. What most of us don’t realize is that the recovery technique was developed for and perfected the CORONA program as a back-up in event of failure of the air catch. DISCOVERER Success ! DISCOVERER XIV launched 1960, one week after the successful water recovery of the DISCOVERER XIII capsule. The carried a camera and a load of film, The camera operated satisfactorily, and the full of film was exposed and transferred to the recovery capsule. The ACENA did not initially position itself in orbit so as to permit the recovery sequence to occur. It was on the verge of tumbling during the first few orbits, and an excessive quantity of gas had to be used in correcting the situation. Fortunately, vehicle attitude became stabilized about midway through the scheduled flight period, thus relieving the earlier fear that recovery would be impossible. The satellite recovery vehicle ejected on the 17th pass, and the capsule was recovered by air snatch. Captain Harold E. Mitchell of the Test Squadron, a C-119 (flying boxcar) called Pelican 9, successfully hooked the descending capsule on 22

1. (Continued)

1. (Continued) his third Air Force Base, Hawaii, with his prize, Captain decorated with the Distinguished Cross, and memthe Air Medal for their accomplishments. bers of his crew were The film was flown to the development and was then delivered to PIC (now known as for readout The resolution was substantially lower than that obtainable from the U-2, but the photography had intelligence value, and it covered areas of the USSR which the U-2 had never reached. This one satellite photo coverage of a greater area than the total produced mission, in fact, missions over the Soviet Union. The only major deficiencies by all of the in the photography were plus and minus density bars running diagonally across the format. Some were due to minor fight leaks, and others were the result of electrostatic discharge known as corona. These marks showed that the program security officer had had great insight when he named the program. There are types of corona markings, a glow which caused the most difficulty, and a discharge which is more spectacular in appearance. A press release announced the success of the mission but naturally made no mention of the real success: the delivery of photographic intelligence. The into an orbit with a 77.6 announcement noted that the satellite bad been miles. a perigee of miles, and an degree of inclination, an apogee of orbital period of 94.5 minutes. A retro-rocket had slowed the capsule to velocity, and a parachute had released at 60,000 feet. The which 84 pounds at recovery, was caught at 8,506 feet by a C-119 airplane on its third pass over the falling parachute. Progress and The program officers did not take the success of DISCOVERER to that their problems with the system were at an end, but many of the earlier injection technique had been difficulties had been surmounted, The improved to a level at which vehicles were repeatedly put into orbit with jcction angle errors of less than four-tenths of a degree. The timing of the initiation of the recovery sequence had been so refined that ejection of the DISSRV occurred within five seconds of the planned time. P-chute COVERER deceleration and air catch of the capsule had been accomplished repeatedly with test capsules dropped from high-altitude The two cameras placed in orbit had operated well. There were other critical problems, however, that remained to be solved. Foremost among them at the time was that of consistently achieving the correct retro-velocity and angle of re-entry of the recovery vehicle. The DISCOVERER ‘Mitchell had been patrolling the primary zone for DISCOVERER XIII, which was fished from the water by a ship after Mitchell’s plane missed it. The Air Force, to the boondocks some miles downrange for DISCOVERER pride stung, assigned XIV. The capsule overshot the prime recovery area, where three aircraft were chasing the to report his catch, he was told to keep off wrong radar blip. When Mitchell first the in order not to interfere with the recovery operation, 24

(Continued) _

(Continued) Corona was the one thus far that had descended in the designated XIV impact zone. This was a problem that was to receive major attention during the next few Four more cameras were launched within the next four months, with one success and three failures. DISCOVERER XV was sent aloft on 13 September. The vehicle was successfully inserted into orbit, and the camera functioned properly. However, the recovery vehicle re-entered at wrong pitch attitude, down outside zone and demonstrating causing the capsule to that the technicians’ concern over the sequence was well founded. The capsule was located, but it sank before a recovery ship could reach it. DISCOVERER XVI was launched on 26 October, but the ACENA failed to go into orbit because of a malfunction of a timing The first ten camera-equipped vehicles carried what was known as the C camera: a single, vertical-looking, reciprocating, panoramic camera that exposed the film by scanning at a right angle to the line of DISCOVERER XVI carried the first of a new series of cameras known the C Prime ( C’ C’ differed only slightly from the original C configuration and was essentially little more than a follow-on procurement of the C camera The DISCOVERER mission was launched on November and went the full route through successful air for one mishap: the film broke after I.7 feet of acetate base leader bad fed through the camera. There succeeding mission. The press is an inconsistency in the records on this and release concerning mission announced the a more powerful second-stage engine, was used for the first the project files record the first first of use of the B vehicle on the following mission. In either event, it was the two-day missions. capsule was recovered on the orbit. DISCOVERER XVIII was launched on December 1960 carrying 39 pounds of film. Orbit was achieved, and the camera worked well, exposing the entire film load. The recovery vehicle was ejected on revolution number 48 after three days in orbit, and was retrieved by air snatch. This was the first successful mission employing the camera and the ACENA B second stage. There was fogging on the first, and last frame of each photo pass due to mirror light leaks, but image quality was otherwise as good as the best from DISCOVERER XIV. CORONA in 1961 Of the next ten launches, extending through 3 August only four were payloads CORONA missions. DISCOVERERS XIX and in support of the CORONA cover story, and they were not intended to ‘be recovered. DISCOVERER XXI included an experiment that was to be of major significance in the later development of CORONA and other programs: the AGENA engine was successfully restarted in space. There was another “first” during these 1961 launches. When the film was removed from one of the capsules, the quality assurance inspector found three objects that should not have been there: two quarters and a buffalo nickel. Early 26

(Continued) Corona had contained a flag, so that there would be one to present to President Eisenhower after the first successful recovery. This had apparently inspired program personnel at Vandenberg to make their own payload additions during flight preparation. The Washington program office sent a sharply worded message to the West Coast project office charging it with responsibility for ensuring that the practice of souvenir-launching be stopped. (Years later NASA find itself in the same position after the Apollo moon flights.) DISCOVERER XX was the fit of a dozen launches extending over a period of three years carrying mapping cameras, a program sponsored by the U.S. Army, which the President had approved for inclusion within the CORONA known ARGON, project. The purpose of the mapping program, which was to obtain precise geodetic fixes and an extension of existing datum planes within the Soviet Union. DISCOVERER XX was a bust on a number of counts: there were no shutter firings; and the orbital programmer the camera malfunctioned. This last-named failure led to an important change in control procedures for CORONA. On this and all prior flights the sequence was initiated automatically by an ejection command cut into the program tape. The program timer temporarily on orbit 31 of this mission, the entire sequence to be about one-half cycle out of phase. The automatic initiation of the recovery sequence was eliminated from the program tape on subsequent missions. Thereafter, the positive issuance of an injection command was required. Of the four CORONA missions attempted between December 1960 and August into orbit as a consequence of AGENA failures, and two 1961, two did not were qualified successes. DISCOVERER XXV was launched on I6 June and its full load of film. The air catch failed, but the back-up water recovery successful. The camera failed on revolution of DISCOVERER XXVI, which was launched on 7 July, but about three-quarters of the film was exposed and was recovered by air catch. into August 1961, a total of 17 camera-carrying CORONA missions had been attempted, and usable photography had been recovered from only four of them. These four successful missions, however, had yielded plottable coverage of some 13 million square miles, or nearly half of the total area of interest. Camera The first substantial upgrading of the CORONA camera system came with the camera. The original introduction in August 1961 of the C Triple Prime (C’ C camera was a scanning panoramic camera in which the camera cycling rate and the velocity-over-height ratio were constant and were selected before launching. Image motion compensation was fixed mechanically to the height ratio. A brief explanation of these terms may be helpful in understanding the nature of the problems with which the camera designers had to cope. A means must be provided for matching the number of film exposures in a given period of time (camera cycling rate) with the varying ratio between vehicle altitude and velocity on orbit (velocity-over-height so that 27

1. (Continued) Corona photographed in a series of swaths with neither gaps the ground area nor overlapping in the coverage. If the subject moves just as a snapshot is taken with a hand-held camera, and if the camera shutter speed is not fast enough to “stop” the motion, the photographic image will be smeared. To a from CORONA space vehicle, the earth’s surface appears to be passing an A camera beneath the camera at a speed of roughly five miles photographing the earth’s surface from a satellite moving at that speed would yield smeared photography if some means were not provided for stopping the relative motion. The technique used in this is known as image motion compensation. The C Triple Prime was the first camera totally by the Corporation. The C’ was also a reciprocating camera with a rotating lens cell, which exposed the Film during segment of its rotation, The new had a aperture lens, an improved film transport mechanism, and a greater flexibility in command of camera and vehicle as regards control of the velocityover-height factor. larger aperture lens permitted use of slower film emulsions, which, combined with the improved resolving power of the itself, offered the prospect of resolution approximately twice as good as the C and cameras. system with a %-pound film load 30 The first C’ August 1961, The mission was a success, the load being transferred orbit. frames of and with ejection and recovery occurring on the photography were out of focus. The cause identified and was corrected by redesigning the scan head. Seven more missions were launched of 1961, three with the camera and four with the during the last four c Six of attained orbit, and the cameras operated satisfactorily on all six. Film was recovered from four of the missions. The last of the four, which carried a camera system, was rated the best mission to date. It also had cover assignment to carry ‘out: the injection of a secondary satellite, dubbed OSCAR (orbital satellite carrying amateur radio), into a separate orbit. OSCAR on 145 megacycles for pick-up was a small radio satellite broadcasting a by amateurs as an aid in the study of radio propagation phenomena. Slowly but surely bugs were being worked out, but it seemed that just as one was laid to rest another arose to take its place. Perhaps what was actually happening was that various sets of problems existed simultaneously, but the importance of some of them was masked by others. The elimination of a particular problem made it possible to recognize the significance of another. The recent successes had resulted largely from correcting weaknesses in the payload portion of the system. At the same time, difficulties in the AGENA vehicle began to seven missions in 1961, four experienced on-orbit difficulties surface. Of the with the AGENA power supply or control gas system. Power system components for general use in satellite systems were designed, developed, and tested in the CORONA program. Foremost among those cornwere the static electronic inverters used to convert direct current 28

(Continued) Corona alternating current required by the battery energy into which were first aboard CORONA other subsystems. Static vehicles, were considered essential, because they had half the weight and double the efficiency of their rotary counterparts. Unfortunately, they are rather gadgets. The history of had been marked high failure rates in system checkouts on the ground. Despite the lessons that had been learned and the improvements in circuit design that resulted from them, the recent on-orbit power failures demonstrated a need for further research development. DISCOVERER The ACENA failed on DISCOVERER XXXVII, launched on L3 January and the payload did not go into orbit It was the last mission to carry the C’ camera system, and with it DISCOVERER series came to an end. After 37 launches or launch attempts, the cover story for DISCOVERER had simply worn out. With the improved record of success and the near-certainty of an be as many even better record in the future, it seemed likely that there as dozen and a half to two dozen launches per year for perhaps years to come. CORONA Stereo The 1961 R&D effort was not confined to improving the performance of the existing system. A major development program was concurrently under way on much better camera subsystem. A contract was awarded on 9 August 1961, March, for a new camera configuration to be known retroactively effective to MURAL. The camera system consisted essentially of cameras mounted with one pointing forward and the other slightly backward. rolls of film were carried in a double-spool film supply cassette. The Two to the two where they were panotwo film webs were fed ramically exposed during segments of the lens cells’ rotations and then were double-spool take-up cassette in the satellite recovery vehicle. The fed to to four days. system was designed for a mission duration of cameras had photographed the target The vertical-looking C, C’, and C’ by sweeping across it in successive overlapping swaths. The concept involved photographing each swath area twice. The forward-looking camera first photographed the swath at an angle 15 degrees from the vertical. About half-dozen frames the backward-looking camera photographed the same degrees from the vertical. When the two resulting swatch at an angle photographs of the same area or object were properly aligned in a 29

(Continued) Corona photography would appear to be three-dimensional. Simultaneous scope, operation of both instruments was required for stereo photography. If either camera failed, photography could still be obtained from the other, but it could be viewed in only ho dimensions. The first MURAL camera system was launched as program flight number 38 on 27 February On the first flight, an anomaly occurred during The RV heat shield failed to separate and was recovered by the aircraft along with the capsule. This anomaly provided valuable diagnostic data on the re-entry effects, which served the program well in later years, when program stretchouts caused shelf life of the heat shields to be a major The twenty-sixth and last in the MURAL series was launched on 21 December were 19 of them by air snatch. The one 1963. Twenty of the water recovery was of a capsule that splashed down a thousand miles from the the capsule nominal impact point. An interesting aspect of this recovery was turned upside down in the water, causing loss of the beacon signals. It was located during the search by an alert observer who spotted the sun shining on the gold capsule. Of the six vehicles that failed, two malfunctioned in the launch sequence, one SRV failed to eject properly, and three capsules came down in be recovered. Twenty successes out of the ocean and sank before they tries appeared to be a remarkable record when viewed against the difficulties experienced only years earlier. zone, indiThe three capsules that sank came down in or near the cating that the problems previously encountered in the reentry sequence had been (One of them solved. They were not supposed to sink so quickly, that a capsule might floated for less than three minutes.} To minimize the be retrieved by persons other than the American recovery crew, the capsules were designed to float for a period ranging originally from one to three days and then to sink. The duration of the flotation period was controlled by a capsule sink compressed salt, which would dissolve in sea water at a rate valve that could be predicted rather broad limits. When the salt plug had dissolved, water entered the capsule, and it sank-ingenious but simple. Other significant improvements in the CORONA program were inaugurated during the lifetime of the MURAL system. One of them was an aid to interpretation. In order to read out the photography, the photointerpreter must be able to determine for each frame the portion of the earth’s surface that is and its geometry. In simplest terms, he imaged, the scale of the vehicle was and how it was oriented in space at the precise must know where time the picture was taken. Until 1962, the ground area covered by a particular frame of photography was identified by combining data provided on the orbital path of the vehicle with the time of camera firing. The orientation or attitude of the vehicle on orbit was determined from horizon photographs recorded at of horizon cameras that were included each end of every other frame from a in the CORONA camera system. 30

(Continued) Beginning with the first of the MURAL flights, an index camera was into the photographic system, and a stellar camera was added a few missions later. The short focal length index camera took a small scale photograph of the area being covered on a much larger scale by successive sweeps of the pan scale photograph, used in conjunctian with orbital data, cameras. The simplified the problem of matching the pan photographs with the terrain. graphs taken of stars by the camera, in combination with those taken of the horizons by the horizon cameras, provided a more precise means of determining vehicle attitude on orbit. program flight number 47, a MURAL mission launched The photography on 27 July 1962, was marred by heavy and radiation fogging. The corona problem was a persistent one--disappearing for a time only to reappear and had become even more severe with the advent of the complicated film transport mechanisms of the MURAL camera. Corona marking was caused by sparking of static from moving parts of the system, from the film The problem was eventually solved by modifications of the parts and by rigid qualification testing of The boosting capacity of the first-stage THOR was substantially increased in early 1963 by strapping to the THOR a cluster of small solid-propellant rockets, which were jettisoned after This Augmented THOR, or TAT as it came to be known, was first used for the launching of the heavier LANYARD camera system. LANYARD was developed the CORONA program as a film recovery modification of one of the cameras designed for the system and, with longer was to yield better resolution than the CORONA cameras, It had a single lens capable of stereoscopic coverage angle. Three flights were attempted, by swinging a mirror through a only one of which was partially The had a serious lens focus problem, which was later traced to thermal factors and corrected. The LANYARD program was initiated as an interim system pending the completion of a resolution spotting system then under development. It was upon the success of the spotting system. The TAT booster itself was a significant success, permitting the later launching of heavier, more versatile CORONA systems. The System Program flight number 69, launched on 24 August 1963, introduced the first two-bucket configuration-the next major upgrading of the CORONA system. 31

(Continued) Corona (The film recovery commonly referred to as a bucket, it more nearly resembles a round-bottomed kettle.) The new modification, which was the J-l system, retained the MURAL stereoscopic camera concept but added a second and recovery With in the system, film capacity was increased to pounds (versus the capacity of the first few CORONA missions). The two-bucket system was designed to be deactivated stored in orbit in a passive (zombie) mode for up to days. This permitted the recovery of the first bucket after half of the film supply was exposed. The second bucket could begin immediately thereafter, or its start could be delayed for a few days. A major redesign of the command and control mechanisms was required to accommodate the more complicated mission of the hvo-bucket system. AS with each of the major modifications of CORONA, the J-l program had few early bugs. On the first mission, the shutter on the master horizon camera remained open about times fogging the adjacent panoramic failed in mid-flight, making it photography, and the AGENA current impossible to recover the second bucket. Also, the J-1 system experienced a rather severe heat problem, which solved by reducing the thermal sensitivity of the camera and by better control of skin temperature through shielding and varying the paint pattern. Back in and 1961, the successful recovery of a CORONA film bucket was an “event.” A mere two years later, with the advent of the J-1 system, success had become routine and a failure was’ an “event.” the end of systems had been launched; of them were put into orbit; and 64 buckets of were recovered. There were failures at recovery in the three years following 1966: 28 buckets were launched, and buckets were recovered. Also, mission duration was expanded during the lifetime of the J-1 system. A mission in June yielded four full days over target for each of the two buckets. Five days of operation with each bucket was attained in January In April 1966, the first bucket was recovered after seven days on orbit. A mission was achieved in August 1966, and this was increased to 15 days in June 1967. The increased mission life and record of recovery resulted from a number of successive improvements that were incorporated into the time period. Among them was a subsystem known as LIFEBOAT, a completely redundant and self-contained apparatus built into the AGENA that could be activated for recovering the SRV in event of an AGENA power failure (which still happened occasionally). Another improvement was the introduction of the new and more powerful booster. A third was the addition of a rocket orbit-adjust system. The CORONA vehicles were necessarily over the target areas with quite a perigee in order to increase the scale of the photography, and this led to a relatively rapid decay of the orbit. The adjust system compensated for the decay. It consisted of a cluster of rockets, known as drag make-up units, which were fired individually and at selected

Corona Each firing accelerated the vehicle slightly, boosting it back into its original orbit. A The CORONA camera system was to undergo one more major upgrading but cannot leave the program without giving an account of one mission failure of truly magnificent proportions. Program flight number 78 (CORONA Mission Number a two-bucket J-1 system, was launched on 27 April 1964. Launch and insertion into orbit were uneventful. The master panoramic camera operated satisfactorily through the first bucket, but the panoramic camera failed after 350 cycles when the broke. Then the AGENA power supply Vandenberg transmitted a normal recovery enable command on southbound revolution number 47 on April. The vehicle verified receipt of the command, but nothing happened.. The recovery command was repeated from various stations-in both the normal asd back-up LIFEBOAT recovery modes-on 26 subsequent passes extending through 20 May. The space vehicle repeatedly verified that it had received the commands, but the ejection sequence did not After 19 May, the no longer acknowledged receipt, and from 20 May on it was assumed that the space hardware of Mission was doomed to total incineration as tbe orbit decayed. But it later developed, had staged its own partial stubborn to the end. At six minutes past midnight on 26 May, with northbound revolution No. 452 of Mission observers in Maraca&o, Venein the sky. zuela saw five burning On 7 July, two farm workers found a battered golden object on a farm in mountain terrain near La in Tachira State, southwestern Venezuela, a couple miles from the Colombian horder. They reported to their employer, Facundo wha had them move it some yards onto his own farm and then spread the news of his find in hopes of selling it. Albarracin got no offers from the market in however-not even from the smugglers with access to Colombia-so he hacked and pried loose the radio transmitter and various pieces of the take-up assembly to use utensils or toys for the children. word of the find reached San the nearest town of any size. Among the curious who visited La was a commercial photographer, Leonardo who telephoned the U.S. Embassy in Caracas on 1 August that he had photographed a space object. It was the first bucket from Mission 1005, with one full spool of well-charred film clearly visible. A team of CORONA officers, ostensibly representing USAF, flew to Caracas to recover the remains. The capsule was lugged out by peasants to a point where the Venezuelan Defense Ministry could pick it up for flight to Caracas. There the CORONA officers bought the crumpled bucket from the Venezuelan ment, and quietly dismissed the event as an unimportant NASA space experiment gone awry. 33

I. (Continued) Corona The story rated only dozen lines in the Times of 5 August, but press a field day. of San the local with a lengthy report, published three pictures of the capsule showing the charred roll of film on the take-up spool. The handled the story in lighter vein with this parody of Longfellow: I shot an arrow into the air. It fell to I know not where. is it at you are?” Cape Kennedy Responded the rocket: The CORONA technicians who examined the after its arrival in the re-entry of the SRV a of orbit States concluded separation from the instrument caused by re-entry degeneration, cone was sheared during separation but retained by its forces. The harness long to act as a chute, preventing the capsule from burning up during re-entry and stabilizing it for a hard, nose-down landing. The Touches The final major modification of the CORONA system got under way in the when about a dozen and a of the two-bucket J-1 systems spring of had been The was performing but it had little potential for growth. new CORONA improvement program was begun with a series of meetings among representatives of Lockheed, General Electric, and the various CORONA program offices to examine ways of bettering the performance of the and cameras, and of ‘providing a more versatile command system. These were the resulting design goals established for a new camera: Improved photographic performance by removal of camera system oscillating members and reduction of vibration from other moving components. Improvement of tbe velocity-over-height match to reduce image smear. Improved photographic scale by accommodation of proper camera cycling rates at altitudes down to (the minimum J-I operating altitude was Elimination of camera failures caused by film pulling out of the guide rails (an occasional problem with the ‘J-1 system). Improved exposure control through variable slit selection. (The J-l system had a single exposure throughout the orbit resulting in poor performance at low sun angles. ) Capability of handling alternate film types and film loads. An in-flight changeable filter and film change detector was added for this purpose. of handling ultra-thin base film (yielding a increase in coverage with no increase in weight). The panoramic camera that was developed to meet those design goals was camera employed a known as the constant rotator. The predecessor C - I 34

I. (Continued) Corona of rotating lens cell and reciprocating camera members. In constant lens cell and the balance of the camera’s optical system is mounted rotator, in a drum, and the drum assembly is continuously rotated, thus eliminating the reciprocating elements from the camera system. The film is during a W-degree angular segment of the drum’s sweep. capability of using ultra-thin base (UTB) film was one of the design goals, but the camera design was not to be constrained by requirements to accommodate the thinner film. UTB was successfuUy flown on several flights but ground test results showed a loss of reliability and attempts to use it in rotator were eventully abandoned. In all other respects, however, the constant rotator a resounding success. It yielded substantially better ground resolution in the photography. also permitted versatility in operation far exceeding that available cameras. in the The stellar/index camera in use was a delicate instrument with a short (1.5”) focal-length and a history of erratic performance. The efforts at upgrading the stellar/index camera resulted in an instrument a 3” performance of focal length (like ARGON) and a dual-looking stellar element The new camera Stellar Index Camera, comhad the jaw-breaking designatian of Dual monly referred to by its acronym: The new payload system, which was designated the consisted of a pair of constant rotator panoramic cameras, a pair of horizon cameras, and a DISK. retained the stereo begun with the MURAL The J-3 system cameras and the two-bucket recovery concept of the J-l. Apart from the improved picture-taking of the hardware itself, the most significant adof vance of the J-3 was the flexibility it allowed in command and operations. Any conventional area search photographic reconnaissance system is film-limited. (When the film runs out, the mission is finished-assuming, of course, that other mission-limiting components of the system survive that long-) the ultimate goal of all the CORONA improvement efforts to pack the maximum of the possible quality of photography of important intelligence targets into each roll of exposed The built-in flexibility of the J-3 system increased the variety and degree of controls that could be applied to camera operations, thus substantially boosting the potential intelligence content of the photography. The first J-3 system was launched on 25 September 1967, and it proved to be the one major modification with no bugs in it. In its nearly five years of operahigher tion, it yielded even better photographic intelligence the remarkably successful predecessor J-l system, An early series of tests demonstrated the unusual flexibility of the J-3. not only accommodate a variety of film loads, including special detection color and high-speed, high-resolution black and white; camera had changeable filters and four changeable exposure slits on each camera. These tests drew such interest throughout the intelligence community that a convened by the Director of the CORONA J-3 Ad Hoc Committee was National Reconnaissance Office on 4 December 1967, and formally constituted February 1968. Its purpose was to analyze and evaluate the experiments

(Continued) on these five test flights. Specific findings of the Committee included the recommendations that further testing of color films and techniques should be conducted, against specific intelligence requirements and that a special subcommittee of the Committee on imagery Requirements and Exploitation (COMIREX) should be constituted to evaluate the utility of satellite color photography; and that a well-planned color program be worked out with close cooperation of the system program offices, the Satellite Operations Center (SOC), the intelligence analysts, and the photo interpreters. Looking back on CORONA, it is not always easy to keep in mind that it was merely an assemblage of inanimate objects designed and put together to perform a mechanical task. The program began as a short-term interim system, suffered through adversity in its formative years, and then survived in glory throughout a decade. Those who were associated with the program or came to depend upon its product an affection for the beast that bordered on the personal. They suffered with it in failure and in its successes. The technological improvements engineered under CORONA advanced the system in eight years from a single panoramic camera system having a design goal of 20 to 25 feet ground resolution and an orbital life of one day, to a twin camera panoramic system producing stereo-photography at the same ground ground resolution; then to a dual recovery system with an improvement resolution to approximately 7 to 10 feet, and doubling the film payload; and to the J-3 system -with a constant rotator camera, selectable exposure and filter controls, a life of 18 to days, and yielding nadir resolution of ‘feet. The totality of CORONA’s contributions to U.S. intelligence holdings on denied areas and to the U.S. space program in general is virtually unmeasurable. Its progress was marked by a series of notable firsts: the fist to recover objects from orbit, the fit to deliver intelligence information from a satellite, the first to produce stereoscopic satellite photography, the first to employ multiple reand the first reconnaissance program to pass the entry mission mark. By 1964, CORONA had photographed of the Soviet complexes then in existence; three months later it had photographed of them. The of CORONA to the U.S. intelligence effort given dimension by this statement in a 1968 intelligence report: new ICBM complexes have been established in the during the past year.” So unequivocal a could be made only because of the confidence held by the analysts that if they were there, CORONA photography would have disclosed them. CORONA coverage of the Middle East during the June war was of great value in estimating the relative military strengths of the opposing sides after the short combat period. Evidence of the extensive damage inflicted by the Israeli air attacks was produced by actual count of aircraft destroyed on the ground in Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The claims of the Israelis might have been discounted as exaggerations but for this timely photographic proof. 37

1. (Continued) Corona CORONA was called on to provide proof Israeli-Egyptian claims with regard to cease-fire compliance or violation. CORONA Mission 1111, July successfully carried out the directions for this coverage, launched on which brought the following praise from Dr. John Under Secretary of the Air Force and Director, NRO, who said in a message to the Director of Special Projects, on August 1970: _ I extend my sincere and a well done to you and your staff for your outstanding response to Community requirement. 1111 to 19 days, without benefit of solar panels, The extension of . . . and the change in the satellite orbit to permit of the Middle East on 10 provided which could be obtained any other means. This photography is as baseline for determining compliance with the Suez cease-fire provisions. CORONA’s Decade of Glory is now history. The first, the longest, and the most successful of the nation’s space recovery programs, CORONA explored and conquered the technological unknowns of space reconnaissance, lifted the curtain of secrecy that screened developments within the Soviet Union and Communist China, and opened the way for the even more sophisticated follow-on satellite reconnaissance systems. The 145th and final CORONA launch took on Slay the final recovery on 31 May 1972. was the 165th recovery in the CORONA program, more than the total of all of the other U.S. programs combined. provided photographic coverage of approximately square nautical miles of the earth’s surface. This dramatic achievement was surpassed only by intelligence derived from the photography. In placing a value the intelligence obtained by the U.S. through its photographic satellite programs between and 1970, a first consideration, on the positive side, would be that it had made it possible for the President in office to react more wisely to crucial international situations with the knowledge provided by these programs. Conversely, it can be said that without the intelligence which this program furnished, might have misguidedly been pressured into a World Wax The intelligence collected by the reconnaissance programs makes a vital contribution to the National Intelligence Estimates upon which the defense of the are based. Principal among U.S. and the strategic plans of the military those estimates are the ones which deal the Soviet and Chinese Communist strategic weapons, space, and nuclear energy programs. The intelligence from overhead reconnaissance heavily not only in planning our defense, but also in programming and budgeting for it, helps to avoid the kind of floundering that occurred during the time of the projection Gap.” Without the kind of intelligence which the CORONA of the gram provided, the U.S. budget for the defense of our own territory,’ and For assistance to our allies, would doubtless have been increased by The total cost for activities of both the Air Force and the CIA over the period was The CORONA program was so efficiently managed that even the qualification models each series were refurbished and flown. As a result, there little 38

(Continued) Corona hardware available at the termination of the program when it was suggested that a museum display should be set up to illustrate and to preserve this program. Using recovered hardware from flight, developmental models from the J-3 program, and photographic records from the memorable was set up in Washington, C. In his flights, a classified museum Richard Helms, the Director of Central speech dedicating the Museum, Intelligence said: It was confidence in the ability of intelligence to monitor compliance with the Arms Limithe commitments that enabled President Nixon to enter tation and to sign Limitation Treaty. Much, but no means all, the intelligence to verify compliance with SALT will come from CORONA, the program which pioneered the way in satellite reconnaissance, deserves the place history which we “A Decade of as the display is entitled, must for the present remain classified. We hope, however, that as the world grows to accept it can be transferred to the Smithsonian Then the can view this work, and then the men of CORONA. like the Wright Brothers, can be recognized for the role they played in the shaping of 39

14. (Continued) SUMMARY Mission 9009 was accomplished on 18 August 1960. It consists of eight south passes over the USSR and includes portions of China, the and Yugoslavia (see accompanying coverage map). percent of the coverage is cloud free, with Approximately scattered to covering the remainder of the photography, The of the coverage ranges from good to very good. PI of the photography is estimated to range from to The Average ground resolution is in the order of 20 to 30 feet on a side. Major items of intelligence significance covered by Mission 9009 include the Yar Missile Test Range the western of the presumed 1,050 area of the newly identified hexadic SA-2 surface-to-air missile sites and six possible SA-2 sites under construction, the Sarova Nuclear Weapons Research and Development Center, several new airfields, and numerous urban complexes. 120

14. (Continued) No WAC 17924w 01 65 5-A 67 2-A 0 1 67 3 0 1 93 8 CONSTRUCTION ACTIVITY AND OTHER ACTIVITY ROAD LOCATED AT POLUNOCHNOYE S C 100 1 NEW RR SPUR CONST NUMEROUS SPURS9 THREE GROUPS OF 15 NM SW KONOSHA C 102 MYS SHMIDTA A/F C U R A / F PROB HARD SURFACED DUDEVO A/F c I ON 8 NM SW OF R 25 6438N 05542E 13 ADJACENT TO R .. SC 1 3-c 102 24 102 11 3 6048N 04000E 11 1 2 AREA 1 NM N OF S C NYANDOMA 0 4 0 1 3 E 1 2 S C 0 4 0 1 5 E 1 2 102 NEW RR CONSTRUCTION AREAS NO A/F NOTED C STORAGE INSTALLATION NEW ROADS AND OTHER CONSTR ACTIVITY S C NYANDOMA 4 AND AREA GROUND SCARING, NEW ROAD LOCATED 3 NM SW NYANDOMA 28 SC -- 121 102 25 102 11-A 0 4 1 0 % 1 3 1 :

14. (Continued) SUBJECT INDEX AT INSTRUMENTATION SITE 5 A/F AT INSTRUMENTATION SITE 6 ABAKAN ABGANEROVO ACHINSK ALEKSEYEVSKOYE ARZAMAS AYAN SE CHOP DE-KASTRI DE-KASTRI SEAPLANE BASE DUDEVO DZHAMBUL W DZHEZKAZGAN SEAPLANE STATION N KAMYSHIN KAMYSHIN NE YAR KOMSOMOLSK KOMSOMOLSK E KOMSOMOLSK KORSAKOV KOSTROMA KYZYLAGACH 122

(Continued) -CZECHOSLOVAKIAOF MICHALOVCE I STORAGE AREA DRAGASANI SMEDEROVO PETROLEUM STORAGE SMEDEROVO W PETROLEUM STORAGE -MILITARY INSTALLATIONS-USSRADADYM AMMO DEPOT ARYS CW STORAGE MILITARY INSTALLATION AMMO STGE INSTALLATION AMMO DEPOT W MIL AREA EXPLOSIVES STORAGE SSE OF KOVROV EXPLOSIVE5 STORAGE OF SHUYA EXPLOSIVES STORAGE W OF MUROM FROLISHCHEVA PUSTYA AMMO STORAGE LAGER CW TNG CENTER KAMYSHIN OFFICERS TANK TRNG SCHOOL KOMSOMOLSK AMMO STORAGE AMMO STORAGE MIL PROCESSING9 STORAGE N OF ARZAMAS AMMO STORAGE DEPOT SE OF AMMUNITION NAVOLOKI EXPLOSIVES STORAGE NEREKHTA AMMO DEPOT9 ARMY AND AREA ARMORED TRNG AREA MUKACHEVO MEL SSE OF RYAZAN EXPLOSIVE AREA U/C WNW OF KASI EXPLOSIVES SOVETSKAYA GAVAN AMMO STORAGE STORAGE AREA SOVETSKAYA GAVAN SOVETSKAYA GAVAN SUPPLY DEPOT9 5 AMMO AREA STORAGE AREA ESE OF 123

14. (Continued) APPENDIX Explanation of Codes Used in the JMCI Individual items are, in general, arranged according scheme. 1. the following Index (First Line) Country: The country is designated by the two-letter code used in . b. Installation: The name will he given, if known. If not, the installation will be titled according to an associated geographic name or according to obvious use, such as storage area, instrumentation station, etc. The when known, will be given. C. Target Number: PIC Target numbers are comprised of the WAC number for the area in which the installation two elements : lies, and (2) a numerical designation (occasionally followed by capital letters) for the specific target within that WAC area. For example, 246-6 designates target number 6 in WAC 246. d. Coordinates: Coordinates are given to the nearest minute for the approximate center of the installation. e. Subject: Thirteen categories are used; they are as follows: 1. Airfields 2. Atomic Energy 3. Electronics and Telecommunications 4. Industry 5. Liquid Fuels 6. Military Installations Missiles 8. Naval Installations 9. Ports and Harbors 10. Storage Facilities, General 124

14. (Continued) 11. 13. 2. Transportation Urban Areas Miscellaneous Significant Information A very brief statement of significant information in connection with the installation will appear in the second and subsequent lines. 3. Photo Reference (Last Line) This line is best explained by using an example HC 3 designates the pass number. 729-31 shows the frame numbers. gives the Universal Reference Grid coordinates of the installation on frame 730. HC - This designation indicates cloud conditions as they exist over the installation. The code used is as follows: C Clear SC Scattered Clouds Heavy Clouds 0 Overcast H Haze (includes smoke, blowing snow and dust) CS Cloud (cloud shadows cast on ground reducing interpretability) 125

National Intelligence Estimate, 1 I -8/l -6 1, “Strength and Deployment of Soviet Long Range Ballistic Missile Forces,” 2 1 September 196 1 21 September NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE - 61 NUMBER STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET LONG RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES (SUPPLEMENTS NIE 11 - 8 - Submitted by the DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE following intelligence participated in the preparation of this estimate: The Agency and intelligence organizations of the Departments State, the Army, the Navy, the Air Farce, The Joint Staff, Agency, the Atomic Energy Commission. the Concurred in by the UNITED-STATES INTELLIGENCE on September 1961. were of Intelligence and search, of State; the Assistant Chief of Staff for DepartAssistant Chief of Operations for Dement of of Navy; Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, the rector for The Staff; the Atomic Energy Commission to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special and the Director of the Security Agency. The Assistant tor, Federal of Investigation, abstained, the subject being of jurisdiction. 127

title of this estimate when used separately from the text should be classified:- White House National Security Council Department of State Department of Defense Atomic Energy Commission Federal Bureau of Investigation 128

NATIONAL ESTIMATE NIE STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OF SOVIET LONG RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILE FORCES" 11 - 8 - 61) THE PROBLEM To estimate current Soviet operational strength in and other or more, to ground-launched ballistic missiles with ranges of 700 identify present areas and methods of deployment, and to estimate the probable trends in strength and over the next few years. NIE revises and updates the estimates on this subject which were made in NIE 11-8-61: “Soviet Capabilities for Long Range TOP SECRET, 7 June 1961. It supplements the program appended to NIE 1 l-8-61 in Annexes summary of evidence and analysis on the Soviet and D (TOP SECRET CODEWORD). e new estimate is issued at CODEWORD classification SO that the reader fully appreciate the quantity and quality of information on which it is based. A brief summary of this estimate, at non-CODEWORD classification, will be included in the 11-4-61: Soviet Capabilities and Policies, now schedforthcoming uled for completion in December 1961. In that estimate, the treatment ground launched missiles will be incorporated into a summary of the entire Soviet long-range capability, including bombers, air-to-surface missiles, and submarine-launched missiles. For our current estimates on 11-4-61, Annex A: “Soviet Military these latter elements of the long range striking force, see Forces and Capabilities”, 24 August 1961, TOP SECRET, paragraphs 16-23. 129

CONCLUSIONS New information, providing a much firmer base for estimates on Soviet long range ballistic missiles, has caused a sharp downward revision in our estimate of present Soviet ICBM strength but strongly supports our estimate of medium range missile strength. 2. We now estimate that the present Soviet ICBM strength is in the range of - 25 launchers from which missiles can be fired against the US, and that this force level will not increase markedly during the months We also estimate that the USSR now has about immediately ahead. 250-300 operational launchers equipped with 700 and 1,100 n.m. ballistic. missiles. The bulk of these MRBM launchers are in western USSR, within range of NATO targets in Europe; others are in southern USSR and in the and MRBM launchers probably have sufficient Soviet Far East. missiles to provide a reload capability and to fire additional missiles after a period of some hours, assuming that rhe launching facilities are not damaged by accident or attack. 3. The low present and near-term ICBM force level probably results chiefly from a decision to deploy only a small force of the cumberand to press the development of a smaller, some, first generation second generation system. Under emergency conditions the existing force could be supplemented somewhat during the first half of 1962, but Soviet probably not increase substantially until the new misICBM strength sile is ready for operational use, probably sometime in the latter half of 1962. After this point, we anticipate that the number of operational launchers will begin increase significantly. On this basis, we estimate that the force level in mid- 1963 will approximate 75-125 operational launchers. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF, does not concur in this sentence. See his footnote following the Conclusions. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, the Conclusions. note does not concur in paragraph 130 See his loot-

(Continued) 4. In addition to 700 and 1,100 n.m. missiles now available, the USSR ready for operational use late will probably have a 2,000 combined strength in these this year or early next year. The probably reach operational launchers in missile categories the 1962-1963 period, and then level off. 5. Soviet professions of greatly enhanced striking power thus derive European and other primarily from a massive capability to Although Soviet propaganda has assiduously pheral targets, an image of great ICBM strength, the bulk of the USSR’s present capability is in bombers and submarine-launched missiles rather to attack the force poses a grave than in a large ICBM force. While the present of US urban areas, it represents only a limited threat threat to a to US-based nuclear striking forces. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, does not concur in paragraph 3 and the last sentence of paragraph 5. See his footnote following the Conclusions. 131

Position on ICBM levels of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF: The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF believes that the Soviets had about 50 operational ICBM launchers in mid-1961 and that they will have about in mid-1962 and about 250 in mid-1963. In his view, the early availability and high performance record of the first generation indicates the that, by mid-1961, substantial numbers of these missiles had been deployed on operational Four considerations weigh heavily in this judgment: a. The continuance of firings of the first generation b. The feasibility of adapting the type pad use the first generation system; the field - d. The USSR’s current aggressive now identified as being deployed in indicates a substantial capability. passed since the first generation system became suitable for 2. In view of the time that operational deployment, now over’ 18 months, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF beoperational launchers in mid-1961 is likely, though the Soviets may have lieves that about elected to await development of second generation missiles before undertaking ment. 3. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF believes that the force now stitutes a serious threat to nuclear striking forces. con- 4. As to the future, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF believes that the Soviets will to deploy first generation missiles, as an interim measure until the second generation missiles become available. He believes that the Soviets would prefer this approach to acceptance of an inordinate delay in the growth of their capabilities. Once the second generation system has become which could be in early 1962, he believes that deployment will be accelerated, with first generation missiles being withdrawn from operational complexes and replaced by the new missiles. It is evident from their test program that the Soviets feel obliged to increase the tempo of their efforts. The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, USAF believes that this sense of urgency, plus the gains realizable from experience will result, in the next year or two, in a launcher deployment program more accelerated that in the