SNIE 85-3-62: the estimate that ruled out missiles in Cuba (1962)

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY CIA Documents on the CuBAN MISSILE QCrisis 1962 Editor ! Mary S. McAuliffe CIA History Staff October 1992 [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

33. Special National Intelligence Estimate 85-3-62 “The Military Buildup in Cuba,” 19 September 1962 (Excerpt) SPECIAL NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE NUMBER 85-3-62 The Military Buildup in Cuba 19 September 1962 [REDACTED] [REDACTED]

33. (Continued) THE MILITARY BUILDUP IN CUBA THE PROBLEM To assess the strategic and political significance of the recent military buildup in Cuba and of the possible future development of additional military capabilities there. CONCLUSIONS A. We believe that the USSR values its position in Cuba primarily for the political advantages to be derived from it, and consequently that the main purpose of the present mili- tary buildup in Cuba is to strengthen the Communist regime there against what the Cubans and the Soviets conceive to be a danger that the US may attempt by one means or an- other to overthrow it. The Soviets evidently hope to deter any such attempt by enhancing Castro's defensive capabili- ties and by threatening Soviet military retaliation. At the same time, they evidently recognize that the development of an offensive military base in Cuba might provoke US military intervention and thus defeat their present purpose. (Paras. 1-11) B. In terms of military significance, the current Soviet deliveries are substantially improving air defense and coastal defense capabilities in Cuba. Their political significance is that, in conjunction with the Soviet statement of 11 Septem- ber, they are likely to be regarded as ensuring the continua- tion of the Castro regime in power, with consequent discour- agement to the opposition at home and in exile. The threat inherent in these developments is that, to the extent that the Castro regime thereby gains a sense of security at home, “SECRET 1

33. (Continued) -Sterer’ it will be emboldened to become more aggressive in fomenting revolutionary activity in Latin America. (Paras. 18-21) C. as the buildup continues, the USSR may be tempted to establish in Cuba other weapons represented to be defen- sive in purpose, but of 2 more “offensive” character: e.g., light bombers, submarines, and additional types of short- range surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs). aA decision to provide such weapons will continue to depend heavily on the Soviet estimate as to whether they could be introduced without provoking a US military reaction. (Paras. 22~28) D. The USSR could derive considerable military advan- tage from the establishment of Soviet medium and inter- ! mediate range ballistic missiles in Cuba, or from the estab- lishment of 2 Soviet submarine base there. As between these two, the establishment of a submarine base would be the more likely. Either development, however, would be in- compatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in US-Soviet relations than the USSR has_ displayed thi thus far, and consequently wore have a age policy SnUeApen mpi reipesiets (Paras. 29-33) E. The Latin American reaction will be to the evidence of an increased Soviet commitment to Cuba, rather than to the technical implications of the military buildup. Many Latin Americans will fear and resent a Soviet military intru- ston into the Hemisphere, but will regard the problem as one to be met by the US and not their responsibility. We esti- mate the chances are better now than they were at Punta de) Este to obtain the necessary two-thirds OAS majority for sanctions and other steps short of direct military action aimed at Cuba If it vecame clear that the USSR was establishing an “offensive” base in Cube, most Latin Ameri- can governments would expect the US to eliminate it, by whatever means were necessary, out many of them would still seek to avoid direct involvement. (Paras, 3+37) Reverse Blank [REDACTED] [REDACTED]