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# CLANDESTINE SERVICES HISTORY

# THE BERLIN TUNNEL OPERATION

## 1952 - 1956

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## PREFACE

PBJOINTLY (the Berlin Tunnel project) came into being sometime in 1952 (the exact date cannot be established) and ceased as an active operation in the summer of 1956. The writer served as Headquarters case officer on the project from the winter of 1952-1953 until the summer of 1954 and then as the field case officer until February 1955.

[redacted] a senior Office of Communications officer in the project; Mr. William K. Harvey, Chief, Berlin Operating Base, 1952-1958; and [redacted] Chief, FI/Division D, 1952-1958, were intimately associated with the planning and implementation of the project at the policy level and very kindly offered suggestions for the preparation of this manuscript. Their comments have been incorporated and are greatly appreciated. Several other individuals, [redacted] who were in a position to offer valuable advice were absent from Headquarters during the period the paper was being prepared and thus unavailable to assist.

When this project was first discussed with the then Director of CIA, Mr. Allen Welsh Dulles, he ordered that, in the interests of security, as little as possible concerning the project would be reduced to writing. It is probable that few orders have been so conscientiously obeyed, and yet there

are a great many cubic feet of files connected with this project. These files mainly concern technical and administrative matters. Only those details which, in the opinion of the writer, are necessary to a broad understanding of the manner in which the project's objectives were accomplished have been included in this paper. Those interested in additional data may wish to consult the files.

In addition to setting forth significant developments, the writer has attempted to provide insight into the reasons for certain courses of action. At times this required a speculative approach. The judgments derived from such speculation were shared by all those actively concerned in the management of the project, and it is the writer's hope that they are accurately expressed in the following paper. Any error in this respect, however, is the sole responsibility of the writer.

[redacted]

August, 1967

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## I. INTRODUCTION

The exact moment when the idea emerged of digging a tunnel to intercept Soviet and East German communications is somewhat obscure. A number of factors must be considered, among them the following:

a. As early as 1948 U.S. Intelligence Officers became interested in the benefits to be derived from tapping Soviet and Satellite landlines on a scale not previously considered necessary. The loss of certain sources during this period created gaps in our intelligence coverage which were particularly unfortunate during this period of Cold War escalation. It became evident that the tapping of certain selected landlines might produce the information needed to fill a number of the gaps in our overall intelligence picture.

b. In the late 1940's and early 1950's the U.S., through the briefings of "returnee" German scientists (those who were taken by the Soviets after World War II to work in Russia) and other sources, became aware of a new Soviet voice secrecy device which the Soviets referred to usually as "VHE CHE." [1/] It soon became evident that

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1/ In normal usage "VHE CHE" means "high frequency". The Soviets, however, in context, used this term for a special speech scrambling device developed to provide security to their high level communications.

the Soviets planned [redacted]

c. In the late 1940's the Office of Communications, in the course of its continuing efforts to provide secure communications for the Agency, became aware of a principle which, when applied to target communications, offered certain possibilities. Plans to exploit this technique were immediately formulated.

These factors then served as additional incentives (above and beyond our normal collection requirements) to focus attention on Soviet landline targets. In mid-1951 exploratory discussions were held in Washington to plan the mounting of an attack on Soviet landlines in East Germany with special emphasis to be placed on the Berlin area. As a result of this conference, [redacted] an agent network was set up which was successful in penetrating the East Berlin office of the East German Post and Telecommunications network.

Vital information [redacted] first became available [redacted]

during the latter part of 1951, and by March 1952 all of the pertinent technical material had been assembled and sufficiently analyzed to permit the pinpointing of the most important Soviet circuits. Subsequent events proved this information to be completely correct.

Various methods of tapping these circuits were explored and one sampling operation was run in the East Zone, unfortunately with negative results. By January 1953, however, the effectiveness of the penetration network had become such that a 15-minute sample was obtained of the prime target circuit. This was accomplished by cable pair to the West Berlin Post Office where it was recorded. This operation continued for some six months for a total of almost two hours. The longest continuous sample obtained was 29 minutes and most samples were of two to three minutes' duration. Special mention should be made of the fact that it was necessary to maintain a 24-hour watch over a six-month period on "our" end of the cable to record these


samples [redacted]

Meantime collateral collection effort continued on the communications systems involved and the Office of Communications developed techniques for recovering the text from the magnetic tape recordings of the target signal. Somewhat ironically, the first actual material recovered proved to be a recording of a student teletypist practicing on the "home keys". While perhaps disappointing from the standpoint of intelligence content, this material served to prove the technical possibility [redacted]

At this point (mid-1953) we knew it could be done - the next step was the problem of installing a permanent tap on the target lines.

Precisely at what point the idea of a tunnel for the purpose of tapping the target cables began to come into focus cannot be pinpointed.' In 1951, the British advised CIA that they had for some years been tapping Soviet cables through a system of tunnels in the Vienna area and offered to share the take with the U.S. The suggestion was made by the British at

the time that similar opportunities might be present in the Berlin area. While it should perhaps be possible to credit one individual with the initial concept, it appears to be a bit difficult to do so. At any rate, the British and CIA continued to pool collateral information, and by May 1953 [redacted] the idea of a tunnel to tap the target cables began to take definite shape.



## II. PLANNING

Inspection of all sites from which it might be possible to tunnel from the U.K. or the U.S. Zones to the target cables served to narrow the choices to two spots: one in the British and one in the U.S. Zone. The site actually used (see figs. 1, 2, and 3) was selected after careful deliberation which included, but was not limited to, the following factors:

a. The location of the permanent water table (which is normally relatively high in Berlin) was ascertained to be 32 feet below ground surface. It was considered that this fact would obviate the necessity for the use of compressed air, watertight locks, and watertight construction with a corresponding reduction in the attendant engineering problems.

b. The length of the tunnel was considered to be not impractical although it far exceeded anything which had been done by the British in Vienna.

c. Land was available on which to construct an installation from which to begin the tunnel.

d. Complete collateral information on the area was available, including the target cable plans, aerial photographs, and the plans for all utilities serving the area.





Figure 1 - Map of Berlin





Figure 1 - Map of Berlin




Figure 3 - Aerial View of Rudow Section, Berlin

At this point the following major questions remained unanswered:

a. Was it indeed possible to dig a tunnel of this magnitude (approximately 1500 feet) clandestinely, considering the fact that the border at this point was heavily and constantly patrolled by the East Germans, and hit the targets?

b. If the answer to the above was favorable, what was to be done with the spoil (reckoned at approximately 3,000 tons of sand)?

c. What type of cover installation could be built in such a remote area (this portion of Berlin was at that time a "squattersville" of shacks and hovels constructed from rubble by refugees from the East German Zone)?


In retrospect the first question, "Could the tunnel be dug?", was never really a debatable one---those concerned more or less decided that given sufficient money and personnel the job could be done. (This judgment fortunately proved sound.) The second question, "Where do we put the dirt?", haunted the minds of project personnel for many weeks and a great many ingenious ideas were brought forth and discarded for one reason or another until the suggestion was made facetiously that we "dig a hole and put the dirt in it." This in effect was the solution. At this time no convincing cover story had

suggested itself and the current consensus favored making the cover compound an element of the Quartermaster Corps with a rather vague mission of housing items that should be dispersed for one reason or another in a remote area of Berlin. Space requirements for the recording and associated equipment were such that a building of warehouse proportions was needed; so it was decided to build a two-story warehouse. Local engineers were told that it had been decided to experiment with a new type of warehouse, one which would be half above the ground and half below with a ramp suitable for running fork lift trucks from the basement to the first floor. Berlin had been selected as the site for this warehouse because (a) construction would be cheap due to low labor rates and (b) the work would benefit the Berlin economy. So the basement was dug under the eyes of the local border guards and we had "our hole to put the dirt in." 2/ (See fig. 4.)

While the "warehouse cover" was adjudged sufficient to solve the temporary problems of construction, it was not deemed solid enough to carry the project for an extended period. At this particular time the intelligence community was becoming increasingly interested in the potential of [redacted]

2/ As an interesting sidelight, we heard later that the Quartermaster Corps became seriously interested in this type construction because the ratio of cost to storage space available was amazingly low. We do not know if any follow-up ever occurred.

Figure 4 - Dirt in the Basement



[redacted] For example:

a. Excuse was provided for maintaining extraordinary physical security and tight compartmentation. [redacted] in the Top Secret category at this period in its evolution.)

[redacted]

c. Legitimate targets [redacted] existed in the area.

d. The existence [redacted] at the site provided the opposition with an explanation for the site's existence. In spite of the fact that any form of [redacted] presents a priority target, it was argued that presenting the opposition with a reason for the site's existence would make it a less prominent target than leaving it a "mysterious something." The

site did in fact [redacted] In addition, the sight of the Soviets and East Germans standing on top of the tunnel with binoculars focused [redacted] on the roof of the installation provided considerable amusement to personnel at the site. (See fig. 5.)

Joint U.S.-U.K. planning for the project continued throughout 1953 and in December of that year the Director of Central Intelligence approved the terms of reference which covered formal negotiations with the British for the implementation of the project. A series of conferences in late 1953 and early 1954 led to the following decisions:

a. The U.S. would:

(1) procure a site, erect the necessary structures, and drive a tunnel to a point beneath the target cables;

(2) be responsible for the recording of all signals produced [redacted] and

(3) process in Washington all of the telegraphic material received from the project.

b. The British would:

(1) drive a vertical shaft from the tunnel's end to the targets;

Figure 5 = Vopos Studying the Installation



Figure 5 - Vopos Studying the Installation

(2) effect the cable taps and deliver a usable signal to the head of the tunnel for recording; and

(3) provide for a jointly manned U.S.-U.K. center in London to process the voice recordings from the site.

It was jointly agreed that each side would keep the other advised in detail on all aspects of the project. It should perhaps be said here that the bilateral aspects of this operation (with one notable exception which will be discussed later (see BLAKE, page 23)) caused few, if any, problems. The skills developed by the British during the Vienna operations stood us in good stead and the distribution of effort and expense proved in the end to be reasonably equitable.

Activity thus proceeded on three fronts - in Berlin steps were taken to lease the necessary land and right-of-way easements for the site and a contract was let with a German contractor. The compound, which was roughly the size of an average city block, was fenced with chain-type high security fencing and contained the main operations building (the one story with basement type warehouse previously described), combined kitchen-dining facilities and barracks, and another building which housed three diesel driven generators to provide power for all facilities. (See fig. 6.) Sanitary

Figure 6 - East German View of the Compound




Figure 6 - East German View of the Compound

provisions consisted of a cesspool. (The logical placement of the cesspool was such that it was situated only a few feet from the tunnel site. It later developed when the tunnel was dug that this was quite unfortunate because working conditions in the sector adjacent to the cesspool were, to say the least, highly unpleasant.) Planning called for the completion of this work on 27 August 1954.

For assistance in actually digging the tunnel it was decided to request help from the Army Corps of Engineers, and to this end the Chief of Staff and the G-2, U.S. Army, were briefed on the project. The initial contact with the Army was made personally by Mr. Allen Dulles to General Matthew B. Ridgway. Fortunately General Arthur Trudeau, a trained engineer, had just been appointed A.C. of S., G-2. From the first moment he learned of the operation, General Trudeau was an enthusiastic supporter of the concept. The Army selected Lt. Colonel Leslie M. Gross (the only available member of the Engineering Corps with any experience in tunneling) to head the project. This proved to be an excellent choice for Lt. Colonel Gross turned in an outstanding job. By mid-summer of 1954 he had firmed up the engineering plans, selected a crew of engineering personnel, and actually constructed a mock-up tunnel some 150 yards long working under operational conditions at a high security base

Some mention should be made of the actual method of constructing the tunnel. Studies of the soil structure in the Berlin area showed a high percentage of sand. For this reason it was decided that the tunnel should be lined with steel. The same sand content contributed greatly to the danger of cave-ins at the face of the tunnel, and to eliminate this risk a shield was devised (see figs. 7 and 8) with horizontal "blinds" so arranged across its face that should even dry sand be encountered the danger of cave-ins was virtually eliminated. The tunnel liner was formed of sections of heavy steel plate so constructed that, when bolted together, five sections formed a steel ring approximately six feet in diameter and 15 inches long. Provision was made for bolting these rings together to form a continuous tube of solid steel. The men worked under cover of the shield described above (which was slightly larger in diameter than the steel liner) and when sufficient material had been excavated, the shield was forced forward with hydraulic jacks and a new section of liner was bolted in place. Since this method left a void of approximately one and one-half inches around the liner (remembering that the diameter of the shield was greater than that of the liner), screw-type removable plugs were built into every third section of tunnel liner. This permitted removal of the plugs and the forcing of grouting material under high pressure to fill the void

Figure 7 - Blinds on the Shield



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Figure 7 - Blinds on the Shield

Figure 8 - Excavating Using the Blinds






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Figure 8 - Excavating Using the Blinds

after the liner was in place. It was calculated (and subsequently proven to be true) that this method of construction would not permit settling of the soil and detection of the tunnel from the surface. (See fig. 9.)

Meantime in the U.K. British engineers constructed a mock-up of the tunnel's terminal end and fabricated an ingenious device which worked in principle like the tunnel "shield" described above, with the difference, of course, that the blinds (which closely resembled a conventional venetian blind) were horizontal but so hinged as to permit vertical excavation. This permitted excavating cautiously across the upper face of the vertical shaft in small areas and then jacking the entire structure up at the optimum rate. (See fig. 10.) Available plans indicated that the cables were buried some 27 inches deep along the side of a heavily traveled highway. The top of the vertical shaft (see fig. 11) then needed to be approximately 12 to 14 inches below the surface of the highway in order to give the tapping crew room to work below the ceiling of the shaft, and the whole structure had to be capable of supporting the weight of heavy trucks since the tunnel and tap chamber lay directly beneath the highway. (See fig. 12.) Considerable care was devoted to insulating the

Figure 9 - View of the Completed Tunnel




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Figure 9 - View of the Completed Tunnel

Figure 10 - Construction of the Vertical Shaft





Figure 10 - Construction of the Vertical Shaft




Figure 11

Completed Vertical Shaft



Figure 12

View of Cables and Taps

tap chamber to prevent its acting like a huge drum. [3/]

Considerable thought was given to the quantity and content of the material available from the target and the manner in which it was to be processed. It was in this field, perhaps, that we experienced some of our greatest problems. It had been decided very early in the project's planning stages to maintain the strictest possible security measures. As a minimum precaution security checks were made on each individual who in any way became knowledgeable of the project's mission, and the same standards in force for clearances for Special Intelligence were utilized. A list of briefed personnel was maintained, special secrecy agreements were executed, and special briefings were given to all knowledgeable personnel. It was in the assemblage of a processing team that we experienced our greatest problem in maintaining security standards. Since the material to be processed was largely Russian voice, it was thought that we would need linguists with near native fluency in Russian. It is axiomatic that native fluency is usually available only in natives, and

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[3/] In spite of the insulation, it was a weird sensation to be in the chamber when an iron-shod horse trotted across it. We also suffered some anxious moments one foggy morning when the microphone in the tap chamber gave forth with a continuous series of dull thuds. After the sun burned away the fog, visual observation showed that the East German police had set up a temporary automobile checkpoint directly over the chamber. The "thuds" the microphone picked up were caused by the police officer in charge stomping his feet on the road surface to keep warm.

natives were not clearable for the project. Although we were never successful in obtaining as many linguists as we needed, we were successful, through careful screening and intensive language training, in assembling a minimum crew for the job. This necessitated screening each personnel file in the Agency of those individuals who claimed any knowledge of German or Russian, arranging interviews and language tests, and negotiating transfers to the project. The Agency's language capabilities then were considerably less than now and some of the negotiations proved, to say the least, difficult.

## III. IMPLEMENTATION

By 17 August 1954 things were beginning to take shape and the situation was as follows:

a. The German contractors had completed the compound and we were in possession.

b. All of the basic supplies, equipment, and personnel were in Berlin ready to start construction on the tunnel. This in itself involved transporting 125 tons of steel tunnel liner from the ZI to Berlin. The initial shipment across the East Zone to Berlin consisted of one and one-half freight trains, the loss of any package of which could have blown the project. For security purposes all sensitive items, such as the tunnel liner, were double crated and banded and subjected to severe drop tests before they left the ZI. Similar items were differently packaged for deception purposes.

c. Space at Headquarters was secured and the Office of Communications had assembled a crew and was well under way in fabricating the unique equipment necessary to process the anticipated telegraphic traffic.

d. Initial personnel had been selected and were being processed for both the Main Processing Unit (MPU) in London and the Technical Processing Unit (TPU) in

Washington. It should be noted that personnel and equipment were programmed initially to exploit approximately ten percent of the anticipated take. In retrospect, perhaps this could be considered overly cautious. In justification of this decision it should be said that no one had ever tunneled 1,476 feet under clandestine conditions with the expectation of hitting a target two inches in diameter and 27 inches below a main German/Soviet highway. There were those who manifested certain reservations on the feasibility of so doing, and it is greatly to the credit of those senior officials, both civilian and military, that, in spite of these reservations, the project was permitted to proceed.

In late August a vertical shaft some 16 feet in diameter was started in the warehouse basement floor (see fig. 13) and ground water was encountered at 16 feet instead of at the predicted 32 feet. Such examination as could be safely undertaken under the steady observation of East German border guards and Soviet officials indicated that a clay lens existed in this particular spot, creating a "perched water table" the magnitude of which was unknown. Available information indicated that the clay lens possibly sloped down in the direction of the target and it was decided to proceed with the tunnel even though the top cover was to be less than half what had been anticipated.

Figure 13 - Shaft and Tunnel Entrance in Warehouse Basement




Figure 13

Shaft and Tunnel Entrance in Warehouse Basement

Careful visual observation was maintained and tunneling operations stopped each time the German guards walked over the tunnel on their regular patrols. Pumps were installed to take care of the excess water. Observation logs were maintained, and since the highway under observation was the main road from East Berlin to the Schoenfeld Airport, considerable Order of Battle information was obtained. It was also possible to estimate quite accurately the relative importance of individuals visiting East Berlin by observing the security precautions taken by the East Germans and the Soviets.

Both sides of the tunnel were lined with sand in bags as the tunnel proceeded and the excess spoil was hauled back to the basement of the warehouse. To facilitate movement, a wooden track was laid on the floor of the tunnel and a converted electric fork lift was used to pull a string of rubber-tired trailers back and forth in the tunnel. (See fig. 14.) Cool air was supplied to the face of the tunnel through ductwork from an air conditioning unit located in the warehouse. The tunnel was completed on 28 February 1955. Construction of the tap chamber commenced 10 March 1955 and was completed, with the three target cables exposed, on 28 March 1955. (See fig. 15.)

To appreciate this accomplishment it is necessary to remember that the tunnel was 1,476 feet long (roughly the

Figure 14 - Converted Fork Lift and Dirt Box




Figure 14

Converted Fork Lift and Dirt Box

Figure 15 - Target Cables Exposed




Figure 15


Target Cables Exposed

length of the Lincoln Memorial reflecting pool) and that the first half sloped down and the second half sloped up. (See fig. 16.) The lack of an adequate base line made the surveying problem especially difficult. The engineers decided at one point that an object of known size in the East Zone would be useful as a reference point, so a baseball game was organized with the objective of knocking a baseball as far into the East Zone as possible. This scheme was frustrated by the friendliness of the East German guards who kept returning the baseball. Nonetheless, the engineers expressed confidence that they knew their position when the tunnel was completed to a point which could be contained in a six-inch cube. They were correct.

Excess humidity is probably one of the greatest enemies of electronic equipment. To guard against this problem the section of the tunnel immediately adjacent to the tap chamber was insulated and sealed with marine-type plywood to form, in effect, a closed room. (See figs. 17 and 18.) Vapor barriers were erected and, in addition, a heavy "anti-personnel" door of steel and concrete was constructed to seal off the tunnel some 15 yards from its terminal end. From the beginning it was realized that the duration of this operation was finite. Considerable thought was given to the posture the U.S. Government would adopt upon the tunnel's discovery and to those

Figure 16 - Schematic View of Tunnel

(NOT TO SCALE - VERTICAL EXAGGERATED - DIMENSIONS APPROXIMATE)




SCHEMATIC VIEW

Figure 16

NOT TO SCALE
VERTICAL EXAGGERATED
DIMENSIONS APPROXIMATE

Schematic View of Tunnel

Figure 17 - Initial Stage of Construction of Pre-Amp Chamber




Figure 17

Figure 17 - Initial Stage of Construction of Pre-Amp Chamber

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measures which would be taken at the site. The following position was finally approved:

a. The posture of the U.S. would be one of flat denial of any knowledge of the tunnel.

b. The tunnel was mined at the point it crossed the East-West Zone border with demolition charges capable of caving in the tunnel liner should the Soviets attempt forcible entry into the cover installation.

c. The "anti-Personnel" door described above was installed. 4/

d. It was agreed that the installation would be defended against forcible entry with all means at hand.

The three cables were tapped on 11 May 1955, 21 May 1955, and 2 August 1955. All equipment for isolating and preamplifying the signals and passing them down the tunnel for recording was in place before each tap was made so that monitoring of each pair could begin as soon as it was tapped. (See figs. 19 and 20.) Careful check was kept of the temperature and

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4/ This door bore the following inscription neatly lettered in German and Cyrillic: "Entry is forbidden by order of the Commanding General." It was reasoned that this sign might give pause to Soviet and/or German officials and gain time. As a matter of fact, there were those Communist individuals who considered the posting of this sign as one of the most audacious aspects of the entire undertaking.

Figure 18 - Pre-Amp Chamber




Figure 18

Pre-Amp Chamber

SECRET

Figure 19 - Tapping Bridle




Figure 19

Tapping Bridle




Figure 20

Lead-Away Lines

humidity in the tap chamber to prevent the possibility of the introduction of moisture into the target cables thus causing faults. The moisture in the air caused by the breathing and perspiration of the technicians doing the tapping operation forced the suspension of the operation several times to permit the air conditioning equipment to dehumidify the chamber. All the components in the electrical isolation networks were individually selected and subjected to rigorous tests to insure maximum reliability, and the lead-away cables were constructed of the best available materials, sheathed in lead, and handled in accordance with the highest telephone company standards. The strictest possible visual watch was maintained with the tap crew. In short, in this, as in all aspects of the operation, every effort was made to guarantee success even though in many instances it meant delay in achieving the objective.

## IV. TERMINATION

The tunnel was discovered (see fig. 21) 21 April 1956, after 11 months and 11 days of operation. A memorandum prepared on 15 August 1956 (reproduced in its entirety as Appendix A) examines in detail all evidence available as of that date on the reasons for the discovery. The conclusion reached was that the loss of this source was purely the result of unfortunate circumstances beyond our control - a combination of the fact that one of the cables was in very poor physical condition (this was known from the beginning) and a long period of unusually heavy rainfall. It appeared that water entered the cable in sufficient quantity to make it inoperative, thus necessitating digging up sections of the cable and causing discovery of the tap.

Subsequent developments offer an alternative reason for the demise of the operation. In April 1956, MI-6 discovered that George BLAKE, case officer in their service, had been recruited by the Soviets while a prisoner in North Korea in 1952 and had continued under Soviet control. BLAKE was privy to all aspects of the tunnel from the earliest planning stages. BLAKE stated that he had informed his Soviet contact of the planned tunnel at the time the final decision was made on its location in the latter part of 1953. The

question then arises as to why the Soviets permitted the tunnel to be dug and to operate for nearly one year. Many theories have been advanced, but it is most probable that we will never know the exact rationale behind the Soviet moves.

## V. PRODUCTION

The following statistics may be of interest in evaluating the project:

a. Three cables were tapped. They contained 273 metallic pairs capable of transmitting a total of approximately 1200 communications channels. The maximum number of channels in use at any one time approximated 500. On the average 28 telegraphic circuits and 121 voice circuits were recorded continuously. Approximately 50,000 reels of magnetic tape were used - some 25 tons.

b. The London processing center employed a peak number of 317 persons. Twenty thousand Soviet two-hour voice reels containing 368,000 conversations were fully transcribed. In addition, 13,500 German two-hour voice reels were received and 5,500 reels containing 75,000 conversations were processed. Seventeen thousand of these conversations were fully transcribed.

c. The Washington center employed 350 people at its peak. Eighteen thousand six-hour Soviet teletype reels and 11,000 six-hour German teletype reels were completely transcribed. It should be borne in mind that many of these reels contained as many as 18 separate circuits, some of which utilized time-division multiplex to create additional circuits. The potential of any given six-hour teletype reel was approximately 216 hours of teletype messages. Both plain text and

encrypted traffic was received. The daily output was about 4,000 feet of teletype messages. Printed in book form, these messages would have filled a space ten feet wide, 15 feet long, and eight feet high.

d. A small processing unit (two to four persons) was maintained at the Berlin site to permit on-the-spot monitoring of engineering circuits for the protection of the project and scanning of the more productive circuits for the "hot" intelligence. Daily reports of sufficient value to warrant electrical transmission to Washington and London were produced.

e. Processing of the backlogged material continued until 30 September 1958 and resulted in a total of 1,750 reports plus 90,000 translated messages or conversations.

f. The total cost of the project was $6,700,000.

The information from this material was disseminated in a closely controlled system called "REGAL." Appendix B consists of a summary of the value of the material received together with typical customer comments. Despite our knowledge of the fact that certain elements of the Soviet Government were aware of our plans to tap these cables, we have no evidence that the Soviets attempted to feed us deception material through this source.

## VI. AFTERMATH

As previously noted, considerable thought was given during the entire life of the project on the result its discovery would bring. In retrospect it is probably correct to say that, among those most actively concerned with the project's management, a consensus developed that the Soviets would probably suppress knowledge of the tunnel's existence rather than admit to the world that Free World intelligence organs had the capability of successfully mounting an operation of this magnitude. In other words, it was felt that for the Soviets to admit that the U.S. had been reading their high level communications circuits would cause the Soviets to lose face. Perhaps fortunately, fate intervened, and as a possible consequence the Soviet course of action was exactly contrary to expectation.

The Commandant of the Soviet Berlin Garrison, who would normally have controlled the handling of the situation when the tunnel was discovered, was absent from Berlin and the Acting Commandant, Colonel Ivan A. Kotsyuba, was in charge. There is some reason to believe that he (for whatever reason) was forced to make a personal decision on a course of action without benefit of advice from Moscow. At any rate his reaction was unexpected in that he invited the entire Berlin

press corps to a briefing and tour of the tunnel and its facilities. As a result the tunnel was undoubtedly the most highly publicized peacetime espionage enterprise in modern times prior to the "U-2 incident." Worldwide reaction was outstandingly favorable in terms of enhancement of U.S. prestige. Non-Soviet Bloc sentiment can be generally summarized as follows:

a. There was universal admiration (and this included informed Soviets) on the technical excellence of the installation and the imaginative nature of the undertaking.

b. The non-Communist world reacted with surprise and unconcealed delight to this indication that the U.S., almost universally regarded as a stumbling neophyte in espionage matters, was capable of a coup against the Soviet Union, which had long been the acknowledged master in such matters.

c. Coupled with regret that the Cold War necessitated such measures, thoughtful editorial comment applauded this indication that the U.S. was capable of fulfilling its role of Free World leadership in the struggle.

Appendix C contains a sampling of typical U.S. press accounts and editorial comment on the tunnel. Predictably the Communist press treated the tunnel as an outrage and an

intolerable indecency. Appendix D consists of a study of East German press reaction to the incident.

For their contributions to Project PBJOINTLY awards were made to the following individuals: 5/

| | |
|---|---|
| [redacted] | Distinguished Intelligence Medal |
| | Intelligence Medal of Merit |
| | Intelligence Medal of Merit |
| | Intelligence Medal of Merit |
| Mr. William K. Harvey | Distinguished Intelligence Medal |
| [redacted] | Intelligence Medal of Merit |
| | Intelligence Medal of Merit |
| | Distinguished Intelligence Medal |
| | Intelligence Medal of Merit |

After the project went into the production phase it was necessary to brief a great many people to properly utilize the product. In all almost 1500 U.S. personnel were cleared for the project, in addition to a very large number of British

5/ Unfortunately the writer has been unable to locate an exact record of those persons who received other recognition from the Agency for their participation in this project and any omissions are regretted. It should also be noted that approximately 1000 people participated wittingly or unwittingly in this undertaking. In fact thereare very few, if any, of the elements of CIA that were not called upon for assistance, either directly or indirectly (such as providing manpower), during the life of the project.

subjects. With the exception of BLAKE (as noted above), we have no indication that there was a single security leak during the life of the project. It is also interesting to note that compartmentation was good enough, even at the Berlin site, that a number of individuals actively engaged in working with the REGAL material were unaware of the exact source until they read about it in the press.

TAB A

APPENDIX A

NOTE: This assessment was prepared by the PBJOINTLY staff immediately after the discovery of the tunnel and is based on pertinent information available. At the time the report was prepared BLAKE's activities had not been surfaced.

15 August 1956

## DISCOVERY BY THE SOVIETS OF PBJOINTLY

Analysis of all available evidence - traffic passing on the target cables, conversations recorded from a microphone installed in the tap chamber, and vital observations from the site - indicates that the Soviet discovery of PBJOINTLY was purely fortuitous and was not the result of a penetration of the U.S. or U.K. agencies concerned, a security violation, or testing of the lines by the Soviets or East Germans. A description of the events leading to these conclusions is contained in this paper.

Following heavy rains in the Berlin area a number of telephone and telegraph cables were flooded and began to fault between Karlshorst and Mahlow on the night of 16 April 1956. The first major fault was discovered on cable FK 151 at Wassmannsdorf on 17 April. The fault was repaired by cutting the defective stretch of cable and replacing a 3000 meter length with a temporary replacement cable. Between 17 and 22

April, when the tap was discovered, cables 150, 151, 153, and 157 were inoperative at various times. During this period Soviet signal troops and East German Post and Telegraph technicians worked frantically to re-establish and maintain communications. Telephone lines serving Marshal Grechko, the Commander of the Group of Soviet Forces, Germany (GSFG), and General Kosyakin, Malyi, Tsarenko, and Dudakov failed, temporarily depriving these officers of communications. Faults on cable FK 150 put the Main Soviet Signal Center in Germany out of communications with Moscow, and the Soviet Air Warning Control Center in East Germany similarly lost its communications.

German technicians began a testing program based at Karlshorst and Mahlow and working north from Mahlow. A major fault on FK 150 was discovered and repaired at Wassmannsdorf on 18-19 April, and on 19 April a second major fault on the same cable was discovered at Schoenfeld only two kilometers south of the tap site. It appears that the faulty section of cable was replaced with a new stretch during the early hours of 20 April, but communications remained unsatisfactory, particularly on FK 150[1/], and the testing and repair program

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1/ FK 150 caused project personnel considerable concern from the day that the cables were reached. It was physically in very poor shape, with brittle and cracking insulation. The actual tap of FK 150 was delayed almost three months in deference to its poor physical condition.

continued. This general situation was noted by personnel at the site who checked the tap on the morning of 19 April and found it to be in good condition with no faults present. Berlin notified Headquarters of this fact on the evening of 20 April, noting, "available precautions taken including primary one of crossing fingers."

Throughout 20 April Soviet operators at Karlshorst, the Mahlow cable chamber, and Zossen/Wuensdorf checked FK 150 pairs carrying circuits serving high ranking officials and made switches where necessary or possible. Nothing was said concerning the testing being conducted to discover the faults or work being done by a Soviet labor force lent to the Germans to assist in digging up bad stretches of cable. On 21 April a Karlshorst technician told a colleague in Zossen/Wuensdorf the FK 150 had not yet been repaired and that another two days' work would probably be necessary to clear up the trouble. Testing and rerouting of circuits were stepped up during the evening of 21 April, and the Soviets showed considerable concern over the failure of the Moscow-GSFG Air Warning telegraph channel which had been transferred to FK 150 on 17 April. Lt. Colonel Vyunik, Chief of the GSFG Signal Center at Wuensdorf, telephoned Major Alpatov, Chief of the Karlshorst Signal Center, at his apartment to inform him of the failure of the Air Warning circuit. They agreed that communications had to be

established before morning and Alpatov left for his duty station.

There is no significant information available on the actual progress of the testing and repair program proper from 0300 hours on 20 April to 0050 hours on 22 April. On the basis of available information, however, it seems probable that (a) the testing program continued north until a fault was located near the site and a decision was made to replace an entire section of cable which embraced the tap site; or (b) the repeated faulting coupled with the age and physical condition of FK 150 led the opposition to the conclusion that the only effective remedy was to replace the cable, section by section, and that this program was inaugurated somewhere south of our site and continued northward until the tap was discovered.

At approximately 0050 hours on 22 April, 40 or 50 men were seen on the east side of Schoenefelder Allee, deployed along the entire area observable from our installation, digging at three to five foot intervals over the location of the cable and, incidentally, the tap chamber. At approximately 0200 hours the top of the tap chamber was discovered, and at 0210 Russian speech was heard from the microphone in the tap chamber. The first fragments of speech indicated that the discovery of the tap chamber aroused no suspicion among those present. A small hole was broken in the tap chamber roof

permitting limited visual observation of the chamber, and a Soviet captain [2/] was brought to the spot. After some discussion all agreed that the discovery was a manhole covering a repeater point, and the working crew began enlarging the hole to gain access to the "repeater point."

While the working party was uncovering the tap chamber, Major Alpatov and Lt. Colonel Vyunik discussed the communications situation in a rambling telephone conversation at approximately 0230 hours. They indicated relief at the restoration of Air Warning Communications with Moscow, and Vyunik went on to express suspicion about the continued trouble on FK 150. In context it appears that this suspicion was directed at the failure of the Germans to clear up the difficulties on FK 150 once and for all. In any event, Alpatov clearly did not share his colleague's doubts. The general tone of this conversation was relaxed and casual, completely in keeping with the character of the two men, both of whom we know well. The conversation appears to be a clear indication that, as of 0230 hours on 22 April, neither of these responsible officers was aware of the existence of the tap.

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[2/] Presumably Captain Bartash, an engineer who later received an unspecified award from Marshal Grechko for the discovery of the tap.

Meanwhile back at the site the work of enlarging a hole to give full access to the tap chamber continued. At approximately 0250 hours an unidentified Soviet Colonel arrived on the scene, presumably in response to a request for guidance by the working party. The Colonel did not appear to be a signal officer since he took no active part in the investigation and remained on the scene only for a short time. Having enlarged the hole in the tap chamber roof, the workers saw for the first time the cables and the trap door on the floor of the chamber. They assumed the trap door to be "some sort of box" and had no suspicion of the true nature of the installation. At approximately 0300 hours barriers were erected to keep inquisitive onlookers away from the excavation and it was suggested that someone be sent to the Signal Directorate, presumably to obtain relevant cable data. At the same time the first German voice was heard, in conversation with a German-speaking Russian. The German stated that two trucks must have passed the spot without locating it. The Russian answered that "Soviet troops are coming as well," and added that they must wait "until morning" for the decision as to what further work would be undertaken.

While these developments were taking place, Vyunik held a telecon with the Air Warning Center in Moscow in which he referred to the move of the GSFG Air Warning Center and

discussed, in detail, communication arrangements necessitated by this move. This revealing teleconference tends to support other evidence indicating that as of 0300 hours the true nature of the installation had still not been established.

The work of excavation continued, and fragments of conversation connected with it were picked up by the tap chamber microphone. A German-speaking Russian commented that "somebody has come from there and there are fewer workers there," suggesting that similar work was in progress at another point. The Russian gave instructions that nothing in the installation was to be touched. A German remarked that the chamber might be connected with sewage work and proposed that plans of the sewage system be obtained from the responsible authorities. The Russian answered that they already had this information and that the plans showed "that chamber" to be 120 meters away from this point. At about 0320 hours, when still more of the tap chamber was revealed and a better view of the interior obtained, those present began to speculate vaguely about its exact nature and the time of its construction. One of the Soviets, probably an officer, suggested that it might have been built during the war, possibly for "Vhe Che" (Russian abbreviation for "high frequency transmission," but used loosely to denote anything connected with secure communications.) Shortly after 0330 hours, the Soviets left the site by motor

vehicle, presumably to report their findings. For approximately one and one-half hours - from 0330 to 0500 - no sounds or voices were recorded.

At approximately 0415 hours Vyunik telephoned Alpatov's apartment in Karlshorst and asked Alpatov if he had spoken with General Dudakov, Chief Signal Officer, GSFG. Alpatov said that he had, that he was getting dressed, and that he would go to his signal center as soon as possible. Vyunik told Alpatov to telephone him at the GSFG frame room at Zossen/Wuensdorf, adding, "When we speak we must do so carefully. We know what the matter is, so we will speak carefully." This indicated clearly that by 0415 hours the GSFG Signal Directorate and General Dudakov, the Chief Signal Officer, had been informed of the discovery of the PBJOINTLY chamber, viewed it with extreme suspicion, and planned to reroute circuits passing over the target cables. This coincides neatly with the departure from the tap site of the Soviets at 0330. At 0630 Vyunik telephoned Alpatov at the Karlshorst Signal Center and informed him that Lt. Colonel Zolochko, Deputy Chief of the Lines Department, GSFG, had left Wuensdorf at 0625 to go "there." Vyunik, in a resigned tone, then added that all that remained for him and Alpatov to do was to sit and wait.

In due course Lt. Colonel Zolochko arrived at the site, accompanied by an unnamed Colonel and Captain Bartash, the

Commander of the working party. By this time the Soviets apparently had brought circuit diagrams to the site and were aware of the pair allocations on the affected cables. There was considerable discussion of the discovery, and one of the crew actually entered the chamber and made a superficial and inconclusive examination. Shortly afterwards the statement, "the cable is tapped," was made for the first time on the scene.

At about this time (0635 hours) Lt. Colonel Vyunik telephoned Major Alpatov and asked whether he had received the "task" and whether its meaning was clear. Alpatov replied that he had received and understood the assignment. Speaking in unusually vague terms, Vyunik instructed Alpatov to take over two low-frequency channels, presumably provided by the KGB signals organization. (These channels would provide telephone communications between Berlin and Wuensdorf via overhead line and would by-pass the tapped cables.) Vyunik added that they could continue necessary technical discussions on the new facilities.

Although teletype traffic continued until the tap wires were cut - at 1535 hours on Sunday afternoon - the last telephone call of any interest was placed sometime between 0800 and 0900 hours on 22 April, when an agitated General speaking from Marshal Grechko's apartment attempted to contact Colonel

Kotsyuba, who was then acting for General Dibrova, Berlin Commandant. Unable to locate Kotsyuba, the General talked to Colonel Pomozanovskii, Chief of Staff of the Berlin Garrison, stressing the urgency of his call. Pomozanovskii promised to find Kotsyuba at once and get him to return the call. The return call was not intercepted, but there appears to be no doubt that Marshal Grechko had by this time been informed of the discovery and wished to discuss it with Colonel Kotsyuba. A few telephone calls were attempted after this, but the operators refused to place the calls, and in one case a Karlshorst operator said, "I won't put you through to anyone. Don't ring, that's all. I won't answer you any more. It's in the order."

Between 0700 and 0800 hours a number of additional Soviet officers arrived at the excavation, including Colonel Gusev of the KGB Signals Regiment. A Russian-speaking German was heard to remark that a "commission" was expected, and a Soviet officer said that they would await the arrival of this commission before making a decision as to what the next step would be. In answer to a question as to whether anything should be disconnected, the same officer stated that nothing should be done beyond making motion pictures of the chamber. He added, however, that the hole providing access to the chamber should be enlarged and a detailed inspection should be carried out. The general discussion continued, and the possibility of some

form of explosive booby trap in the chamber was discussed at some length. There was widespread belief that the trap door, which in fact provided access to the tunnel proper, was a "box" or "battery box" possibly involving a booby trap. One of the Soviet officers, probably Zolochko, suggested that, after everything had been carefully noted and recorded, a grappling iron could be attached to the "box" in order to tear it away. "If there is no explosion," he said, "then we can calmly go ahead and deal with it."

Several individuals, presumably German cable splicers, agreed that the cables were fully tapped and discussed the method employed. They agreed that it must have been done in such a way as to render the tap undetectable by measurements, although one of them failed to understand why the actual cutting of the cables was not detected. He added that at that time "everyone must have been quite drunk." The Germans continued to speculate on the nature of the "box" and about the means of access to the tap chamber. One of them said, "They themselves must have some means of entering this place, but naturally it's highly improbable that they have constructed a passage for getting from here to there!"

Some of those present apparently believed that the tap was an old one and had been abandoned due to recent faults on the cable. During this discussion the microphone was

twice noted, but was not recognized for what it was. In the first instance the speaker said, "That is not a microphone," and in the second it was described as "a black ball."

The general discussion continued, with speculation as to the nature of the "battery box" and with several comments that it should be possible to identify the tappers "from the make of the materials" and the techniques employed. While the Germans began work enlarging the hole around the tap chamber, the Soviets discussed in some detail the order in which technical experts and administrative representatives would carry out their inspection. The Soviets identified the lead-off cable as "not ours," indicating that after the inspection they planned to disconnect the lead-off cable and to "check how far it goes from here" - probably by means of electrical measurements. It is evident that at this time (approximately 1130 hours) the Soviets and Germans were still unaware of the existence of the tunnel, the means of access to the tap chamber, or those responsible for the tap.

At approximately 1145 hours one of the German crew was heard to exclaim, "The box is an entry to a shaft!"

From the tenor of the ensuing conversation it would seem that a small hole had been made near the still-intact trap door. The Germans debated the removal of the trap door, but continued to work at and around it despite the alternate

suggestion that "we should open up the road opposite until we reach the cable or the shaft." By approximately 1230 they had removed the hinges and entered the lower part of the tap chamber. The padlock which secured the trap door from below was examined and was identified as "of English origin." Failing to open the door separating the tap chamber from the equipment chamber, the Germans, after approximately twenty minutes, broke a hole through the wall and gained visual access to the equipment chamber, which they described as "a long passage." By 1300 they evidently had enlarged the access hole and described "a completed installation - a telephone exchange.. ..... An installation for listening in /Abhoeranlage/."

Additional motion pictures were made and frequent exclamations of wonder and admiration were heard. At 1420 a Soviet Colonel, probably Zolochko; a person addressed as Nikolai Ivanovich, probably Major Alpatov; and a Captain, presumably Bartash, entered the chamber and discussed the method used by the tappers in gaining access to the cables. Zolochko evidently still believed that this was done "from above." Conversations indicated that the joint Soviet-German commission, mentioned earlier, had already visited the site and established the nature of the installation without going into technical details.

Measurements of parts of the interior were then taken, discussion of the installation became general, and the participants clearly indicated that the means of access and full implications of the operation were finally appreciated. Conversations reflected that all present realized that the planning of the tunnel approach to the cables must have necessitated a very detailed study of relevant maps and plans. The stress to which the roof of the chambers would be subjected and the necessity of preparing the lead-off cables beforehand were mentioned, and a German was heard to exclaim, "It must have cost a pretty penny." A Russian-speaking German added, admiringly, "How neatly and tidily they have done it." It was decided that work on the tunnel must have been carried out during the day when the sound of the street traffic would drown any noise, whereas the actual tapping was done "during the night, between one and two o'clock, when the traffic on the cables is slight."

One of the Germans rather indignantly exclaimed, "What a filthy trick. And where you would least expect it." -- to which another replied, "Unless one had seen it for oneself, nobody would believe it."

Between 1515 and 1530 hours the tap wires were cut, and at about 1545 the attention of the Germans began to concentrate on the microphone itself. One of them assumed it to be an "alarm device - probably a microphone," to give warning of

approaching motor traffic, and added that it ought to be photographed. At 1550 hours work began on dismantling the microphone. Shortly afterward the microphone went dead and, after 11 months and 11 days, the operational phase of PBJOINTLY was completed.

TAB B

APPENDIX B

## RECAPITULATION OF THE INTELLIGENCE DERIVED

Set forth below are a recapitulation of intelligence derived from the REGAL material and some typical consumer comments.

### GENERAL

The REGAL operation provided the United States and the British with a unique source of current intelligence on the Soviet Orbit of a kind and quality which had not been available since 1948. Responsible U.S. and British officials considered PBJOINTLY, during its productive phase, to be the prime source of early warning concerning Soviet intentions in Europe, if not world-wide. Following are examples of items of intelligence for which REGAL was either a unique or most timely and reliable source.

### POLITICAL

Throughout the life of source (11 May 1955 - 22 April 1956) we were kept currently informed of Soviet intentions in Berlin; REGAL provided the inside story of every "incident" occurring in Berlin during the period - a story which was in

each case considerably at variance with accounts of the same incident as reported by other sources. REGAL showed that, contrary to estimates by other sources, the Soviets at that time did not intend to relinquish their prerogatives vis-a-vis the other three occupying powers despite continually increasing pressure from the East Germans to assert their sovereignty in East Berlin as well as in the rest of East Germany. REGAL provided a clear picture of the unpreparedness, confusion, and indecision among Soviet and East German officials whenever an incident occurred in East Berlin involving citizens of one of the Western powers.

The Soviet decision to implement the establishment of an East German Army was disclosed by REGAL in October 1955, in time to notify our representatives at the Foreign Ministers Conference in Geneva to that effect.

REGAL provided a detailed account of the Soviet program for implementation of the decisions of the 20th Party Congress, including measures to suppress unrest among Soviet nuclear scientists resulting from a too-literal interpretation of the new theory of collective leadership and the denigration of Stalin.

The progress of Marshal Zhukov's attempt to curtail the influence of the political officer in the Soviet Armed Forces (which led to his subsequent downfall) was traced in REGAL

material from the autumn of 1955 to mid-April 1956.

REGAL provided considerable intelligence on the relationships between various key military and political figures of the Soviet hierarchy and on relations between the Poles and the Soviet military forces stationed in Poland.

MILITARY

General

a. Reorganization of the Soviet Ministry of Defense.

b. Soviet plans to implement the Warsaw Pact by increasing Soviet-Satellite military coordination.

c. Implementation of the publicly announced intention to reduce the strength of the Soviet Armed Forces.

d. Identification of several thousand Soviet officer personnel.

Air

a. Development of an improved nuclear delivery capability in the Soviet Air Army in East Germany.

b. Re-equipment of the Soviet Air Army in East Germany with new bombers and twin-jet interceptors having an airborne radar capability.

c. Doubling of the Soviet bomber strength in Poland and the appearance there of a new fighter division.

d. Identification and location of approximately 100 Soviet Air Force installations in the USSR, East Germany, and Poland, including a number of key aircraft factories.

Ground Forces

a. Order of battle of Soviet ground forces within the USSR not previously identified or not located for several years by any other source.

b. Soviet training plans for the spring and early summer of 1956 in East Germany and Poland.

c. Identification of several thousand Soviet field post numbers (used by G-2 to produce Soviet order of battle intelligence).

Navy

a. Reduction in the status and personnel strength of the Soviet Naval Forces.

b. Organization and administrative procedures of the Headquarters of the Soviet Baltic Fleet and Soviet Naval Bases on the Baltic Coast.

SCIENTIFIC

Identification of several hundred personalities associated with the Soviet Atomic Energy (AE) Program.

Association of certain locations in the USSR with AE activities.

Organization and activities of Wismuth SDAG (mining uranium in the Aue area of East Germany).

OPERATIONAL

Organization, functions, and procedures of the Soviet Intelligence Services in East Germany; identification of several hundred Soviet Intelligence personalities in East Germany and Moscow.

TYPICAL CONSUMER COMMENTS

March 1956

ACSI/Army - "REGAL has provided unique and highly valuable current information on the order of battle, training, organization, equipment, and operations of the Soviet and East German Ground Forces. In addition, the scope and variety of the types of information found in REGAL have confirmed that it is our best source of early warning of Soviet attack."

ACSI/Air - "The numerous productions received from the REGAL project have been an extremely valuable contribution to the Intelligence Community in our common problems."

7 February 1958

CIA/OSI - "REGAL has provided valuable information on atomic energy activities in East Germany, including

organizational relationships, personalities, procurement details, and uranium ore shipment data. The number of hitherto unknown atomic energy localities, personalities, and activities disclosed in REGAL traffic is impressive."

CIA/ORR - "In referenced memorandum we indicated our great interest in financial material of all kinds which was available in REGAL material. Thanks to your cooperation we are exploiting the material with great success."

TAB C

APPENDIX D

NOTE: This analysis was prepared by the PBJOINTLY staff as part of the wrap-up of the operation.

## ROUND-UP OF EAST GERMAN PRESS REACTION TO THE DISCOVERY OF THE WIRETAP TUNNEL AT THE BERLIN SECTOR BORDER

(Sources as Indicated)

The following is an analysis of the East German press reaction to the discovery of the wiretap tunnel at the sector border between West and East Berlin. During the period under review - 24 to 26 April 1956 - a total of 31 dailies per day and four weeklies were available for scrutiny; however, only the dailies reported and commented on the incident.

Mostly concerned with reporting and commenting on the incident were the East Berlin papers which, in some instances, devoted full pages of their local sections to reports and pictures on the tunnel in addition to their front-page or second-page accounts of developments. The provincial press gave front-page treatment to the matter only in few instances, generally refrained from large articles or commentaries, and often carried pictorial material with only brief explanations. The least coverage was noted in the provincial press of other

than SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands - Communist Party Germany) affiliation; none of these papers published any commentary, or any cartoon of their own, on the subject up to 26 April, in fact.

Describing the tunnel as inspected by the journalists after the Soviet press conference, the papers pointed out that the installation was well designed and constructed, that the installation was costly and equivalent to a modern telephone exchange, and that the material - of British and American origin - used in the installation was of such quality as to guarantee long service.

The East Berlin papers, which were leading in the reports on the issue, treated the matter as a "bitterly serious incident" which represents an "international scandal" and a "breach of the norms of international law." The papers, in their commentaries, addressed the West Berlin Senat, demanding an all-Berlin understanding and stressing the necessity for united action, and insinuated that Berlin is being kept divided merely for the purpose of providing the espionage centers in West Berlin with a base for launching provocations against the GDR. Other commentaries by central and provincial papers contained calls for vigilance and for defense preparedness. Only one paper printed an editorial on the incident. In commenting on the incident the press did not draw a line

between the different developments, such as the press conference, the Soviet protest, the GDR Government protest, etc., but, as a rule, the commentaries dealt with the incident as a whole. Later, when the first reaction of the West Berlin press was available, the central press swooped down upon the West Berlin press for attempting to belittle the incident and to divert attention from the "seriousness of the matter."

The few caricatures published by the papers were designed to slander the Americans.

## Day by Day Reaction

### 24 April 1956

On 24 April 1956 six East Berlin papers printed the ADN (Allegemeines Deutsches Nachrichten Bureau - General German News Office) release of individual reports on the Soviet press conference, reported on the inspection of the tunnel by the journalists, and carried excerpts from General Zarenko's letter of protest (1 - 6). DER MORGEN and BERLINER ZEITUNG (5 and 6) printed only the abbreviated version of the ADN release. Six provincial SED papers (7 - 12) carried announcements of the discovery, brief reports on the press conference, and merely an announcement to the effect that a letter of protest has been sent to the American Chief of Staff. Only NEUER TAG, Frankfurt/Oder, printed the long version of the ADN release(12).

Provincial papers of other party affiliations carried no reports.

25 April 1956

On 25 April 22 provincial papers came out with the ADN version of the report on the discovery of the tunnel (13 - 34); the six provincial SED papers which had carried a brief announcement the day before followed up their reports by more extensive accounts of the press conference, the letter of protest, and the inspection of the tunnel (13 - 18). Papers of other party affiliations joined in the reporting campaign on this day. Only MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME, of all provincial papers, published an "eye-witness" report containing a description of the tunnel and quoting individuals who had voiced their "outrage at such a thing" which produces new material for conflicts in foreign policy (16). SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG, which printed the long version of the ADN release, reproduced the first picture of the tunnel (22).

Meanwhile the central press, in addition to supplementary reports on the discovery of the tunnel, descriptions of the tunnel, and pictorial material showing sections of the tunnel such as the amplifier station, etc., came out with the first commentaries. A total of five commentaries appeared on this day. The press treated the matter as a "bitterly serious affair" which represents an "international scandal" and a

"breach of the norms of international law," pointing out that the United States violated the Buenos Aires Treaty on Telecommunications on the one hand and the GDR's sovereignty on the other hand (35 - 39). NEUES DEUTSCHLAND spoke of a new, hitherto unsurpassed "gangster act" of the U.S. secret service (35), NATIONAL ZEITUNG termed the incident as a "sensational international scandal" (36), NEUE ZEIT stressed that there is no word "strong enough to brand such wickedness" (38), and JUNGE WELT declared that "this had to happen just to those who always babble about Communist infiltration but can never prove it" (39). All commentaries were addressed to the West Berlin Senat, demanding an all-Berlin understanding for the purpose of discontinuing the "stubborn adherence to NATO policy," achieving the withdrawal of the "cold war experts of all shades," dissolving the espionage centers in the "frontier city," and achieving a "normalization in the situation in Berlin." Three papers reported on a meeting held by the National Front at Alt-Glienicke, at which the population adopted a resolution protesting against this "provocation." Franz Fischer, First Secretary of the Kreis Treptow SED Executive Board, was reported to have said at the meeting that the people of West Germany and West Berlin have to pay for this installation through the occupation costs and to have termed the tunnel as "an appendix of the cold war" (38, 40, and 41).

TRIBUENE, moreover, referred to a report by the HAMBURGER ANZEIGER to underscore the fact that the installations in the tunnel were not of provisional nature but designed for long service (40). DER MORGEN, describing the tunnel, added that West German correspondents who inspected the tunnel noted with satisfaction the declaration of the Soviet Lieutenant Colonel that "quite obviously, German quarters have no part in this" (41), while NATIONAL ZEITUNG briefly referred to an announcement made at the Alt-Glienicke meeting to the effect that the tunnel was open for public inspection (36).

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reproduced the first caricature on the issue. The cartoon showed a garden which is divided into two parts by a sign indicating the "Democratic Sector" - full of flowers, and the opposite side - a barren piece of land with a molehill topped by a flag with the dollar sign. A strong arm is pulling out of a hole in the Democratic Sector a mole wearing "U.S."-marked earphones, some sort of Army trousers with plugs and pliers showing from the pocket, and a U.S. Army cap bearing the legend "Espionage." The cartoon is captioned, "Do Not Burrow in Other People's Yards" (35).

26 April 1956

On 26 April 27 papers continued reporting on the issue (42 - 68). In 17 instances the reports were supplemented with pictures as outlined above. A total of 15 papers

printed the text of, or large excerpts from, the press release on the GDR Government protest (42 - 56). Six papers reported on the inspection of the tunnel by the population, the press, and representatives of the diplomatic corps (42, 49, 59, 60, 65, and 67). Four papers referred to a report carried by the West Berlin TAGESSPIEGEL according to which Western journalists were prohibited from inspecting the mouth of the tunnel on the Western side (42, 43, 51, and 58), and four papers referred to FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE which had spoken of an "eloquent silence" about the affair on the part of the Americans (42, 51, 55, and 58). A total of four papers reported on the Alt-Glienicke meeting (51, 60, 61, and 67). NEUES DEUTSCHLAND gave excerpts from Fisher's speech, quoting him to the effect that the people of West Berlin, in particular the SPD members, will be invited to inspect the tunnel (51). Three papers reproduced caricatures (51, 52, and 56), six papers carried commentaries (51, 52, 53, 54, 57, and 58), and one paper came out with an editorial (55). Three East Berlin papers, through their commentaries, swooped down upon the West Berlin press for its attitude toward the incident. NEUES DEUTSCHLAND accused the West Berlin papers of attempting to belittle the incident and of lauding the efficiency of the American "goblins," adding that the West Berlin press is thus making vain attempts to divert attention from the seriousness of the matter (51).

JUNGE WELT lashed out at the West Berlin DER TAG, saying that, by its opinion, the West Berlin paper manifests its total loss of any sense of decency. Besides, DER TAG is not in the least disturbed about the violation also of West Berlin's territory (52). NATIONAL ZEITUNG held that DER TAG now admitted what it has been denying at all times, namely that West Berlin is a de facto part of NATO, adding that DER TAG now regards as "customary" the military espionage of the United States on GDR territory in addition to the "customary frontier-city policy," the "customary" partition, and the "customary" diversionist activities of the KGU and other underworld organizations. The paper stressed that all Berliners fully agree with the FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE which said that the people must demand the discontinuation of "such things" (58). NEUE ZEIT, carrying the only editorial, said that the wire-tapping post is a feature of West Berlin's misuse as a NATO base. The paper emphasized that GDR policy will continue to serve all-German understanding and relaxation of international tensions. "But it must be kept in mind that the success of this policy will not only depend on the volume of the appeal for peace but also on our preparedness to defend our homeland as well as on our vigilance regarding the prevention of dangers resulting from the fact that one part of Berlin has become a frontier city against peace," the paper added. "What

we need are contact points above the ground and in full light, namely all-German talks, and not underground trenches in the cold war" (55).

The first commentaries carried by provincial papers dealt with the incident as an example of proof for East German press reports on hostile espionage. VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt, pointed out that the tunnel represents "a document" which is quite apt to dispel all doubts of those who have hitherto been inclined to regard East German press reports about the underground activities of Western espionage services as "exaggerated" (57). MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME quoted several workers who voiced their indignation over "such a vileness" which makes German unity more difficult to demonstrate that the "Western side" is just as quiet about this "unpleasant affair" as the population is outraged (53). And LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG stressed that anyone reading about the discovery of the tunnel will inevitably weigh the Soviet attempts at maintaining peace against the efforts made by the U.S. espionage service, adding that this "breach of international law" also places the West Berlin administration "in a peculiar light." The paper reminded its readers that war preparation, which "formerly marched on Prussian Army boots," is now marching on "American rubber soles, chewing gum, and tapping telephone lines" (54).

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND's caricature showed an American soldier trying in vain to "milk" a disconnected, oversized telephone receiver into a bucket marked "CIC" while another soldier is thoughtfully standing by (51). JUNGE WELT reproduced a cartoon showing a mole wearing a U.S. Army cap on its head and a telephone receiver on its back halting before a sign which warns that "spies are now facing danger." The cartoon is captioned, "The Underworld that Shuns the Light," and footnoted, "Damned, we did not put up that sign" (52). FREIES WORT showed rats wearing U.S. Army caps being disturbed by a Russian soldier in the operation of what looks like a communication center. Two rats are shown facing the soldier in surprise, another standing with arms raised, and still another escaping through an opening in the wall. The caricature is entitled, "Unpleasant Surprise," and footnoted, "It is an Effrontery of the Russians to Disturb Us in Our (Burrowing) Work" (56).

## SOURCES

| | | 1956 |
|---|---|---|
| 1. | NEUES DEUTSCHLAND | 24 Apr |
| 2. | NEUE ZEIT | 24 Apr |
| 3. | TRIBUENE | 24 Apr |
| 4. | NATIONAL ZEITUNG | 24 Apr |
| 5. | DER MORGEN | 24 Apr |
| 6. | BERLINER ZEITUNG | 24 Apr |
| 7. | FREIHEIT | 24 Apr |
| 8. | SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG | 24 Apr |
| 9. | VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt | 24 Apr |
| 10. | MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME | 24 Apr |
| 11. | LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG | 24 Apr |
| 12. | NEUER TAG | 24 Apr |
| 13. | FREIHEIT | 25 Apr |
| 14. | SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG | 25 Apr |
| 15. | VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt | 25 Apr |
| 16. | MAERKISCHE VOLKSSTIMME | 25 Apr |
| 17. | LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG | 25 Apr |
| 18. | NEUER TAG | 25 Apr |
| 19. | LAUSITZER RUNDSCHAU | 25 Apr |
| 20. | VOLKSSTIMME, Magdeburg | 25 Apr |
| 21. | DAS VOLK, Erfurt | 25 Apr |
| 22. | SCHWERINER VOLKSZEITUNG | 25 Apr |
| 23. | FREIE ERDE | 25 Apr |
| 24. | OSTSEE ZEITUNG | 25 Apr |
| 25. | VOLKSWACHT | 25 Apr |
| 26. | FREIES WORT | 25 Apr |
| 27. | SAECHSICHES TAGEBLATT | 25 Apr |
| 28. | DIE UNION | 25 Apr |
| 29. | NORDDEUTSCHE NEUESTE NACHRICHTEN | 25 Apr |
| 30. | MAERKISCHE UNION | 25 Apr |
| 31. | BRANDENBURGISCHE NEUESTE NABBR. | 25 Apr |
| 32. | BAUERN ECHO | 25 Apr |
| 33. | DER NEUE WEG | 25 Apr |
| 34. | LIBERAL DEMOKRATISCHE ZEITUNG | 25 Apr |
| 35. | NEUES DEUTSCHLAND | 25 Apr |
| 36. | NATIONAL ZEITUNG | 25 Apr |
| 37. | BERLINER ZEITUNG | 25 Apr |
| 38. | NEUE ZEIT | 25 Apr |
| 39. | JUNGE WELT | 25 Apr |
| 40. | TRIBUENE | 25 Apr |
| 41. | DER MORGEN | 25 Apr |

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|---|---|---|
| 42. | BERLINER ZEITUNG | 26 Apr |
| 43. | SAECHSISCHE ZEITUNG | 26 Apr |
| 44. | DAS VOLK, Erfurt | 26 Apr |
| 45. | NEUER TAG | 26 Apr |
| 46. | FREIHEIT | 26 Apr |
| 47. | DER MORGEN | 26 Apr |
| 48. | TRIBUENE | 26 Apr |
| 49. | BAUERN ECHO | 26 Apr |
| 50. | DER NEUE WEG | 26 Apr |
| 51. | NEUES DEUTSCHLAND | 26 Apr |
| 52. | JUNGE WELT | 26 Apr |
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| 54. | LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG | 26 Apr |
| 55. | NEUE ZEIT | 26 Apr |
| 56. | FREIES WORT | 26 Apr |
| 57. | VOLKSSTIMME, Karl-Marx-Stadt | 26 Apr |
| 58. | NATIONAL ZEITUNG | 26 Apr |
| 59. | VOLKSSTIMME, Magdeburg | 26 Apr |
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| 61. | FREIE ERDE | 26 Apr |
| 62. | LEIPZIGER VOLKSZEITUNG | 26 Apr |
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| 66. | LAUSITZER RUNDSCHAU | 26 Apr |
| 67. | DIE UNION | 26 Apr |
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